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FOREWORD
About two years ago the editors of the Denver Law Journal invited me
to join them in a meeting with some other judges and faculty members
to discuss ways in which the Law Journal could improve itself. I was flat-
tered to be invited, but as luck and the exigencies of the trial bench
would have it, I was caught at the last minute with an emergency hearing
on a motion for a temporary restraining order. As I recall, the hearing
established that there was neither an emergency nor a need for restraint.
Even so, I missed the meeting and in lieu of my attendance I sent a
letter.
I suggested that the Law Journal should assume the responsibility of
a more critical function. More particularly, I opined that the annual sur-
vey of decisions of the Tenth Circuit was a valuable reference service,
but it failed to provide a critical analysis of the developing jurisprudence
of this area of the country which its residents consider the heartland of
the nation and which those from the seacoasts who appear from time to
time in our courts refer to as the hinterland. However distant we may be
from the soi-disant cultural centers of our land, crucial decisions are issu-
ing from our courts on a daily basis. Those who are burdened with
crushing caseloads have little time for respite and even less for contem-
plation. It is this lacuna which I suggested might be filled by the Tenth
Circuit Survey.
Criticism, in its best sense, is an art of evaluating and analyzing with
knowledge and propriety the work of others. Absent this critical func-
tion, a law journal becomes not much more than a vapid exercise for its
editors and a tedium for its subscribers. With it, however, a journal is of
immense benefit and vitality. Those who write opinions should welcome
considered criticism and those who practice law will find such evalua-
tions and analyses to be of great practical assistance.
From a review of the articles in this Eleventh Annual Survey, I infer
that my suggestion may have taken root. No doubt it is immodest to
make such an inference. Nevertheless, a comparison between this sur-
vey and its predecessors will disclose an increased vigor-a grasping and
tussling, if you will, with the quality and direction of our decisions.
When I was asked to write this Foreword, I foolishly accepted the
challenge. The first article I reviewed was the survey on civil rights. Dis-
cussing McKay v. Hammock, I the commentator said: "The Tenth Circuit
quickly and correctly distinguished Baker, observing that the arrest of
McKay had been in violation of his bond and was therefore significantly
different than an arrest pursuant to a valid warrant." Needless to say, I
was the trial judge who was reversed in McKay, and here I am advertis-
ing it.
1. 730 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984).
FORE WORD
When I saw the comment on Rustad v. United States Air Force,2 I
could barely restrain myself from calling the editor and telling him that
it was probably imprudent of me to take on this assignment. Rustad,
however, provides me with an excellent opportunity to illustrate one of
the most vexing problems of the judicial process. I remember the case
well, but not for its obvious importance in the development of the right
to counsel. I remember a phone call from the plaintiff's lawyer asking
for an immediate hearing. I was presiding over a jury trial in a criminal
case at the time. The attorney was advised that he could be heard that
day during the afternoon recess, but he would be limited to fifteen min-
utes. I heard the case in fifteen minutes and decided it from the bench-
more accurately-from the hip. When the case in trial went to the jury, I
immediately started another trial and forgot all about Cadet Rustad and
his demand for counsel. You can read for yourselfjust how complicated
the case really is.
Being a trial judge is necessarily an exercise in humility. When law-
yers get together one never hears about the cases each has lost. Rather,
we glean from their comments that they never lose. Trialjudges, on the
other hand, seem obsessed with talking about cases in which they are
reversed. For me, it is easy and, as you will note, I obviously have a lot
to talk about. I am reminded of the marvelous opinion of another trial
judge, James W. Musgrove of the First Judicial District of the State of
New Mexico, who closed an unreported opinion with this marvelous
sentence:
Therefore this fervent prayer.- Appellate Court, affirm, reverse or
modify, but please do not remand.
3
So say us all. We try not to be reversed, but sometimes it happens.
The survey of administrative law reminds me of one case, however,
in which I was not pleased at all to be reversed. In Mayoral v. Jeffco Ameri-
can Baptist Residences, Inc. ,4 I enjoined the defendant and HUD from im-
posing mandatory meal charges for senior citizens in a HUD-subsidized
apartment complex for elderly, low-income tenants. I was promptly re-
versed for showing a lack of deference to an agency decision. All I can
say is that the Court of Appeals did not have to decide the case as I did
with a courtroom full of blue-haired little old ladies in polyester pant-
suits watching every blink of my eyes and every twitch of my moustache!
Readers of this Eleventh Annual Survey are in for a special treat. In
addition to the informative and thought-provoking articles on the law of
the Tenth Circuit, Walter A. Steele has presented us with a profile of the
venerable Senior Circuit Judge Jean S. Breitenstein. Mr. Steele's profile
is written with his customary grace and charm. Indeed, his contributions
to the bar of this circuit are such that he, too, should be made the sub-
ject of a profile.
2. 718 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1983).
3. United Nuclear Corp. v, General Atomic Co. v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. (No.
50827, unreported, Jan. 9, 1981).
4. 726 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 255 (1984).
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Judge Breitenstein is now completing his thirty-first year on the fed-
eral bench. (I believe I am using the typewriter that was purchased for
him when he became a District Judge in 1954.) One ofJudge Breiten-
stein's former law clerks, The Honorable Warren 0. Martin, Colorado
State District Judge, has succinctly stated the feeling that all of us who
know Judge Breitenstein share. "Whenever we are around him," Judge
Martin said, "we have the feeling that we are in the presence of great-
ness." A look at the sensitive profile written by Mr. Steele will provide
every reader with a sense of that presence. An examination of each arti-
cle in this issue will likewise benefit each reader. May all of our efforts
continue and improve.
JOHN L. KANE, JR.
THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM J.
HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma governor,
Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma, in 1923. He and his family
moved to Oklahoma City in 1927. He
served as a First Lieutenant in the Army
during World War II. He then returned to
complete his undergraduate studies at the
University of Oklahoma, receiving his B.A.
in 1947. He graduated from Harvard Law
School in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952, Judge Holloway was
an attorney with the Department of Justice
in Washington, D.C. Afterwards, he re-
turned to private practice in Oklahoma City
where he was appointed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit by Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968 and be-
came Chief Judge on September 15, 1984.
He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and Phi
Gamma Delta.
JUDGE JAMES K. LOGAN
Judge Logan was born in Quenemo,
Kansas, in 1929. He received his A.B. from
the University of Kansas in 1952 and was
graduated magna cum laude from Harvard
Law School in 1955. He went on to be U.S.
Circuit Judge Walter Huxman's law clerk in
1956 and then practiced with the Los An-
geles firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. He
became Dean of the University of Kansas
Law School in 1961 and served in the ca-
pacity until 1968.
Since 1961 he has been a visiting profes-
sor at Harvard Law School, The University
of Texas Law School, Stanford University,
and the University of Michigan. He was a
commissioner for the U.S. District Court
from 1964 until 1967 and was a candidate
for the U.S. Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta
Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi,
and Phi Delta Phi. He has co-authored nu-
merous books on estate planning and ad-
ministration. In 1977 he was appointed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit.
JUDGE JAMES E. BARRETT
The son of the late Frank A. Barrett, who
served as Wyoming's Congressman, Gover-
nor, and U.S. Senator, Judge Barrett was
born in 1922 in Lusk, Wyoming. He at-
tended the University of Wyoming for two
years prior to his service in the Army dur-
ing World War II. After the War, he at-
tended Saint Catherine's College at Oxford
University. He received his LL.B. from the
University of Wyoming in 1949. In 1973
he was given the Distinguished Alumni
Award from his alma mater.
Prior to his appointment, Judge Barrett
had been involved in private practice in
Lusk and had served as County and Prose-
cuting Attorney for Niobrara County;
Town Attorney for the towns of Lusk and
Manville; and attorney for the Niobrara
County Consolidated School District. In
1967 he was appointed by Governor Stan-
ley K. Hathaway to serve as Wyoming At-
torney General and he remained in that
position until 1971.
Judge Barrett is a member of the Judicial
Conference Subcommittee on Federal Ju-
risdiction, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review, and is a
trustee of Saint Joseph's Children's Home.
He was appointed to the Court in 1971.
JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929 and lives in Provo. He grad-
uated from Brigham Young University in
1957 with high honors. He received his
J.D. from the University of Chicago and be-
came the law clerk forJusticeJesse A. Udall
of the Arizona Supreme Court in 1960.
From 1961 to 1974,Judge McKay was with
the firm of Lewis and Roca in Phoenix, tak-
ing two years out to serve as Director of the
United States Peace Corps in Malawi, Af-
rica. He was a law professor at Brigham
Young University from 1974 until he was




Judge Seymour was born in Battle Creek,
Michigan, in 1940. She graduated from
Smith College, magna cum laude, in 1962
and earned her J.D. from Harvard Law
School in 1965. She was admitted to the
Oklahoma bar in 1965.
Judge Seymour has practiced law in Bos-
ton, Massachusetts, 1965-1966; in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, 1967; and Houston, Texas,
1968-1969. Most recently, she has prac-
ticed with the Tulsa firm of Doerner, Stu-
art, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson from
1971 to 1979. Judge Seymour is a member
of Phi Beta Kappa, and the American,
Oklahoma, and Tulsa County Bar associa-
tions. She served as a bar examiner from
1973 through 1979.
Judge Seymour was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit by President Carter in 1979.
SENIOR JUDGE JEAN S.
BREITENSTEIN
Judge Breitenstein was born in Keokuk,
Iowa, in 1900. His family moved to Boul-
der, Colorado, in 1907. After graduation
from the University of Colorado, where he
received his A:B. in 1922 and LL.B. in
1924, he served as a Colorado Assistant At-
torney General from 1925 until 1929. He
was an Assistant United States Attorney
from 1930 until 1933. Between 1933 and
1954, he practiced law in Denver. In 1954,
he became a United States District Judge.
Judge Breitenstein has served as Chair-
man of the Judicial Conference Committee
on Intercircuit Assignments and is a past
president of the Denver Law Club.
A member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of
the Coif, and Phi Alpha Delta, Judge Brei-
tenstein holds LL.D. degrees from the Uni-
versity of Colorado and the University of
Denver. He was appointed to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1957 and be-
came a Senior Judge on July 31, 1970.
SENIOR JUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in New Mexico in
1915 and grew up in Santa Fe. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale in 1940.
During World War II he served as a Ma-
jor in the U.S. Army and was decorated
with the Croix de Guerre. Judge Seth has
been a director of the Santa Fe National
Bank, chairman of the Legal Committee of
the New Mexico Oil and Gas Association,
and counsel for the New Mexico Cat-
tlegrowers' Association. He has also been
a regent of the Museum of New Mexico and
a director of the Santa Fe Boy's Club. In
1962 he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit by
President John F. Kennedy. He became
Chief Judge in 1977 and held this position
until September 15, 1984. On December
25, 1984, Judge Seth assumed senior
status.
SENIOR JUDGE WILLIAM E.
DOYLE
Judge Doyle was born in Denver in 1911
and received his A.B. from the University
of Colorado in 1940. He obtained his
LL.B. andJ.D. degrees from George Wash-
ington University. He served as Deputy
District Attorney for Denver from 1938 un-
til 1941, a Colorado district court judge in
1948 and 1949, and Chief Deputy District
Attorney from 1949 until 1952. During
1959-61 he was a Justice on the Colorado
Supreme Court.
Judge Doyle has been a Visiting Profes-
sor of Law at the University of Colorado
and a Professor of Law at the Westminster
College of Law (University of Denver Col-
lege of Law) in Denver. He is a former
Chairman of the Judicial Conference Com-
mittee to Implement the Magistrates' Act
and served for ten years as a member of the
Judicial Conference Committee on the Ad-
ministration of the Bankruptcy System. He
is a member of the Order of the Coif, the
Order of Saint Ives, Pi Sigma Alpha, and
Phi Alpha Delta.
He was appointed to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1971 following ten
years as a United States District Judge for
the District of Colorado. On December 28,
1984, Judge Doyle assumed senior status.
SENIOR JUDGE ROBERT
H. McWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas, in 1916 and moved to Denver in
1927 where he has lived ever since. He re-
ceived his A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the
University of Denver. In 1971, he was
awarded an Honorary Doctor of Law de-
gree from the University.
During World War II, judge McWilliams
served in the United States Army and was
with the Office of Strategic Services. He
has served as a Deputy District Attorney, a
Colorado district court judge, and was a
member of the Colorado Supreme Court
for nine years prior to his appointment to
the Court of Appeals.
Judge McWilliams is a member of theJu-
dicial Conference Committee on the Ad-
ministration of the Criminal Law, Phi Beta
Kappa, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi Delta
Phi, and Kappa Sigma. He was sworn in as
a Judge of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit in 1970. On
August 31, 1984, Judge McWilliams as-
sumed senior status.
SENIOR JUDGE DELMAS C.
HILL (Retired)
Judge Hill was born in Wamego, Kansas,
in 1906. He received his LL.B. from Wash-
burn College in 1929. From 1929 to 1943
he practiced law in Wamego, serving as an
Assistant U.S. Attorney from 1934 to 1936.
He was general counsel for the Kansas
State Tax Commission from 1937 to 1939
and Chairman of the State Democratic
Committee from 1946 to 1948. During
World War II he was a Captain in the U.S.
Army. In 1945, he assisted in the prosecu-
tion of General Yamashita in Manila. He
was a U.S. District Judge from 1949 until
1961 when he was appointed to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Hill be-
came a SeniorJudge on April 1, 1977.
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THE HONORABLE JEAN S. BREITENSTEIN
THE HONORABLE JEAN S. BREITENSTEIN-
A PROFILE
WALTER A. STEELE*
Jean S. Breitenstein on March 10, 1984, completed his sixtieth year
as a lawyer and on April 27, 1984, completed his thirtieth year as a fed-
eral judge. As he commences his thirty-first year on the bench and his
twenty-eighth year on the Tenth Circuit he continues to be a prodigious
worker, a brilliant jurist, a senior judge often appointed by the United
States Supreme Court for special assignments, a man possessed of a
keen wit and as universally respected and revered as any judge on any
court in the land. These sentiments are shared by bench and bar and
especially by his brethren on the Tenth Circuit, by federal district judges
whose work he reviews and by lawyers who appear before him.
On the day of his thirteith anniversary as a federal judge his ex-law
clerks assembled from all parts of the country to attend a very special
ceremony to honor him. This was a gathering only of Tenth Circuit
judges, ex-law clerks, Judge Breitenstein, and his family, including his
wife, his daughter, his son and their families. Fortunately, that proceed-
ing was reported and the record thereof contains some pearls of the
high regard with which he is held by his colleagues on the court and his
former law clerks.
Jean Breitenstein was born in Keokuk, Iowa onJuly 18, 1900, and in
1907 went with his parents to Boulder where he attended public
schools. He served in the Army in World War I, returned to Boulder
where he received an A.B. degree from the University of Colorado in
1922 and an LL.B. in 1924. He was married on July 8, 1925, to his
charming wife, Helen, a Bostonian, who to this day has retained her Bos-
ton accent, not to mention her keen mind and twinkle in her eye. She
had come to the University of Colorado from Radcliffe College to com-
plete her college education. She met the judge at a picnic. His daugh-
ter, Eleanore, is married to George Wilfley, a prominent Denver
businessman and member of a pioneer Denver family. His son, Peter, is
an outstanding Denver lawyer and partner in the firm of Fairfield and
Woods. He has five grandchildren and three great grandchildren.
Upon admission to the bar, Jean Breitenstein moved to Craig, Colo-
rado where he practiced law and became interested in water law. In
1924 he returned to Denver and served until 1929 as an Assistant Attor-
ney General for the State of Colorado. In 1929 he joined the staff of
United States Attorney Ralph Carr as an Assistant United States Attor-
* Princeton University (A.B., 1947); University of Colorado (LL.B., 1949); Presi-
dent, Colorado Bar Association (1964-65); President, White and Steele, P.C.
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ney which post he kept until 1933 when he went into private practice in
Denver.
His Honor soon gained fame as a water lawyer. He represented the
State of Colorado in numerous water cases and negotiations. He argued
many cases in the United States Supreme Court during his twenty-one
years in private practice. A revealing incident occurred during one of
these arguments. The justices then (as now) often whispered to one an-
other during oral arguments. On this particular occasion Justice Frank-
furter, during Jean Breitenstein's remarks, said to the justices sitting
next to him, but in a very audible voice clearly heard by those present:
"Listen to this guy, he knows what he's talking about." Indeed, he did
know what he was talking about and his record as a water lawyer, partic-
ularly before the highest Court, was an outstanding one.
Before his appointment to the bench, Jean Breitenstein contributed
extensively to the legal profession. He served as Chairman of the Colo-
rado Supreme Court Rules Committee which was responsible for the
adoption of essentially the same civil rules for Colorado courts as the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, he served as President of
the Colorado Bar Association in 1952-53.
Shortly before his appointment to the bench, His Honor appeared
in the County Court in Meeker, Colorado in a probate matter challeng-
ing the validity of a will and involving very substantial oil interests in the
nearby Rangley field. He was opposed by a battery of Denver's finest
lawyers from leading firms. He soon realized a simple appeal to the
non-lawyer county judge was appropriate and he assumed his very best
country-boy style. Following lengthy and astute arguments by his distin-
guished opponents, Jean Breitenstein advised the court that he was just
a sole practitioner without a big library, but there was one book, he told
the judge, that would answer the case. With one brief reading from a
single volume of the Colorado statutes, which he borrowed from the
judge, and a simple statement of the case, he won it. Thereafter he was
named by his admiring though disappointed adversaries as "Barefoot
Breitenstein." His victory withstood appeal and his client was well re-
warded by his astute perception of courtroom strategy. (See Reed v. Mc-
Laughlin, 128 Colo. 581, 265 P.2d 691 (1954).)
Jean Breitenstein was appointed to the federal district bench by
President Eisenshower in April, 1954, to fill a newly created judgeship.
He served with William Lee Knous on that court until June, 1957, when
he was appointed to the Tenth Circuit. In June, 1970, he took senior
status but there has been no change since 1970 in the output and the
caliber of the work by this eminent jurist.
The Breitenstein opinion is written in a very special style. The clar-
ity, simplicity and compactness of his opinions are evident at first glance.
One of his law clerks characterized the judge as a master of the declara-
tive sentence. Judge Logan at the proceeding honoring Judge Breiten-
stein's thirty years on the bench stated: "We, your colleagues, marvel at
your ability to write clearly, fully and briefly."
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Judge Logan in his tribute to His Honor also commented on the
value of working with him on the Court of Appeals and further stated:
By the nature of our employment as federal appellate
judges we are isolated from the public and even the Bar.
Therefore, we are viewed as remote, distant figures. But you,
Jean Breitenstein, are not so viewed by those who have the
privilege of working with you and the benefit of your counsel
and friendship. We cannot help being struck also by the
warmth and regard in which you are held by your former law
clerks. Your law clerks, colleagues, and everyone who knows
you well are moved and revitalized by the evidence from your
life and work that the virtues we admire are alive and well.
Later on in the proceedings Judge Logan summed up his remarks as
follows:
A great judge has intelligence, wisdom, energy, and a
sense that life is a matter of love, loyalty, courage, hope, and
service. A great judge is cognizant of the trust imposed by the
office and of his responsibility to administer that trust to the
best of his abilities impartially and with compassion. By all of
those standards you, Jean Breitenstein, are a great judge. We
are privileged to have served with you.
As a special tribute to the judge, his former law clerks some years
ago established a scholarship in his name at the University of Colorado.
Currently, the recipient receives a grant of $2,000 and the fund contin-
ues to grow each year. The opening paragraph of the inscription estab-
lishing this scholarship states:
This scholarship is funded by former law clerks of The
Honorable Jean Sala Breitenstein, in honor of: his commit-
ment to the highest standards of professional conduct; his sen-
sitivity to the human consequences of legal decisions; and his
dedication to the principles of impartiality, objectivity and fair-
ness in judicial decision-making.
The group of ex-Breitenstein law clerks holds an annual dinner with
the judge where they renew their association with him and engage in
reminiscences. Warren Martin, an early law clerk who is now a Denver
judge on the state district court, at the celebration in April, 1984, spoke
for the assembled law clerks. Among his observations was Judge Brei-
tenstein's belief that courtesies between the court and lawyers, being
mutual, call for punctuality on both sides. A lawyer could and still can
count on Judge Breitenstein being on the bench at the appointed hour.
By the same token, His Honor has always expected punctuality by law-
yers. Warren Martin told of an incident when the judge was stuck at the
head table at a luncheon meeting and could not leave until the speaker
was through. To avoid being late, the judge ran many blocks to the
courthouse, mounted the bench exactly on time but totally out of
breath.
Judge Breitenstein has been assigned numerous special assign-
ments over the years by the United States Supreme Court. While still a
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district judge he was assigned to Brooklyn to help clear up a logjam of
cases. As a court of appeals judge his special assignments have included
serving as a special master in a massive water controversy between
Texas and New Mexico over water rights to the Pecos River. He also
served in a like capacity in a dispute over fishing rights in the Columbia
River in the Northwest. He served as Chairman of the Judicial Confer-
ence Committee on Intercircuit Assignments for many years, a most im-
portant and difficult task in the federal court system. The Chief Justice
assigned him to be one of the panel of three judges to hear the appeal of
the criminal conviction of Judge Otto Kerner, former governor of Illi-
nois, who was indicted and tried while a judge of the Seventh Circuit.
These special assignments evidence the esteem with which Jean Breiten-
stein is held by the highest Court of our country.
Among his many talents is the ability to respond in poetry when the
occasion calls for it. In litigation involving King Resources a few years
ago, a jurisdictional issue arose in a dispute over an underwater oil and
gas lease in Texas. The litigation also involved an issue of the ability of
the King Resources Trustee to possess the lease. Both the Texas Attor-
ney General and the Denver attorney for the Trustee engaged in bouts
of briefs and oral arguments completely in poetry. In turn, ChiefJudge
Winner of the federal district court wrote a memorandum opinion in
poetry. Although no formal appeal was taken, Judge Winner could not
resist forwarding the entire poetical record, including post-trial mo-
tions, also in poetry, directly to Judge Breitenstein with the following
invitation to the Tenth Circuit:
In our town sits a Court of Appeals
It carefully listens to litigants' squeals.
One of its judges by devious means
Has an informer-unfairly it seems.
We District Judges cannot talk back
When that sly judge our secrecy cracks.
To destroy if I can this vile perfidy
This opinion I send straight to Judge B. And if that damn
court wants me to reverse
Justice demands they do it in verse.
Judge Breitenstein authored aper curiam Tenth Circuit opinion-not
for routine publication-admonishing the trial court to avoid poetical
decision making.
Alas and alack, we note with dismay
A practice unique, which we hasten to slay.
An odd innovation of Honorable Winner,
Who presides over court in the City of Denver,
To render decision in cases adverse
By forsaking the law and resorting to verse.
Decisions he makes in couplets bare
Have pitfalls to trap all those unaware.
Whatever be gained in light serendipity
Forever is lost for lack of lucidity.
[Vol. 62:1
1984] BREITENSTEIN - A PROFILE 5
The facts and the law, see Rule Fifty-two,
Are hidden to hamper appe*llate review.
Metaphors, similes, and all of the like,
Can only invite a motion to strike.
The Court of Appeals, its duty most clear,
To reason and law must always adhere.
And when a decision is rendered in verse,
There's naught to be done but quickly reverse.
L'envoi:
For a judge's decision to be copacetic
He must ever refrain from efforts poetic.
We are told that Judge Winner "shipped" the entire record to the
United States Supreme Court where apparently it has found its burial
place.
Drawing again from the recent proceedings on the judge's thirtieth
anniversary on the federal bench, Judge Logan reported a Westlaw
search as showing that Judge Breitenstein as of April 10, 1984, had par-
ticipated in panels of the Tenth Circuit in 2,355 published opinions. As
his colleagues report, when His Honor is on the panel, even though he
may not author the majority opinion, he participates fully in the final
decision and, of course, dissents on occasion. The statistics disclosed
the judge has authored majority opinions in 646 cases. Judge Logan
noted that these statistics did not include the innumerable cases submit-
ted on briefs, special writ matters and other frequent proceedings result-
ing in unpublished orders, opinions andjudgments. Being a resident of
Denver, where the Tenth Circuit is based, His Honor has served on spe-
cial circuit cases often requiring immediate action. His brethren at-
tested to the fact that their continual reliance on his wise counsel and
leadership have been of very special assistance to the court during his
entire tenure.
In the judge's days as a federal prosecutor he was assigned the task
of prosecuting bootleggers. Stories are legion of those years. Senior
District Judge Hatfield Chilson, a close friend, tells of a case that Jean
Breitenstein tried in Pueblo. The United States Attorney insisted that
the case be tried despite the fact that the three witnesses endorsed by
the government, Messrs. Jones, Smith and Rankin, had all been mur-
dered. Thinking it was a hopeless case, Prosecutor Breitenstein none-
theless proceeded to trial, called a United States revenue agent as a
witness and presented essentially the following testimony:
Q. Where is Mr. Jones?
A. He was murdered.
Defense. Objection as irrelevant.
Prosecution. It is relevant to explain the absence of this
witness.
Court. Objection overruled.
Q. Where is Mr. Smith?
A. Mr. Smith has been murdered.
Defense. Objection as irrelevant.
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Prosecution. It is relevant to explain the absence of this
witness.
Court. Objection overruled.
Q. Where is Mr. Rankin?
A. Mr. Rankin has been murdered.
Defense. Objection as irrelevant.
Prosecution. It is relevant to explain the absence of this
witness.
Court. Objection overruled.
Prosecutor Breitenstein rested his case and amazingly the defend-
ant was convicted.
During the era of prohibition, the young prosecutor was in Du-
rango, Colorado when revenue agents asked him to accompany them
into the mountains to arrest some suspected moonshiners. Judge Brei-
tenstein volunteered to drive them in his car up Red Mountain Pass near
Silverton. The agents suggested he stay close to his car while they
sought out the suspects. He had walked around the area near his car
during the wait. The agents returned with their captives who had been
heavily armed when arrested. The prosecutor successfully tried them
and upon conviction the court allowed comments from the defendants.
One of them said that during the hunt they had seen Prosecutor Breiten-
stein answering the call of nature right on top of their buried still. One
of them had said, "Shall we shoot him?" The other replied, "No, he's
just a dumb lawyer and wouldn't know a still if he saw one!"
A final episode of the bootlegger prosecution era occurred during a
trial in which the prosecution was having difficulty proving the existence
of alcoholic contraband which was denied by the defendant. The prose-
cutor, searching for a way to trap the defendant, asked him the capacity
of the ice box in his house. The defendant answered, "Oh, it holds
about forty-seven bottles of bourbon!"
Thejudge tells of an incident which occurred much later when Pres-
ident Nixon was in the process of filling a vacancy on the United States
Supreme Court. Judge Haynsworth from the Fourth Circuit had been
considered initially but became bogged down in controversy as did
Judge Carswell from the federal district bench in Florida. Speculation
was rampant as to the next nominee and there was pressure to appoint a
woman. While the judge was out to lunch his long-time, faithful secre-
tary, Mrs. Smythe, received a call from the Associated Press inquiring as
to whether "Jean" Breitenstein was a man or a woman. When the judge
returned to his chambers after lunch and Mrs. Smythe reported the call,
the judge asked her, "What did you say to the inquiry?" He then said to
her, "Young lady, don't you know you have cost me my only opportunity
to be considered for the Supreme Court?"
In a recent case the Tenth Circuit was reviewing a very substantial
verdict in favor of one Miss Pring, former "Miss Wyoming," against
Penthouse Magazine. The Penthouse New York lawyer, during rebuttal
oral argument, referred repeatedly to justice "out here in the heart-
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land." Finally, His Honor, in a firm manner, admonished the New York
lawyer to refrain from casting aspersions on this part of the country and
not to refer again to it as the heartland and thus upheld the honor and
dignity of our Tenth Circuit.
Shortly after his appointment in 1954 to the federal district court,
seven avowed Communists were indicted under the Smith Act and
charged with conspiracy to teach and advocate the overthrow of the gov-
ernment by force and violence. A celebrated Smith Act case had been
tried earlier in New York and this was another prosecution gaining na-
tional attention. In 1954 there was no provision for payment to ap-
pointed counsel and the seven defendants advised the court of their
total inability to get any lawyer to take on their unpopular cause. Judge
Breitenstein, recognizing that the defense of the case would take hun-
dreds of hours and involve a lengthy trial, devised a plan to recruit a
group of top lawyers from the "large" firms in Denver (in 1954 the defi-
nition of "large" was around ten or more lawyers) and asked each of
those firms to designate a lawyer for the defense team. This plan would
spread the burden of free legal service among the larger firms which
could absorb the heavy commitment of professional time better than the
sole practitioner or smaller firms and would also provide the seven
Communists with the best possible defense. The judge called upon
Louis Issacson of Denver, then President of The Denver Bar Associa-
tion, and gave him the identity of eleven major Denver firms and asked
that Issacson personally call on the senior partners of each firm and ask
for the designation of one of their lawyers for the team. Issacson carried
out this charge and presented a team of eleven very able Denver lawyers
to the judge who appointed them all as defense counsel. Three of the
firms designated their senior partners and the other eight firms desig-
nated very competent and skilled, but somewhat younger lawyers.
Those eleven men spent months of trial preparation and participated in
a trial in 1955 which consumed many weeks. They served without a cent
of compensation.
The defendants were convicted. The Tenth Circuit reversed and by
then Jean Breitenstein was on the circuit. The eleven defense lawyers,
with their wives who suffered through the late hours and all night ses-
sions, have held regular reunions ever since 1955. The eleven Denver
lawyers who served were William V. Hodges, Sr., Robert More, William
Bryans, Arthur K. Underwood, Luis Rovira, John Ferguson, Forest
O'Dell, Robert Harry, John Shafroth, Jay Tracy and William Naugle. Af-
ter the first appeal and Judge Breitenstein's subsequent disqualification
from sitting on any further appeals of the case, the judge and Don Kelly,
the United States Attorney who prosecuted the case, have participated
in those reunions of the defense team.
The concept of the appointment of this team of top lawyers in an
explosive, sensitive criminal case brought national attention. Indeed,
shortly after this Denver case Congress, after multiple hearings, enacted
a statute allowing for some compensation and costs for appointed coun-
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sel in criminal cases. The procedure of calling on the leading law firms
to donate a lawyer to a strong defense team was a typically effective Brei-
tenstein way of dealing with a difficult problem. What is more, he con-
ceived this plan as a freshman federal district judge with but a few
months in harness.
Judge Breitenstein authored and delivered at a Tenth Circuit con-
ference in 1974 a history of the Tenth Circuit. It was printed in the First
Annual Tenth Circuit Survey of The Denver Law Journal. It has since
been updated by the judge and in the later edition he summed up the
work of the Tenth Circuit as follows:
The work of the court goes on and on. The peaceful days
of simple contract and tort litigation have vanished. The vari-
ety and complexity of the cases demand more and more judicial
time. The effort in the Tenth Circuit traditionally has been not
to make the law but to decide what law is applicable to a partic-
ular set of facts. The task is changing subtly. The courts must
give life and understanding to the jargon of opaque statutes
and regulations. Often they are asked to fill in the interstices
left by legislative and executive action. The mission is
challenging.
The wisdom of Judge Breitenstein is still applied every day in the
administration of justice in the Tenth Circuit. His opinions are looked
to as clarion pronouncements of the law in federal and state courts, not
only in the Tenth Circuit but throughout the country. It is particularly
appropriate to recognize this magnificent accomplishment upon com-
pletion of his thirtieth year of judicial service. It is unique to note that
we not only recognize his thirty years of contribution to the jurispru-
dence of our land, but that each day it is continuing with the same vigor,




Administrative agencies function within statutorily defined parame-
ters. While within these bounds, an agency may perform any or all of
the three governmental functions. Given the immense power and perva-
siveness of administrative agencies, it is important for practitioner, pro-
fessor and student to understand the workings of and limitations upon
these bodies. Judicial review is the most direct means to check unau-
thorized agency action. As such, the opinions of the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals provide an excellent guide for understanding the lim-
itatons placed upon this "fourth branch" of government. Generally, re-
viewing courts show great deference to agency decisions-be they
adjudicatory or rulemaking. The Tenth Circuit during the last survey
period has, with few exceptions, followed this trend of deference.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS
A. Interpretation of Federal Legislation
1. Mayoral v. Jeffco American Baptist Residences, Inc.
Traditionally, reviewing courts are ultimately responsible for con-
struing federal statutes.' Administrative applications of statutory terms,
however, will be granted persuasive weight if reasonable. 2 This rule was
illustrated in Mayoral v. Jeffco American Baptist Residences, Inc. 3 in which the
1. See the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), (C) (1982) (directing
reviewing courts to decide questions of law and to interpret statutory provisions). See also
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968) (ultimate responsibility for construction of Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, making unfair methods of competition unlawful, rests with
courts); IRS v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 717 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1983) (courts are
the final authority on issues of statutory construction); Lubrizol Corp. v. EPA, 562 F.2d
807 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (courts have primary responsibility over questions of statutory inter-
pretation); Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Gerace, 581 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (statu-
tory interpretation is a question of law which, as a general rule, is freely reviewable); Gaibis
v. Werner Continental, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 1538 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (construction of statutory
terms is a legal question for the court to decide); Sumlin v. Brown, 420 F. Supp. 78 (N.D.
Fla. 1976) (courts have the ultimate responsibility to determine issues of statutory inter-
pretation); Bryant v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 407 F. Supp. 360 (N.D.
Ill. 1976) (construction of a statute is a matter of law to be resolved by the court); Young v.
AAA Realty Co. of Greensboro. inc., 350 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D.N.C. 1972) (the judiciar'y is
ultimate authority on issues of statutory interpretation).
2. Rarely does a term of the Supreme Court expire without a reaffirmation of this
principle. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977); United
States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975); Train v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361
(1974); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973);
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Investment Co. Inst. v.
Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S.
1 (1965); Massachusetts Trustees of Eastern Gas and Fuel Assoc's v. United States, 377
U.S. 235 (1964); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
3. 726 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 255 (1984).
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Tenth Circuit decided whether "mandatory meal charges are rent under
the United States Housing Act and whether HUD [Housing and Urban
Development] can permit the charges under that Act."
'4
In Mayoral, the defendant, Jeffco, operated an apartment complex in
Lakewood, Colorado which housed elderly, low-income tenants. The
tenants required only minimum support services. The apartment com-
plex included a cafeteria, but every apartment had its own kitchen. In
order to prevent the dining facility from closing, the Jeffco operators
imposed a mandatory meal program on the tenants. 5 The program in-
cluded 24 meals a month for sixty dollars.
6
HUD approved the Jeffco meal plan pursuant to HUD regulations
7
and the residents were given notice and an opportunity to comment on
the plan.8 WhenJeffco instituted the plan, the tenants sought to enjoin
it. 9
The district court, perJudge Kane, permanently enjoinedJeffco and
HUD from imposing the mandatory meal charges unless such charges
were treated as "rent" under 42 U.S.C. § 1437f.10 By so doing, Judge
Kane ensured that any mandatory meal charge imposed on the tenants
would be subjected to the same seventy to eighty-five percent subsidy
applicable to the tenants' rent." In reaching this decision, Judge Kane
reasoned:
Just like any other mandatory charge, the meal ticket charge is
one that a tenant must. . . shoulder if she is to continue to live
in the complex. All mandatory charges must therefore be con-
sidered. rent. It is defendants' choice whether or not to furnish
and charge for such services, but if they decide to make the
charges mandatory, they must be included in "rent" under
§ 1437f. To hold otherwise would circumvent Congress's in-
tent in enacting § 1437f to leave low income families with 70-
85% of their incomes to spend or save as they deem best.'
2
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the Jeffco mandatory meal
plan as approved by HUD fell within the authority granted by the Na-
4. Id. at 1363. The United States Housing Act is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701-1750
(1982). Rent subsidies are provided for under 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1982).
5. Id. at 1362-63.
6. Id. at 1363.
7. Id. See 24 C.F.R. § 880.607(d) (1984).
8. 726 F.2d at 1363.
9. Id. at 1362.
10. Mayoral v. Jeffco Am. Baptist Residences, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 701 (D. Colo. 1981).
11. Id. at 703-04. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1437f the Secretary of HUD and the project
owner enter into an assistance contract which specifies the share of rent to be paid by each
tenant. The amount paid by each qualified tenant cannot exceed 15-30% of the tenant's
income. HUD subsidizes the amount of rent owed to the project owner that the tenant
does not pay. Id. at 702.
12. Mayoral, 519 F. Supp. at 703-4. See S. REP. No. 392, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19,
reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1524, 1542, which states: "One of the
purposes of this section is to permit improved operating and maintenance services in pub-
lic housing projects while still permitting occupancy by very low-income tenants. The Sec-
retary would be expected, however, . . . to insure that excessive operating costs, and consequently
higher rentals, are not incurred." (emphasis added).
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tional Housing Act. 13 In reaching its decision the court relied on three
factors. First, the court made clear that it would show deference to
HUD's interpretation of the United States Housing Act. 14 Although
HUD had approved the meal plan, it argued against including the cost of
mandatory meal plans under the Act's definition of rent. 15 Second, the
court relied on an unpublished Ohio district court opinion for the prop-
osition that, under the United States Housing Act, a mandatory charge
for meals does not constitute rent. 16 Third, finding that section 8 of the
Act contains no controlling definition of rent, the court purported to
"interpret the word in accordance with its ordinary meaning."' 17 The
court concluded that "[a] mandatory meal program does not violate the
purpose of Section 8,"18 rejecting plaintiffs' argument that the meal
charge contravenes the purpose of section 8, as stated in the Act's decla-
ration of policy.19
Given that the United States Housing Act fails to provide an appro-
priate definition of "rent," it is understandable that the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court; however, in so doing the Tenth Circuit may
have deferred too quickly to the agency's position. 20 The Tenth Cir-
cuit's opinion can be challenged on at least two grounds.
First, the court's reliance on the plain meaning of the word "rent" is
suspect. The court was content to state simply: "Meal charges do not
fall within the commonly understood concept of rent. Rent is income
that an owner of land receives from a tenant for the use or occupation of
land."
2 '
In Mayoral, the meal program was mandatory; the tenants were re-
quired to purchase the meal program as a condition of occupancy.
Given the mandatory nature of this charge, one can persuasively argue
13. Mayoral, 726 F.2d at 1366.
14. Id. at 1363 (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).
15. HUD was a defendant in the action.
16. 726 F.2d at 1363-64. See Chambers v. Toledo Jewish Home for the Aged, Inc.,
No. C 80-575 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 1980) (held that a mandatory meal charge is not rent
under 42 U.S.C. § 14370.
17. 726 F.2d at 1365 (citing S. REP. No. 392, 91 st Cong., I st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1969
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1524, 1542, which states: -[T]he 'rental' for such unit
would be the proportional share of the total shelter costs to be borne by the low-income
tenants .. ")
18. 726 F.2d at 1366.
19. Id. at 1365.
20. The Supreme Court recently held that reviewing courts should not rubberstamp
administrative decisions which are inconsistent with a statutory mandate or which frustrate
the underlying Congressional policy. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977) (ad-
ministrative interpretations of statutory terms are given important, but not controlling,
significance); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (agency interpretations of federal stat-
utes must be consistent with the congressional purpose); Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v.
Montana, 729 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1984) (deference accorded administrative interpreta-
tions of statutes is not absolute); Banda v. Office of Personnel Management, Dept. of Air
Force, 727 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1984) (deference to agency construction of federal statutes is
not required where compelling indications exist suggesting that agency interpretation is in
error); Public Ser. Co. of Colo. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1983) (administrative
interpretations of statutes are entitled to deference, not obeisance).
21. 726 F.2d at 1364 (emphases added) (citing Peterson v. Oklahoma City Housing
Auth. 545 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1976)).
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that the income Jeffco received from the plan was in fact income re-
ceived "for the use or occupation of land." Jeffco received sixty dollars
per month, per tenant, regardless of whether the tenant actually ate any
of the 24 cafeteria meals. Failure to pay the charge would violate the
lease; hence, the tenants did not necessarily pay for food so much as
they paid for the right to remain in occupancy. Indeed, in this case, it is
a very short step from an "ordinary" definition of rent to a definition
that reasonably includes the cost of meals as a condition of occupancy.
22
Second, and perhaps most important, the Tenth Circuit never ad-
dressed an important equitable consideration raised by the district
court. 23 On one hand, a decision to enjoin the plan would cause Jeffco
some lost profits. On the other, by excluding the mandatory meal
charge from the definiton of rent, the elderly low-income tenants would
be forced to pay sixty dollars a month for meals they might never eat.
The Tenth Circuit implicitly gave greater weight to the owner's lost
profits than to the tenants' lost income-and loss of choice. The district
court, however, reasoned differently:
Because plaintiffs are all aged people on whom the uncer-
tainty and added burden of suing for damages would take a
great toll, I hold that injunctive relief is proper here. Further,
this case is not limited to purely financial matters. The quintes-
sential issue is whether these tenants can be deprived of their
freedom to choose. Admittedly, the tenants are free to leave,
but it must likewise be admitted that the defendants have
availed themselves of federal funding which must be used in
furtherance of the clear congressional policy to subsidize the
freedom of choice and diginity of life for these aged people.
Thus, I hold that there is no adequate remedy at law which can
compensate these tenants for the daily loss of that freedom to
choose which, according to their own poignant testimony, is a
matter of the utmost concern to each of them. It is that very
loss of choice which is irremediable.
24
2. Brandon v. Pierce
Another HUD interpretation of federal legislation was upheld in
Brandon v. Pierce.2 5 This case involved an Urban Development Action
Grant (UDAG) to expand a city-owned sewage treatment facility onto
property owned by plaintiffs. The Brandons sought injunctive and de-
claratory relief in a suit against the Secretary of HUD.2 6 The complaint
alleged that HUD had violated the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) 2 7 and the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
22. The court's reliance on the Senate Report for the proposition that "rent is gener-
ally payment for shelter" (see infra note 17) is refuted by this same reasoning.
23. See 519 F. Supp. at 704 n.6.
24. Id.
25. 725 F.2d 555 (10th Cir. 1984.)
26. The city of Stilwell, Oklahoma was a co-defendant.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
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(HCDA)2 8 by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) prior to approving the UDAG for the City of Stilwell, Oklahoma.
The Tenth Circuit held the HUD regulations, which did not require
an independent environmental review by HUD of a UDAG prior to ac-
ceptance of the application and release of funds thereunder, were a valid
implementation of the agency's authority under NEPA. 2 9 The court
based its conclusion on legislative history which emphasized congres-
sional intent to transfer NEPA responsibilities from the federal agency
to the local grant applicant.3 0 Because the HUD environmental regula-
tions satisfied this legislative purpose, the regulations were sustained.
3. Matzke v. Block
In Matzke v. Block,3' the Tenth Circuit displayed a distinct lack of
deference to what it considered administrative "construction of the stat-
ute by silence."'3 2 The statute in question concerned the Farm and Ru-
ral Development Act.33 Under this Act, payment and principal due on
loans made by the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), could be de-
ferred by the Secretary upon request.3 4 More important, under the
same statute, the Secretary was permitted to forego foreclosure of any
such loan.
3 5
Plaintiffs, the class of farmers living in Kansas who had received
loans from the FmHA, sued to force the Secretary to promulgate rules
under which the Secretary could defer payment and forego foreclosure
on FmHA loans. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the Secretary had
"taken no action to place in operation or implement the remedies pro-
vided for them" by section 1981a of the Act.
36
As a defense, the Secretary argued that the promulgation of regula-
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1982).
29. 725 F.2d at 563-64. In regard to other issues raised by the Brandons on appeal,
the court held: (1) Stilwell complied with HUD's procedural requirements; therefore,
HUD's approval of the UDAG was not arbitrary and capricious, id. at 561; (2) Stilwell's
decision not to prepare an EIS was reasonable "in light of the mandatory requirements
and high standards set by NEPA," id. at 563 (citation omitted); and (3) Stilwell's environ-
mental assessment was not invalid because the private engineering firm hired to prepare
the assessment depended on HUD's favorable action on the UDAG grant application to
obtain its fee, id. at 563-64.
30. Id. at 559-61. See CONF. REP. No. 1279, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4449-4500. The Housing and Community Development Act of
1974 specifically authorized the assumption by grant applicants of environmental review
responsibilities for compliance with NEPA. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(h) (1982). In addition, 1979
amendments to the HCDA added clarifying language which guaranteed that grant appli-
cants could assume other environmental responsibilities. See CONF. REP. No. 706, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 45, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2402-04; see also H. REP.
No. 154, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CON6. & AD. NEWS 2317,
2323.
31. 732 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984).
32. Id. at 800.
33. Id. See 7 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1982).
34. As a condition of the loan, the FmHA took interests in the farmers homes, crops,
livestock and equipment. 732 F.2d at 800.
35. 7 U.S.C. § 1981a (1982). See infra note 38.
36. 732 F.2d at 800.
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tions was discretionary under the Act and that other existing legislation
provided adequate remedies; therefore, further regulations were
unnecessary.
3 7
The Tenth Circuit resolved the case by construing the word "may"
as used in the enabling statute. The statute provided that the Secretary
"may permit . . . the deferral of principal and interest . . . and may
forego the foreclosure of any such loan..."38 Based on this language,
the Secretary argued that development of the program was discretion-
ary. The farmers maintained that while the Secretary retained discretion
to deny requests for deferrals or to forego foreclosure, development of
rules and procedures was mandatory.
3 9
The Tenth Circuit, relying upon the repeatedly stated legislative
policy of fostering, encouraging and maintaining the family farm,40 held
that the Secretary was required to develop a section 1981a deferral pro-
gram.4 1 Moreover, the court went on to require that the Secretary use
the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.
42
Unlike the Mayoral decision discussed above, 43 the Tenth Circuit in
Matzke determined that language of the statute and the underlying pur-
pose thereof took precedence over administrative convenience. Also, it
is interesting to note that, unlike Mayoral, the Tenth Circuit felt free to
grant relief to the class of Kansas farmers even though the opinion does
not state exactly how the farmers were aggrieved.
B. Interpretation of Agency Regulations
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides for judicial re-
versal of administrative legal conclusions "found to be ... an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'44 Generally,
37. Id. at 801.
38. 7 U.S.C. § 1981a states in pertinent part:
In addition to any other authority that the Secretary may have to defer princi-
pal and interest and forego foreclosure, the Secretary may permit at the request of
the borrower, the deferral of principal and interest on any outstanding loan
made, insured, or held by the Secretary under this chapter, or under the provi-
sions of any other law administered by the Farmers Home Administration, and
may forego foreclosure of any such loan, for such period as the Secretary deems
necessary upon a showing by the borrower that due to circumstances beyond the
borrower's control, the borrower is temporarily unable to continue making pay-
ments of such principal and interest when due without unduly impairing the stan-
dard of living of the borrower.
(emphasis added).
39. 732 F.2d at 801-02.
40. Id. at 801 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2266(a) (1982) and 7 U.S.C. § 1921 (1982)).
41. 732 F.2d at 803.
42. Id. at 802. The Administrative Procedure Act is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706
(1982).
43. See supra notes 1-24 and accompanying text.
44. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). This section of the APA restates the common law
rule that administrative officers vested with discretion possess a limited authority to exer-
cise such discretion reasonably. If an abuse of discretion occurs, judicial intervention is
appropriate, and the issue becomes whether the challenged act falls within a "zone of
reasonableness" allowed agencies upon review. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283,
307 (1974). See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) (even broad delegations of
administrative authority contain an implied condition of reasonable exercise).
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courts need not defer to administrative decisions on questions of law". 4 5
However, an exception arises when the agency interprets and applies its
own regulations. 4 6 During the survey period the Tenth Circuit upheld
two such agency decisions scrutinized under the "abuse of discretion"
test.4 7 In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Independent Mills, Inc. ,48 however,
the court overruled an administrative interpretation of an Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) tariff.
The case involved the application of rail tariffs to wheat shipments.
Plaintiff, a common carrier of freight, contended that certain rate in-
crease tables applied to the defendant, Independent Mills. 49 Both the
district court and the Tenth Circuit refused to defer to an agency inter-
pretation which was ambiguous on its face. 50 Rather, the courts focused
on earlier affirmative acts by both the ICC and the Southern Freight
Tariff Bureau which indicated an intent to exclude wheat shipments
from rate increases. 5 ' The lack of deference in this case can be ex-
plained by the absence of clear and consistent agency action upon which
deference could be founded.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING
A. Review of Informal Rulemaking
Judicial review of informal administrative rulemaking usually em-
ploys a "rational relationship" test: the regulations are upheld when
rationally related to a proper government interest.5 2 This test was ap-
plied to uphold contested regulations in Wyoming Hospital Association v.
Harris. 53 The Association 54 sought declaratory and injunctive relief rel-
45. See supra note 1.
46. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Mulcrome, 636 F.2d 1190 (10th Cir. 1980) (reviewing
court must look to the administrative construction given to the meaning of the language
used in the regulation, as such interpretation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation).
47. Sotelo v. Hadden, 721 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1983) (involving deference to the U.S.
Parole Commission's interpretation and application of parole guidelines); Hughes v. Watt,
No. 82-1583 (10th Cir. July 10, 1983) (Department of Interior regulations as to reopening
of estate matters involving Native Americans).
48. 706 F.2d 1080 (10th Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 1082.
50. Id. at 1082-3. The Tenth Circuit stated that the district court "acted properly in
intervening and vacating an ICC tariff construction where, as here, the tariff was ambigu-
ous on its face. This condition is especially subject to court review where the interpreta-
tion by the ICC is at odds with the interpretation intended by the drafters of the tariff." Id.
at 1083.
51. 706 F.2d at 1083.
52. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1982). Administrative rules must be reasonably related
to the purpose of the agency's enabling legislation. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv.
Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973). Regulations will be invalidated by a reviewing court if they
are determined to be arbitrary or unreasonable. Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936); In re Permanent Surface Mining Reg. Litig., 653 F.2d
514, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1981). See also Herweg v. Ray, 455
U.S. 265, 275 (1982) (reviewing courts have the authority to determine whether an
agency's regulations are arbitrary).
53. 727 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1984).
54. The Wyoming Hospital Association brought suit on behalf of its institutional
members, and was joined by twenty-two individual hospitals. Id. at 938.
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evant to regulations issued under the "Hill-Burton" hospital construc-
tion assistance program. 5 5 Hill-Burton assists in the "construction and
modernization of such public or other non-profit community hospitals
. . .as may be necessary. . . to furnish adequate hospital. . . services
to all . . .people."' 56 A prerequisite to obtaining aid under the Act is
the submission to the Surgeon General of a state plan furthering the
Act's purposes.
5 7
Two assurances are required of such a state plan. First, a "commu-
nity service assurance" must guarantee medical treatment to all persons
residing in the territorial area of the hospital.5 8 Second, an "uncompen-
sated care assurance" requires that a reasonable volume of medical serv-
ices be given to persons unable to pay for services.
59
Subpart F of the disputed regulations deleted a prior presumption
of compliance with the volume of care provision where the hospital
adopted an "open door" policy. 60 Under the open door policy, the hos-
pital was not held to a minimum service requirement if it certified that it
would treat any person regardless of his ability to pay. 6 1 The new regu-
lations require hospitals to provide a minimum percentage of uncom-
pensated care 62 in order for states to obtain federal assistance under
Hill-Burton. 6 3 Plaintiffs had elected to comply under the previous
"open door" policy and thus appealed these changes. Plaintiffs argued
that the new regulations exceeded the Secretary's statutory authority.
64
The Tenth Circuit applied the "rational basis" standard, 6 5 and
found that the contested regulations had a rational basis and thus were
within the Secretary's delegated authority. 66 Under Hill-Burton,6 7 the
Secretary has broad authority to promulgate general regulations which
extend to regulation of community service assurances and uncompen-
sated care assurances. 68 The new regulations attempted to develop
more specific standards ensuring that hospitals provide a reasonable
volume of uncompensated care. The regulations promoted certainty in
compliance and fairness; hence, the court held that they were rationally
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-1 (1982).
56. Id. § 291(a) (1982).
57. Id. §§ 291c, 291d (1982).
58. 727 F.2d at 938.
59. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1982).
60. See Wyoming Hosp. Ass 'n, 727 F.2d at 938.
61. Id.
62. The minimum percentage must be either a level of three percent of its operating
costs or a level often percent of the amount of the federal assistance. See 42 C.F.R. § 124,
subpart F (1980).
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-I (1982).
64. 727 F.2d at 938-39.
65. Id. at 939 (citing American Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170 (7th Cir.
1983), appeal pending ; Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976)). To be upheld by a reviewing court, administrative regulations must be both
within the agency's authority as delegated by the enabling statute, and must be reasonably
related to the purpose of the statute. See supra note 52.
66. 727 F.2d at 940. See 42 U.S.C. § 291c (1982).
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o-I (1982).
68. 727 F.2d at 939.
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related to the purpose of originating legislation and were a valid exer-
cise of the Secretary's discretion.
6 9
B. Rulemaking vs. Adjudication
One of the most interesting cases decided recently by the Tenth
Circuit held that an agency abused its discretion by attempting to pro-
pose legislative policy by means of an adjudicative order. In First Bancor-
poration v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 7 0 the Board had
approved plaintiff's application concerning acquisition of Beehive Fi-
nancial Corporation subject to two conditions. First, Beehive could not
offer both negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts and com-
mercial loans. Allegedly, performance of both functions made Beehive a
bank rather than an industrial loan company under the Bank Holding
Company Act. 7 1 Second, if Beehive offered NOW accounts instead of
commercial loans, these accounts would be subject to Board regulations
governing reserves and interest limitations. 72 In addition, the Board or-
dered that plaintiff's industrial loan company, Foothill Thrift & Loan
Co., conform to these conditions. 73 An unrelated company subse-
quently acquired Beehive, and plaintiff appealed the Board's order con-
cerning Foothill.
The Tenth Circuit set aside this order on the ground that it was, in
effect, an announcement of a significant policy change. 74 As such, it was
not adjudication but rather substantive rulemaking subject to the
rulemaking provisions of the APA.7 5 Though the choice between
rulemaking and adjudication normally lies within agency discretion,
76
"there may be situations where the agency's reliance on adjudication
69. Id.
70. 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984).
71. Id. at 435. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982).
72. 728 F.2d at 435.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 437.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). Administrative action under the Administrative Procedure
Act is classified as either rulemaking or adjudication. Association of Nat'l Advertisers v.
FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). Rulemaking
can be described as the promulgation of new policy which governs future conduct, while
adjudication involves the application of such policy to the facts of a particular case; how-
ever, such a distinction may be difficult to draw in actual practice. Id. at 1165 (citing
United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973)). "Rules" are character-
ized under the APA in accordance with their effect on the public. Herron v. Heckler, 576
F. Supp. 218, 230 (N.D. Cal. 1983). Substantive rules have a substantive impact on the
rights and duties of the person subject to regulation. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v.
Schweiker, 649 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld,
564 F.2d 663, 669 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978)).
76. The Supreme Court has been reluctant to specifically require that new agency
policy should be formulated through rulemaking rather than adjudication and has left this
choice within the agency's discretion. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947);
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267 (1974). The recent judicial trend, however, has been to favor rulemaking over adjudi-
cation for the formulation of new policy. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE,
§ 7:25 (Supp. 1982). This trend is particularly pronounced in the Ninth Circuit, but the
future of this trend remains in doubt. For a rare "ghost" opinion dealing with this issue,
see Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 654 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1981).
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would amount to an abuse of discretion .... ..77 The court pointed to
the Board's instructions issued to other bank holding companies which
stated that Board policy toward NOW accounts was determined in its
order to plaintiff. This led the court to conclude that the Board's order
was simply a vehicle by which to change general policy. The court
stated: "That the Board's order is an attempt to construct policy by ad-
judication is evident. . . . We must conclude that the Board abused its
discretion by improperly attempting to propose legislative policy by an
adjudicative order.''78
In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit rejected the Board's
argument that its order was an interpretative rule and therefore exempt
from the rulemaking provisions of the APA. 79 The court stated that an
interpretative rule is a mere clarification or explanation of an existing
statute or regulation,8 0 whereas the Board's order announced a signifi-
cant policy change. Thus, the order was a substantive rule subject to
APA rulemaking provisions. 8 ' Since these provisions were not com-
plied with, the Tenth Circuit set aside the Board's order.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION: REVIEW OF AGENCY FACT-FINDING
The APA provides for judicial review of administrative findings of
fact under the "substantial evidence" test.8 2 The test requires only that
there be enough evidence in the record, viewed as a whole, that a rea-
sonable person could have reached the same conclusion as the agency.
The substantial evidence test is most often applied during review of ad-
ministrative proceedings involving a formal trial-type hearing. By its
very nature, the substantial evidence test is highly deferential towards
77. 728 F.2d at 437 (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
See also Automobile Club of New York, Inc. v. Cox, 592 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding
that approval of rates for the future constitutes rulemaking, not adjudication, for purposes
of application of APA sections); National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. ICC,
725 F.2d 1442 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that trial-like procedures are particularly appro-
priate for retroactive determination of specific facts about individual parties, and, in cer-
tain cases, due process may even require such procedures); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that any claim of exemption from
APA rulemaking requirements will be narrowly construed and only reluctantly counte-
nanced); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
78. 728 F.2d at 438 (citations omitted).
79. Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A), (d)(2) (1982).
80. 728 F.2d at 438 (quoting Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins.
Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). Interpretative rules are clarifications or expla-
nations of existing laws or regulations. Continental Oil Co. v. Burns, 317 F. Supp. 194,
197 (D. Del. 1970). APA rulemaking procedures are not applicable to interpretative rules.
Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Production Tool Corp. v. Employ-
ment & Training Admin., 688 F.2d 1161, 1165-6 (7th Cir. 1982). However, substantive
rules create rather than interpret law. New Jersey v. Dept. of HHS, 670 F.2d 1262, 1282
(3d Cir. 1981). Substantive rules affect existing rights and obligations. Lewis-Mota v. Sec-
retary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972). Thus, substantive rules are subject to
the APA's rulemaking procedures. Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. Block, 694 F.2d 1205, 1209
(9th Cir. 1982).
81. 728 F.2d at 438.
82. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (defining the "substantial evidence" test as "such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.").
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the administrative decision. Although the agency must base its decision
on something more than a "mere scintilla," the reviewing court can usu-
ally find this minimal quantum of evidence upon reviewing the record as
a whole. The presence or absence of "substantial evidence" was a key
factor in several cases recently decided by the court of appeals. Not sur-
prisingly, out of the seven cases in which the Tenth Circuit applied the
substantial evidence test,8 3 only one was remanded to the agency for
lack of substantial evidence.
84
In Winn v. Schweiker,85 the Tenth Circuit held that the record did not
support a decision by the Department of Health and Human Services to
terminate plaintiff's disability insurance benefits under the Social Secur-
ity Act. 8 6 The administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Winn had
supervisory experience which was transferable; however, the record was
contradictory as to such experience and totally lacking as to details.
87
The case was remanded for reconsideration and development of a more
complete record on this factual issue.
88
IV. JURISDICTION
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
There exist a number of self-imposed restraints onjudical review of
agency action which allow courts to refuse to consider the merits of a
case. Chief among these threshold questions is the doctrine of exhaus-
tion of remedy. In Romero-Carmona v. Department of Justice,8 9 the Tenth
Circuit held the case nonjusticiable because the petitioner failed to ex-
haust his administrative remedies.90 Romero-Carmona sought review of
a denial of a stay of deportation by a district director of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS). An immigration judge originally
found petitioner to be deportable on August 25, 1978, following three
separate illegal entries into the United States. The judge granted peti-
tioner's request for voluntary departure in lieu of deportation. Peti-
tioner waived his right to appeal the immigration judge's decision but
failed to return to Mexico, ignoring a subsequent deportation order.
Petitioner was then arrested on February 18, 1983, and again agreed to
return to Mexico. Petitioner failed to return and instead requested a
83. The six cases affirming the agency decision included: Wyoming Bancorporation
v. Board of Governors, 729 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1984); Murdock v. Schweiker, No. 82-1849
(10th Cir. Jan. 6, 1984); Turner Bros. Trucking v. ICC, 709 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1983);
Ringer v. Helms, No. 82-1190 (10th Cir. Aug. 24, 1983); Manzanaves v. Heckler, No. 83-
1223 (10th Cir. Dec. 15, 1983); Hall v. Heckler, No. 82-2578 (10th Cir. Dec. 15, 1983).
84. Winn v. Schweiker, 711 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1983).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 946.
87. Id. at 948.
88. Id. at 949.
89. 725 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1984).
90. Id. at 105-6. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1982) (which provides: "An order of depor-
tation. . . shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien has not exhausted the administra-
tive remedies available to him as of right under the immigration laws and regulations
.. .
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stay of deportation.9 '
The Tenth Circuit held that a denial of a stay of deportation can be
reviewed only if the deportability issue is reviewable at the same time.
9 2
Because Romero-Carmona did not contest the original finding of de-
portability or preserve his right to appeal that decision, he failed to ex-
haust his administrative remedies.93 Petitioner also failed to timely
appeal the deportation order of August 25, 1978.9 4 The court found
that the issue of petitioner's deportability was not reviewable and dis-
missed the petition for review. I"
As a result of the exhaustion doctrine, the court of appeals also
failed to reach the merits in Bartlett v. Schweiker.9 5 In this case, recipients
of social security benefits brought suit in federal district court, claiming
that they were totally disabled under the Social Security Act's definitions
and that their benefits were wrongfully denied or terminated.9 6 District
court jurisdiction to review a denial of social security benefits by the
Secretary is statutory, permitting an individual to seek judicial review
within sixty days after receiving notice of a Secretary's "final decision"
following a hearing.
9 7
The Supreme Court has held that this "final decision" requirement
is "central to the grant of subject matter jurisdiction,"-9 8 and consists of
two elements.9 9 One is waivable and the other is not. "The waivable
element is the requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed
by the Secretary be exhausted. The nonwaivable element is the require-
ment that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secre-
tary."10 0 The exhaustion requirement can be waived by the Secretary if
further review is unwarranted due to fulfillment of the agency's internal
needs or if the relief sought is beyond the Secretary's power.' 0 ' A
waiver of the exhaustion requirement may also be found by a reviewing
court if a constitutional claim is wholly collateral to the substantive claim
of entitlement, and if plaintiff can show irreparable injury not compensa-
ble by retroactive payments.' 0 2 None of these arguments were success-
91. 725 F.2d at 104-05.
92. Id. at 105 (citing Reyes v. INS, 571 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1978)). The rationale
for this rule is that review of the denial of a stay of deportation is ancillary to the de-
portability issue, and therefore both determinations should be made at the same time.
Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 227 (1963). See also Antolos v. INS, 402 F.2d 463, 464 (9th Cir.
1968).
93. 725 F.2d at 105. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1982).
94. 725 F.2d at 105. See 8 U.S.C. § 105a(a)(l) (1982).
95. 719 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1983).
96. Id. at 1060.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g) (1982).
98. Bartlett, 719 F.2d at 1060 (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975)).
99. Bartlett, 719 F.2d at 1061.
100. Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976)).
101. 719 F.2d at 1061 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330; Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975)).
102. 719 F.2d at 1061 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330-31 & n.l 1; Franks v.
Nimmo, 683 F.2d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 1982); New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v.
New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 850 (10th Cir. 1982); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121,
1125 (10th Cir. 1973)).
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fully advanced by the plaintiffs. The court held that waiver of the
exhaustion requirement was not justified and affirmed dismissal of the
case for failure to meet this requirement.'
0 3
B. Timeliness
In Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 10 4 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dis-
missal of plaintiffs' complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Quivira Mining
and other energy-related companies challenged an Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) regulation establishing standards for permissible
doses of radiation released from uranium fuel cycle operations.
10 5
Plaintiffs claimed that EPA lacked the authority to promulgate the regu-
lation. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the regulation was
invalid and an injunction against its enforcement.
106
The district court dismissed this action, concluding that the Atomic
Energy Act 10 7 "referred all appeals of such proceedings directly to the
Court of Appeals under the Hobbs Act."' 108 The Tenth Circuit also dis-
missed the action, concluding that the Presidential Reorganization Plan
of 1 9 7 0 ,109 which transferred regulatory authority over environmental
standards regarding radioactive materials from the Atomic Energy Com-
mission (AEC) to the EPA, did not alter the original exclusive review
provisions for AEC rulemaking.110 Plaintiffs therefore had long since
missed, under the Hobbs Act," i I the deadline for appellate review of the
challenged regulations 112 and thus were denied review. 113
In White v. Schweiker, 114 the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff sought review
of the Social Security Administration's (SSA) denial of her claim for sur-
vivor's benefits.' 15 White was originally awarded benefits effective as of
April 1974 and requested reconsideration on the ground that benefits
should have been effective from 1970. Plaintiff did not file a request for
a hearing within the sixty-day time limit, but waited two years before
making the request. Nevertheless, the ALJ granted the request and af-
firmed the original award. Plaintiff then sought review of the ALJ's deci-
sion by the Appeals Council, which dismissed the case for lack of good
cause for late filing of hearing request.' 16
The Tenth Circuit concluded that a decision of the SSA not to reo-
103. 719 F.2d at 1061-63.
104. 728 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1984).
105. Id. at 478. See 40 C.F.R. Part 190.10(a) (1983).
106. 728 F.2d at 478.
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982).
108. 728 F.2d at 478. The pertinent provision of the Hobbs Act is codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2342 (1982).
109. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (1982). See 40 C.F.R. § 190 (1984).
110. 728 F.2d at 481.
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1982).
112. 728 F.2d at 484.
113. Id.
114. 725 F.2d 91 (10th Cir. 1984).
115. Id. at 92. Judicial review was sought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982).
116. 725 F.2d at 92-93.
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pen a claim is unreviewable, whether or not the SSA held a hearing on
whether good cause for the late filing was shown. 1 7 The Court also
held that the Appeals Council may substitute its judgment for that of the
ALJ on any matter committed to the absolute discretion of the SSA," 1
8
and the federal courts have no jurisdiction to review such an action.' 19
V. OTHER LIMITATIONS ON AGENCY ACTION
A. Procedural Due Process
The constitutional requirement of procedural due process remains
a viable source of limitation on agency action. In Allison v. Heckler,120 the
Tenth Circuit held that an ALJ's use of a post-hearing medical report
constituted a denial of Allison's due process rights. Allison sought re-
view of an ALJ's denial of Social Security benefits. 12 1 In reversing this
decision, the Tenth Circuit, per Judge Seymour, stated that the ALJ
erred in adopting a doctor's conclusions made upon post-hearing review
of Allison's medical records. When these medical conclusions became
the basis of the ALJ's finding of non-disability, plaintiWs right to "a full
and fair hearing" was abrogated.' 2 2 The Court remanded the case with
instructions to provide plaintiff an opportunity to subpoena and cross-
examine the doctor, and to offer rebuttal evidence.
12 3
The Tenth Circuit also determined that the plaintiff was entitled to
a hearing in City of Colorado Springs v. United States.12 4 The City sought
review of an ICC order authorizing the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad
Company (D & RGW) to raise its rates based on the filing of tariffs on
intrastate freight. Early in 1980, several Colorado railroads, including
the D & RGW, had sought permission from the Public Utilities Commis-
sion (PUC) to implement a four percent general rate increase on Colo-
rado intrastate traffic. Colorado Springs protested this increase and
PUC rejected the increase. The Colorado railroads then petitioned the
117. Id. at 93 (citing Davis v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1982); Giacone v.
Schweiker, 656 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1981); Rios v. Secretary of HEW, 614 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.
1980); Hensley v. Califano, 601 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1979); Carney v. Califano, 598 F.2d 472
(8th Cir. 1979); Teague v. Califano, 560 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1977)).
118. 725 F.2d at 94.
119. Id. The Court had no jurisdiction to review the Appeals Council's action under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (1984).
Plaintiff also argued that the Appeals Council violated her due process rights because
it did not notify her that it would reconsider the ALJ's good cause finding. The court
rejected this constitutional claim, stating:
It would be good practice for the Appeals Council to notify a claimant that it
is considering reopening the good cause issue-a practice it apparently now fol-
lows-but we cannot say the Due Process Clause requires that a claimant be noti-
fied and be given a chance to reargue the good cause issue before the Appeals
Council.
725 F.2d at 94 (citing generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976)).
120. 711 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1983).
121. Id. at 146.
122. Id. at 147 (citing Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 737 (11 th Cir. 1981); Gullo v.
Califano, 609 F.2d 649, 650 (2d Cir. 1979); Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 712, 714
(7th Cir. 1976)).
123. 711 F.2d at 147-48.
124. 724 F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1983).
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ICC, requesting that the PUC's rejection of their proposed rate increase
be vacated.1 2 5 Shortly afterwards, Congress enacted the Staggers Motor
Carrier Act of 1980.126 Prior to this enactment, the railroads' intrastate
transportation services and rates were subject to state regulation under
ICC review. The Staggers Act, however, abrogated most state jurisdic-
tion over intrastate rates.
127
An ICC ALJ accordingly ruled that the Staggers Act nullified the
Colorado PUC order, leaving the railroads free to implement their in-
crease.' 2 8 The ICC Review Board affirmed this decison. 129 The Tenth
Circuit reversed and remanded to the ICC,' 30 holding that a retroactive
application of the Staggers Act to all legal issues obviated the right of
Colorado Springs to a hearing. To deny such a hearing constituted a
denial of due process.'
3 '
B. Punitive Sanctions
In United States v. Sheshtawy, 13 2 the Tenth Circuit clarified the limita-
tion on the goverment's authority to revoke citizenship as a punitive
sanction. In this case, the district court revoked plaintiff's citizenship
and cancelled his certificate of naturalization because he failed to dis-
close a prior arrest on his naturalization questionnaire.13 3 In reversing,
the Tenth Circuit, per Judge McKay, relied on the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Chaunt v. United States,' 3 4 ihich defined the heavy burden of
proof the government carries when it attempts to revoke citizenship for
the willful misrepresentation or concealment of material fact. 135 In or-
der to demonstrate that a given fact is "material," the government must
125. Id. at 858-59.
126. Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1913 (1980).
127. The purpose of the Staggers Act is "to ensure the development, coordination, and
preservation of a transportation system that meets the transportation needs of the United
States" and in pursuit of this goal, "to encourage the establishment and maintenance of
reasonable rates for transportation without unreasonable discrimination or unfair or de-
structive competitive practices." 49 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(4) (1982). To achieve its objec-
tives, this Act gave the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction over transportation
by rail carrier, as well as other forms of transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 10501 (1982). For
more complete discussion of the Staggers Act and its effect on interstate transportation,
see Birkholz, The Staggers Act of 1980, Deregulations and Rereguation: A Railroad Perspective, 17
FORUM 850 (1982); Dempsey, Congressional Intent and Agency Discretion - Never the Twain
Shall Meet: The Motor Carier Act of 1980, 58 CHI. KENr L. REV. 1 (1981); Kretsinger, The
Motor Carrier Act of 1980: Report and Analysis, 50 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 21 (1981).
128. 724 F.2d at 859.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 860.
131. Id. The court stated:
Inasmuch as the Commission took it upon itself to apply the Staggers Act (the
parties operated under the assumption that the Staggers Act did not apply), and
considering that the Commission's decision caused Colorado Springs to lose its
right to a hearing under pre-Staggers Act law, we think it constituted manifest
injustice for the Commission to deny Colorado Springs a hearing.
Id. at 860 (citing Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)).
132. 714 F.2d 1038 (10th Cir. 1983).
133. Id. at 1039.
134. 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
135. Id. at 353.
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"show by 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' evidence either (1) that
facts were suppressed which, if known, would have warranted denial of
citizenship or (2) that their disclosure might have been useful in an in-
vestigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting
denial of citizenship."'136 Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion to
Fedorenko v. United States, 137 concluded that the Chaunt test requires that
the government demonstrate the existence of actual disqualifying facts
which would themselves warrant denial of petitioner's citizenship.
138
The Tenth Circuit adopted Justice Blackmun's interpretation of
Chaunt and outlined a balancing test which weighs the "importance of
securing the stability and security of naturalized citizenship against the
risk. . . of encouraging lying in connection with applications for citizen-
ship."' 3 9 The court concluded that in this case the danger of unwar-
ranted revocation of naturalized citizenship far outweighs the danger of
dishonesty. Serious cases of misrepresentation would still be punishable
under the Chaunt test,14 0 but since the government had not established
facts warranting denial of plaintiffs citizenship, the court concluded that
revocation under section 1451(a) was not justified.' 
4 '
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the government's alternative argu-
ment that revocation was justified because the plaintiff failed to meet all
of the statutory prerequisites to naturalization. 142 The government con-
tended that plaintiff, as a liar, was not of good moral character and
therefore ineligible for citizenship.14 3 The court held that such ineligi-
bility can only result from false testimony concerning material facts,
14 4
and that plaintiff's statements were not made in regard to any material
facts. The Tenth Circuit reinstated plaintiff's citizenship.'
45
SusanJ. Tyburski
136. Id. at 355.
137. 449 U.S. 490, 518-26 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 524.
139. 714 F.2d at 1040.
140. Id. at 1040-41.
141. Id. at 1041. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982).
142. 714 F.2d at 1041.
143. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(6), 1427(a)(3) (1976).
144. 714 F.2d at 1041 (citing Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 507 (1981)).
145. Id. Judge McWilliams dissented, arguing that if Sheshtawy had answered the
questionnaire truthfully, the authorities may have started an investigation "possibly eading
to other facts warranting denial of citizenship." Id. at 1042 (emphasis in original). With-




The Tenth Circuit's antitrust decisions of the past survey period re-
flect two trends in national antitrust analysis: confusion regarding what
constitutes injury to competition and avoidance of the use of the per se
rule in analyzing alleged antitrust violations. I In Black Gold, Ltd. v.
Rockwool Industries, Inc. ,2 the Tenth Circuit examined charges that a man-
ufacturer violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, 3 section 3 of the Clay-
ton Act, 4 and section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 5 Black Gold, the
most significant antitrust case decided during this period, is the subject
of extensive analysis in this survey.
Three remaining antitrust cases considered by the Tenth Circuit
during the survey period involved charges of conspiracy to eliminate
competition in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. In Blankenship
v. Herzfeld,6 the Tenth Circuit joined the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Cir-
cuits in holding that whether related corporations are capable of con-
spiring in violation of section 17 is a question of fact to be answered by
the trier of fact.8 In Mid-West Underground Storage, Inc. v. Porter,9 the
Tenth Circuit examined the per se and rule of reason approaches to
conspiracy to eliminate a competitor by unfair means and grappled with
the meaning of "injury to competition." Finally, in United States v. Metro-
politan Enterprises, Inc.,' 0 the court upheld a district court's finding of a
bidding conspiracy among contractors over several challenges to evi-
dence rulings and to the sufficiency of the indictment.'" Later in this
issue, this article analyzes how the Supreme Court addressed the Tenth
i. Under the per se rule, a horizontal restraint such as price fixing is held to be
illegal without any inquiry into surrounding circumstances. It is contrasted with the rule
of reason which provides that a restraint should not be condemned if it is reasonable, and
that surrounding circumstances should be considered in determining whether a particular
act has violated the Sherman Act. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60
(1911), for the first formulation of the rule of reason.
2. 729 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1984), af'd on rehearing, 732 F.2d 779 (1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 178 (1984).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1982).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13(6), 21(d) (982).
6. 721 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1983).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 provides, in part, that "[elvery contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
8. 721 F.2d at 309.
9. 717 F.2d 493 (10th Cir. 1983).
10. 728 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1984).
11. The court also dismissed an antitrust claim in Central Nat'l Bank v. Rainbolt, 720
F.2d 1183 (10th Cir. 1983). The claims were brought under sections 7 and 16 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 26 (1982), but were dismissed because of failure to prove
injury sufficient to meet the Tenth Circuit's requirement that the violations be proven to
be the proximate cause of the injury. That injury test was announced in Reibert v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973).
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Circuit's decision in Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association. 12
I. BLACK GOLD: PRICE DISCRIMINATION, ILLEGAL TYING, AND REFUSAL
TO DEAL
In Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Industries, Inc. ,13 the Tenth Circuit re-
versed a general verdict in favor of Black Gold, the plaintiff, on discrimi-
nation charges brought under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act. 14 The court also affirmed the district court's directed verdict in
favor of Rockwool on the tying claims, and reversed the district court's
directed verdict in favor of Rockwool on the charge of refusal to deal in
violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act,' 5 remanding the last issue to
the jury. 16
A. Background
Rockwool Industries (Rockwool) is a manufacturer, retailer, and
distributor of building insulation material known as rockwool. The ma-
terial comes in two forms, blown wool and batts. Blown wool is loose
rockwool which can be blown into existing buildings as insulation. Batts
are made of rockwool formed into thick strips and wrapped in foil or
heavy paper. Batts are installed as insulation during the construction of
new buildings. 
17
At the time the action arose, Black Gold was an installer of insula-
tion and a purchaser of rockwool from defendant Rockwool. Williams
Insulation Company (Williams) competed with Black Gold in the busi-
ness of installing insulation; it also purchased rockwool from defendant
Rockwool.18
Black Gold's claims against Rockwool arose in connection with a
program run by the Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC). The
program, which encouraged home owners to insulate, allowed PSC cus-
tomers to choose the type of insulation they wanted to add to their
homes. PSC maintained a list from which it selected, on a rotating basis,
qualified installers to fit the homes with insulation. Both Black Gold and
12. 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), afd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
13. 729 F.2d 676.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982). Section 2(a) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality. ...
Where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them ....
15. 729 F.2d at 680. Section 3 of the Clayton Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
16. A petition for certiorari filed by Rockwool has been denied by the Supreme Court.
For a synopsis of the issues raised on appeal, see 105 S. Ct. 178 (1984).
17. 729 F.2d at 678-79.
18. There was at least one other installer of blown rockwool insulation, but only Wil-
liams is mentioned by name because evidence of price discrimination was only available
with respect to Williams. Id. at 679.
[Vol. 62:1
ANTITRUST LA W
Williams were on the PSC list of qualified installers. 19 The utility con-
trolled the program by setting the prices for the jobs and dictating the
brands of insulating materials that the installers could use. 20 Because
the only brand of rockwool approved for use in PSC's program was that
manufactured by Rockwool, both Black Gold and Williams depended
exclusively on Rockwool for their supply of rockwool.
2 1
At trial, Black Gold offered evidence supporting charges that it had
been forced to refuse PSC jobs and that competition with Williams had
been injured because Black Gold could not obtain the necessary
rockwool from the defendant. 2 2 According to Black Gold, Rockwool
had initially tried to force Black Gold to buy batts by withholding timely
delivery of the blown wool. Black Gold chose not to buy the batts from
Rockwool because they were being sold at a lower price to Williams.
Black Gold alleged that because it refused to purchase the batts,
Rockwool subsequently refused to sell Black Gold blown wool.
Rockwool admitted that it did sell blown wool and batts to Williams at a
lower price than it sold the same materials to Black Gold;2 3 it main-
tained, however, that this price difference did not tend to lessen compe-
tition, an essential element of price discrimination under the Robinson-
Patman Act.
2 4
B. The Robinson-Patman Claims
Black Gold alleged, in its section 2(a) claims, that it was forced to
refuse jobs because Rockwool: (1) sold blown wool to Williams at a
lower price than to Black Gold, (2) failed to make timely deliveries of
blown wool, and (3) eventually refused to sell any blown wool to Black
Gold, while continuing sales to other installers. The jury issued a gen-
eral verdict for Black Gold in the amount of $93,350.25 The Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed this general verdict, adopting Rockwool's argument on
appeal that the price difference did not lessen competition as required
by the Robinson-Patman Act.
2 6
Rockwool also argued, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that the trial
court's instructions to the jury were erroneous. 2 7 The instructions to




22. Id. This is an example of secondary-line injury, where price discrimination injures
competition with "any person who knowingly receives the benefit of such [price] discrimi-
nation." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982). Primary-line injury refers to anti-competitive effects
between suppliers at the same level of the distribution system.
23. 724 F.2d at 679.
24. Id. at 680.
25. Id. The award was trebled to $280,050 pursuant to section 4 of the Clayton Act
which provides that treble damages be made available to "[a]ny person who shall be in-
jured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
.. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
26. 729 F.2d at 682.
27. Id.
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crimination in the unit price. 28 The instructions also recognized that
price competition was not the only type of competition possible between
Black Gold and Williams. 29 The court, however, repeatedly denied that
there could be harm to competition within the PSC program itself, em-
phasizing that PSC set the price for installing and applied the price uni-
formly to all installers.3 0 The court refused to affirm the jury's verdict
for Black Gold.3 1 It did note, however, that during the retrial on the
refusal to deal claim, Black Gold should be allowed to establish injury
occurring outside the PSC program.
3 2
The decision reflects both the Tenth Circuit's increasing reluctance
to award damages under section 2(a) and a trend towards limiting the
scope of the Robinson-Patman Act in general.3 3 It appears, however,
that the Tenth Circuit may have gone beyond the Supreme Court's re-
cent holding inj Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.
3 4
On appeal, Rockwool charged that Black Gold failed to present the
jurisdictional elements of a section 2(a) violation3 5 or to make out a
prima facie case by proving probable injury to competition. 3 6 The
Tenth Circuit found that Black Gold did not prove that the lower price
offered by Rockwool to Williams had the requisite potential to substan-
tially affect competition. 3 7 Because PSC jobs were offered without re-
28. The jury instruction stated, in pertinent part: "The advantage may be given by
lower prices, discounts or other advantages, such as timely delivery given to the favored purchaser
and not given to others." Id. at 682 (emphasis by Tenth Circuit).
29. The jury instruction stated, in pertinent part:
In addition to price competition, you may consider whether Black Gold and Wil-
liams engaged in other forms of competition based on their ability to have the needed
insulation on hand to install when required, or based on their ability to provide the
services and quality of services demanded by their customers.
Id. at 682.
"[T]he jury could infer that installers were competing with each other on the basis of
their economic ability to participate in the PSC program at all, and to meet PSC installa-
tion standards within the margin between price and their cost for rockwool." See Black
Gold's Consolidated Brief: Response to Rockwool's Opening Brief on Appeal and Reply
to Rockwool's Brief on Black Gold's Cross-Appeal at 12.
30. 729 F.2d at 681. That the PSC program could not remove all competition con-
nected with participating in the program is demonstrated by Rockwool's assertion that it
had lowered prices to Williams in order to "meet competition." Brief, supra note 29, at 12,
21.
31. 729 F.2d at 683.
32. Id. The court of appeals also suggested that the court on remand examine the "in
commerce" requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act as well. Id.
33. See Rosner, A Year Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 435 (1983).
34. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
35. The jurisdictional elements of a section 2(a) violation require that: (1) the party
charged be a person within the meaning of the Sherman Act; (2) the charge arise out of
two "consummated and contemporaneous" sales transactions; (3) the same seller must
deal with different purchasers; (4) the sales must involve "commodities" within the mean-
ing of section 2(a); (5) the commodities must be of like grade and quality; and (6) inter-
state commerce must be involved. 4 J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS,
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 23.02[l] (1983) (hereinafter Kalinowski).
36. Id. at § 23.02[l] n.16. The three types of competitive injury include: "(1) sub-
stantial lessening of competition; (2) substantial tendency to create a monopoly; and
(3) injury to, or destruction or prevention of, competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefits of the discrimination, or with customers of either
of them." Id. at § 23.02[2] at n.16, paraphrasing 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
37. 729 F.2d at 681.
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gard to price demands of the installers, it was argued that Williams
could not have used its ability to obtain rockwool more cheaply than
Black Gold to lower prices within the program. Therefore, the court
held, "the price differential on blown wool purchased for use in the PSC
program could not have adversely affected competition within the
program.''38
This holding implies that price discrimination is not actionable un-
less it affects competition through the lowering of prices. The Robin-
son-Patman Act, however, defines unlawful discriminatory pricing not
only as the lessening of competition and the tendency to create a mo-
nopoly, but also as preventing competition with a person who grants the
discriminatory prices, or "knowingly receives the benefit of such dis-
crimination, or with customers of either of them."' 39 In response to
Black Gold's argument that an effect on competition could be shown
even if Williams had not lowered its resale price, the Tenth Circuit rec-
ognized that courts have been willing to infer injury to competition in
some cases. CitingJ. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. ,40 the court
acknowledged that a competitor may be less able to compete as a result
of having to pay more for materials. 4 1 In Black Gold, however, the Court
found no "sales costs, advertising costs or collection expenses" in con-
nection with the PSC program. 4 2 Because the PSC program purported
to eliminate competition for jobs among installers by fixing prices and
offering the jobs on a rotating basis, the Tenth Circuit did not consider
the threshold question regarding Black Gold's ability to participate in
the program.
Under the Tenth Circuit's analysis, blatant price discrimination in a
program such as PSC's is exempt from scrutiny under the Robinson-
Patman Act unless it results in lowered prices by the favored competi-
tion. Such a result is difficult to accept, both in Black Gold and as a gen-
eral proposition. The factual evidence presented by Black Gold showed
that it was unable to obtain sufficient quantities of blown wool on a
timely basis, was forced to turn away jobs, and performed 1,252 fewer
blown wool jobs than Williams. 4 3 Ignoring these effects on competition,
38. Id. (emphasis in original).
39. Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). See supra note 14.
40. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
41. "To the extent a disfavored purchaser must pay more for its goods than its com-
petitors, it is less able to compete. It has fewer funds available with which to advertise,
make capital expenditures, and the like." 729 F.2d at 681, citingJ. Truelt Payne, 451 U.S. at
564. See also Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 959 (1965).
42. 729 F.2d at 681. Thus, the Court concluded that competition was not injured.
The Tenth Circuit's understanding of competition seems to be limited to price wars. Sec-
tion 2(a), however, "is concerned with substantial impairment of the vigor or health of the
contest for business, regardless of which competitor wins or loses. The competition which
is sought to be protected by this section is a contest between sellers for the buyer's busi-
ness, because "competition is, in its very essence, a contest for trade .... Competition
. . .is a battle for something that only one can get; one competitor must necessarily lose."
Anheuser-Busch v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 1961) (citations omitted).
43. See Brief, supra note 29, at 6. This ignoring of evidence of injury recalls to mind
the Supreme Court's warning in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948):
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the Tenth Circuit concluded that Rockwool's price discrimination and
the resultant lower profits could not have produced the "effect on com-
petition" required to find a section 2(a) violation.
The "effect on competition" alluded to by the court was Williams'
lowering of its price to the PSC. As the Supreme Court noted inj Truett
Payne,4 4 the failure of a person to prove that its competitor lowered
prices as a result of his favored status does not necessarily defeat recov-
ery.4 5 Indeed, the Supreme Court refused to rule as a matter of law
whether a plaintiff must prove that the favored competitor used his price
advantage to lower his resale price.
46
J. Truett Payne established that automatic or presumptive damages
could no longer be based solely on the showing of a substantial price
discrimination. InJ. Truett Payne, the dealer sought treble damages pur-
suant to section 4 of the Clayton Act.4 7 The Supreme Court held that
the dealer, in order to recover, must prove a violation of section 2(a) of
the Clayton Act,4 8 and antitrust injury.4 9 The Supreme Court, however,
It would greatly handicap effective enforcement of the Act to require testimony to
show that which we believe to be self-evident, namely, that there is a "reasonable
possibility" that competition may be adversely affected by a practice under which
manufacturers and producers sell their goods to some customers substantially
cheaper than they sell like goods to the competitors of these customers.
Id. at 50. The Court in Morton upheld the Commission's findings of a violation, noting that
the Commission "found what would appear to be obvious, that the competitive opportuni-
ties of certain merchants were injured when they had to pay respondent substantially more
for their goods than their competitors had to pay." Id. at 46-47.
44. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
45. "That argument assumes that evidence of a lower retail price is the sine qua non of
antitrust injury, that the disfavored purchaser is simply not 'injured' unless the favored
purchaser has lowered his price . . . . If by reason of the discrimination, the preferred
producers have been able to divert business that would otherwise have gone to the disfa-
vored [person], damage has resulted to the extent of the diverted profits." 451 U.S. at 564
n.4.
46. Id. at 565 n.4. See also Note, Tracing an Antitrust Injury in Secondary Line Price Discrimi-
nation Cases, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 909 (1982) (arguing that the Supreme Court left open the
possibility that other factors may be considered in establishing a Robinson-Patman Act
violation).
47. 451 U.S. at 561-62.
48. The lower court did not deal with the issue of liability under section 2(a); the
Supreme Court, therefore, did not consider it proper to rule on the adequacy of the evi-
dence. 451 U.S. at 561-62.
49. 451 U.S. at 561-62 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477 (1977)). Brunswick held that for a plaintiff's injury to be an antitrust injury it would
have to be "of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent..." and "reflect the
anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by
the violation." Id. at 489. The injury would have to be the "type of loss . . . that the
claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause." Id. (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Ha-
zeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969)). The Supreme Court inJ. Truett Payne
stated that its decision "is virtually governed by our reasoning in Brunswick." 451 U.S. at
562.
The Court's clear tightening of the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate effects on
competition may reflect the emerging conflict between the goals of the Robinson-Patman
Act and modern economic theory. The Act represented a Congressional decision to pro-
tect individual, particularly smaller competitors ahead of the consumer-welfare efficiency
goals which emphasize the protection of competition not competitors. See Tracing Antitrust
Injury, supra note 46, at 914-17. What is frequently forgotten by those advocating the effi-
ciency model is the necessity of protecting competitors in order to safeguard competition.
FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) described the legislative history of the
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did not go so far as to disallow an antitrust plaintiff the opportunity to
establish such injury.50 Thus, the Tenth Circuit's holding that the price
discrimination and resultant lower profits could not result in anticompe-
titive effects without showing a lowering of price goes a step beyond the
Supreme Court's requirement that a court consider evidence of plain-
tiff's injury as evidence of a section 2(a) violation. Based on its un-
founded assumption that anticompetitive efforts could not be felt within
the PSC program, the Tenth Circuit simply refused to consider the
evidence.
After reaching the conclusion that there was no section 2(a) viola-
tion based on the price differential, the Tenth Circuit held that section
2(a) is directed at nothing more than price discrimination; hence, the
untimely and insufficient deliveries of blown wool did not violate section
2(a). 5 1 Even if Black Gold's claim was read as a charge of refusal to deal,
it would not constitute a section 2(a) violation because the "requisite
price discrimination between two buyers is lacking."
52
Black Gold also charged that the price discrimination by Rockwool
amounted to a conspiracy by Rockwool and others violating section 1 of
the Sherman Act. The Tenth Circuit held that if the discriminatory sales
were legal under the Robinson-Patman Act, they were legal under the
Sherman Act.53 Unfortunately, no case law is cited by the court for this
dubious conclusion. 54 As Black Gold argued,5 5 the fact that particular
discriminatory conduct did not violate the Robinson-Patman Act does
not preclude that conduct from violating the Sherman Act as long as the
other elements of a Sherman Act violation are established.
Robinson-Patman Act as making it "abundantly clear that Congress considered it to be an
evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive advantage over a small buyer solely
because of the large buyer's quantity purchasing ability. ... Id. at 43. "We think...
that Congress meant by using the words 'discrimination in price' in § 2 that in a case
involving competitive injury between a seller's customers the Commission need only prove
that a seller had charged one purchaser a higher price for like goods than he had charged
one or more of the purchaser's competitors." Id. at 45 (footnote omitted).
50. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
51. 729 F.2d at 682.
52. Id. at 683. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982) specifically provides that "nothing herein
contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in com-
merce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of
trade .... ." The inapplicability of the Robinson-Patman Act to refusals to deal is also
based on case law which has only applied section 2(a) when there have been two actual.
completed sales. See 4 KAuNOWsKI, supra note 35, at § 24.03[2]. As Kalinowski points out,
however, the legislative history makes it clear that this allows "the selection of customers
and not of what shall be sold to them." Id. at § 24.03[2] n.36 (quoting Representative
Utterback, 80 CONG. REC. H.R. 9418 (daily ed. June 15, 1936) (statement of Rep.
Utterback)).
53. "However, discriminatory sales that are legal under the Robinson-Patman Act be-
cause they do not tend to substantially lessen competition are likewise legal under Sher-
man 1." 729 F.2d at 683.
54. The Tenth Circuit cites only 2 P. AREEDA AND D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw § 304(a)
(1978), for the broad proposition that the same criteria should be used in analyzing "un-
reasonableness" under the Sherman Act and "substantial lessening of competition" under
Robinson-Patman.
55. See Brief supra note 29 at 46-50.
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C. The Tying Arrangement Claim
The directed verdict for Rockwool on the tying charges was af-
firmed by the Tenth Circuit. Black Gold charged that Rockwool tied the
sale of blown wool to the sale of batts, violating section 3 of the Clayton
Act.5 6 The district court directed a verdict for Rockwool, finding no an-
ticompetitive effect as required by section 3.57 The court of appeals,
however, upheld the district court's verdict for a different reason. Be-
cause Black Gold had refused to purchase batts from Rockwool, 58 the
court found that Black Gold was neither a buyer injured because its free-
dom of choice was limited nor a seller injured by being foreclosed from
sales. 59 Black Gold alleged its injury was caused by Rockwool's refusal
to sell blown wool unless Black Gold also bought batts. What was miss-
ing, and crucial to a finding of a section 3 violation, was the actual sale to
Black Gold made on the condition that Black Gold buy another
product.
6 0
D. The Refusal to Deal Claim
Black Gold also charged that Rockwool's refusal to sell Black Gold
blown wool violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 6 1 The district court
directed a verdict for Rockwool, finding no evidence of a contract, com-
56. 729 F.2d 678. Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits a person from leasing or
making a sale or contract "on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee
or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods. . . of a competitor or competitors
of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract may be to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
In defining "tying arrangement" the Tenth Circuit stated: "A tying arrangement is an
agreement by a party to sell one product only on the condition that the buyer also
purchase a different or 'tied' product." Black Gold, 729 at 684 (quoting Foremost Pro
Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 546 (9th Cir. 1983)).
57. 729 F.2d 684. Section 3 of the Clayton Act declares a tying arrangement to be
unlawful when the effect of the arrangement "may be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
In a footnote, the Tenth Circuit admonished the trial court for incorrectly granting
Rockwool's motion for directed verdict on the tying issue. After stating the basic test for
properly granting a directed verdict (in the light most favorable . . . .) the Tenth Circuit
stated:
Under this standard, we do not believe the directed verdict could have been sus-
tained on the ground adopted by the trial court. Rockwool had sufficient market
power in the tying product, blown wool, because this product was the only one
approved for use in the PSC program. Thus the tying product was both unique
and desirable. Moreover, construing the evidence and inferences most favorably
to Black Gold, the dollar volume of rockwool batts tied to the sale of blown wool
cannot be considered de minimis.
729 F.2d at 684 n.6. For a discussion of the two factors that can establish an unlawful tying
arrangement, see 3 KALINOWSKI, supra note 35, at § 14.03[3].
58. Black Gold had purchased only one test order for $3,919.
59. 729 F.2d at 684-85.
60. Id. at 683. Rockwool's refusal to deal unless Black Gold bought batts was the cause
of Black Gold's injury, and may be a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, but is not
within the scope of section 3. See Black Gold, 729 F.2d at 685 (citing L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 168, at 488 (1977)).
61. 729 F.2d 678. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very contract com-
bination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states
• . . is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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bination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. 62 Noting the difficulty in
determining when a refusal to deal becomes a section 1 conspiracy or
combination, the court attempted to explain the law on this question.
First, the Tenth Circuit recalled United States v. Colgate,6 3 in which
the Supreme Court clearly established that a unilateral refusal to deal
cannot violate section 1 because the requisite combination or conspiracy
is missing. Second, the Tenth Circuit showed that a purported refusal
to deal can be an unlawful combination if the producer goes beyond
merely refusing to deal. 64 The court stated that an unlawful combina-
tion exists "if the producer secures adherence to his suggested prices by
means which go beyond his mere declination to sell to a customer who
will not observe his announced policy."'6 5 The court continued, noting
that there are two ways to establish such a conspiracy: (1) proof by the
customer that he complied with the producer's anticompetitive practice;
or (2) showing that other buyers complied under fear of termination
although the plaintiff refused to comply. 66 Under this second method,
the Tenth Circuit found that there was enough evidence to send the
issue of a combination between Rockwool and other buyers to the jury.
6 7
II. TENTH CIRCUIT REJECTS THE PICK-BARTH DOCTRINE
6 8
In Mid-West Underground Storage, Inc. v. Porter,69 the Tenth Circuit
addressed the question of whether a conspiracy to eliminate a competi-
tor by unfair means is a per se antitrust violation or should be analyzed
under the rule of reason. Consistent with the general trend set by the
Supreme Court, it rejected the per se approach.
70
A. Background
Plaintiff, Mid-West Underground Storage (Midwest), was engaged
62. 729 F.2d at 685.
63. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
64. The court quotes extensively from United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S.
29 (1960). In that case, Parke Davis induced the retailers to adhere to the suggested retail
prices by announcing a policy to sell only to those who did so, and then involving the
wholesalers in the scheme by refusing to deal with them if the retailers did not comply. See
729 F.2d at 685-86.
65. 729 F.2d at 686 (quoting United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43
(1960)).
66. 729 F.2d at 686.
67. "We note evidence that Rockwool communicated its desire to its customers that
they purchase both blown wool and batts, and that Rockwool continued to sell blown wool
to Williams and another competitor, both of whom bought batts. However, blown wool
sales to Black Gold, which refused to buy batts from Rockwool, were terminated." Id.
What needed to be shown to prove Rockwool's liability under section 1 of the Sherman
Act was that Rockwool used the refusal to deal with Black Gold to induce other customers
to adhere to a tying arrangement. Id.
68. The Pick-Barth Doctrine is derived from Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell
Woodbury Corp., 57 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 552 (1932). In Pick-
Barth, the First Circuit held that a conspiracy to deprive a competitor of a substantial factor
of commerce with an intent to eliminate that competition by unfair methods is per se an
unreasonable restraint of trade.
69. 717 F.2d 493 (10th Cir. 1983).
70. Id. at 495. See supra note 1.
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in the business of storing liquid petroleum gas (LPG) products. 7 1 Mid-
west's president, Melland, while still in a fiduciary capacity to Midwest,
combined efforts with a former Midwest stockholder (Porter) and set up
a competing LPG product storage company. 72 Midwest served a com-
plaint upon the defendants charging: (1) that Melland's conduct consti-
tuted a business tort under state law; and (2) that Melland, Porter and
various entities controlled by Melland and Porter violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act by conspiring to engage in unfair competition for the
purpose of eliminating Midwest as a competitor.
73
At trial, the jury found in favor of plaintiff Midwest on both claims,
awarding the company $250,000 on the antitrust claim and $3,911,637
on the state tort claims. 74 The trial court then trebled the antitrust
award to $750,000. 7 5 Three issues were raised on appeal: (1) whether
the lower court had erred in denying the defendants' motion for a di-
rected verdict on the antitrust claim; (2) whether the court erred in not
ordering a new trial on the state law claims; and (3) whether the court
erred in refusing to enter judgment on the state law claims against the
defendants other than Porter and in dismissing a third defendant for
lack of in personam jurisdiction.
76
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment against Porter on the state
law claims in the amount of $3,911,637. 7 7 With regard to the antitrust
claim, however, the court found that the district court erred in refusing
to grant a directed verdict and ordered the district court to enter judg-
ment n.o.v. for the defendants. 78 The court's twofold reasoning de-
serves careful analysis.
B. Rejection of the Per Se Approach
The trial court refused to issue plaintiWs per se instruction to the
jury.7 9 Plaintiff, Midwest, argued that a conspiracy to eliminate competi-
tors was a horizontal restraint created for the direct purpose of exclud-
ing a competitor from business.8 0  The jury, based on special
interrogatories, found for Midwest on a rule of reason charge. 8 ' Both
parties appealed. Defendants charged that, even under a rule of reason
analysis, the plaintiffs failed to prove injury to competition.8 2 Midwest






77. Id. at 500-503. The court noted several difficulties with the calculation of this
damage award but upheld the lower court's refusal to grant a new trial because of strong
judicial policy in favor of upholding jury verdicts and the policy against an appellate court
finding abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. Id. at 502.
78. Id. at 498-500.
79. Id. at 496.
80. Id.
81. Plaintiff's Reply Brief, Addendum.
82. 717 F.2d at 498.
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continued to maintain that it should win under either approach.
83
The Tenth Circuit attempted to answer Midwest's charge that de-
fendant's alleged conspiracy constituted a per se violation. 84 In tracing
the origins of the argument that a horizontal conspiracy to suppress
competition through the elimination of a competitor by unfair means is
a per se violation, the court began at Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Wood-
bury Corp. ,85 outlined the sparse judicial development after Pick-Barth,
86
and then announced that the Tenth Circuit had never adopted the Pick-
Barth doctrine and would not do so in this case. 87 The Tenth Circuit
cited Supreme Court cases,8 8 a circuit court case, 8 9 and a treatise dem-
onstrating why the per se rule should not apply. 90
The court's ruling conforms with the general trend away from the
per se rule. 9 1 Unfair competition is not the kind of business practice
that is characterized by a "pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue" 9 2 so as to warrant the application of a per se rule.
Indeed, as the Tenth Circuit pointed out, "such conspiracies may actu-
ally have a beneficial effect on competition by facilitating new entry or
otherwise decreasing concentration."
9 3
83. Id. at 496.
84. Midwest argued that defendants' conspiracy was a per se violation because "it was
essentially a horizontal conspiracy which utilized one of the conspirator's powers as presi-
dent of Midwest to exclude it from the competitive market for sale and leasing of substan-
tial amounts of underground storage [and because] it was also a form of indirect price-
fixing, and a per se violation for that reason as well." Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 36.
85. 57 F.2d 96 (ist Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 252 (1932).
86. Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v. Pioneer Distrib. Co., 353. F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 945 (1966), has been cited as the Tenth Circuit's adoption of the Pick-
Barth doctrine. Although Perryton did not use per se language, it did say that conspiracy to
eliminate a competitor distributor "destroys rather than maintains competition, is an un-
reasonable restraint on trade, and violates the statute." Id. at 622. Perryton specifically
distinguished cases where one distributor was substituted for another, thus changing the
identity of the competitor but not eliminating competition, and cases such as Perryton
where the "intent of the conspiracy was to eliminate the competitor predominant in the
area." Id. In Midwest, however, the court of appeals cited Craig v. Sun Oil Co., 515 F.2d
221 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976), which disposed of Perryton as "not
necessarily a per se case despite the citation of the First Circuit cases." Id. at 224.
87. 717 F.2d at 496.
88. Id. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977);
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).
89. 717 F.2d at 496. See Northwest Power Prods., Inc., v. Omark Indus. Inc., 576 F.2d
83, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
90. 717 F.2d at 496-97. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw § 828b, at 323
(1978).
91. For a recent analysis of the per se rule, see Lipner, Antitrust 's Per Se Rule: Reports of
its Death are Greatly Exaggerated, 60 DEN. L.J. 593 (1983). See also Northwest Power Prods.,
Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116
(1979) ("We thus reject the per se rule of Pick-Barth and adopt a rule of reason to be
applied on a case-by-case basis in situations where competitive forces protected by the
Sherman Act suffer some palpable injury."); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 561 (1st Cir. 1974) ("Insofar as Pick-Barth ... may be said to
stand for the broad proposition that unfair competitive practices accompanied by an intent
to hurt a competitor constitute per se violations of the antitrust laws, we do not now accept
their teaching."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
92. 717 F.2d at 496 (quoting Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958)).
93. 717 F.2d at 496 (citing Northwest Power Prods., 576 F.2d 83, 90-91).
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The Tenth Circuit then culminated its rejection of the per se rule
with five additional reasons why the per se test should not apply:
(1) The definition of "unfair means" is so vague as to preclude review
under the Pick-Barth line of cases because a "bright line of illegality" is a
prerequisite to per se analysis; 94 (2) The fundamental conflict between
antitrust and unfair competition laws and the necessity of determining,
inferentially, whether there is impermissible intent to eliminate competi-
tion precludes per se analysis; 9 5 (3) Congress did not intend antitrust
illegality to be determined by the unfair competition laws of the individ-
ual states;9 6 (4) Only the Federal Trade Commission, not private plain-
tiffs under the Sherman Act, has the authority to prosecute unfair trade
practices; 97 and (5) The ethical arguments against unfair competition
"are irrelevant to, or even inconsistent with, the economic considera-
tions on which the antitrust laws are based."
98
C. Injury to Competition Under the Rule of Reason
Having decided that the case should be analyzed under the rule of
reason, the Tenth Circuit turned to defendants' charge that the plaintiff
had not proved injury to competition. 99 The court reviewed the record
and found that the evidence could support a finding of injury to a com-
petitor but could not support a finding of injury to competition as re-
quired by the antitrust laws.10 0 In short, Midwest had failed to meet the
well-established injury tests.' 0 ' Thus, the court of appeals concluded,
the district court erred in refusing to enter a directed verdict for the
defendants on Midwest's antitrust claim.
10 2
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF Co-CONSPIRATOR'S STATEMENTS
In United States v. Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc., 103 the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's finding of a bid rigging conspiracy among
contractors in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.i04 Eighteen
contractors had entered bids for the repaving of four sections of an
94. 717 F.2d at 497 (citing Northwest Power Prods., 576 F.2d at 90).
95. 717 F.2d at 497.
96. Id. (citing and quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 512 (1940)).
97. 717 F.2d at 497 (citing I E. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MO-
NOPOLIES 4.3, at 137-42 (3d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1976 at 35) and 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982)).
98. 717 F.2d at 497 (citing National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (.1978)).
99. The evidence failed to show that the defendants' conduct "raised entry barriers,
increased concentrations or otherwise led to the acquisition or exercise of market power."
717 F.2d at 499.
100. Id. at 498. In fact, the court noted that even if it were willing to infer injury to
competition had Midwest itself been eliminated from the market or injured severely, that
no such injury to Midwest existed. Id. at 499.
101. Id. at 498 (citing generally George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders,
Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 562 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975)).
102. The second part of the Midwest decision addresses state law claims based on unfair
competition, loss of corporate opportunities, self-dealing and fiduciary breaches. See 717
F.2d at 500-502.
103. 728 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1984).
104. Id. at 446.
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Oklahoma highway. Broce Construction Company (Broce), after a se-
ries of meetings, "worked out a deal" with Metropolitan Enterprises
(Metropolitan) whereby Broce was to subcontract the northernmost of
the four sections to Metropolitan if Metropolitan agreed to stay out of
the bidding. Broce subsequently received all four contracts and subcon-
tracted the northernmost section to Metropolitan.
0 5
A. The Hearsay Rule and the Co-conspiracy Exception
At trial, following the grand jury indictment charging Metropolitan
and its president with conspiracy to rig bids in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 10 6 the jury found both Metropolitan and its president
guilty. Metropolitan's president, Kavanaugh, was sentenced to two
years in prison and fined $25,000.I07 Metropolitan was fined
$75,000.108
On appeal, Kavanaugh and Metropolitan charged that the district
court had erred in admitting the testimony of two witnesses, and that the
prosecution had failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence and
independent of the admitted statements of the co-conspirators, that
Kavanaugh and others were participants in the conspiracy.
10 9
As to the admission of the statements of the co-conspirators, the
court of appeals noted that an out-of-court statement is not hearsay if it
is offered against a party and is a statement by a co-conspirator made
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."l 0 The court
reviewed the record, and held that the district court had been aware of
and followed what is known as the "preferred order of proof' proce-
dure I I in deciding whether to admit hearsay statements of co-conspira-
tors." l 2 The court, after examining the evidence, upheld the lower
court's finding that Kavanaugh and Metropolitan were guilty of inten-
tionally participating in a conspiracy to rig bids.' '
3
On appeal, the appellants, Kavanaugh and Metropolitan, also
charged error in the instructions to the jury because the instructions did
not sufficiently inform the jury that it is lawful for competitors to obtain
105. Id. at 445-46.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The indictment also contained two counts of mail fraud in
connection with the conspiracy.
107. 728 F.2d at 446.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 448 (emphasis added). See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
111. The "preferred order of proof," outlined in United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d
1313 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980), provides that: (1) the judge deter-
mines admissibility of the co-conspirators' statements; (2) the court makes a threshold
determination based on independent evidence; (3) where possible, the government must
introduce independent proof of the conspiracy first and the defendants' connection with
the conspiracy second, before admitting the hearsay; and (4) the court determines
whether, independent of the hearsay statements, (a) a conspiracy existed; (b) that co-con-
spirator and defendant were members of the conspiracy; and (c) the statement was made
during course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 728 F.2d 448-49.
112. 728 F.2d at 450.
113. Id.
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or exchange information concerning prospective bids.' 14 The Tenth
Circuit, reviewing the instructions as a whole,' 15 found that the instruc-
tions given were adequate to enable the jury to find a violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act.
1 16
The last challenge of appellants was that the first count of the in-
dictment failed to allege the requisite anticompetitive intent or knowl-
edge to state an offense under section 1. The court of appeals found
that the indictment adequately apprised appellants of their participation
in a conspiracy, and that the requisite intent and knowledge was implicit
in the charge of conspiracy. 1 17 The Tenth Circuit thus upheld the lower
court, relying on United States v. Gypsum. 1 18 Gypsum held that intent is a
necessary element of a criminal antitrust violation' 19 but that a "re-
quirement of proof not only of this knowledge of likely effects, but also
of a conscious desire to bring them to fruition or to violate the law
would [be] . . .unduly burdensome. . . . [Tjhe perpetrator's knowl-
edge of the anticipated consequences is a sufficient predicate for a find-
ing of criminal intent."' 120 Furthermore, in Schnautz v. United States,'
2 1
the Fifth Circuit held that the mere failure of the indictment to use the
words "unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully" did not render the indict-
ment insufficient.' 2 2 Thus, the Tenth Circuit in Metropolitan concluded
that the appellants, upon a reading of the indictment outlining the ele-
ments of the conspiracy offense charged, should have been able to pre-
pare their defense despite the omission of the word "intent."'
12 3
IV. CONSPIRING ENTITIES UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
In Blankenship v. Herzfeld (Herzfeld I),124 the Tenth Circuit joined
the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits in holding that the determina-
tion of whether related corporations are capable of conspiring in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act "is a question of fact to be
answered under the circumstances of each case." 12 5 The Tenth Circuit
then deferred to the district court's determination that the defendant
businesses were not separate business organizations capable of conspir-
ing under the Sherman Act.
12 6
114. Id. at 451.
115. This is the standard set forth in several Tenth Circuit cases including United
States v. Burns, 624 F.2d 95, 105 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1980).
116. 728 F.2d 452.
117. Id.
118. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
119. Id. at 443.
120. Id. at 446.
121. 263 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 910 (1959).
122. 263 F.2d at 529.
123. 728 F.2d at 453.
124. 721 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1983). The bulk of this case is set forth and decided in
Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1981) (Herzfeld I).
125. 721 F.2d 309 (quoting Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 588 (8th Cir.
1981)).
126. 721 F.2d at 310.
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In the earlier Herzfeld decision (Herzfeld /),i27 the court had noted
that the defendants shared common ownership and officers, had no pre-
vious history of competition among themselves and essentially "en-
gaged in mutually advantageous business practices."1 2 8 Noting that the
other circuit courts of appeal had drawn differing conclusions as to when
"legally distinct" but "economically related" units should be considered
one actor for section 1 analysis,' 29 the court remanded Herzfeld for a
decision on this issue. 130 On remand, the lower court found that the
defendants constituted a single enterprise.
In Herzfeld II, the Tenth Circuit soundly followed the trend in other
circuits that disregards the "incorporation test,"'31 formerly applied by
the Supreme Court, and, instead, favors a less formalistic "functional
test."' 3 2 The Tenth Circuit cited one of its former decisions which had
noted that "antitrust defendants with separate legal labels . . . are not
always capable of conspiring; they must be separate economic entities in
substance as well."'
133
Had the Tenth Circuit waited another seven months for the
Supreme Court's June 1984 decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp.,'1 4 the court's job in Herzfeld would have been considerably
easier. In Copperweld, the Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law, a
parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring with
each other for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 3 5 Although
the Herzfeld defendants do not represent a clean "parent-subsidiary"
grouping, the reasoning of the Supreme Court's decision-that a parent
and its wholly owned subsidiary have the same objectives, are guided by
a single corporate consciousness, and in "agreeing to a course of ac-
tion," are not joining previously disparate economic resources-would
have sustained a finding that the Herzfeld defendants were incapable of
conspiring with each other.'
3 6
Christine O'Connor
127. 661 F.2d 840 (1981).
128. 721 F.2d at 310 (citing Rec., vol. I, at 77).
129. 721 F.2d at 309. See, e.g., Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 588 (8th Cir.
1981).
130. Id. at 308-09.
131. The incorporation test suggests that when corporate subdivisions are incorpo-
rated separately, they can be treated as separate entities for the purpose of applying sec-
tion 1. See Comment, Intraenterprise Antitrust Conspiracy: a Decision-making Approach, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 1732 (1983). This incorporation test was resoundingly rejected in Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4821 (June 19, 1984).
132. The functional test examines the relationship between the entities to determine
whether they are capable of conspiring to restrain trade. See 721 F.2d at 309.
133. 721 F.2d at 309 (citing Holter v. Moore & Co., 702 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 347 (1983)).
134. 52 U.S.L.W. 4821 (June 19, 1984).
135. Id. at 4828.
136. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Copperweld, "the very notion ofan agreement






A record number of bankruptcy petitions were filed in the bank-
ruptcy courts under the appellate jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals for the fiscal year October 1, 1983 to September 30, 1984.
In that period, debtors filed 23,062 new petitions.' For the fiscal years
1981-82 and 1982-83, there were respectively 20,086 and 22,191 new
cases filed. 2 The increasing number of appeals from the bankruptcy
courts to the Tenth Circuit reflects this heavy caseload. This survey will
focus primarily on the published opinions which were handed down by
the Tenth Circuit within the survey period.
Many of the cases discussed in this survey contain issues raised by
the numerous changes, legal and judicial, in the bankruptcy system since
the 1898 Bankruptcy Act was repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978. 3 Several cases deal with the impact of state law on federal bank-
ruptcy law. Where pertinent, this survey notes further changes in the
bankruptcy system due to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 19844 on July 10, 1984.
I. JURISDICTION AFTER MARATHON
A. Background
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 established a new bankruptcy
court system which gave bankruptcy judges the authority that was previ-
ously shared by bankruptcy referees and federal district judges. 5 The
old system established by the 1898 Act was wasteful and inefficient.
6
Cases were referred from the courts of bankruptcy (the United States
district courts and territorial district courts) to the bankruptcy referee.
The referee was given jurisdiction over the case "subject always to a
1. Telephone interviews with Clerks of Bankruptcy Court, Tenth Circuit (November,
1984).
2. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Statistical Analysis and Reports
Division, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics, A-47 (1982), A-43 (1983).
3. "The term 'Bankruptcy Code' is often used in connection with Title II of the
United States Code as amended by Public Law No. 95-598. The numerous provisions of
Public Law No. 95-598 that amend Title 28 of the United States Code have no common
name or designation and will be referred to simply as ...the Bankruptcy Reform Act."
Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Court Under the New Bankruptcy Law: Its Structure and Jurisdiction, I I
ST. MARY'S L.J. 251 (1979), reprinted in 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 66 n.20 (1981).
4. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
5. See Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53 (1982).
6. The years of study that lead to the passage of the 1978 Inkruptcy law made clear
that the two major failings of the prior bankruptcy referee sysiin were Ihe lack of simplic-
ity in determining jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and the low starius and lack of power
of the bankruptcy judges which resulted in disrespect for their position and inability to
attract the best caliber judges. 130 CONG. REC. 7490 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement
of Rep. Edwards).
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review by the judge" of the bankruptcy court. 7 The referee was also
responsible for administrative duties under section 39a of the 1898 Act.
The system resulted in duplication of effort and mixed judicial and ad-
ministrative functions.
In order to make the bankruptcy process workable and efficient, the
1978 Reform Act abolished the referee system and created a newly
structured and independent bankruptcy court. Congress hoped that the
new system would attract highly qualified applicants to the judicial posts
established, and that the role of these judges would be limited to judicial
functions, thus resulting in increased fairness and less bias than under
the referee system.8 Also, in recognition of the specialized nature of
bankruptcy and for the sake of judicial economy, the new bankruptcy
court was given a pervasive grant ofjurisdiction. 9
There was one major problem with the 1978 Reform Act-the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by the bankruptcy courts was unconstitutional. In
June 1982, in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. ,'1
the Supreme Court held the jurisdictional component of the new system
unconstitutional because article I bankruptcy judges were adjudicating
rights and claims that only article III judges could constitutionally de-
cide. " The ruling was prospective only, and the Supreme Court gave
Congress over three months to remedy the situation.' 2 When Congress
failed to act, the Judicial Conference of the United States proposed a
model interim operating rule which split jurisdiction between the dis-
trict courts and the bankruptcy courts, depending on whether the case
arose under title 11 or was a civil proceeding "related to"' 13 cases under
7. 11 U.S.C. § 66 (1976) (repealed 1978).
8. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Pts. I and 11 (1973).
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (1982).
10. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
11. Id. at 87. U.S. CONST. article III, section 1 states:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Serv-
ices a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.
It is well established that the "good Behavior" language means that article lII judges shall
be appointed for life terms, "subject only to removal by impeachment." Marathon, 458
U.S. at 59 (citing Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955)). Under the Reform Act, how-
ever, bankruptcy judges were appointed to 14-year terms and their salaries could be ad-
justed downward by Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982) (14 yr. term); 2 U.S.C.
§§ 351-361 (1982) (salary adjustment).
For a more detailed analysis of the Marathon decision see Redish, Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197 (1983).
12. Marathon, 458 U.S. 87-88. Judgment was stayed to afford Congress an opportu-
nity to "reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication,
without impairing the interim administration of the bankruptcy laws." Id. at 88.
13. Consistent with Marathon, the interim operating rule defined related proceedings
as follows:
Related proceedings are those civil proceedings that in the absence of a petition
in bankruptcy could have been brought in a district court or state court . . ..
Related proceedings do not include: contested and uncontested matters con-
cerning the administration of the estate; allowance of and objections to claims
against the estate . . ..
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title 11. In "related to" proceedings, a bankruptcy judge could only
make findings and recommendations concerning a judgment. 14 A judg-
ment became final only upon being signed by a federal district judge. 15
This split of jurisdiction for bankruptcy issues led to a flood of liti-
gation regarding what was and was not a "related to" proceeding. The
Tenth Circuit rendered two decisions within the survey period which
dealt with this split of jurisdiction and its effects.
B. Oklahoma Health Services Credit Union v. Webb
In Oklahoma Health Services Credit Union v. Webb, 16 the Webbs filed a
joint chapter 13 petition and a chapter 13 plan. Prior to the petition, the
appellant credit union had repossessed the Webbs' automobile upon
their default in payments. The chapter 13 plan called for the return of
the automobile to the Webbs with a provision under the plan to cure the
default and to resume the required payments. The bankruptcy court en-
tered an order confirming the plan and a second order calling for the
return of the automobile to the Webbs.
The credit union appealed both orders. 17 It challenged the juris-
diction of the bankruptcy court, arguing that in Marathon the Supreme
Court, by invalidating the jurisdictional provision of 28 U.S.C. section
1471(c) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, had also invalidated 28
U.S.C. section 1471(a) and (b).18 Subsections (a) and (b) relate only to
the grant of jurisdiction to the district courts; subsection (c) relates to
the pervasive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. 19
The Tenth Circuit joined other circuits in rejecting this argument.
2 0
It held that the split ofjurisdiction under the interim operating rule was
valid because the district courts retain primary jurisdiction over bank-
MODEL RULE: JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, reprinted in A. HERZOG & L.
KING, COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION BANKRUPTCY CODE 665 (1983).
14. See A. HERZOG & L. KING, COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION BANKRUPTCY CODE 665
( (d)(3)(b)) (1983).
15. Id. at (e)(2)(A) and (B).
16. 726 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1984).
17. Id. at 625.
18. Id.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982) reads in part:
Jurisdiction:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a
court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original
but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title II or aris-
ing in or related to cases under title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is com-
menced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the dis-
trict courts . ..
20. See Salomon v. Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574 (2d Cir. 1983); White Motor Corp. v. Ci-
tibank, N.A., 704 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1983); First Nat'l Bank of Tekamah, Nebraska v. Han-
sen, 702 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3539 (1983); Braniff Airways, Inc.
v. CAB, 700 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 944 (1983); see also Coastal Steel
Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
349 (1983).
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ruptcy matters. 2 ' It also rejected the argument that the subject matter
of the orders was controlled by state law and that the case was a "related
proceeding." '2 2 It found that the subject matter of the orders was based
on the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, the bankruptcy court had juris-
diction to enter a final order.
C. In re Colorado Energy Supply, Inc.
A procedural issue arising out of the interpretation of "related to"
proceedings under Marathon was raised in In re Colorado Energy Supply,
Inc.23 Following the sale of debtor's property, debtor's landlord, Price,
applied for immediate payment of his claim for rent from the sale pro-
ceeds. The claim was disallowed as a cost of sale. Following the entry of
judgment by the bankruptcy court, Price filed a notice of appeal and a
motion for extension of time for filing a notice of appeal with both the
bankruptcy and district courts. The appeals were denied as the time pe-
riod allowed by Bankruptcy Rule 802 for filing the notice of appeal and
the motion for extension had expired. 2
4
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Price claimed that the Bankruptcy
Rule 802 time period was not applicable to his case. 2 5 Alternatively, he
claimed that his failure to file timely under Rule 802 was due to excusa-
ble neglect which he explained had resulted from confusion over the
applicable procedural rules due to the Marathon decision.2 6
If the matter was a "related to" proceeding, the Bankruptcy Rule
802 time period was inapplicable because the judgment would be final
and appealable only after being signed by a district court judge.2 7 If
however, the proceeding was one arising under title 11, the time period
for appeal would run from the entry of judgment by the bankruptcy
judge and that time period would have expired. The court noted that
Price was attempting to keep his claim alive by seeking a broad interpre-
tation of Marathon so as to obtain a ruling that the bankruptcy court had
no jurisdiction to render a final order regarding his alleged "related to"
claim. 28 The Tenth Circuit found the issue to be purely a bankruptcy
matter and again, as in Webb, joined other circuits in narrowly interpret-
ing the Marathon decision.2 9 Finally, the court held that the late filings
of the notice of appeal and motion for an extension of time were not due
21. 726 F.2d at 625.
22. Id. at 625-26.
23. 728 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1984).
24. Former Bankruptcy Rule 802 required that a notice of appeal be filed with the
clerk of the bankruptcy court within 10 days of the date of the entry of the appealed judg-
ment, order, or decree. A request to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal must
have been made before the time for filing a notice of appeal expired except that a request
made no more than 20 days after the expiration of the time for filing a notice of appeal
may have been granted upon the showing of excusable neglect.
25. 728 F.2d at 1284.
26. Id. at 1286.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1285.




D. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
Subsequent to the holdings in Webb and Colorado Energy Supply, Con-
gress passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984 ("BAFJA") 3 i creating a solution to the problems arising out of
Marathon. Title I of BAFJA contains jurisdictional provisions; Title II
creates 85 additional district and circuit court judgeships; Title III
makes significant changes in the Bankruptcy Code in the areas of con-
sumer credit, rejection of labor contracts, discharge of debts incurred by
drunk drivers, repurchase agreements, time share agreements and bank-
ruptcies of grain storage facilities and shopping centers. The new court
structure created by BAFJA parallels practice under the interim operat-
ing rule so closely that it is fair to say the new provisions are in many
respects a codification of the interim rule.
3 2
Jurisdiction of the district court is set forth in 28 U.S.C. section
1334(a) and (b) 33 as amended, which parallels former 28 U.S.C. section
1471(a) and (b). As under the interim rule, practice under BAFJA is
premised on district court jurisdiction of all title 11 cases and related
proceedings with reference of any and all cases to the bankruptcy judge
for the district. Bankruptcy judges may enter judgment on core pro-
ceedings 34 arising under title 11 but may only propose findings and con-
30. Id. at 1286.
31. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
32. Special Report: Highlights of H.R. 5174, CURRENT AWARENESS ALERT, 1984 Issue 5,
Part II, at 49 (July, 1984).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1984) provides in part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a
court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original
but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title !1, or
arising in or related to cases under title 11.
34. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2) (West 1984) defines core proceedings as follows:
Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from
property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interest for the purposes of
confirming a plan under chapter 11 or 13 of title II but not the liquidation or
estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death
claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
() objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash
collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from
claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the
estate; and
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clusions to the district court regarding a proceeding that is non-core but
is otherwise related to a case under title 11.
There are also provisions for distinctive treatment of certain pro-
ceedings. Upon timely motion of a party, the district court must abstain
from jurisdiction of a state law claim or cause of action, and the decision
to abstain is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.3 5 Personal injury
and wrongful death claims are also singled out for distinctive treatment.
These claims must be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy
case is pending or the district court in the district in which the claim
arose.3 6 The mandatory abstention rules do not apply to personal in-
jury and wrongful death suits.
A negative view of the new bankruptcy legislation was expressed by
Congressman Edwards in his remarks before the House of
Representatives:
Mr. Speaker, the conference report H.R. 5174, Bankruptcy
Amendments of 1984, is regrettable, at best. It ignores over a
decade of study in this issue and creates a maze for debtors,
creditors, and their lawyers who participate in the bankruptcy
process . . . The conference report before us today turns
back the clock, and it does so more than just 6 years by dimin-
ishing the status of bankruptcy judges and their powers from
what they were before the 1978 legislation . . . . Finally, and
very importantly, the jurisdictional powers granted to the bank-
ruptcyjudge and the methods of appointment are not free from
constitutional doubt, which is what got us into this in the first
place under the 1978 compromise.
3 7
His view is shared by many bankruptcy practitioners who believe the
only real solution is to give article III status to bankruptcy judges.
3 8
As Congressman Edwards pointed out, there is concern over the
constitutionality of the provisions which extend the terms of bankruptcy
judges. These terms technically expired on June 27, 1984, the day that
the last Congressional deadline passed without new legislation having
been enacted. One could argue that this congressional extension of au-
thority amounts to appointment of judges by Congress. The appoint-
ment clause 39 of the United States Constitution vests appointment
authority in the executive branch and the judicial branch rather than in
the legislative branch.
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the
adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship, ex-
cept personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
35. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c)(2) (West 1984).
36. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(5) (West 1984).
37. 130 CONG. REC. 7489 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
38. See Norton and Lieb, Ending the Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Dilemma-An Article III Bank-
ruptcy Court Approach, 67 JUDICATURE 346 (1984). But cf. DeMascio, Bankruptcy A Solution In
Search Of A Problem, 67 JUDICATURE 354 (1984) (a separate article III bankruptcy court is
both unnecessary and unwise).
39. [T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Depart-
ments. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
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William E. Foley, Director of the Adminstrative Office of the United
States Courts, responded to BAFJA just one day after it was signed into
law. He sent a memorandum to all circuit judges, district court judges
and former bankruptcy judges. He stated his concern with the constitu-
tionality of BAFJA and announced his decision not to pay any former
bankruptcy judge purporting to exercise judicial authority under the
new provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 121. He stated:
If the purpose served by the provision is interpreted to be
equivalent to a new appointment of individuals to the offices
they held on June 27, there is a very real possibility, in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976), that the section will be held to be unconstitutional
when challenged. In that event decisions by bankruptcy judges
relying upon section 121 for their grants of judicial authority
may all be invalidated, extensively disrupting the bankruptcy
system and inconveniencing bankruptcy litigants.
40
Since July 10, 1984, the bankruptcy system has been operating
under the jurisdictional provisions of BAFJA. New constitutional chal-
lenges loom on the horizon just months after the Tenth Circuit upheld
in Webb and Colorado Energy Supply the validity of 28 U.S.C. section 1471
(a) and (b) and the jurisdictional system established by the interim oper-
ating rule.
II. DEBTORS' STRICT DUTY TO GIVE FORMAL NOTICE TO CREDITORS
In Reliable Electric Co. v. Olson Construction Co. ,41 the Tenth Circuit
held that the claim of Olson Construction Company, appellee, was not
dischargeable and not subject to the debtor's plan of reorganization be-
cause the debtor, Reliable, had not given Olson sufficient notice of the
bankruptcy confirmation hearing. 4 2 Rejecting Reliable's "fresh start"
argument, the court stated that Olson's guaranteed right to due process
was paramount to the "all encompassing" language of section 114143
40. Memorandum to all circuit, district and former bankruptcy judges, W.E. Foley,
Director, Admin. Office of the United States Courts, July 11, 1984.
41. 726 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1984).
42. Id. at 623.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section, the provi-
sions of a confirmed plan bind . . . any creditor . . . of. . . the debtor, whether
or not the claim or interest of such creditor . . . is impaired under the plan and
whether or not such creditor . . . has accepted the plan.
(c) After confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and
clear of all claims and interests of creditors . . . except as otherwise provided in
the plan or in the order confirming the plan.
(d)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the plan, or in the
order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan-
(A) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such
confirmation . . . whether or not-
(i) a proof of the claim based on such debt is filed or deemed filed
under section 501 of this title;
(ii) such claim is allowed under section 502 of this title; or
(iii) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan . . ..
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under the circumstances presented in the case. 44
Olson received actual knowledge of the chapter 1 1 proceedings
through a phone call from Reliable's attorney. Olson was also a defend-
ant and counter-claimant in a breach-of-contract action within the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. Despite the fact that Olson had counterclaimed for
damages, Reliable had failed to schedule Olson as a contingent creditor.
As a result, Olson did not receive notice of the time for filing an accept-
ance or rejection of the reorganization plan, of the confirmation hear-
ing, of the time for filing objections to the confirmation, or of the
confirmation and discharge of Reliable. After confirmation of the plan
and after judgment for Olson in the breach of contract action, Reliable
moved the court to allow thejudgment as a prepetition unsecured claim.
By doing so, the claim would be subject to the confirmed plan of reor-
ganization and, therefore, dischargeable. 4 5 Under the plan, class four
unsecured debt was substantially impaired, and Olson would have been
forced to share in the distribution to the class four unsecured creditors
on a percentage basis.
Applying the standard of reasonable notice outlined by the United
States Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co. ,46 the Tenth
Circuit held that due process requires that creditors be given notice
which is reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise
them of the pending confirmation and which gives them the opportunity
to present their objections. 47 A creditor who has general knowledge of
a debtor's reorganization proceedings has no duty to inquire about fur-
ther court action. 4 8 A creditor has a "right to assume" that he will re-
ceive all of the notices required by statute before his claim is forever
barred.49 This case should serve as a warning to all debtors and their
attorneys that there is a strict duty to give formal notice of bankruptcy
proceedings to all potential creditors.
III. RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAw
A. Child Support: Law in Effect at Time of Filing Determines Dischargeability
At issue in Franklin v. State of New Mexico ex. rel. Department of Human
Services 50 was the dischargeability of child support payments owed to the
State of New Mexico. Franklin, the debtor and appellee, was the alleged
father of an illegitimate child. The State of New Mexico had provided
economic assistance to the child when the debtor failed to pay child sup-
port. The dischargeability of the debt to the State depended on whether
the law in effect at the time of filing the bankruptcy petition or the
44. 726 F.2d at 623 n.6.
45. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) and (d)(1) (1982).
46. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
47. 726 F.2d at 622.
48. Id. (citing New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293,
297 (1953)). See also In re Intaco Puerto Rico, Inc., 494 F.2d 94, 99 (1st Cir. 1974); In re
Harbor Tank Storage Co., 385 F.2d 111, 115 (3d Cir. 1967).
49. 726 F.2d at 622.
50. 730 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1984).
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amended law in effect at the time of the hearing on dischargeability
should apply. 5 1 The Tenth Circuit held that the date of filing is determi-
native. 52 In doing so, it followed the rule under Bradley v. Richmond
School Board,5 3 which dictates that a court must apply the law in effect at
the time it renders its decision unless doing so would result in manifest
injustice or unless there is statutory or legislative history to the con-
trary. 54 The Tenth Circuit balanced the nature of the parties, the nature
of their rights and the resulting impact the change in the law had on
those rights, and determined that an injustice would result if the dis-
charge law were applied restrospectively. 5 5 The court pointed out that
the Bankruptcy Act provides a legislative scheme in which the time of
filing is determinative of many substantial rights. 56 The court also
noted the absence of language within the 1981 amendment to the Code
which would indicate a legislative intent that the amendment apply
retrospectively.
5 7
B. "Gap Period" Liens
The Tenth Circuit decision In re Groves 58 involved a consolidation
of four cases in which debtors attempted to avoid nonpossesory, non-
purchase-money liens on certain property pursuant to section
522(f)(2). 59  The issue decided in each case was whether section
522(0(2) applied to "gap period" liens. The court defined a "gap pe-
riod" lien as a lien created "after the enactment but before the effective
date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978."60 The bankruptcy court
held that application of section 522(f)(2) to such liens would impair
vested property rights and therefore violate due process. The United
States, intervenor in the bankruptcy proceedings, appealed directly to
the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit adopted the analysis of the Ninth
Circuit in In re Webber 6 1 and reversed. In Webber, the Ninth Circuit found
that Congress intended that section 522(0(2) should apply to gap pe-
riod liens and that application of section 522(f)(2) to such liens did not
violate due process because creditors acquiring liens during the gap pe-
51. Prior to October 1, 1979, support obligations owed to the state were nondis-
chargeable. This type of debt became dischargeable after that date pursuant to the 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act, II U.S.C. § 52 3 (a)(5). On August 13, 1981, the Code was
amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat.
357 § 2334(b) and (c) to again disallow the discharge of this type of debt.
52. 730 F.2d at 87.
53. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
54. Id. at 697.
55. 730 F.2d at 87-88.
56. Id. at 87. For example, rights pertaining to the operation of the automatic stay,
the evaluation of secured claims, and the determination of what constitutes property of the
estate are determined as of the date of filing. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 506 and 541 (1982).
57. 730 F.2d at 87 (citing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-35, § 2334(c), 95 Stat. 863 (1981)).
58. 707 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1983).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1982).
60. 707 F.2d at 452. The "gap period" extends from Nov. 6, 1978, the date of enact-
ment, through October 1, 1979, the effective date. Id. at 452 n.l.
61. 674 F.2d 796 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982).
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riod had notice of the future effect of the Act.6 2
Judge Barrett, dissenting in Groves, refused to put the creditors "on
notice" of section 522(f)(2) until the effective date of the Act. 6 3 He ar-
gued that the creditors' security interests in the property of the debtors
were property interests which could not be taken without due process of
law. Judge Barrett criticized the majority opinion for imputing notice to
creditors from the date of enactment, and supported the prospective ap-
plication of new law where Congress is silent on retroactive
application.
64
The holding of the Tenth Circuit in Groves,65 decided May 16, 1983,
and in Franklin,6 6 decided March 26, 1984, are inconsistent regarding
retroactive application of new law. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
provided that the majority of its provisons would take effect on October
1, 1979. There was no provision for any section to be retroactively ap-
plied, yet the majority in Groves found retroactive application to be "in-
tended."' 6 7 In contrast, the majority opinion in Franklin noted that the
effective date of the Code amendment was the date of enactment and
thus found an intent for prospective application. The Franklin majority
stated, "[t]his court generally disfavors retrospective application of a law
without a clear expression of legislative intent .... .68
At best, the Groves decision will create only minimal confusion re-
garding whether the enactment date or effective date controls the vari-
ous provisions of the Reform Act of 1978. At worst, if liberally
interpreted, Groves could render meaningless statutory effective dates.
The general rule, however, as quoted by dissenting Judge Barrett,
should still prevail: "Acts of Congress are generally to be applied uni-
formly throughout the country from the date of their effectiveness
onward."
69
IV. IMPACT OF STATE LAW ON FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY LAW
A. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
In In re Colorado Corp. ,70 the limited partners of Green Mountain 69
(Green Mountain) sued The Colorado Corporation (TCC) for additional
distributions from the liquidation of Green Mountain. Green Mountain
was formed to finance drilling operations on Green Mountain proper-
ties, and TCC was its general partner. The 1969 limited partnership
agreement provided that certain payments be made by each of the lim-
62. Id. at 804.
63. 707 F.2d at 453 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
67. 707 F.2d at 452.
68. 730 F.2d at 87 (citing Edgar v. Fred Jones Lincoln-Mercury of Oklahoma, Inc.,
524 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1975)).
69. Groves, 707 F.2d at 553 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Estate of
Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 294 (1974)).
70. No. 81-2177 (10th Cir. filed June 20, 1983).
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ited partners to provide capital for drilling. When the plaintiffs de-
faulted on their final payments, TCC purchased their interests as
provided by the agreement. The limited partnership agreement was
then amended to reflect the modified list of partners and their capital
contributions.
When TCC was adjudicated bankrupt, the limited partners of Green
Mountain filed for reclamation of their share of the Green Mountain
mineral interests (Green Mountain-i). In response, the trustee at-
tempted to reject the limited partnership agreement as an executory
contract. The limited partners then filed a stipulation of facts which ac-
knowledged the purchase by TCC of the interests of certain defaulting
limited partners. 7' The bankruptcy court held that the limited partner-
ship agreement was not executory and had been fully performed with all
monies having been paid. The court also held that TCC, as general
partner, could wind up the affairs of the limited partnership and liqui-
date its assets. Green Mountain was subsequently liquidated, and the
proceeds were distributed according to the interests set out in the
amended limited partnership agreement. At that time, the limited part-
ners raised no objection to the distribution; however, in 1978, they filed
an action for an accounting. This second action for an accounting,
Green Mountain-2, was appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
In Green Mountain-2, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee's
motion for summary judgment, finding plaintiffs' claim barred by res
judicata. The district court affirmed, 72 finding that the underlying facts
and issues relevant to the holding in the reclamation proceeding, Green
Mountain- 1, were the same facts and issues which the defaulting limited
partners were attempting to relitigate in their claim for an accounting in
Green Mountain-2. The limited partners argued before the Tenth Cir-
cuit that there was no similarity of issues of fact between the actions; that
there was not a full and fair opportunity to litigate the accounting in
Green Mountain-1; that there was no threat of inconsistency of rulings;
and that the limited partners were not on notice that the facts pertinent
to the repurchase were necessary to the determination of Green Moun-
tain- 1.73
The Tenth Circuit addressed each of the limited partners' argu-
ments and concluded that to rule in their favor would contradict the
central holding in Green Mountain-i (that the limited partnership
agreement was not executory and that TCC had fully performed by pay-
71. The limited partners filed a stipulation of facts which stated in part:
By amendment, dated January 31, 1971, and recorded in Denver, Colorado, on
February 11, 1971, the certificate of limited partnership for Green Mountain-69
was amended to reflect that as of October 26, 1970, pursuant to the default and
repurchase provisions of the Partnership Agreement, certain defaulting Limited
Partners had sold their interest to TCC so that TCC had contributed $294,271.66
of the $798,600 required of the Limited Partners, and thereby re-acquired ap-
proximately 37% of ten Limited Partners' 30% interest . ...
Colorado Corp., No. 81-2177, slip op. at 4.
72. No. CIV 81-F-402 (D.C. Colo. filed August 31, 1981).
73. Colorado Corp., No. 81-2177, slip op. at 6.
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ing all monies as set forth in the amended agreement and as stipulated
by the plaintiffs). In response to the limited partners' argument that the
application of res judicata against them was unfair, the circuit court
quoted the United States Supreme Court in Federated Department Stores,
Inc. v. Moitie,7 4 stating that "[t]he doctrine of res judicata serves vital
public interests beyond any individual judge's ad hoc determination of
the equities in a particular case."
'75
The Tenth Circuit also addressed the application of collateral es-
toppel in Goss v. Goss. 76 A state court determined that the obligations
embodied in the debtor's divorce decree were in the nature of mainte-
nance and support and, therefore, were nondischargeable under former
Bankruptcy Act section 17a(17). 7 7 In a subsequent bankruptcy proceed-
ing, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma held that
it was not bound by the prior state court judgment. The bankruptcy
court concluded that the judgment awarded in the divorce decree con-
stituted a property settlement, not alimony, and thus was dischargeable.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and held that the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel should have been applied in the bankruptcy proceeding.
78
The court distinguished the application of res judicata (claim pre-
clusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion):79 "[w]hereas res
judicata forecloses all that which might have been litigated previously,
collateral estoppel treats as final only those questions actually and nec-
essarily decided in a prior suit."' 80 The court also recognized that appli-
cation of these concepts may differ if the bankruptcy court has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine dischargeability as opposed to concurrent ju-
risdiction with state courts.
8 1
The United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Felsen 82 held that res
judicata does not prevent a bankruptcy court from going beyond the
judgment and record of a prior state court proceeding to determine
debt dischargeability under section 17a(2) and (4) of the former Act.
83
In Goss, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Brown because in that case the
dischargeability of debt had been under the exclusive juridiction of the
bankruptcy court; also Brown dealt only with resjudicata, explicitly leav-
ing open the question of whether collateral estoppel should apply to a
state court judgment in the face of exclusive jurisdiction in the bank-
74. 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
75. Id. at 401.
76. 722 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1983).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1976) (repealed 1978).
78. 722 F.2d at 604.
79. See generalty M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 234-41 (2d ed. 1979).
80. 722 F.2d at 602 (quoting Brown v. Felsen 442 U.S. 127, 139 n.10 (1979)).
81. Section 17c(2) of the 1976 Bankruptcy Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to bank-
ruptcy courts to determine dischargeability of debts under § 17a(2), (4) and (8). 11 U.S.C.
§ 35(a)(2), (4), (8) (1976). State courts possess jurisdiction concurrent with that of the
bankruptcy courts to determine dischargeability, with respect to other classes of debts
under § 17a, including debts for alimony or maintenance and support under § 17a(7). 722
F.2d at 602.
82. 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
83. Id. at 138.
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ruptcy court.8 4 The Tenth Circuit did not rule on whether, within its
jurisdiction, collateral estoppel should apply in a dischargeability deter-
mination involving a bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction. The cir-
cuits are divided on this question.8 5 In a situation where the states have
been granted concurrent jurisdiction, however, collateral estoppel will
apply when, as in this case, the elements of collateral estoppel are
satisfied.
8 6
B. Constitutionality of Colorado Bankruptcy Exemptions
In Hinkson v. Pfleiderer,8 7 the Tenth Circuit addressed the constitu-
tionality of the Colorado bankruptcy exemptions. Hinkson, a chapter 7
debtor, claimed certain federal exemptions provided by section
522(d).8 8 The trustee objected. In response, Hinkson challenged the
constitutionality of Colorado Revised Statutes section 13-54-107 which
in part denies section 522(d) exemptions to Colorado citizens pursuant
to an option in the Code.8 9 He claimed the provision in the second
sentence of the two-sentence statute offended the supremacy clause 9 °
because it prevented him from claiming certain "nonbankruptcy exemp-
tions," meaning those not contained in section 522(d) but provided by
other federal and state laws.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court's ruling that Hink-
son could not claim the federal exemptions contained in section 522(d)
because Colorado had "opted out" of providing its citizens such an ex-
emption.9 ' The Tenth Circuit also held that Hinkson lacked standing to
84. Id. at 139, n.10.
85. Some courts have held that collateral estoppel does apply in this situation. See,
e.g., In re Rahm, 641 F.2d 755, 756 n.2, 757 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981)
(§ 17a(8); In re Kasler, 611 F.2d 308, 309-10 (9th Cir. 1979) (§ 17a(8). Other courts, how-
ever, have applied collateral estoppel where the issue was previously litigated by the par-
ties in state court, despite the existence of exclusive jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court.
See, e.g., Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 227 (6th Cir. 1981) (§ 17a(8), In re Ross, 602
F.2d 604, 607-08 (3d Cir. 1979) (§ 17a(2).
86. The elements of collateral estoppel are:
(1) The issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical with the issue
in the present action.
(2) There must have been a final judgment rendered.
(3) The party against whom an issue is to be precluded must have been a party
or in privity with a party in the prior case.
(4) The party against whom the doctrine is asserted must have had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate in the prior case.
(5) The determination of the issue was essential to the judgment.
See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS at 682-85 (4th ed. 1983).
87. 729 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1984).
88. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982).
89. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-54-107 (Supp. 1984) reads:
The exemptions provided in section 552(d) of the federal bankruptcy code of
1978 (Title II of the United States Code), as amended, are denied to residents of
this state. Exemptions authorized to be claimed by residents of this state shall be
limited to those exemptions expressly provided by the statutes of this state.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-102 (Supp. 1984) lists the exemptions which substitute for the
federal § 522(d) exemptions.
90. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
91. This ruling is consistent with the position taken by other circuits. See, First Nat'l
Bank of Mobile v. Norris, 701 F.2d 902, 904 (1lth Cir. 1983); In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d
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challenge a part of the Colorado statute which did not affect him;
although Hinkson challenged the constitutionality of the second sen-
tence of section 13-54-107, it was the first sentence which denied him
the federal exemption. The Tenth Circuit noted that it was a "close
question" whether the Colorado statute precludes a debtor from claim-
ing other federal non-code exemptions.
92
The Colorado bankruptcy court has since ruled on the constitution-
ality of the second sentence. On June 24, 1984, in Ranes v. Molen,
9 3
Judge Brumbaugh of the United States Bankruptcy Court, for the Dis-
trict of Colorado, held the Colorado statute did not deny "nonban-
kruptcy exemptions" to its citizens. The parties have not appealed the
decision.
C. Releasing a Joint Tortfeasor-Effect on Dischargeability of Debt
In LeaseAmercia Corp. v. Eckels,94 the Eckels were the owners and de-
velopers of an equestrian facility. They entered into a lease agreement
with LeaseAmerica whereby LeaseAmerica would purchase a sound sys-
tem and portable stalls and lease them to the Eckels. The sound system
was purchased from David Beatty. Beatty quoted the price of the sound
system as $18,484 in a letter to LeaseAmerica. The actual cost of the
sound system was $7,810. LeaseAmerica paid the $18,484 to the Eckels,
who in turn paid Beatty for the system and retained $10,674.
LeaseAmerica also paid Harold Krug $183,200 for the portable stalls.
The stalls actually cost $159,600. Krug remitted $23,600 to the Eckels.
Evidence indicated that the Eckels participated in both transactions in-
tentionally and without the knowledge or consent of LeaseAmerica.
The Eckels later filed a chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy. LeaseAmerica
filed a complaint contesting the dischargeability of the $10,674 and
$23,600 debts. The bankruptcy court in Kansas held that these debts
were nondischargeable because they constituted a willful and malicious
conversion of funds.
LeaseAmerica also sued David Beatty for the $10,674 in Missouri
state court. More than a year and a half after the bankruptcy court had
held the debt nondischargeable as to the Eckels, LeaseAmerica and
Beatty entered into a compromise settlement. Under the settlement,
Beatty agreed to pay LeaseAmercia $3,750 and court costs, and
LeaseAmercia gave Beatty a complete and unconditional release. Just a
month after the settlement, the federal district court in Kansas affirmed
the bankruptcy court's holding that the debts were nondischargeable.
The Eckels responded by filing a motion for relief from judgment
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) and (6). 95 They argued
1131, 1132 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Canaday, 653 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 1981); see generally 3
COLLIER ON BANKR. 522.02 at 522-11 (15th ed. 1983) (listing states which do not provide
522(d) exemptions).
92. 729 F.2d at 699.
93. 31 Bankr. 70 (Colo. 1983).
94. 710 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1983).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) and (6). The rule provides in pertinent part:
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that the compromise settlement with a full release effectuated by
LeaseAmerica and Beatty constituted the unconditional release of ajoint
tortfeasor, and that, under Kansas law, the unconditional release of one
tortfeasor acts as an unconditional release of all joint tortfeasors. In de-
nying the Eckels' motion for relief from judgment, the district court rea-
soned that the agreement between LeaseAmerica and Beatty did not
affect that part of the indebtedness found nondischargeable by the bank-
ruptcy court. The district court emphasized the Eckels' "willful and ma-
licious conversion" of the funds and refused to excuse the Eckels from
accountability.
9 6
The Tenth Circuit, finding no manifest abuse of discretion on the
part of the district court, affirmed. In the opinion, Judge Barrett noted
several relevant facts: Beatty was sued in Missouri while the bankruptcy
was filed in Kansas; the Eckels were not parties to the Missouri lawsuit
and did not appear therein; and the Eckels were not represented by
counsel in the Missouri proceedings. Judge Barrett reasoned that
"[n]othing in the record .. .support[ed] the Eckels' bald assertion that
they were actually joint tortfeasors in the Missouri action or that the
settlement and release in full effectuated between the parties in Missouri
was binding upon the federal district court in Kansas for purposes of
evaluating a rule 60(b) motion." 9 7 The opinion implies that the willful
and malicious conversion of funds is the heart of the matter. The court
stated: "We concur in the district court's observation that 'to grant the
relief requested would mean that the Eckels would be excused from any
accountability despite their 'willful and malicious conversion' of funds-
the very act which under the law made the indebtedness
nondischargeable.' "98
The LeaseAmerica opinion is unclear as to whether facts, legal princi-
ples or equitable considerations governed the Tenth Circuit's holding.
The opinion does not indicate whether a release prior to a determina-
tion of nondischargeability or prior to a bankruptcy petition would re-
verse the holding. Absent more detailed reasoning, it is difficult to
determine what impact state laws governing the release of joint
tortfeasors may have upon the nondischargeability of debts falling
under section 523(a)(b).
V. GOOD FAITH PROPOSALS IN A CHAPTER 13 PLAN
In Flygare v. Boulden, 99 the debtors' first proposed chapter 13 plan
was denied confirmation, and the case was dismissed. Three months
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: . . . (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of thejudgment. ...
96. 710 F.2d at 1475.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 709 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir. 1983).
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later the debtors filed a second petition which was similar to the first.
The debtors' second proposed plan called for payment to the trustee of
$106 per month for five years. Under the plan, unsecured creditors
would receive approximately one to two percent of their claims. The
bankruptcy court again refused to confirm the plan. At issue was
whether payment to unsecured creditors of one or two percent of the
debts owed them would satisfy the good faith requirement of section
1325(a)(3).1 0 0 Controversies concerning good faith under chapter 13
resulted in more litigation than almost any other issue during the year
immediately following the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code. 0 1
The court in Flygare noted that the various bankruptcy court inter-
pretations of the "good faith" requirement fall into three broad catego-
ries. One interpretation requires substantial or meaningful repayment
in all cases. 10 2 The second interpretation requires only that creditors
receive as much as they would receive under chapter 7.103 The third
interpretation, a "middle road" approach, inquires on a case by case
basis into whether the plan abuses the provisions, purpose or spirit of
chapter 13. The Tenth Circuit joined six other circuits 10 4 in adopting a
formulation of the "middle road" approach and specifically adopted the
factors considered relevant to a determination of good faith by the
Eighth Circuit. 10 5 The court stated, "We agree with the Eighth Circuit
100. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Confirmation of plan.
(a) The court shall confirm a plan if
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbid-
den by law ...
101. 5 COLLIER ON BANKR. 1325.01[2][C] at 1325-8.6 (15th ed. 1983).
102. See, e.g., In re lacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982) provides that the court shall confirm the plan if
.. the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the
plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be
paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title
on such date."
104. In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1983); In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir.
1982); In re Deans, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Barnes, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir.
1982); In re Goeb, 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir.
1982).
105. See In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982). The factors are:
(I) the amount of the proposed payments and the amount of the debtor's
surplus;
(2) the debtor's employment history, ability to earn and likelihood of future
increases in income;
(3) the probable or expected duration of the plan;
(4) the accuracy of the plan's statements of the debts, expenses and percentage
repayment of unsecured debt and whether any inaccuracies are an attempt
to mislead the court;
(5) the extent of preferential treatment between classes of creditors;
(6) the extent to which secured claims are modified;
(7) the type of debt sought to be discharged and whether any such debt is non-
dischargeable in Chapter 7;
(8) the existence of special circumstances such as inordinate medical expenses;
(9) the frequency with which the debtor has sought relief under the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act;
(10) the motivation and sincerity of the debtor in seeking Chapter 13 relief; and
(11) the burden which the plan's administration would place upon the trustee.
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that '[a] per se minimum payment requirement to unsecured creditors as
an element of good faith would infringe on the desired flexibility of
Chapter 13 and is unwarranted.' "106 The Tenth Circuit reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Congress has recently responded to the litigation which has cen-
tered around the good faith issue. The Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,107 enacted July 10, 1984 amended sec-
tion 1325(b) to provide that, upon objection by the trustee or by the
holder of an allowed unsecured claim, the court cannot confirm the plan
unless the claims are to be paid in full, or unless all of the debtor's pro-
jected disposable income in the subsequent three year period will be
applied under the plan. Disposable income is that income in excess of
what is reasonably necessary for support of the debtor and dependents,
or, if the debtor is in business, that which is necessary for the preserva-
tion, conservation and operation of the business. If a debtor has no ex-
cess income over necessary expenses, then it is possible to make a zero
payment to unsecured creditors.
One likely result of this new provision is that the trustee and inter-
ested parties will scrutinize the budget of the debtor more carefully than
in the past. Accordingly, courts will be asked to decide if a debtor's
budget is reasonable. It is not clear at present what dollar amount or
what budget items the courts will find reasonably necessary for support.
It is also unclear what standard of reasonableness will apply.
Some inequity is likely to result in the application of the new provi-
sion because the excess disposable income paid into the plan can go
toward payment of attorneys' fees, tax and priority claims, secured
claims and unsecured claims. The debtor who has secured debt or taxes
to pay under the plan will pay less to unsecured creditors than a debtor
with the same amount of excess disposable income who has no secured
debt or taxes due. The debtor with a secured debt will, in effect, be
purchasing something through the plan rather than making any repay-
ment to unsecured creditors while meeting the new statutory provisions.
Although at first glance the new section 1325(b) appears to provide
unsecured creditors with more meaningful repayment than under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, there still exists the potential for debt-
ors to structure their budgets and plans in order to minimize repayment
to unsecured creditors. While Congress has attempted to reduce the
abuses which occurred under the chapter 13 provisions of the 1978 Act,
the amendment to section 1325 may well be subjected to as much litiga-
tion as its predecessor has been in the past.
Sally Herron Zeman
106. 709 F.2d at 1348 (quoting In re Estus, 695 F.2d at 316 (footnotes omitted)).






Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is undeniably a very
powerful weapon in protecting constitutional rights. Perhaps it is too
powerful. The success that section 1983 plaintiffs have met in recent
years has encouraged an increasingly large number of section 1983
claims, including many of questionable merit. Of the more than thirty-
five civil rights cases considered by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
in the past year, over four-fifths were brought pursuant to section 1983.
Prisoners, employees, political parties, an architect denied his license to
practice, and a dismissed judge were among the many Tenth Circuit
plaintiffs seeking recovery under section 1983 for alleged violations of
their constitutional rights. Yet less than half of these plaintiffs were suc-
cessful. The increase in section 1983 claims is certainly a major contrib-
utor to the steadily growing number of civil rights claims crowding
federal dockets across the country.'
In accordance with the growing reliance upon section 1983, the
most significant developments of civil rights law in the Tenth Circuit
during the past survey period involved the section 1983 cause of action.
Notable progress was made on the issue of the applicability of state stat-
utes of limitation to section 1983 claims. Also, an exhaustive but neces-
sary opinion describing the "reasonable fee" to be awarded under the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act made the Tenth Circuit law the
most understandable and useful on the issue.
I. SECTION 1983 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871
Section 1983 places personal liability upon any individual who, act-
ing under color of state law, violates constitutional or other federally
protected rights of another person.2 As the Tenth Circuit assessed the
validity of the section 1983 claims before it during the survey period, it
was compelled to consider the limits of several constitutional rights and
further define the boundaries of state action.
1. In 1960, the number of civil rights suits totalled 280. 1960 ANN. REP. OF DIREC-
TOR OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. CT., at 232. Over 19,700 civil rights cases were filed in
federal courts during the twelve month period endingJune 30, 1983. 1983 ANN. REP. OF
DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. CTS., at 135.
2. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)
and provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
zen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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A. Liability: A Deprivation of Rights
1. First Amendment Rights
The tension created between the state's interest in regulating the
speech of its employees and the employees' first amendment speech
rights has been the focus of recent judicial attention. A Tenth Circuit
interpretation of a significant change in the law governing public em-
ployees' free speech rights made by the Supreme Court in Connick v.
Myers 3 further restricted the rights of employees.
In Wilson v. City of Littleton,4 Glen Wilson had been fired from his
position as a police officer for refusing to remove a black shroud that he
had placed over his badge in mourning the death of a fellow officer. The
Tenth Circuit held that the termination was not a deprivation of his first
amendment rights. The court rejected the lower court's application of
symbolic speech principles to Wilson's section 1983 claim, and turned
to the recent Connick decision for guidance on the issue of public em-
ployees' speech rights.5
Connick is significant because it established a threshold requirement
that the employee's speech be a matter of "public concern" before a
court may proceed into the traditional balancing test of weighing public
and private speech interests. 6 The Supreme Court defined "public con-
cern" as a matter of "political, social, or other concern to the commu-
nity." 7 The Connick case involved a questionnaire which Sheila Myers,
an assistant district attorney, had prepared and distributed among her
fellow staff members. The questionnaire generally pertained to internal
working conditions and employee transfer policy, although one question
concerned employer-created pressure to work in political campaigns.8
Myers' superiors considered the distribution of the questionnaire to be
an act of insurbordination and forced her to resign.
In ruling upon Myers' section 1983 claim against her employers for
violation of her first amendment rights, the Supreme Court said that,
with the exception of the political campaign question, the questionnaire
amounted to an attempt by Myers to turn her dissatisfaction with a pro-
posed transfer into an office insurrection. 9 The Court subsequently dis-
missed Myers' claim, holding that the content of the questionnaire was
not a matter of public concern entitling her to protection.
The Tenth Circuit interpreted Connick in a curious manner. The
3. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
4. 732 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1984).
5. Id. at 767.
6. 461 U.S. at 142, 146. See also Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the
landmark case on the balancing of state and individual interests when a public employee's
speech rights are involved. The Supreme Court upheld a teacher's right to comment upon
the issue of school funding without losing her teaching position.
7. 461 U.S. at 146.
8. Id. at 149.
9. Id. at 148-49. Because the political campaign question had touched upon an issue
of public concern, the Court proceeded with the Pickering balancing analysis to determine
if Myers' discharge had been constitutional.
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Supreme Court obviously felt that matters such as office morale, the
need for an internal grievance committee, and the amount of trust and
confidence officeworkers have in their superiors are not of public con-
cern.10 But the Tenth Circuit borrowed from the dissenting opinion in
Connick and found that the Supreme Court had rejected Myers' question-
naire because it "did not sufficiently inform the issue as to be helpful in eval-
uating the performance of a district attorney."" The Tenth Circuit
added that the public concern issue turned not on the topic itself, but
rather on what was being said about the topic.'
2
By making this deduction from the Supreme Court decision, the
Tenth Circuit dealt a severe blow to Officer Wilson's first amendment
rights. The message or meaning of Wilson's symbolic interest, rather
than the subject of the protest, became the issue. The court, in a very
brief analysis, said that although the death of a policeman could be the
subject of public concern, the statement Wilson was making upon the
subject by covering his badge was not. 13 The court assumed that Wil-
son was merely expressing a feeling of personal grief. The opinion only
briefly mentioned the fact that Wilson did not know the victim person-
ally, 14 and did not address the likelihood that Wilson may have been
making a symbolic statement on the broader issue of police deaths in
general, which is certainly a public concern.
The Tenth Circuit, in Wilson, has undermined symbolic speech
rights because it has exposed a form of speech which is inherently am-
biguous and capable of carrying several meanings to a narrow, restricted
method of analysis. 15 Rather then eliminate a public employee's sym-
bolic speech rights at the threshold by deciding that the content of the
speech does not relate to a matter of public concern, a legal reasoning
more protective of first amendment rights should be based on a pre-
sumption that the employee's speech is constitutionally protected. This
presumption of protection could then be overcome only by a clear and
convincing showing that the speech is not a matter of public concern, in
which case courts would proceed to the traditional balancing of public
and private interests.' 6
The Tenth Circuit considered another first amendment issue in Baer
10. See id. at 147-49. The Court, tentatively assuming that the public would be inter-
ested in an evaluation of the performance of the district attorney, expressly said "we do
not believe these questions are of public import." Id. at 148.
11. 732 F.2d at 768 (emphasis by Tenth Circuit).
12. Id. at 769.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 766.
15. The Tenth Circuit's opportunity to consider the relationship between symbolic
speech and public employees' speech rights as defined in Connick has not been duplicated
in the other federal appellate circuits. Most cases applying Connick have involved speech in
spoken or written form, where the question of whether the speech relates to a matter of
public concern is more easily decided. See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist.,
730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984); Renfroe v. Kirkpatrick, 722 F.2d 714 (11th Cir. 1984); Mc-
Kinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1983).
16. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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v. Meyer, 17 a section 1983 action brought by members of the Citizens
Party of Colorado and the Libertarian Party of Colorado. The political
parties claimed that the State of Colorado had unconstitutionally bur-
dened their right to political opportunity by denying the parties the abil-
ity to place a party designation other than "unaffiliated" on the voter
registration form, while allowing Democrats and Republicans to do so. 18
The Tenth Circuit agreed. The court noted a recent Supreme Court
decision which held that a burden which falls unequally on political par-
ties violates the associational choices guaranteed by the first amend-
ment. 19 The court then rejected the state's argument that it could not
grant the party's request for registration designation because it was not
possible to ascertain whether the request was valid or merely a frivolous
act by an unorganized group.2 0 The court observed that existing Colo-
rado law contains a workable set of criteria indicating when a political
organization merits the Secretary of State's permission to receive party
designation in registering. 2 1 These criteria would allow the state to dis-
cern the legitimate requests from the insubstantial requests. Further-
more, because there was minimal difficulty involved in altering the
registration forms to accomodate the plaintiffs, the court upheld the sec-
tion 1983 claim and ordered the Secretary of State to provide the name
designation.
2 2
2. Due Process Rights
In McKay v. Hammock, 23 the Tenth Circuit considered whether a law
enforcement officer's conduct in arresting and detaining an individual
constituted a deprivation of due process rights. McKay brought a sec-
tion 1983 claim for deprivation of his liberty without due process, claim-
ing wrongful arrest against DeLuca and Hammock, Colorado county
police officers, Pfeffer, a city policeman in New Mexico, and against the
respective police departments directly.2 4 Officer Hammock had ar-
17. 728 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1984).
18. Id. at 472-73. The political parties emphasized that placement of the full party
names on the registration forms was needed to be able to later use the computerized rec-
ord of all registered voters, which the Republican and Democratic parties had found to be
an invaluable tool. The plaintiffs also brought a related claim on the matter of name de-
scription of political parties. This issue was decided by applying Colorado law, not reach-
ing the merits of the constitutional claim. Id. at 473-74.
19. Id. at 475 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)).
20. 728 F.2d at 475.
21. Id. (referring to McBroom v. Brown, 53 Colo. 412, 127 P. 957, 958 (1912)). The
plaintiff in McBroom was a political organization, with political officials, that had previously
placed a candidate on the ballot by petition. Although McBroom did not specifically set
forth criteria, the Tenth Circuit Court was referring to the facts of the case as the criteria.
These three elements found in McBroom constitute the standard to be applied under Colo-
rado law.
22. 728 F.2d at 476.
23. 730 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984). This decision also provides an excellent example
of the court's application of the uniform characterization analysis for § 1983 claims, as
recently set forth in Garcia v. Wilson. See infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
24. 730 F.2d at 1369. The constitutional basis for this claim is the fourteenth amend-
ment, § 1, which provides in part: "[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."
[Vol. 62:1
CIVIL RIGHTS
rested McKay in Routt County, Colorado, for being in possession of a
stolen automobile. McKay was released on a bond which required him
to appear in Routt county three weeks later for other charges filed
against him by the New Mexico authorities. McKay was then twice im-
properly re-arrested in Colorado due to a misunderstanding created by
Hammock concerning the limits of McKay's bond. The officers had ar-
ranged for the arrest and detention of McKay in Denver and again later
in Buena Vista, erroneously thinking that the bond was only applicable
in Routt County, when in fact the bond provided McKay with the right
to travel freely throughout Colorado. 2 5 McKay was detained for a short
time in both cities and then released.
The district court applied Baker v. McCollan,26 a Supreme Court case
in which the plaintiff had been incorrectly identified by policemen as
another individual, arrested under a valid warrant, and held for four
days despite his pleas of mistaken identity. In Baker, the Supreme Court
ruled that the detention was not a deprivation of a constitutional right,
thereby rendering invalid McCollan's section 1983 claim against the ar-
resting officer.
2 7
The Tenth Circuit quickly and correctly distinguished Baker, observ-
ing that the arrest of McKay had been in violation of his bond and was
therefore significantly different than an arrest pursuant to a valid war-
rant. 28 In so reversing the district court, the issue of whether McKay's
due process rights had been violated by the police officers was
reopened.
29
The Tenth Circuit then turned to the officers' defense that McKay
had only alleged negligence, thereby failing to state a valid claim under
section 1983. The issue of whether an allegation of official negligence
may in itself be the basis of a cause of action under section 1983 has
been a legal quagmire for many years.3 0 The Tenth Circuit, by remand-
ing most of McKay's claims, 3 1 pulled the district court into the swamp
but offered no clear escape. The court noted the absence of a clear
Supreme Court ruling on the significance of official intent or negligence
25. 730 F.2d at 1371-72.
26. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
27. 730 F.2d at 1371 (referring to Baker, 443 U.S. at 144-45).
28. 730 F.2d at 1372. Several other circuits have also found the Baker decision inap-
plicable where the plaintiff was not arrested and detained under factual circumstances
identical to those in Baker. Id. at 1371. See also Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir.
1980) (Baker was considered inapposite where the prisoner was detained without a valid
commitment order).
29. 730 F.2d at 1373.
30. The problem arises from the absence of clear language in § 1983 pertaining to a
standard of conduct requirement. For a thorough discussion of the issue, and an attempt
to discern when consideration of official negligence is sufficient in alleging § 1983 claims
based upon eighth amendment violations, see Comment, Actionability of Negligence Under
Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1979).
31. The Tenth Circuit did dispose of McKay's claim against the New Mexico city po-
lice department by ruling that the allegations were insufficient. 730 F.2d at 1375. Addi-
tionally, the court held that negligence was not at issue. McKay had alleged knowledge on
the part of Officer Hammock that the arrests were improper. The court therefore ruled
that McKay had sufficiently stated a § 1983 claim against Hammock. Id. at 1374.
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in section 1983 claims for due process violations. 3 2 The Tenth Circuit
also made reference to an indication by the Supreme Court that official
negligence may, in certain circumstances, result in a deprivation of due
process rights.3 3 But as to what those circumstances are, the Tenth Cir-
cuit gave no instruction. The district court was provided with no firm
standard with which to determine whether Officers Pfeffer and DeLuca
had acted in a manner sufficient to support McKay's claim. The Tenth
Circuit merely referred to "various standards of proof" under which dif-
ferent government officials may be liable.
34
The court further confused the matter by suggesting that perhaps
the entire unsettled negligence issue could be avoided by approaching
the problem through immunity defense analysis. 3 5 But the immunity
defense to section 1983 actions and the issue of official negligence are
not conterminous. Until the Supreme Court rules that an assessment of
the possible negligence of public officials subjected to a section 1983
claim is no longer necessary, 3 6 the Tenth Circuit would better serve the
development of the law by ruling directly upon the factual circumstances
as they occur, rather than force the lower courts to do so without
guidance.
3 7
In Dock v. Latimer,38 the Tenth Circuit considered a section 1983
claim by a Utah state prisoner that the chairman of the state prison
board had violated his fourteenth amendment right to due process by
failing to comply with Utah regulations that address parole eligibility.
The prisoner's argument received treatment consistent with similar
claims brought before the Tenth Circuit in the past several years. In
rejecting the claim, the court said that even assuming the regulations
had not been followed, the plaintiff had not suffered a due process viola-
tion because he did not have an entitlement interest in the parole-re-
lease consideration process.3 9 The court ruled that Utah parole
decisions were a matter of state discretion, not of constitutional right, as
it has similarly ruled upon the Oklahoma and Colorado parole decision
32. Id. at 1373.
33. Id. (referring to Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1981)).
34. 730 F.2d at 1373-74 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)).
35. 730 F.2d at 1373 n.5. It is not clear why the court has now turned to the immunity
defense criteria as a possible solution to the negligence question. Two of the three
Supreme Court cases cited by the Tenth Circuit for immunity analysis were handed down
over four years ago.
36. Justice Stevens has most recently made reference to official negligence in the
§ 1983 context, indicating that the issue is still alive, if unsettled. Castorr v. Brundage,
459 U.S. 928 (1982) (opinion of Stevens, J., explaining the denial of the petition for writ of
certiorari).
37. See generally Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1980). The Seventh
Circuit decided the negligence question for the lower court, ruling that where plaintiff had
been arrested and detained pursuant to an invalid arrest warrant the section 1983 claim
was valid. The case was then remanded for a determination of which of the several named
defendants had acted negligently. Id.
38. 729 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 256 (1984).
39. Id. at 1289-92 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional





B. Liability: Under Color of State Law
The second element essential to a successful section 1983 action is
that the individual or entity acting to deprive another of his rights has
done so under color of state law. In Loh-Seng Yo v. Cibola General Hospi-
tal,4 1 the court erased any doubt that an exception may exist to the gen-
eral rule that receipt of government aid does not in itself make the
actions of a private institution the acts of the state. Yo, a physician, sued
the hospital claiming that probationary actions imposed upon him by
the hospital had violated his civil rights. He pointed to government
funds and government regulation of the hospital as the basis of his state
action allegation. 4 2 The Tenth Circuit referred to a recent Supreme
Court case in which the defendant school district, primarily supported
by public funds, was not held liable for a section 1983 claim because the
deprivation of rights at issue had no connection with the public fund-
ing.4 3 The Tenth Circuit emphasized that the state action must be re-
lated to the specific action involved in the section 1983 action to be valid
and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case.
4 4
C. Governmental Immunity
1. The Good Faith Defense
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,4 5 decided in 1982, the Supreme Court rede-
fined the qualified or "good faith" immunity defense that shields gov-
ernmental officials from personal liability in section 1983 claims. The
court broadened the immunity by eliminating the subjective element of
the "good faith" defense, which had removed the official's immunity in
circumstances where he "reasonably should have known" that his con-
duct would violate the constitutional rights of another.4 6 The Tenth
Circuit court, in Fairchild v. Valentine,4 7 recently demonstrated the poten-
tially dramatic reduction in a plaintiff's access to public officials that
Harlow has effected. The defendants, drug enforcement officials, placed
an electronic "beeper" in a large drum of ether in a chemical supply
store, correctly suspecting that Fairchild would purchase the ether for
use in manufacturing cocaine.48 After tracing Fairchild to his home by
using the "beeper," the officials installed a camera on an electric utility
pole near his house to monitor his activities. Fairchild discovered the
camera when it malfunctioned, causing images of his home to appear on
40. See Shirley v. Chestnut, 603 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1979); Schuemann v. Colorado
State Bd. of Adult Parole, 624 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
41. 706 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1983).
42. Id. at 307.
43. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 83 (1982).
44. 706 F.2d at 308.
45. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
46. Id. at 815-19 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975)).
47. No. 82-1702 (10th Cir. Nov. 4, 1983) (not selected for publication).
48. Id. slip op. at 2.
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his neighbors' television sets. Because no search warrant had been ob-
tained by the defendants for any of these activities, Fairchild brought a
section 1983 action against them for violation of his fourth amendment
rights.
4 9
The Tenth Circuit, citing Harlow, held that the officials were im-
mune from the section 1983 prosecution because their actions "did not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea-
sonable person would have known." 50 Although the court had cited, in
dicta, a case for the proposition that the warrantless placement of a
"beeper" in a private residence was probably illegal, 5 1 there was no firm
law so holding at the time of the official's action. 52 Therefore, although
the officials might have reasonably suspected that a warrant was re-
quired before engaging in this invasive conduct, qualified immunity re-
mained available to them as an adequate defense. The "good faith"
defense, in accordance with Harlow, is now assessed by answering the
simple objective question of what the law explicitly requires of the offi-
cials at the time of their conduct.
2. Absolute Immunity
The Tenth Circuit court's resolve to protect public officials from
civil rights claims was most evident in the strained reasoning put forth to
deny a forceful attack on absolute immunity in Lerwill v. Joslin.5 3 Joslin, a
part-time city attorney for Santaquin, Utah, charged and arrested Lynn
and Penny Lerwill for violation of state felony statutes. Joslin, however,
was only authorized to file criminal charges based upon city misde-
meanor ordinances. 5 4 The Lerwills therefore brought a section 1983
suit against Joslin, claiming, inter alia, a violation of their due process
rights. Joslin asserted the affirmative defense of absolute immunity from
section 1983 suits as a prosecuting attorney engaged in his prosecutorial
duties, citing Imbler v. Pachtman.55 The Tenth Circuit accepted the de-
fense and reversed the district court. 56 But in so doing, the court ex-
49. Id.
50. Id. at 4 (emphasis by Tenth Circuit).
51. Id. (referring to United States v. Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346, 351 n.3 (10th Cir.
1978)).
52. In a subsequent case, the Tenth Circuit explicitly ruled that the warrantless use of
a "beeper" to monitor contraband inside a private residence was unconstitutional. United
States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1983); cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1918 (1984). Section
I of the criminal procedure article in this issue contains an extensive discussion of the Karo
decision.
53. 712 F.2d 435 (10th Cir. 1983). Although not stated in any opinion handed down
this term, perhaps the Tenth Circuit is tiring of § 1983 claims of questionable merit
against public officials. At least seven decisions during the term dealt with the immunity
issue, either qualified or absolute, and in each the plaintiffs argument for an exception to
the official's immunity was rejected. See Benavidez v. Gunnell, 722 F.2d 615 (10th Cir.
1983); Tuttle v. City of Oklahoma City, 728 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1984); A.E. v. Mitchell,
724 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1983); Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co., 720 F.2d 1173 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1601 (1984); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391 (10th Cir. 1984).
54. 712 F.2d at 436.
55. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
56. 712 F.2d at 438.
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tended the Imbler immunity.
The issue in Imbler was "whether a state prosecuting attorney who
acted within the scope of his duties" as a criminal prosecutor was im-
mune from section 1983 suits. 57 As the Lerwills argued, Joslin clearly
acted beyond his authority, rendering Imbler inapplicable as precedent.
58
However the Tenth Circuit reasoned that just as a prosecutor who acts
unconstitutionally, and therefore beyond his authority, nonetheless does
not automatically lose absolute immunity, neither should a prosecutor
acting beyond the boundaries of local law immediately lose immunity.59
The Lerwills had put forth the strong argument that the extension
of the prosecutor's immunity to include constitutional violations was not
justification for the extension of the immunity to obvious violations of
local law, such as Joslin had committed. Allegations of unconstitutional
actions are often not clearly and easily substantiated, whereas a breach
of a local ordinance is more readily recognized. The Lerwills pointed to
the law governing judicial immunity, which does not protect a judge
where he has acted beyond his jurisdiction.60 The court side-stepped
this analogy by emphasizing that only in the "clear absence of all juris-
diction" does a judge cease to be protected by absolute immunity.
6'
The court then observed that Joslin's illegal prosecution had been a
"mistake that many honest prosecutors could make," ' 62 as if to suggest
that the ease with which Joslin illegally acted made that action less
clearly improper.
D. Statute of Limitations: Garcia v. Wilson
1. A Uniform Characterization for Section 1983 Claims
Choosing the appropriate state statute of limitations for federal sec-
tion 1983 claims has been the source of inconsistency both within the
Tenth Circuit and among the several circuits. In Garcia v. Wilson, 6 3 the
court set the matter to rest for the Tenth Circuit. The case involved a
section 1983 claim for a violation of constitutional rights against a New
Mexico state police officer for viciously beating the plaintiff. An addi-
tional claim was brought against the officer's superior for negligently
hiring and failing to train, supervise, and discipline the officer while hav-
ing knowledge of his history of violence and convictions for several seri-
57. 424 U.s. at 410 (1976) (emphasis added).
58. 712 F.2d at 438.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 439 (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (quoting Bradley
v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 351, 355 (1872)).
62. 712 F.2d at 439-40. The Fifth Circuit came to the same result through less trou-
bled and considerably shorter reasoning in Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 657 (5th Cir.
1979). While admitting that the prosecutors had acted beyond their jurisdiction, the court
simply held, without reference to any authority, that those actions "unquestionably ill
within the band of prosecutorial immunity" as a "necessary and integral part of a prosecu-
tor's role in the judicial system." 608 F.2d at 657.
63. 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 79 (1984).
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ous crimes. 64 The defendants moved for a motion to dismiss, claiming
that the suit was barred by the New Mexico two-year tort claims statute
of limitations. 6 5 The district court denied the motion and sent the limi-
tations issue to the court of appeals as an interlocutory appeal.
66
After an examination of the law on the issue in each of the federal
circuits, 6 7 the court held that it was imperative that a uniform characteri-
zation of all section 1983 claims be adopted in the interest of settled
expectations and equal treatment of the claims within each Tenth Cir-
cuit state.68 The court then chose to characterize section 1983 claims as
actions for injury to personal rights.
69
In holding that a uniform characterization is required to effectuate a
consistent approach to the issue, the court attacked the alternative case-
by-case approach. This approach entails identifying the state cause of
action most analogous to the specific facts of the section 1983 claim at
hand, and then applying the state statute of limitations that governs that
cause of section. 70 The Tenth Circuit court rejected this approach, and
its own past practice, by observing that a strong focus on the individual
facts of each section 1983 case, as the case-by-case approach requires, is
often prevented because section 1983 facts are frequently complex and
known only to the defendant. 7 I Furthermore, because the disputed fac-
tual issues in section 1983 claims are typically quite different from the
issues involved in the analogous state cause of action, the application of
the corresponding state limitation period to the federal claim may be
inappropriate. 72 The court cited as further justification for abandoning
the case-by-case approach the difficulty of achieving consistency when
analogizing section 1983 claims to state claims, and the potential conflict
between the state policies underlying the various statutes of limitations
and the broad remedial purpose of section 1983.
7 3
In deciding to characterize all future section 1983 claims as actions
for injury to personal rights, the Tenth Circuit likened the statutory
claim, which entails a deprivation of an individual's constitutional rights,
to a personal injury. "In the broad sense, every cause of action under
64. Id. at 642.
65. Id. at 651.
66. Id. at 642.
67. Id. at 643-48. In the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court, the cir-
cuits have chosen to apply, either uniformly for all § 1983 cases or varying with the facts of
each case, state statutes of limitations for causes of action including torts, liability created
by statute, personal injury, wrongful arrest, and assault and battery. In Tenth Circuit deci-
sions prior to this case, § 1983 actions have been characterized in three separate ways: as
liability created by statute, as contractual in nature, and as a non-contractual injury to the
rights of another. See id. at 648-49.
68. Id. at 650.
69. Id. at 651.
70. See McClam v. Barry, 697 F.2d 366, 371-73 (D.C. Cir. 1983), for an example of the
case-by-case approach to the statute of limitation question for § 1983 claims. In this case,
the D.C. Circuit found that a constitutional assault claim was most analogous to common-
law assault, for which the District of Columbia provides a limitations period of one year.
71. 731 F.2d at 649.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 649, 650.
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section 1983 which is well-founded results from a 'personal injury' .74
Turning to the facts of Garcia, the court applied the New Mexico three-
year "injury to personal rights" limitation period, under which the plain-
tiffs' claim remained timely, and remanded to the district court for fur-
ther proceeding.
75
2. Garcia Applies Prospectively Only
InJackson v. City of Bloomfield,76 the court limited the applicability of
the Garcia statute of limitations ruling to cases commenced after the Gar-
cia date of decision. The plaintiffs had brought a section 1983 claim
against the city and various city officials for wrongful termination of
their employment in retaliation for exercising their first amendment
rights. The termination had occurred more than three years but less
than four years before the suit was filed. The district court denied the
defendant's motion for a judgment on the pleadings and certified the
limitations issue for immediate appeal to the Tenth Circuit court.
77
On appeal, the defense argued that either the New Mexico two-year
torts claims limitation period or the three-year personal injury limitation
period should apply. The plaintiffs agreed that either of these limita-
tions periods could be applicable, but asserted that two four-year stat-
utes of limitation governing statutory claims and unwritten contracts
were also applicable. The plaintiffs then claimed that the longest statute
of limitations should govern in a civil rights case where more than one
statute is arguably applicable, citing Shah v. Halliburton Co.78
In response to these arguments, Tenth Circuit first ruled that the
Garcia uniform characterization of section 1983 claims directly overruled
Shah insofar as the latter case required the application of the longer of
two arguably applicable limitations periods. 79 The court then ruled that
retroactive application of Garcia would not be appropriate in this case
because of the plaintiffs reliance upon the Shah rule 80 and clear Tenth
Circuit precedent that held that a New Mexico four-year limitations pe-
riod governed section 1983 based upon employment discrimination.
8 1
The court reasoned that because both of these cases were overruled by
Garcia after the plaintiff's case had been filed, to apply the New Mexico
74. Id. at 651 (quoting Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1972)).
75. 731 F.2d at 651-52. Where state law did not include a statute of limitations ex-
pressly applicable to actions for injury to personal rights, the Tenth Circuit twice applied
that state's residuary statute. See McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984) (Col-
orado); Mismash v. Murray City, 730 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984) (Utah).
76. 731 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1984).
77. Id. at 653.
78. 627 F.2d 1055, 1059 (10th Cir. 1980). The plaintiff in Shah brought, inter alia, a
§ 1981 claim against his employer for wrongful termination of employment. The Tenth
Circuit reasoned that the rule calling for the application of the longer of two potentially
applicable limitations periods was particularly apposite in the statutory civil rights context
because it would assist more individuals in achieving the equal rights and opportunities for
which the civil rights statutes were enacted.
79. 731 F.2d at 653-54.
80. Id. at 655.
81. Id.
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three-year injury to personal rights limitations periods that Garcia re-
quired would result in a substantial inequity.8 2 Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the defendant's motion and
remanded for further consideration of the section 1983 claim.
83
3. Fraudulent Concealment of Section 1983 Violations
In Pike v. City of Mission, Kansas,84 the Tenth Circuit court rejected
the plaintiffs argument that a section 1983 claim should not be defeated
by a statute of limitations defense because the defendants had fraudu-
lently concealed their violations of his constitutional rights. Pike al-
leged, in a suit brought nearly six years after his termination as city
police chief, that various city officials had wrongfully discharged him,
failed to give him a constitutionally fair post-termination hearing and
defamed him. Pike further claimed that the officials had subsequently
conspired to refuse to reinstate him.8 5 The court said that although
Pike may not have known of all of the individuals responsible for his
termination, there were sufficient facts known to him, including the de-
fective nature of the hearing and the lack of cause given for termination,
to inform him at the time of the termination that his rights may have
been violated.
86
Pike alternatively argued that the constitutional violations were con-
tinuing in nature because the city officials refused to reinstate him or
provide him a hearing, and therefore his case was timely under the limi-
tations period. 8 7 Citing the Supreme Court decision of United Airlines
Inc. v. Evans,8 8 the Tenth Circuit held that although the impact of the
defendants' acts may have continued to be felt by Pike during the statu-
tory limitations period, the discrete actions comprising the violation oc-
curred outside the period. The court therefore affirmed the district
court's application of the Kansas two-year injury to personal rights limi-
82. Id. The Tenth Circuit Court referred to Chevron Oil Co. v. Hudson, 404 U.S. 97,
106-07 (1971), for a three part analysis of the appropriateness of applying federal deci-
sions retroactively: (1) whether the decision to be applied directly overruled past prece-
dent upon which the parties may have relied, (2) whether retroactive application would be
in keeping with the purpose and effect of the decision, and (3) whether retroactive applica-
tion would impose a substantial inequity on one of the parties. The court found that the
first and third factors required prospective application on Garcia, leaving the second factor
unresolved.
83. 731 F.2d at 655. A very similar analysis to the retroactivity issue was taken by the
court in Abbit v. Franklin, 731 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1984), involving Oklahoma statutes of
limitation. The decision indicates that the non-retroactivity ruling set forth in Jackson was
not limited to the specific facts of'Jackson and will be applicable to any Tenth Circuit case in
which a § 1983 claimant, prior to the Garcia ruling, justly relied upon an appropriate limi-
tations period.
84. 731 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1984).
85. Id. at 659.
86. Id. at 659-60. The court also observed that Pike's request for a tolling of the
statute of limitations was inadequate under governing Kansas law, which provides such
relief only for claims specifically grounded on fraud, not simply a § 1983 claim for viola-
tion of constitutional rights, as Pike had presented. Id. at 658.
87. Id. at 660.
88. 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).
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tations period, in accordance with Garcia,89 and dismissed the case.
II. ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
A. 4 Reasonable Fee: Ramos v. Lamm
The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Award Act of 1976 provides that
the court may award a "reasonable" attorney's fee to the prevailing
party in federal statutory civil rights actions. 90 The question of what
facts are to be considered in assessing the "reasonableness" of a claim
for fees has been the source of debate since the inception of the Act.9 1
In order to provide some consistency in this area of legal uncertainty, 92
and relying upon the recent Hensley v. Eckerhart Supreme Court deci-
sion, 9 3 the Tenth Circuit court explicitly took the opportunity to estab-
lish more specific standards in Ramos v. Lamm.
9 4
The appeal arose from a successful claim for attorney's fees follow-
ing a class action suit by prisoners in the Colorado State Penitentiary at
Canon City.9 5 The court began its analysis by questioning the applica-
bility and usefulness of the frequently cited twelve factors of Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc.9 6 Borrowing a "formula" from the Hensley
89. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 . . .the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorneys' fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
91. Justice Brennan has observed: "section 1988's straight-forward command [has
been] replaced by a vast body of artificial, judge-made doctrine, with its own arcane proce-
dures, which like a Frankenstein's monster meanders its well-intentioned way through the
legal landscape leaving waste and confusion in its wake." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424,455 (1983) (Brennan,J., dissenting). See also Berger, Court Awarded Attorney's Fee: What
is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281 (1977).
92. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F. Supp. 730 (D. Colo. 1982).
93. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
94. 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983).
95. See Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F. Supp. 730 (D. Colo. 1982). In the initial action, the
district court, per Judge Kane, held that the inadequate physical conditions of the Canon
City prison violated the prisoners' eighth and fourteenth amendment rights and ordered
that the facility be closed. Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122 (D. Colo. 1979). On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit court affirmed in part and remanded in part, instructing the district
court to take into consideration state plans for the construction of a new facility. Ramos v.
Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980). On reconsideration, the district court affirmed its
order for closure. 520 F. Supp. 1059. No further appeal was taken by the state.
96. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). This case has been consistently relied upon by
federal courts at all levels in the determination of reasonable attorney's fees. It was re-
ferred to favorably in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act
of 1976 as providing appropriate factors for fee determination. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), and S. REP. No. 1101, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976). The extent
to which Ramos has discreditedJohnson is uncertain. Subsequent to the Ramos decision, the
Tenth Circuit citedJohnson with favor in Cooper v. Singer. See 719 F.2d 1496, 1498-1500
(1983) and infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's
Hensley decision did not directly overrule Johnson.
The twelveJohnson factors are: (I) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by
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decision, the Tenth Circuit said that by multiplying the hours reasonably
expended on the litigation by a "reasonable hourly rate," a reasonable
fee would be obtained.
9 7
1. Time Reasonably Expended
The Tenth Circuit held that district courts in the Tenth Circuit
should "carefully scrutinize" all of the hours claimed by the prevailing
attorney to determine the number of hours reasonably spent on the liti-
gation.9 8 To facilitate this thorough review, attorneys intending to seek
fees under section 1988 are required to keep precise time records. 99 In
the instant case, and in future cases in which thorough records are not
kept, reconstructed records are to be tolerated but subjected to a special
scrutiny.' 0 0 The reviewing court is to distinguish between "raw" time
spent on the case, and "billable" time, being particularly suspicious of
billable hours reported in excess of the "norm" of "six to seven billable
hours per day for a five day week.''
The complexity of the case, the number of reasonable strategies
pursued by the attorney, the work required due to the strategies of the
opposing counsel, and the extent that legal work was unnecessarily du-
plicated by a second or third attorney are additional factors to be con-
sidered in determining the reasonableness of the number of hours
expended. '
0 2
2. Reasonable Hourly Rate
The court stated that the second element of the "formula," a rea-
sonable hourly rate, is to be based upon the rate received by lawyers of
comparable skill and experience practicing civil rights law in the locality
in which the litigation takes place.' 0 3 A downward adjustment of the fee
should be made when the attorney is inexperienced in the civil rights
field. Additionally, the rate should reflect the prevailing rate at the time
the award is made, not at the time the litigation took place.1
0 4
However, the court rejected the state's arguments that a reasonable
fee for a public interest lawyer is lower than that for a lawyer in private
practice, 10 5 and that a fee award to be paid from public funds should
also be reduced.' 0 6 The court noted that allowing these arguments to
the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case;
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards
in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19.
97. 713 F.2d at 553-55.
98. Id. at 555.
99. Id. at 553.
100. Id. at 553 n.2.
101. Id. at 553.
102. Id. at 554.
103. Id. at 555.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 551.
106. Id. at 552.
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prevail would defeat the legislative intent of section 1988: to encourage
attorneys, public and private, to act as public attorneys general, pursu-
ing civil rights action that might not otherwise be prosecuted due to the
plaintiff's inability to pay. 10 7 Furthermore, inasmuch as many civil
rights actions are brought pursuant to section 1983 under color of state
law,' 0 8 by enacting section 1988 Congress anticipated that governmen-
tal entities would be responsible for payment of many of the award
fees. '
0 9
3. Additional Reduction or Enhancement of Fees Awarded
Borrowing directly from the Henley Supreme Court decision," 10 the
Tenth Circuit described circumstances in which a further modification of
the reasonable hourly rate should be made, after having been derived as
set forth above. Partial success, as when unrelated claims fail, is to be
awarded only partially. I I However, where a plaintiff has received "ex-
cellent results" overall, the attorney should not be penalized for failing
to prevail on every claim made, and all hours reasonably expended
should be included in the award.' 12 The most critical factor is the de-
gree of success obtained.' 13
While the court expressed reluctance to award fees in an amount
greater than a reasonable hourly rate for hours reasonably expended, it
did agree with the Supreme Court that such an enhancement may be
justified for victory under "unusually difficult circumstances" or time
constraints.' 14 But the court cautioned that this "genius factor" dimin-
ishes as the amount of time spent on the suit increases. Also, the "unde-.
sirability" of the case is no longer a reason for fee enhancement because
no real social stigma is attached to civil right cases today.' 15
4. Other Elements of the Fee Award
A reasonable fee includes the cost of law clerk and paralegal serv-
107. id.
108. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
109. 713 F.2d at 552.
110. 461 U.S. at 434-37.
111. 713 F.2d at 556. The court leaves the method of reducing the fees for partial
success to the discretion of the district court. The lower court can attempt to identify the
precise hours spent by the attorney on the failed claims, or simply eliminate a portion of
the award to recover for the failures. E.g., Elmore v. Warne, Nos. 81-2076, 81-2144 (10th
Cir. 1984) (not published), in which the Tenth Circuit upheld a district court decision to
award only $2,000 in fees, while $12,997 had been requested. The plaintiff had sought
$20,000 in damages in the underlying § 1983 action but recovered only $4,000.
112. 713 F.2d at 556.
113. Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 436).
114. 713 F.2d at 557 (quoting Hensley, 103 S. Ct. at 1940).
115. 713 F.2d at 557-58. In discussing whether a fee is worthy of enhancement,Judge
Logan introduced what may come to be known as the "Peck Factor." Judge Logan stated:
"Situations in which great courage is required to undertake a case, like that confronting
the fictional lawyer in To Kill a Mockingbird, may still exist. But a bonus for the social
stigma assumed by a lawyer participating in civil rights litigation should rarely be given."
Id. at 558.
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ices.' 16 Other items normally billed to clients, such as reasonably neces-
sary expert witnesses, telephone and copying costs, but not travel
expenses, may also be includable in the fee.'"
7
B. The Effect of a Contingency Fee Upon a Section 1988 Award
In Cooper v. Singer, 1 8 on rehearing en banc, the Tenth Circuit took
the Ramos approach to the calculation of a reasonable fee one step fur-
ther when it held that a previously arranged contingency fee agreement
between the prevailing plaintiff and his attorney should not limit the
court's reasonableness fee determination. Directly overruling the ear-
lier Tenth Circuit decision which held that a contingency fee arrange-
ment sets an upper limit to the award fee available pursuant to section
1988,119 the court said that the "market standard" of Hensley, as set
forth in Ramos, will automatically include an allowance for the contin-
gent risks assumed by the attorney. 120 The court observed that the con-
gressional intent of section 1988 was to allow the fee award to
compensate fully the attorney for the cost of a successful statutory civil
rights action. 12'
Because contingent fee arrangements based upon a percentage of
the recovery money obtained in the underlying action will often differ
from the section 1988 "reasonable fee",' 2 2 the court suggested that, to
avoid this conflict, attorneys take the availability of the statutory fee
award into consideration when fee arrangements are established with
clients. Disposing of the instant case, however, in which a percentage
contingency fee arrangement had been informed, the court held that
should the district court award a section 1988 fee to the attorney lower
in the amount than the fee available under the contingency arrange-
ment, the attorney will be expected to reduce his fee to the amount
awarded by the courts.123 Hence, in effect, the court concluded that the
Ramos reasonable fee calculation principles should prevail regardless of
the contingency arrangement.
C. Limitations to the Applicability of Section 1988
Following the authority of the other federal appellate courts, the
Tenth Circuit court denied the availability of section 1988 attorney's fee
awards to two types of litigants-parties prevailing in nonmandatory
state administrative proceedings and pro se litigants.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 559. The court indicated that employment of counsel from outside the area
of litigation is generally unnecessary due to the large number of lawyers capable of han-
dling civil rights cases in each major metropolitan area. Id. at 555.
118. 719 F.2d 1496 (10th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
119. Cooper v. Singer, 689 F.2d 929-31 (10th Cir. 1982).
120. 719 F.2d at 1502.
121. Id. at 1506.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1506-07.
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In Garcia v. Ingram, 124 the sole issue was whether a section 1988
attorney's fee should be awarded to a party who had prevailed in a state
administrative proceeding. The plaintiff claimed that the reinstatement
of her eligibility for social security benefits by an administrative hearing
officer constituted a successful "proceeding" to enforce her rights under
section 1983, entitling her to a fee award pursuant to section 1988.125
The court appeared sympathetic toward the plaintiffs argument
that to disallow a fee award in an administrative context yet allow it in
the more expensive and time-consuming civil court proceeding would
only encourage further over-crowding of the federal court docket.
126
Nevertheless, the court took a narrow view of the term "proceeding" in
section 1988, holding that the term does not include nonmandatory
state administrative proceedings.
12 7
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit denied a request for a section 1988 fee
award by a pro se movant in Turman v. Tuttle. 1 28 The plaintiff, a prison
inmate, had been successful in representing himself in a section 1983
claim against prison employees at the state correctional facility in Canon
City, Colorado. The court upheld the district court's denial of the fee
award, reasoning that the Congressional intent in enacting section 1988
was to allow worthy statutory civil rights litigants to bring their cases
without bearing the legal costs, not to compensate pro se litigants. 1
29
D. Attorney's Fees for Prevailing Title VII Claimants
Salone v. United States' 30 demonstrated that an otherwise strong case
for the recovery of legal fees for successful Title VII litigation may fail if
counsel does not present clearly to the bench his case for fees. The
attorney's fees issue in this case had been considered previously by the
Tenth Circuit,' 3 ' and remanded to the district court with instructions to
consider the guidelines set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express.
13 2
Upon remand, however, the plaintiffs attorneys failed to appear in per-
124. 729 F.2d 691 (10th Cir. 1984).
125. Id. at 692.
126. Id.
127. Id. This Tenth Circuit holding is in agreement with the opinions of several other
courts of appeal that have decided the issue. The Supreme Court has presently granted
certiorari to a Sixth Circuit case, Webb v. County Brd. of Educ., 715 F.2d 254 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1906 (1984), which directly involves the Garcia v. Ingram
issue.
128. 711 F.2d 148 (10th Cir. 1983).
129. Id. at 149 (citing Owen v. Lash, 682 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1982); Pitts v. Vaughn, 679
F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1982); Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1981); Lovell v.
Snow, 637 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1981); Davis v. Parratt, 608 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1979).
130. No. 81-1930 (10th Cir. June 2, 1983) (a prevailing attorney in a Title VII case is
entitled to a reasonable fee in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
131. Salone v. United States, 645 F.2d 875 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
The attorneys for the plaintiff sought a reasonable fee for time spent both on the plaintiff's
suit directly and in filing an amicus brief in a related case which arguably contributed to a
favorable Supreme Court ruling and subsequent vacating of a Tenth Circuit decision
against the plaintiff. See Salone v. United States, 511 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1975), vacated,
426 U.S. 917 (1976).
132. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1978). See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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son before the lower court, relying instead upon affidavits to explain
that the fees they requested were reasonable. 133 The lower court
awarded only a portion of the fees sought. 134 While the Tenth Circuit
agreed with attorneys that the requested fees may have been reasonable,
the court held that the lower court's inability to follow the attorneys'
arguments as presented in the affidavits and its displeasure with the at-
torneys' failure to appear in court was understandable.' 3 5 Accordingly,
the lower court decision was affirmed, with only a slight increase in the
fee award. '
3 6
III. THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
The Tenth Circuit clarified and restricted an exception to the tradi-
tional sovereign immunity defense which bars suits against Indian tribes
in White v. Pueblo of San Juan.13 7 The Whites, non-Indians, had brought
suit in a federal court against the Pueblo of San Juan tribe alleging that
the Indians had deprived them of their property without due process
and had effected a taking of their property without just compensation in
violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).' 3 8 The Whites did not
attempt to pursue a remedy in the tribal forum before bringing the fed-
eral suit.
Traditionally, there has been a firm rule that Indian tribes are ex-
empt from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.' 3 9 Recently,
the Supreme Court, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,140 specifically
barred suits against Indian tribes brought pursuant to the ICRA. The
Tenth Circuit, however, created an exception to that bar in Dry Creek
Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes. 14 1 Under this case, the Whites
argued that their suit fell within the jurisdiction of the federal court.
14 2
The Whites claimed that Dry Creek stood for the proposition that federal
court jurisdiction should be granted for suits against Indian tribes when
three elements are satisfied: (1) the suit involves a non-Indian, (2) a
deprivation of an individual's real property interests is alleged, and
(3) there is an absence of an adequate tribal remedy.
143
133. No. 81-1930, slip op. at 6.
134. Id. at 2.
135. Id. at 5-6.
136. Id. at 6-7.
137. 728 F.2d 1307 '(10th Cir. 1984).
138. 25 U.S.C. § 1301-03 (1982). The facts giving rise to the White's suit involved an
alleged interference by the Indians with a sale of property located within the Indian reser-
vation but owned by the Whites. The Whites were negotiating a sale of the land with a
third party when the Indians obstructed an access road to it, causing the third party not to
purchase the land. Eventually the plaintiff sold the property to the government in trust for
the Pueblo at a considerably lower price. 728 F.2d at 1308-09.
139. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919); United States v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Dept.
of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
140. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
141. 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981).
142. 728 F.2d at 1310.
143. Id. The White's emphasis on the fact that they were a non-Indian party is under-
standable in view of the significance accorded to similar factual circumstances in Dry Creek.
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The Tenth Circuit, in a rambling opinion per Judge Doyle, never
rejected the plaintiffs Dry Creek argument, but distinguished Dry Creek
from the case at bar by finding that the Whites, unlike the Dy Creek
plaintiffs, had not attempted to pursue a remedy in the tribal forum. 144
While the Dry Creek plaintiffs had sought a remedy with the tribal court
but had been refused,145 the Whites proceeded directly to federal court,
claiming, inter alia, that the Indians' failure to properly adopt and pub-
lish their Tribal Code of Law and Order excused them from exhausting
the possible tribal remedies. 14 6 "Speculative futility is not enough to
justify federal jurisdiction," wrote the Tenth Circuit as it ruled against
the Whites. 14 7 A plaintiff must seek and be denied all tribal remedies
before federal jurisdiction applies. Furthermore, where a tribal remedy
exists, it is "exclusive."'
48
Lawrence K. Hoyt
"The reason for . . . the references to tribal immunity also disappear[s] when the issue
relates to a matter outside of internal tribal affairs and when it concerns a non-Indian."
623 F.2d at 685. The Tenth Circuit, however, clearly emphasized in White that this fact
alone will not be cause for conferral of federal jurisdiction and that the Dry Creek exception
is to be construed narrowly. 728 F.2d at 1312.
144. 728 F.2d at 1312.
145. 623 F.2d at 684.
146. 728 F.2d at 1310.
147. Id. at 1313.





No thunder was cast from the legal summit of the Tenth Circuit
with regard to commercial law this survey period. Certain rumblings, in
the form of commercial law decisions, did make themselves heard, how-
ever, in the Survey Editor's office. Of particular interest was the circuit
court's decision in Scivally v. Time Insurance Co. ,I which distinguished be-
tween a negligent delay in issuing an insurance policy and a bad faith
breach of the implied duty of fair dealing. In banking, the court en-
forced a loan agreement in excess of the bank's legal lending limit even
though the borrower had knowledge of the limit.2 Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, the court rendered a questionable decision involving
a bank's liability for a loss in a loan agreement resulting from a forged
signature card. 3 Finally, in the area of trademark infringements, the
court looked at the "Brew Nuts," "Beer Nuts" litigation.
4
I. THE DUTY Or FAIR DEALING IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Can a bad faith delay in issuing an insurance policy, which results in
a loss of coverage for an insured, expose an insurance company to dam-
ages for breach of the duty imposed upon the insurance industry to deal
fairly with its customers? Under the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Scivally,
without an issued, effective policy, no damages, punitive or otherwise,
may be awarded for a breach of the implied duty of fair dealing. 5 The
court stated that the implied duty arises only from the insurance con-
tract. 6 Thus, when no such policy is issued, a plaintiff is limited to dam-
ages in tort for negligent delay in issuing a policy.
7
In the Scivally case, Scivally contacted an insurance agent on Febru-
ary 21, 1980, to request a replacement for her health and accident insur-
ance policy which was to expire on March 16, 1980.8 She specifically
asked that her new policy begin on March 15.9 Scivally paid her first
premium, signed the application form and was given a "conditional re-
1. 724 F.2d 101 (10th Cir. 1983) (a diversity action arising in Oklahoma).
2. See National Farmers Org., Inc. v. Kinsley Bank, 731 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1984).
See infra text accompanying notes 33-52.
3. See Bridgeport Firemen's Sick and Death Benefit Ass'n v. Deseret Fed. Sav. &
Loan, 735 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 53-81.
4. See Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 320 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 1981),
rev'd, 711 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1983). See infra text accompanying notes 82-109.
5. 724 F.2d at 104.
6. id.
7. Id. The Scivally opinion conforms with settled law that a plaintiff may not recover
for both negligent delay in tort and breach of the implied duty of fair dealing, an action
sounding in contract, but the circuit court goes even further than this by holding that,
under the facts of Scivally, no action for breach of the implied duty of fair dealing can lie at
all. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
8. 724 F.2d at 102.
9. Id.
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ceipt".' 0 She was injured in a car accident on March 15 and subse-
quently requested coverage under her policy.' I Time Insurance denied
liability because it had not yet effectuated her policy.'
2
The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's directed verdict for Time
on the issue of breach of the implied duty of fair dealing.13 The circuit
court also upheld the trial court's verdict in favor of Scivally for the neg-
ligent delay in issuing the policy.14
Had the circuit court simply held that because Scivally had suc-
ceeded on her tort claim she was precluded from maintaining her breach
claim, a claim sounding in contract, the court's opinion in Scivally would
be of little interest. The circuit court's opinion, however, does not so
confine itself. Under Scivally, a well established remedy is eliminated; a
breach claim is completely disallowed where the insurance company has
not issued a timely policy, regardless of the reason, and the plaintiff is
limited to the tort claim for negligent delay. The Scivally decision not
only ignores Oklahoma precedent,15 it ignores the policy underlying the
implied duty of fair dealing, a policy eloquently espoused by the Tenth
Circuit in a case decided during this same survey period: "Because of
the special relationship between an insurer and its insured, and because
of the quasi-public nature of the insurance industry . . . a duty [is im-
posed] upon the insurance carrier to deal fairly with their customers
apart from any contractual obligations owed."'
16
This language apparently recognizes an implied contract theory of
recovery for the insured. Moreover, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in
Peddicord v. Prudential Life Insurance Co., 17 has also approved actions based
upon an implied insurance contract. Peddicord held that an applicant
whose insurance contract was not issued within a reasonable time could
sue on the implied promise to act reasonably, or waive the contract and
sue in tort. 18 According to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, an action for
delay in issuing a policy actually sounds more in contract than in tort,
especially where the first premium has already been paid, 19 as in
Scivally's case.
20
The only feature distinguishing Peddicord from Scivally is that the re-
ceipt tendered to Peddicord at the signing of the insurance agreement




13. The court found that the trial court granted the directed verdict on erroneous
grounds, but upheld the directed verdict because of the non-issuance of the policy. Id. at
103.
14. Id.
15. See Peddicord v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 498 P.2d 1388 (Okla. 1972).
16. McCarty v. First Ga. Ins. Co., 713 F.2d 609, 611 (10th Cir. 1983) (emphasis
added).
17. 498 P.2d 1388 (Okla. 1972).
18. Id. at 1390.
19. Id. at 1389.
20. 724 F.2d at 102.
21. 498 P.2d at 1388.
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Scivally receipt stated that the effective date of the policy would be either
the "requested date" or when medical examinations were completed, if
required.2 2 No medical examinations were required in Scivally. The
court, however, deemed the policy not in effect when Scivally's injury
occurred because it was issued with riders after the March 15 date.
2 3
Despite the factual differences between these two cases, the rule in Peddi-
cord and the Tenth Circuit's own prior case law warranted a recognition
of an implied contract theory of recovery in the Scivally case.
The Alabama Supreme Court was also presented with questions
very similar to those raised in Scivally in Barnes v. Atlantic and Pacific Life
Insurance Co. 24 The conditional or "binding receipt" in Barnes was similar
to the one in Scivally. 2 5 In both cases, for the policies to become effec-
tive, the receipts required that the policies had to be issued within a
certain time limit and issued according to the exact terms of the applica-
tion. In both cases the conditions of the receipts were not met, trigger-
ing the defense arguments that the policies were not issued at the time
of the injury.2 6 The Barnes decision stated that the trier of fact should
determine whether the insurer unreasonably delayed in issuing the pol-
icy. A finding of unreasonable delay would estop the insurer from deny-
ing coverage. 2 7 The Scivally court did not address this estoppel theory.
The Scivally decision permits the conclusion that if a company decides
not to issue a policy it can avoid liability for breach of the implied duty
of fair dealing and thus insulate itself from punitive damages based on
such a theory.
28
22. The "effective date" language of the receipt given to Scivally reads:
"Effective Date" as used herein:
Means the later of (a) the date the application is signed, (b) the date of completion of all
medical examinations, if required, and (c) the Requested Policy Date shown on the
application, but for health insurance, not more than 10 days prior to the receipt
of the application by the Company.
724 F.2d at 102 n.l (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 103.
24. 325 So. 2d 143 (1975). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified unset-
tled questions of insurance law in Barnes to the Alabama Supreme Court. 514 F.2d 704
(1975). The Fifth Circuit accepted the Alabama Supreme Court's answers and vacated and
remanded the case to the trial court for a resolution of the material issues of fact presented
in light of the supreme court's answers to the certified questions. 530 F.2d 98 (1976).
25. See 325 So. 2d at 146, and 724 F.2d at 102 n.l.
26. The Barnes policy was issued one day after Barnes' injury. 325 So. 2d at 147. The
Scivally policy was issued twelve days after Scivally's injury. 724 F.2d at 103.
27. 325 So. 2d at 150.
28. In asserting her claim that Time acted in bad faith, Scivally relied on Christian v.
American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978). In analyzing Christian, the
Tenth Circuit stated:
In Christian, the Oklahoma Supreme Court approved and adopted "the rule
that an insurer has an implied duty to deal fairly and act in good faith with its
insured and that the violation of this duty gives rise to an action in tort for which
consequential and, in a proper case, punitive damages may be sought." 577 P.2d
at 904. The source of the implied duty is the contract between the insurer and
the insured.
Consequently, if there is no contract-no policy of insurance-then there is
no implied duty upon which to base the cause of action.
Scivally, 724 F.2d at 103-04.
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Under general contract theory, the Scivally decision might be sup-
ported by the rule that an application for insurance is a mere offer, and
if the policy is issued with riders it is a counteroffer. 29 Thus, reasonable-
ness may not be an issue when there is no contract as a matter of law.
This was considered in Barnes but rejected because, according to the
court, where the occurence of a condition is wholly controlled by one
party, "there is an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing" owing
from the insurer.3 0 Thus, the Barnes court pointed out that there is a
duty to act reasonably in processing an applicant's insurance policy, and
to act unreasonably can expose an insurance company to liability for
breach of the implied duty of fair dealing.3 ' The logic of this rule
should be especially persuasive in the Tenth Circuit in light of the
court's recognition of the quasi-public nature of the insurance indus-
try.3 2 Perhaps the circuit court should consider these factors in deciding
a future case similar to Scivally, and in so doing overrule the broad lan-
guage of Scivally.
II. LEGAL LENDING LIMITS IN BANKING
In National Farmers Organization, Inc. v. Kinsley Bank,3 3 the defendant
bank agreed to loan the plaintiff, a Kansas sheep farmer, enough money
to finance the purchase of 17,000 Colorado sheep.3 4 After advancing
the farmer enough money for the down payment, and after the first
sheep were delivered, the bank dishonored the farmer's checks and re-
fused to loan him any further funds.3 5 The sheep farmer sued the bank
to enforce the loan contract and was awarded damages by the trial
court.
3 6
On appeal, the bank argued as a defense that the loan contract was
unenforceable because the final amount of the loan exceeded Kansas'
legal lending limit to a single borrower-15% of the banks unimpaired
capital and surplus.3 7 In spite of its illegality, the Tenth Circuit held the
loan to be enforceable.3
8
There is a split of authority on the issue of whether a bank loan in
29. See, e.g., Barnes, 325 So. 2d at 148-49 (citing Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 292 Ala. 525,
529, 296 So. 2d 900, 903 (1974)).
30. Barnes, 325 So. 2d at 150.
31. See Annot., 18 A.L.R. 4th 1115 (1982) for an annotation covering the liability of
an insured for delay in issuing a policy of insurance.
32. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
33. 731 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1984).
34. Id. at 1466.
35. Id. at 1466-67.
36. Id. at 1466.
37. Id. at 1467. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1104 (1982). All states in the Tenth Circuit
and most other states have similar laws limiting either the amount of a single loan or the
amount of total outstanding loans. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11-7-108(e) (1973 & Supp.
1984) (15%); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-1-21(e) (1977) (10%); OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 802
(West Supp. 1983-84) (20%); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-19 (1982) & Supp. 1983) (15%);
WYo. STAT. § 13-3-402 (1977) (20%). See also 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(a)(2) (1972) (governing
federal banks) (15%).
38. 731 F.2d 1469. Other, less significant, issues decided in National Farmers Organiza-
tion but not covered in this survey included a brief discussion of agency law, the appropri-
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excess of the bank's legal lending limit is enforceable.3 9 Injaynes v. First
National Bank,40 the borrower's knowledge of the fact that his loan was in
excess of the legal lending limit was held to make the loan unenforce-
able. The Ninth Circuit in that case did not enforce a loan agreement in
excess of the legal amount where a cashier of the bank was the recipient
of the loan. 4 1 In pertinent part, the Ninth Circuit stated: "If this were
the plight of an innocent borrower who had assumed the bank knew
what it was doing . . . we could at least express our sympathy."' 42 The
Jaynes court then found that the cashier knew the amount of the bank's
capital and surplus, presuming he had heard of the bank's ten percent
limit.4 3
The Tenth Circuit in National Farmers Organization took a different
approach regarding the borrower's knowledge of the bank's lending
limit. Mr. Burkhart, the plaintiff, presumably knew of the bank's lending
limit because he was well acquainted with the bank's president.4 4 Ap-
parently, the Tenth Circuit set Mr. Burkhart apart from the loanless
cashier inJaynes on the ground that Burkhart also knew that the bank
could have legally exceeded its lending limit by working through a cor-
respondent bank.4 5 This knowledge precluded any culpability on Burk-
hart's part,4 6 and rendered moot the issue of his knowledge of the
lending limit.
The primary reason for the court's enforcement of the loan was
based on its view of the nature of loan limitation laws. The laws are
intended as rules for the government of the bank, in the sense that they
impose no penalty on the borrower. 4 7 The court noted the general rule
that borrowers are still obliged to pay back excessive loans,48 and con-
cluded that lenders, therefore, should not be able to avoid liability, espe-
cially where the borrower has concluded an agreement in reliance on the
ateness of allowing the jury to decide the issue of the definiteness of the loan agreement,
lost profits and incidental and punitive damages. Id. at 1469-73.
39. See, e.g.,Jaynes v. First Nat'l Bank of Ketchikan Ala., 236 F.2d 1956 (9th Cir. 1956)
(unenforceable: invalidity of contract as exceeding loan limit not a valid basis for defense
of borrower to avoid liability); International Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Bank of Wadley, 407 F.
Supp. 1270 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (unenforceable: contracts that require the doing of an illegal
act are void and unenforceable); First Am. Nat'l Bank v. Alcorn, Inc., 361 So. 2d 481 (Miss.
1978) (enforceable: loan limits are not so commonly known that knowledge of them could
be imputed to the borrower); Labor Discount Center, Inc. v. State Bank & Trust Co., 526
S.W.2d 407 (Mo. App. 1975) (enforceable: no knowledge on the part of the borrower as
to existence of a lending limit).
40. 236 F.2d 1956 (9th Cir. 1956).
41. Id. at 259.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 259-60.
44. 731 F.2d at 1469. The bank was so familiar with Burkhart that it was standard
practice for the bank to honor Burkhart's checks before he had signed any loan agreement
for the funds. Id. at 1460.
45. 731 F.2d at 1469.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1468 (citing Bank of College View v. Nelson, 106 Neb. 129, 130, 183 N.W.
100, 101 (1921)).
48. 731 F.2d at 1468.
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loan. 4
9
In essence, the court held that loans in excess of the legal lending
limit are nonetheless enforceable against both contracting parties. The
question arises: is the legislative intent behind such laws being accom-
plished? Could it have been the legislature's intent in passing such a law
to provide sanctions 50 only against a violating bank, or is there also an
important economic reason for prohibiting such loans? If the object of
lending limit laws is to protect the bank's depositors, stockholders, and
the public in general from extremely speculative loans, 5 1 then perhaps
such loans should not be enforced. While it is true in this case that the
bank was capable of financing the loan through a correspondent bank,
much of the language of National Farmers Organization implies that logic
and equity demand the general enforcement of excessive loans, regard-
less of such capability.
5 2
It is unclear whether the probable use of a correspondent bank in
National Farmers Organization was the primary reason for the holding or
merely a consideration. How the Tenth Circuit would hold in a case
involving a completed loan in excess of the legal amount, with no use of
a correspondent bank, is therefore uncertain.
III. BANK LIABILITY ON FORGED COMMERCIAL PAPER
A leading UCC case decided by the Tenth Circuit during this survey
period also involved the banking industry. The case, Bridgeport Firemen's
Sick and Death Benefit Association v. Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion, 53 involved an ingenious embezzlement scheme designed by a cor-
porate officer, a motion for summary judgment granted in favor of the
embezzled corporation, and a convoluted Tenth Circuit opinion, per
Judge Doyle, suggesting that under the UCC the loss should fall back on
the bank-barring a finding by the trial court, on remand, that the plain-
tiff corporation was negligent 54 or that the Utah Fiduciaries Act ap-
plied.5 5 This section of the survey focuses primarily on the UCC
portion of the Bridgeport decision.
Bridgeport obtained a $100,000, ten-year certificate of deposit from
Deseret. 56 At the time the certificate was obtained, Bridgeport submit-
49. Id. at 1469.
50. In Kansas it is a misdemeanor for any banker, officer, employee, director or agent
of a bank to fail to perform a duty required by the banking statute. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-
2001 (1982).
51. See Dove Creek St. Bank v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 157 Colo. 263, 274, 402
P.2d 369, 375 (1965) (business of banking bears such a relation to the economic security
of the public so as to be a proper subject of regulation by the state in the exercise of its
police power).
52. See 731 F.2d at 1468 (citing Bank of College View v. Nelson, 106 Neb. 129, 131,
183 N.W. 100, 101 (1921)). The Court considers the fact that many of the cases denying
enforcement were decided before the widespread use of correspondent banks, 731 F.2d at
1467, but cites Nelson, a 1921 case, as persuasive authority. Id. at 1468.
53. 735 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1984).
54. Id. at 387.
55. Id. at 387-88. See infra note 64.
56. Id. at 384.
[Vol. 62:1
COMMERCIAL LAW
ted a signature card authorizing four of its corporate officers to transact
business. 5 7 Among those authorized were Bernard Packo, Treasurer,
and William Egan, Secretary. 58 The account remained unused for two
years. Then Mr. Packo, in a well planned scheme, decided to embezzel
$90,000 from the account.
59
Packo walked into the Deseret Bank one day with the following:
1) the certificate of deposit; 2) a letter ostensibly signed by Packo and
Egan notifying the bank of the recent election of a Mr. Coffin, Secretary,
and three other new officers (all fictitious); 3) a letter bearing the ficti-
tious Coffin's signature, authorizing Packo to borrow $90,000 for the
company; 4) a new signature card containing Coffin's and Packo's signa-
ture along with a resolution authorizing any two officers to transact busi-
ness; and 5) a promissory note bearing Coffin's signature. 60 With these
documents Packo was allowed to sign the promissory note, pledging the
certificate of deposit as collateral, and walk out of the bank with a check
written to Bridgeport for $90,000. Deseret retained the certificate, re-
fusing to return it to Bridgeport. 6 1 Mr. Packo was, of course, never
heard from again.
6 2
Bridgeport sued Deseret to recover the certificate of deposit. At the
trial court, Bridgeport prevailed on a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court declared that the loan and related pledge of the certifi-
cate were made without authority and were therefore void, and that Des-
eret had converted Bridgeport's certificate of deposit.
6 3
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit addressed, to varying degrees, three
arguments raised by Deseret: 1) that the Utah Fiduciaries Act 6 4 shel-
tered Deseret from liability; 2) that Deseret did not breach the contract
with Bridgeport because the transaction with Packo "was authorized by
virtue of the fact that the documents contained the requisite two signa-
tures and/or by Packo's indicia of authority"; and 3) that Deseret had a
complete defense in that it was a holder in due course of the certifi-
cate.6 5 Neither Deseret nor Bridgeport argued that the UCC applied to
the case. Nevertheless, Judge Doyle embarked upon a confusing and
unnecessary UCC discourse by announcing: "The applicability of the
UCC to this transaction was not specifically argued by the parties. How-
ever, the parties have implicitly assumed applicability of the Code."
'66
Judge Doyle reasoned that under the UCC an unauthorized signa-





60. Id. at 384-85.
61. Id. at 385.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 22-1-1 to -10 (1953 & Supp. 1983).
65. 735 F.2d at 385.
66. Id. at 386 (emphasis added).
67. U.C.C. § 3-404(1) (1977). The section reads in full:
Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose
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and an instrument bearing such a signature is not properly payable.68
Furthermore, both forgeries and signatures made in excess of an agent's
authority are within the UCC's definition of "unauthorized." '69 The
Tenth Circuit then determined that the signature of the fictitious Coffin
was a forgery, and it therefore need not reach the issue of whether
Packo's signature alone was an unauthorized signature.70 The Court
concluded that the bank could be found liable for the loss provided that
Bridgeport was not precluded from recovery because of its own
negligence.
7'
This reasoning, however, is significantly complicated by the particu-
lar facts of Bridgeport. In Bridgeport, the bank paid funds out of its own
account to Packo, not out of the certificate of deposit account, and sim-
ply took a pledge of the certificate of deposit funds. The only negotiable
instrument bearing a forgery was the promissory note.7 2 No funds were
actually "paid" on the note, in the ordinary sense of the term, in that no
debit was specifically charged against the certificate of deposit account.
The bank simply refused to deliver the certificate upon Bridgeport's
request.
73
In order to justify its discussion of the UCC, the court made a
strained analogy: "Here, the defendant, in essence, made a payment out
of the plaintiff's account which was not properly payable. . . because of
the forged signature on the promissory note . . . . Defendant did this
by giving Packo a check for $90,000 and retaining the certificate of de-
posit."'74 When does one sign a promissory note in order to draw on his
own funds? This question was not answered by the Bridgeport decision.
In fitting this case within the parameters of the UCC, the Tenth Cir-
cuit has tread upon new ground. This probably accounts for the notable
lack of case authority in the opinion. 75 The court has presented few
guidelines for similar fact situations which might arise in the future.
Perhaps it should have followed the district court's lead and focused pri-
marily on the forged signature cards. 7 6 Instead, the Tenth Circuit rea-
soned that although a signature card is "perhaps not a negotiable
instrument," it should not be viewed in isolation.7 7 Rather than raise
issues which were neither pleaded nor proven in the lower court, the
Tenth Circuit could have correctly and adequately resolved the appeal,
name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it; but it operates
as the signature of the unauthorized signer in favor of any person who in good
faith pays the instrument or takes it for value.
Id.
68. 735 F.2d at 387. See also U.C.C. § 3-401 (1977).
69. 735 F.2d at 386. See U.C.C. § 3-404 (1977) (Comment 1).
70. 735 F.2d at 386.
71. Id. at 387. See U.C.C. § 3-406 (1977).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing UCC §§ 4-401, 3-404 (1977)).
75. The court cites only one case, Perini v. First Nat'l Bank of Habersham County, 553
F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1977), in the entire UCC portion of the opinion. See 735 F.2d at 386-87.
76. 735 F.2d at 385.
77. Id. at 386.
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as presented by the parties, based on the common law. Under the com-
mon law, not only is a bank charged with knowledge of its depositer's
signatures, 78 but also the bank is under a duty to inquire into an individ-
ual's corporate authority. 79 If the Tenth Circuit had chosen this course,
it could have held the bank liable without discussing the UCC.
Ultimately, advocates may convincingly maintain that Judge Doyle's
UCC discussion was not necessary for the resolution of the case and is
therefore mere dicta. The court's only clear holding is that under the
Utah Fiduciaries Act,80 the question of whether Packo had apparent au-
thority to pledge the certificate is a question of fact. Therefore, the trial
court erred in determining that, as a matter of law, Packo had no appar-
ent authority. 8 ' On the other hand, the UCC language of the Bridgeport
decision may be cited as persuasive authority for the following proposi-
tions: the presence of a forgery on a negotiable instrument which re-
quires two signatures may result in the burden of loss being carried by
the lender accepting the instrument;8 2 and the presence of a forgery on
such a negotiable instrument renders the instrument not properly paya-
ble, regardless of the presence and validity of other signatures.
IV. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Is the use of "Brew Nuts" as a logo on a package of sweetened,
salted nuts an infringement of the "Beer Nuts" registered trademark?
The trial court had answered this question in the negative in Beer Nuts,
Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co. ,83 and found the case remanded to it by the
Tenth Circuit.
8 4
The trial court had based its decision primarily on a side-by-side
comparison of the packages and found the "Brew Nuts" product pack-
aging and wording sufficiently unique. 85 According to the trial court,
the "Beer Nuts" trademark has two functions, to describe the contents
of the package, and to identify to the consumer the corporate source of
the product, the latter referred to as the trademark's "secondary mean-
ing".8 6 The trial court determined that the trademark was only entitled
to protection as to its "secondary meaning". 8 7 Noting the packages
were dissimilar in color, lettering, and style, and that the Clover Club
trademark appeared conspicuously on every "Brew Nuts" package, the
trial judge surmised: "The eye of this court is not confused, nor is the
78. See, e.g., Sabatino v. Curtis, 446 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1971).
79. See Wheat State Ser. Corp. v. Colfax Nat'l Bank, 44 Colo. App. 376, 618 P.2d 698
(1980).
80. See supra note 64.
81. 735 F.2d at 388.
82. The court gave only cursory attention to Deseret's claim of being a holder in due
course (and, presumably, not a payer, drawee bank). Id. at 386.
83. 520 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 1981).
84. 711 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1983).
85. 520 F. Supp. at 398. Copies of the packages appear in the text of the opinion. Id.
at 401-02.
86. Id. at 398.
87. Id.
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eye of the consuming public likely to be."'a8 The question of confusion
being one for the finder of fact and determinative of the infringment
claim, Beer Nuts was denied relief.8 9 A quick perusal of the packages in
question90 left little doubt in this author's mind as to the soundness of
the district court's opinion. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, how-
ever, was not so moved, and in a complex decision, remanded the case
pointing out that the district court did not apply the appropriate legal
standards or weigh all the relevant evidence. 9 1
It is not difficult to extract from the circuit court's decision exactly
where the district court erred. "[Ilt is axiomatic in trademark law that
side-by-side comparison is not the test."' 92 It is difficult, however, to
assimilate the myriad of factors mentioned as components of an in-
fringement determination.9 3 According to the court, it is not simply
similarity in sight or sound which constitutes infringement; infringement
can also be found where concepts or ideas are commingled. 94 The court
minimized the importance of the dissimilarity in packaging, focusing in-
stead on whether confusion, sensory or conceptual, would result if the
"mark" 9 5 were singly presented to the public. 96
What was important to the court was not so much the similarity of
the names as the extenuating circumstances. The court indicated the
importance of considering whether the market channels are convergent,
increasing the likelihood of confusion, 97 whether the products them-
selves are very much alike, 98 -the degree of care the ordinary purchaser
exercises in buying a product of the same general nature, 99 and the in-
tention of the actor in adopting the mark.'0 0 The Tenth Circuit re-
88. Id.
89. Id. at 397. "The pivitol question still remains the same, are the terms used so
similar that the public is likely to be confused as to the origin of the product." Id.
90. See 520 F. Supp. at 401-02.
91. 711 F.2d at 940-42.
92. Id. at 941 (citing Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir.
1980)); American Home Products Corp. v.Johnson Chem. Co., 589 F.2d 103, 107 (2d Cir.
1978); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th Cir. 1976);
Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (D. Kan. 1977)).
93. These were components the trial court ignored, according to the Tenth Circuit.
"[T]he [trial] court erroneously equated likelihood of confusion with similarity. Similarity
must be considered along with other factors .. " 711 F.2d at 942.
94. Id. at 940. "Confusion of origin of goods may be caused by confusing similarity in
the meaning of the designations employed." Id. at 940-41 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v.
Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65, 74 (10th Cir. 1958)) (emphasis added).
95. Despite the conspicuousness of the Clover Club registered trademark on the
"Brew Nuts" packages, the court apparently determined that the "Brew Nuts" logo was
being used as a trademark, noting the much larger lettering and distinctive style of the
"Brew Nuts" mark. Id. at 938. At the end of its infringement discussion, however, the
court stated: "Although we offer no opinion regarding the merits of this case, we remand for a
proper evaluation of similarity and a reconsideration of likelihood of confusion. ... Id.
at 942 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 941.
97. Id. The trial court did note that both products were sold in supermarkets and the
like. 520 F. Supp. at 397.
98. 711 F.2d at 941.
99. Id. In this respect, the Tenth Circuit noted that purchasers of inexpensive or "im-
pulse" items are more likely to be confused than purchasers ofi more costly items. Id.
100. Id. at 940 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938)).
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manded the case with instructions for the trial court to consider these
alternative factors.'
0 '
The Beer Nuts case is significant because it will affect the decision-
making process of marketers. The court explored this process, noting
the testimony of the president of Clover Club concerning his decision to
use the "Brew Nuts" name.10 2 The court stated, however, that the in-
tent of the alleged infringer is only part of the complete test and not in
itself determinative. '
0 3
The Beer Nuts case presented a compounded problem in that the
product in question is hard to describe as other than "Beer Nuts." Nuts
can be sweetened and salted in a number of different ways, thus making
an attempt to describe the nuts merely as sweetened and salted some-
what hopeless. 10 4 The Court did discuss the possibility of a "fair use"
defense,' 0 5 the use of a trademark for descriptive purposes only, but
dismissed its application in Beer Nuts because it was not raised.1
0 6
In attempting to move trademark infringement law -away from the
subjective "side-by-side comparison" test, the Tenth Circuit may have
made the test even more subjective. Determining when "ideas" are
commingled and sufficiently similar as to cause confusion among ordi-
nary shoppers will not be an easy task for judges, let alone marketing
executives. The complexity of factors can only be viewed as somewhat
subjective in themselves, despite their objective language.
10 7
V. CONCLUSION
The cases examined in this survey article do not represent the en-
tirety of the noteworthy commercial cases recently decided by the Tenth
Circuit. Two cases concerning the effects of declarations made by insur-
ance agents when issuing insurance policies are recommended for com-
101. 711 F.2d at 942.
102. Id. at 938 n.4. The company also considered the name "Ah Nuts", but was con-
cerned that the nature of the product inside would be a mystery, even with "sweetened
salted peanuts" written on the package. Id. Perhaps Clover Club should have considered
the possibilities: "Brew Ha Ha Nuts," "Nutz fer Beer," or "Suds Nuts."
103. Id. at 941. The court stated that the intent to pass one's goods off as another's
raised an inference of confusion. Id.
104. See supra note 102.
105. 711 F.2d at 937-38. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1982), which provides for the use of
registered trademarks by persons other than the registrant under certain conditions.
106. 711 F.2d at 937.
107. For an informative case discussing the general area of trademark infringement
law, see Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
981 (1981). See also Beatrice Foods Co. v. Neosho Valley Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 297 F.2d
447 (10th Cir. 1961) ("Meadow Sweet" and "Meadow Gold"); Nebraska Consol. Mills Co.
v. Shawnee Milling Co., 198 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1952) ("Mother's Best" and "Mother's
Pride"); Hesmer Foods, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1965) (the
somewhat humorous contrast of "Beanee Barbeque" and "Barbeque Beans"). For discus-
sions concerning the descriptive nature of certain trademarks, see Kellog Co. v. National
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) ("Shredded Wheat"); Dixi-Cola Laboratories v. Coca-
Cola, Co., 117 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1941) ("Cola"); American Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Creame
Laboratories, Inc., 420 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970) ("Aloe"). A
trademark can be cancelled because of its long continued use as a generic term. See, e.g.,
Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. 80 (1950) ("Escalator").
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parison. s0 8 Bank counsel might also note Hibernia National Bank v.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. ,109 which outlines a depositor's right to set
off his deposit accounts against any loan obligations he has with an in-
solvent bank, despite the fact that his loans were participated in or
purchased by another bank. CMI Corp. v. Leemar Steel Co. Inc. 110 provides
an excellent factual vehicle for a discussion of the closely wed theories of
rejection of goods and revocation of acceptance of goods.
Matthew G. Walton
108. Compare McGehee v. Farmers Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 1422 (10th Cir. 1984) (insurer
estopped from asserting interest uninsurable where agent wrote policy with full knowledge
of circumstances) with Catts Co. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 723 F.2d 1494 (10th Cir. 1983) (insurer
not estopped from asserting no coverage even though agent informed insured that goods
would be covered as long as insured retained an interest).
109. 733 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1984).




During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals de-
cided several cases involving constitutional issues. Some of the cases
cast new light on old problems in interpreting the constitution; others
reinforced principles previously enunciated in settled precedent; and in
others, the appellants failed to raise valid constitutional challenges.
This article focuses primarily on first amendment cases. The lead
case addresses the constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute that at-
tempted to prohibit school teachers from advocating or engaging in
"public homosexual conduct."' Other important Tenth Circuit consti-
tutional law cases touch on such diverse areas as a Wichita obscenity
ordinance,2 Jewish school teachers' freedom of religion rights,3 and the
Oklahoma Take-over Bid Act.4 And, to the chagrin of non-smokers
working in smoke-filled offices throughout the Tenth Circuit, the court
of appeals refused to use the Constitution to ban smoking in the work-
place, thereby rejecting appellants claim to a constitutional right to
think.
5
I. FREEDOM OF SPEECH: NATIONAL GAY TASK FORCE V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION
A. Facts
In National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education,6 the Tenth Circuit
addressed the question of whether a statute 7 which punishes school
1. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), prob.
juris. noted, 105 S. Ct. 76 (Oct. 1, 1984) (No. 83-2030) (arguments heardJanuary 14, 1985;
decision pending). See infra notes 6-52 and accompanying text.
2. M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983). See infra notes 53-70
and accompanying text.
3. Pinsker v. Joint School Dist. No. 28J, 735 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1984). See infra
notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
4. Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Servs. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983). See infra
notes 136-152 and accompanying text.
5. Kensell v. Oklahoma, 716 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir. 1983). See infra notes 128-135 and
accompanying text.
6. 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir.), prob. juris noted, 105 S. Ct. 76 (Oct. 1, 1984) (No. 83-
2030) (arguments heard January 14, 1985; decision pending).
7. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-103.15 (1981). This statute provides:
1. "Public homosexual activity" means the commission of an act defined in
Section 886 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes, if such act is:
a. committed with a person of the same sex, and
b. indiscreet and not practiced in private;
2. "Public homosexual conduct" means advocating, soliciting, imposing,
encouraging or promoting public or private homosexual activity in a
manner that creates a substantial risk that such conduct will come to the
attention of school children or school employees; and
3. "Teacher" means a person as defined in Section 1-116 of Title 70 of the
Oklahoma Statutes.
B. In addition to any ground set forth in Section 6-103 of Title 70 of the
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
teachers for "public homosexual activity" 8 and "public homosexual con-
duct" 9 violates the Constitution. Oklahoma law, as written in state stat-
utes and subsequently interpreted by the state courts, defined
homosexual "activity" as including the commission of oral or anal sod-
omy. 10 Homosexual conduct, however, was statutorily defined as "ad-
vocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting public or
private homosexual activity."' Punishment for public homosexual con-
duct or activity by a teacher included refusal to hire or rehire, suspen-
sion or dismissal.'
2
The National Gay Task Force (NGTF), a political action group
which promotes the rights of homosexuals and which includes among its
membership teachers employed by the defendant school district, chal-
lenged the facial constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that the
section prohibiting homosexual activity deprived its members of the
right to privacy' 3 and equal protection under the law, 14 and that the law
was vague. 15 The appellants also contended that the section outlawing
public homosexual conduct was infirm in that it was overbroad, invading
freedom of speech.16 Finally, NGTF argued that the statute violated the
establishment clause of the first amendment' 7 because it reflected
Oklahoma Statutes, a teacher, student teacher or a teacher's aide may be re-
fused employment, or reemployment, dismissed, or suspended after a find-
ing that the teacher or teachers' aide has:
1. Engaged in public homosexual conduct or activity; and
2. Has been rendered unfit, because of such conduct or activity, to hold a
position as a teacher, student teacher or teachers' aide.
C. The following factors shall be considered in making the determination
whether the teacher, student teacher or teachers' aide has been rendered un-
fit for his position:
1. The likelihood that the activity or conduct may adversely affect students
or school employees;
2. The proximity in time or place of the activity or conduct to the teacher's,
student teacher's, or teachers' aide's official duties;
3. Any extenuating or aggravating circumstances; and
4. Whether the conduct or activity is of a repeated or continuing nature
which tends to encourage or dispose school children toward similar con-
duct or activity.
8. Id. In this statute, homosexual activity refers exclusively to the actual commitment
of an act defined in 21 OKLA. STAT., § 886 (1981), which states: "Every person who is
guilty of the detestable and abominable crime against nature, committed with mankind or
with a beast, is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding ten (10)
years." In Berryman v. State, 283 P.2d 558, 563 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955), the Oklahoma
court construed § 886 as proscribing oral and anal copulation. The United States
Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973), upheld a nearly identical Flor-
ida statute.
.9. See supra note 7. In this statute, public homosexual conduct refers not to the com-
mission of sodomy, but to the advocacy of homosexual activity as defined in note 7, supra.
10. See supra note 8.
11. See supra note 7.
12. See supra note 7.
13. Brief for the Appellant at 21-36, National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729
F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984).
14. Id. at 36-45.
15. Id. at 17-21.
16. Id. at 14-16.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I states, in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an





The Tenth Circuit, speaking through Judge Logan, upheld the sec-
tion of the law which permits the state to fire teachers for committing
indiscreet public acts of sodomy. 19 Although the court did not com-
ment extensively, it ruled that because the statute prohibits only public
homosexual activity, it does not violate any constitutionally protected
right to privacy.20 In response to the equal protection challenge, the
court ruled that since the choice of sexual partner has not been held to
be a suspect class,2 1 the state may reasonably discharge a teacher "for
engaging in an indiscreet public act of oral or anal intercourse."
22
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court in rejecting the
NGTF establishment of religion challenge with little comment other
than reference to Harris v. McCrae.2 3 In Harris, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that just because a law coincides or harmonizes
with a religious belief, it does not necessarily follow that the law was
inspired by that belief, citing for example that theJudaeo-Christian ethic
against stealing does not negate larceny laws.
24
The Tenth Circuit further ruled that the homosexual activity section
of the statute was not invalid for vagueness. 2 5 Relying on Village of Hoff-
man Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. ,26 the court stated that an
appellant must show that a challenged law is "impermissibly vague in all
its applications."' 2 7 Noting that the challenged statute defines public ho-
mosexual activity as the "commission of an act defined in Section 886 of
Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes," 28 and that Oklahoma courts have
construed this section as proscribing oral and anal intercourse, 29 the ap-
peals court ruled that the behavior prohibited by the statute is clearly
defined, and thus the law is not void for vagueness.
3 0
The section of the statute which proscribed advocating public ho-
mosexual conduct 3 l did not fare as well as the section outlawing public
homosexual activity. The court ruled that this section reached protected
speech.3 2 The trial court had also found that the statute forbade pro-
tected speech, but upheld its constitutionality by reading into it a "mate-
18. Brief for the Appellant at 46-47.
19. 729 F.2d at 1273.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1273 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
22. 729 F.2d at 1273.
23. 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
24. Id. at 319-320.
25. 729 F.2d at 1273. See supra notes 7 and 8.
26. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
27. 729 F.2d at 1273 (quoting Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497).
28. See supra note 3.
29. 729 F.2d at 1273 n.1 (citing Berryman v. State, 283 P.2d 558, 563 (Okl. Crim.
App. 1955)).
30. 729 F.2d at 1273.
31. See supra note 7.
32. 729 F.2d at 1274.
1984]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
rial and substantial disruption" test. 33 The Tenth Circuit ruled,
however, that it could read no such test into the statute, and thus found
it an unconstitutional invasion of free speech.
3 4
Citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma,3 5 the court acknowledged that first
amendment facial challenges based on overbreadth are "strong
medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort."'3 6 Neverthe-
less, the court felt compelled to invalidate the advocacy section of the
statute because it regulated pure speech,3 7 it has a "deterrent effect on
legitimate expression," 3 8 and because it would not be "readily subject
to a narrowing construction by the state courts."
'3 9
The court found that even though the statute sought to condemn
advocacy of a crime, the first amendment protects such speech so long
as the illegal activity is to take place at "some indefinite future time."
40
Only advocacy intended to incite imminent lawlessness is not so pro-
tected, the court noted, citing Brandenburg v. Ohio.4 1 The court observed
that a teacher appearing before the Oklahoma legislature to lobby for
homosexual rights, although exercising protected speech, would be sub-
ject to punishment under the statute if his advocacy came to the atten-
tion of his students or school employees. 4 2 Thus, under the statute, the
court noted, teachers necessarily must restrict their expression in order
to protect their jobs.
43
Recognizing that in some instances the state may restrict teachers'
freedom of speech,4 4 the court ruled that such a restriction is constitu-
tionally proper only when the speech creates a "material or substantial
interference or disruption in the normal activities of the school." 4 5 The
court went on to observe that the appellee had made no showing that
mere advocoacy would create such a disruption.
4 6
C. The Dissent
Judge Barrett, in a vigorous dissent, entirely rejected the majority's
33. Id. at 1272-73.
34. Id. at 1274.
35. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
36. 729 F.2d at 1274 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613).
37. 729 F.2d at 1274 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772-73 (1982)).
38. 729 F.2d at 1274 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216
(1975)).
39. Id.
40. 729 F.2d at 1274 (citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973)).
41. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
42. 729 F.2d at 1274.
43. Id. at 1274 (citing Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217 (1975)).
44. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (teachers' interest
in commenting upon matters of public concern must be balanced against the State's inter-
est, as an employer in public employee efficiency); Childers v. Independent School Dist.
No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1982) (public employee's first amendment rights of ex-
pression are protected unless the employer demonstrates that some restriction is neces-
sary to ensure effective employee performance or to prevent disruption of official
functions).
45. 729 F.2d at 1274 (citing Tinker v. Des Monies, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
46. 729 F.2d at 1274.
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constitutional overbreadth analysis, and would have upheld the
Oklahoma statute in its entirety. 4 7 Declaring sodomy to be "malum in
se," 48 Judge Barrett concluded that advocacy of homosexual conduct
merited no constitutional protection. 49 Not being protected speech, the
judge asserted that the state is not required to demonstrate that such
advocacy would cause a material or substantial disruption of school ac-
tivities. Rather, all the state need show was that "such advocacy is ad-
vanced in a manner that creates a substantial risk that such conduct will
encourage school children to commit the abominable crime against na-
ture." 50 The judge concluded that, regardless of the situs where made,
any public advocacy involved a substantial risk of reaching the ears of
school children, creating a danger that it would incite them to "partici-
pate in the abominable and detestable crime against nature."' 5 1 Such
speech, opined the judge, "is without First Amendment protection."
5 2
II. OBSCENITY: M.S. NEWS V. CASADO
5 3
In M.S. News Co. v. Casado,54 the Tenth Circuit considered a first
amendment challenge to the constitutionality of a proposed Wichita,
Kansas, obscenity ordinance. The case presented to the court two previ-
ously unraised questions: first, the constitutionality of incorporating a
modified Miller definition of "obscenity" into an ordinance designed for
the protection of children as an audience; 5 5 and second, the constitu-
tionality of protecting children from the display of materials which are
not legally obscene in the possession of an adult. Relying on a related
47. Id. at 1275 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 1276. Judge Barrett defines malum in se as an act "immoral and corruptible
in its nature without regard to the fact of its being noticed or punished by the law of the
state." Id.
49. Id. at 1276.
50. Id. at 1277.
51. Id. at 1276.
52. Id.
53. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Lawrence K. Hoyt in
drafting this section of the article.
54. 721 F.2d at 1281 (10th Cir. 1983). The case also raised equal protection, prior
restraint, and sixth amendment issues. On each of these issues the court ruled against the
plaintiff news company. The equal protection claim, which arises frequently in conjunc-
tion with obscenity issues, was disposed of by directly applying Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) (Supreme Court stated that "stemming the tide of commer-
cialized obscenity" is a legitimate state interest).
The court rejected outright the plaintiff's prior restraint claim, noting that the ordi-
nance penalizes violations of its terms, "[i]t does not require prior approval of the authori-
ties before any material can be distributed or displayed." 721 F.2d at 1292.
The court also rejected the plaintiff's sixth amendment argument that, because prose-
cutions under the ordinance are tried before the municipal court, the ordinance violates
the right to a jury determination of what constitutes contemporary community standards.
721 F.2d at 1293. The court determined that Kansas' "two-tier" adjudicatory system,
which provides an appellant the right to a trial de novo in the district court where trial by
jury may be requested, adequately affords an accused his right to a jury trial. Id. at 1294.
The court refused to accept plaintiff's argument that the application of the constitutional
obscenity test must, in the first instance, be by a jury. Id. at 1295.
55. In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), a majority of five justices agreed on a
new definition of "obscenity" which is constitutionally acceptable for use in determining
when materials or speech are not entitled to first amendment protection. The decision
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but not clearly precedential Supreme Court decision, the Tenth Circuit
rejected in a logical manner each of the arguments raised against the
ordinance.
The plaintiff, a wholesale and retail distributor of publications, was
appealing the district court's dismissal of its request for injunctive and
declaratory relief against enforcement of the ordinance. 5 6 The ordi-
nance, if enforced, would render illegal the sale of sexually oriented
materials to minors and would limit the display of such materials. The
ordinance specifically required that material "harmful to minors" must
be kept behind devices commonly known as "blinder racks" so that the
lower two-thirds of the material would not be visible.
5 7
The Tenth Circuit first cited Ginsberg v. New York 58 for the general
principle that it is constitutionally permissible to accord minors a more
restrictive right to purchase sexually related materials than that given to
adults.59 The court then addressed the plaintiff's allegation that the
Wichita ordinance was void due to overbreadth and vagueness. Observ-
ing that the Ginsberg Court had upheld, in the face of vagueness and
overbreadth claims, a New York statute which similarly prevented the
sale of obscene materials to minors, the Tenth Circuit reconciled two
important factual differences between Ginsberg and the case at bar.60
First, the New York obscenity ordinance in Ginsberg had defined
materials "harmful to minors" by incorporating the definition of "ob-
scenity" as set forth in the now overruled Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
6 '
modifying each of the three elements of the Memoirs definition so that it
applied to minors.62 The Wichita ordinance, however, used the current
Miller definition of obscenity, modifying it in the same manner to derive
its definition of "harmful to minors."' 63 Because the Ginsberg Court had
held that such a modification to a constitutionally acceptable definition
did not cause the resulting definition to fail for overbreadth or vague-
modified the definitions previously set forth in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
The Miller guidelines are (a) "whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest" (quoting Roth), (b) "whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offen-
sive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the state law," and (e) "whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 413 U.S. 15,
24 (1973).
56. 721 F.2d at 1285.
57. Id. at 1296, 1297.
58. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
59. 721 F.2d at 1285.
60. Id. at 1286.
61. 383 U.S. 413-18 (1966).
62. 721 F.2d at 1286 (citing Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 646 (1968)).
63. 721 F.2d at 1296. The Wichita ordinance defined as "harmful to minors" any
material or performance having the following characteristics:
(a) The average adult person applying contemporary community standards
would find that the material or performance has a predominant tendency to ap-
peal to a prurient interest in sex to minors; and
(b) The average adult person applying contemporary community standards
would find that the material or performance depicts or describes nudity, sexual
conduct, sexual excitement or sado-masochistic abuse in a manner that is patently
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ness, the Tenth Circuit reasoned, by implication, that the Wichita ordi-
nance should likewise be upheld against the vagueness and overbreadth
claims. 64
The second important difference between the Wichita and Ginsberg
ordinances was that the Wichita ordinance included the display prohibi-
tion. The Tenth Circuit held that although the prohibition was content-
based regulation, it was valid as a reasonable time, place and manner
regulation designed to further "the substantial governmental interest of
protecting minors from harmful adult material."' 65 The plaintiff's over-
breadth argument was therefore rejected. 6 6 The court noted that adults
were not deprived of access to the material, and minors were deprived
only of material that was obscene as to them.6 7 The court further rea-
soned that the display regulation could be categorized as governing
"speech plus conduct," rather than pure speech, thereby invoking the
requirement that the overbreadth of the challenged statute must be
"substantial" before invalidation is justified.6 8
The court rejected the plaintiff's vagueness claim by holding that
the ordinance's clearly defined obscenity standard gives each seller of
sexually oriented material sufficient notice of when displays must be re-
stricted. 69 The scienter provision in the ordinance was found to further
offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community with respect to what is
suitable for minors; and
(c) The material or performance lacks serious literary, scientific, educa-
tional, artistic, or political value for minors.
Id. at 1296. Compare the ordinance definition of "harmful to minors" with the Miller defi-
nition of obscenity presented at supra note 55.
64. 721 F.2d at 1286-87.
65. Id. at 1288 (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63-72 (1976)).
The Tenth Circuit rationale should not, however, be interpreted as allowing or en-
couraging content-based regulation of speech beyond the obscenity context. Unlike the
evolution of the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity which, since Miller, has appar-
ently reached a condition of stability (see supra note 55), the Supreme Court's position on
the validity of content-based regulation is in a state of flux. The plurality opinion in Ameri-
can Mini Theatres supported a broader use of content-based regulation, 427 U.S. at 63 &
n. 18, but Justice Powell, the swing vote, and Justice Stewart, with whom three Justices
joined in dissent, wrote that an ordinance discriminating between theatres solely on the
basis of the content of the films shown is unconstitutional. Id. at 75, 76, 86. Furthermore,
there has historically been a presumption against the validity of content-based regulations
as indicated by the recent Supreme Court decisions in Metromedia Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981), and Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530, 536 (1979). Therefore. MS. News should not be relied upon as authority for
content-based regulation of speech beyond the obscenity context. However, see FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-51 (1978), which upholds a content-based regulation
designed to protect children from indecent forms of speech.
66. 721 F.2d at 1289. See also Dover News, Inc. v. City of Dover, 381 A.2d 752, 755
(1977) in which the Supreme Court of New Hampshire suggested that a properly written
display ordinance would be upheld as a reasonable time, place and manner restriction.
Compare American Booksellers v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 129 Cal. App. 3d 188,
204, 205, 181 Cal. Rptr. 3d 33, 38 (1983), ruling that a display ordinance was overbroad to
the extent it denied access of adults and minors to material that was not obscene to each
group respectively.
67. 721 F.2d at 1288-89.
68. Id. at 1289 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 (1982)).
69. 721 F.2d at 1290.
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mitigate any claim of vagueness or lack of notice. 70
III. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
The Tenth Circuit considered two cases in which appellants invoked
a freedom of religion argument to vindicate perceived invasions of con-
stitutional rights. In both cases, the appeals court rejected the claims of
the appellants.
A. Denver Post of The National Society of The Volunteers of
America v. NLRB.
7 1
The Volunteers of America (VOA) and its affiliated Denver chapter
is an organization whose stated purpose is to bring people to "a knowl-
edge of God."'7 2 Although the Denver chapter operates three chapels in
the metropolitan area, it also operates six social welfare facilities in coor-
dination with various state and local governmental agencies. 7 3 In 1981,
several of its social workers were the targets of an organizing effort by
the United Nurses, Professionals and Health Care Employees (the
Union). The Union filed a petition with the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) requesting that it be certified as the bargaining agent for
VOA employees. VOA objected to the certification on the grounds that
it was a religious organization, and that its complex relationship with
various governmental levels, especially for funding and administration,
made negotiations for wages, hours, and conditions of employment with
a third party almost impossible. 74 Nevertheless, the NLRB certified the
Union, which subsequently won an election among VOA employees.
When the Union sought to negotiate a wages-and-hours contract,
VOA refused on the ground that the jurisdictional certification issued by
the NLRB was erroneous. The NLRB regional director issued a com-
plaint against VOA alleging violations of the National Labor Relations
Act. 7 5 Shortly thereafter VOA and the Union jointly filed a stipulation
requesting that the NLRB issue an order charging the VOA with a tech-
nical refusal to bargain. The sole purpose of the requested order was to
place VOA's objections to the NLRB certification before the Tenth
Circuit.
7 6
Before the appellate court, VOA cited NLRB v. Catholic Bishop7 7 as
authority for its refusal to bargain with the Union. In Catholic Bishop, the
United States Supreme Court rejected a bid by the NLRB to force a
union election in church schools, observing that "the 'obvious fact [is]
that the raison d'tre of parochial schools is the propagation of a reli-
70. Id.
71. 732 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1984).
72. Id. at 770.
73. Id. at 771 n.l.
74. Id. at 771.
75. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (5) (1982).
76. 732 F.2d at 771.
77. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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gious faith.' ",78 This, the court ruled, would cause the NLRB, a govern-
mental organization, to become impermissibly entangled in church
affairs.79
The circuit court observed that, although the primary purpose of
the VOA is to help people find God through the social programs it ad-
ministers, the religious aim clearly is not the "central role . . . [of] the
programs themselves." 8 0 Thus, the court ruled that VOA was not enti-
tled to the same first amendment protection as that given parochial
schools. The court noted that, although all VOA officers are ordained
ministers, the staff of its various social work programs have no religious
training and provide no spiritual guidance to their clients. This, con-
cluded the court, is "a far cry from that of the parochial school teachers
in Catholic Bishop," and poses little potential for entangling the NLRB in
religious matters. 8 ' However, the court noted that if the VOA was using
funds received from federal and state sources for sectarian purposes, it
would raise "serious establishment questions under the First Amend-
ment, as well as the Colorado Constitution."1
8 2
The appellate court also ruled'against VOA's contention that it
should be exempt pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act provi-
sion which excludes governmental bodies from NLRB jurisdiction.
8 3
The court found that VOA was a private contractor rather than a gov-
ernmental agency. As such, it had sufficient control over wages, hours
and working conditions to bargain meaningfully with the Union. 84 Cit-
ing its decision in R. W. Harmon & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 8 5 the appeals court
ruled that whether an employer had sufficient control over employee
relations to bargain effectively is a question of fact, and that the NLRB
finding would not be disturbed so long as it is supported by substantial
evidence. 8 6 Thus, having ruled against VOA on both of its objections to
78. Id. at 503 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 628 (1971) (Douglas, J.
concurring)).
79. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bishop Ford Cent. Catholic High School, 623 F.2d 818, 823 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 996 (1981), in which the appeals court ruled that a first
amendment conflict arose because of "the suffusion of religion into the curriculum and the
mandate of the faculty to infuse the students with the religious values of a religious creed."
80. 732 F.2d at 772.
81. Id. See, e.g., NLRB v. St. Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1981), in
which the NLRB was upheld in ordering union elections in a church-operated home for
battered children. The court emphasized that the home was operated in the same manner
as secular child-care centers, hired employees without regard to religion, and received
substantial public funding. See also Tressler Lutheran Home for Children v. NLRB, 677
F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1982).
82. 732 F.2d at 772 n.2.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982).
84. 732 F.2d at 774-75. But see Board of Trustees of Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB. 624
F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1980), in which the court ruled against the NLRB on the grounds that
the hospital did not have sufficient control over employment relations to barguitt
meaningfully.
85. 664 F.2d 248 (10th Cir. 1981).
86. 732 F.2d at 774. See also NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 403 k1947):
NLRB v. St. Louis Comprehensive Health Center, Inc., 633 F.2d 1268, 1272 (Sth Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981).
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the NLRB's findings, the court enforced the Board's order to bargain
collectively with the Union.
B. Pinsker v. Joint District Number 28J
87
The appellant, Gerald Pinsker, an Aurora, Colorado, school
teacher, and the Aurora Education Association, filed this suit against the
school district claiming a violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,8 8 and of
his first and fourteenth amendment rights to freedom of religion. 89
Pinsker alleged that the district's annual schedule is arranged so that
Christmas is not a school day, and that in most years Good Friday or
Good Friday afternoon are not school days.90 Jewish teachers, however,
must take personal leave or unpaid leave to celebrate Yom Kippur and
Rosh Hashanah. The appellants argued that this leave policy discrimi-
nates against Jewish teachers on religious grounds and burdens their
rights to free exercise of religion. 9 1
The appeals court observed that the collective bargaining contract
between the school district and its teachers provides for twelve days of
paid leave, two of which may be used for special purposes. Tradition-
ally, Jewish teachers who chose to celebrate Yom Kippur and Rosh
Hashanah have used their two days of special leave and one day of un-
paid vacation.
92
Citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,93 the court ruled that the
1964 Civil Rights Act 9 4 requires an employer to either make a reason-
87. 735 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1984).
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). The applicable subparagraphs provide:
§ 2000e-2. Unlawful employment practices
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
§ 2000e. Definitions
(j) The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and prac-
tice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to rea-
sonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business.
89. 735 F.2d at 389.
90. Id.
91. Id. The parties to the suit stipulated that if Pinsker prevailed, any relief accorded
him would be extended to other Jewish teachers. Id. at 389 n. 1.
92. Id. at 390.
93. 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (Holding that the "intent and effect" of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(j) was to require employers to make "reasonable accommodations, short of undue
hardship," for employee religious practices. According to the court, requiring an em-
ployer "to bear more than a de minimus cost" in order to accommodate employee religious
practices constituted "undue hardship." Id. at 84. See also McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc.,
571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982). See supra note 88.
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able accommodation to an employee's religious beliefs or demonstrate
that such accommodation would be an undue hardship.9 5 But, the court
stated, reasonable accommodation does not mean that the employer
must do exactly what the employee wants, or cause the employee no
expense. Therefore, the court ruled that requiring a teacher to take oc-
casional unpaid leave "is not an unreasonable accommodation of teach-
ers' religious practices."
9 6
The plaintiffs also claimed that the leave policy burdened Pinsker's
right to free exercise of religion. The Tenth Circuit relied on Thomas v.
Review Board,9 7 in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that a
burden on religion exists when the state puts substantial pressure on an
employee "to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs."9 8 The
court held that loss of an occasional day's pay by a teacher does not
constitute a substantial burden, citing Braunfeld v. Brown.99
IV. MINOR PARTY BALLOT ACCESS AND MOOTNESS
In Thournir v. Buchanan, 0 0 the Tenth Circuit addressed appellant's
claim that a Colorado ballot access law' 0 ' violates article I, section 2 of
the United States Constitution. ' 0 2 Colorado law requires that if a per-
son is not affiliated with a political party recognized by the state, that
person must be a registered voter in the political subdivision he seeks to
represent for at least one year prior to the placing of his name in nomi-
nation.' 0 3 The law permits the transfer of current registration from
county-to-county within the state, but specifically denies transfer of
party affiliation from without the state.1°4
Eileen Thournir, a registered member of the Socialist Workers
Party in California, moved to Colorado in 1981 but failed to register her
95. 735 F.2d at 391 (citing as support Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hosp., 671 F.2d
141, 145-46 (5th Cir. 1982)).
96. 735 F.2d at 391. However, the court's "reasonable accommodation" analysis
failed to address Pinsker's primary argument; namely, that the school board practiced in-
vidious discrimination because it accommodates Christian teachers by closing the schools
for Christian holidays, but requires Jewish teachers to take leave, paid or unpaid, to ob-
serve their religious holidays. The issue was not whether Pinsker was being reasonably
accommodated, but whether the school district invidiously discriminated between Jewish
teachers and Christian teachers.
97. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
98. Id. at 717-18.
99. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). In this case the Court ruled that Sunday closing laws,
although causing economic loss to Jewish merchants, do not interfere with the free exer-
cise of religion.
100. 710 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1983).
101. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 1-4-801(1) (i) (1973):
No person shall be placed in nomination by petition unless the person is a regis-
tered elector of the political subdivision or district in which the officer is to be
elected and unless he was registered as unaffiliated, as shown on the books of the
county clerk and recorder, for at least twelve months prior to the date of filing of
the petition . . ..
102. See infra note 112.
103. See supra note 101.
104. CoLo. REV. STAT. 1-2-219(1) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
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party affiliation in Colorado until July of 1982.105 Thournir attempted
to run for Congress in the 1982 election, filing the petition required by
Colorado statute' 0 6 with the secretary of state. In September, appellee
Buchanan, then secretary of state, sued to have Thournir's name struck
from the ballot on the ground that Thournir had not been a registered
unaffiliated voter for the statutorily required time period.' 0 7 The Den-
ver District Court, on September 30, 1982, ordered Thournir's name
struck from the ballot.10 8 The Colorado Supreme Court, on October 1,
1982, declined to review the decision.' 0 9 On October 13, 1982, the ap-
pellant filed a section 1983 suit1 10 in federal district court seeking to
have her name restored to the ballot, and to recover damages and attor-
ney's fees.I I Thournir also sought to have the Colorado statute which
denied her access to the ballot declared unconstitutional.' 12
On October 15, 1982, the federal district court denied relief, treat-
ing the suit as a motion for a preliminary injunction against striking her
name from the ballot. The court did not reach the constitutional ques-
tion raised by Thournir, 1 13 denying the injunction upon the basis that,
although Thournir had shown irreparable harm, she had not demon-
strated a likelihood that she would prevail on the merits."14 Requests
for a mandatory stay order to both the Tenth Circuit and the United
States Supreme Court were subsequently refused."t 5 After the election,
Thournir appealed to the Tenth Circuit. The court, perJudge Carrigan,
declined to review the case, declaring that the only relief sought was the
injunction, and, since the election had already been held, the case was
moot. 16
The Tenth Circuit further ruled that it could not address the consti-
tutional issues raised by Thournir because those issues had not been
adequately argued before the federal district court. ' 17 Noting, however,
that the case presented delicate and subtle issues of constitutional law
105. 710 F.2d at 1462.
106. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-804(1) (1980).
107. 710 F.2d at 1462.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
111. 710 F.2d at 1462.
112. Thornir asserted that COLO. REV. STAT. § I-4-801(l)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1983) was
unconstitutional because it imposed more stringent qualification requirements upon can-
didates for Congress than those imposed by Article I, § 2, cl. 2 of the United States Consti-
tution, which states: "No person shall be Representative who shall not have attained to
the Age of twenty five years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen."
113. 710 F.2d at 1462.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1462-63 (Carrigan, J., sitting by designation).
117. Id. at 1465.
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not yet settled, the court invited the appellant to "litigate the matter in
the district court if she so chooses."
' 18
V. CASE DIGESTS
A. Tenth Circuit Denies Prisoners' Right to Court Appointed Counsel
in Paternity Suits' 19
In Nordgren v. Mitchell, 120 several Utah state prison inmates who
were defendants in paternity suits brought an action claiming that the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment
requires the state to provide them counsel in paternity proceedings.
The appellate court, using the analyses ordered in Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services12 1 and Matthews v. Eldridge,122 determined that the state
need not provide counsel in these cases. 123 Eldridge requires a three
step evaluation in determining the need for the presence of counsel in a
court action: first, the private interest affected by the action; second, the
risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest; and third, the govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the financial and
administrative burdens imposed. 12 4 If the Eldridge factors indicate the
need for the presence of counsel, then, under the Lassiter evaluation, this
need must be weighed against the probability that the defendant in a
suit would lose his freedom.
12 5
The Tenth Circuit, after weighing the Eldridge factors, opined that
need for the presence of counsel was indicated but ruled that the appel-
lants' likelihood of losing their freedom was minimal and, therefore,
held for the state. 126 The court reasoned that since indigence is a de-
fense against criminal non-support, there was little likelihood that any of
the appellants would lose their freedom because of a lack of counsel.1
2 7
B. Tenth Circuit Rejects Constitutional Right to Think
In Kensell v. Oklahoma,' 28 a state employee filed suit against the state
118. Id.
119. The right to counsel in student disciplinary proceedings was the sole issue before
the Tenth Circuit in Rustad v. United States Air Force, 718 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1983).
This case is analyzed extensively infra at 109.
120. 716 F.2d at 1335 (10th Cir. 1983).
121. 452 U.S. 18, 25, 27 (1981).
122. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
123. 716 F.2d at 1339.
124. Id.
125. 716 F.2dat 1339 (citingLassiter, 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981)). TheLassitercourtformu-
lated the test as follows:
The dispositive question . . . is whether the three Eldridge factors, when
weighed against the presumption that there is no right to appointed counsel in
the absence of at least a potential deprivation of physical liberty, suffice to rebut
that presumption and thus to lead to the conclusion that the Due Process Clause
requires the appointment of counsel.
452 U.S. at 31.
126. 716 F.2d at 1339.
127. Id.
128. 716 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir. 1983).
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of Oklahoma and several of its agencies and officials claiming a section
1983129 tort. The appellant claimed that these agencies and officials, by
not providing him a smoke-free place to work, deprived him of his right
to think. Kensell asked for damages and injunctive relief.
130
The appellant alleged that he suffered from respiratory and cardio-
vascular ailments, and that smoke interfered with his ability to think,
drawing an analogy between his case and Rogers v. Okin. 13' In Rogers,
which was subsequently vacated by the United States Supreme Court,'
3 2
patients at a Massachusetts mental hospital claimed that forcible injec-
tions of psychotropic drugs deprived them of the right to think, an ele-
ment of the right to privacy.'
3 3
The appellant also claimed that being forced to breathe smoke con-
stituted an assault, a tort actionable under section 1983, and that he was
being deprived of a property right by being forced to choose between
breathing smoke and quitting his job. Without extensive comment, the
Tenth Circuit denied the appellant's claims, observing that being forced
to breathe smoke is not analogous to being forced to take psychotropic
drugs; that no official abused his power in the case; and that appellant
had suffered no property loss because he still had his job, which he took
voluntarily, knowing that there were smokers in the workplace. 134 The
court stated that, whatever his claims for relief, the appellant could not
expect the federal judiciary to use the United States Constitution to im-
pose no-smoking rules in the workplace. To do so "would support the
most extreme expectations of the critics who fear the federal judiciary as
a superlegislature promulgating social change under the guise of secur-
ing constitutional rights."'
3 5
C. The Commerce Clause: Tenth Circuit Declares Oklahoma's Take-Over Bid
Act Unconstitutional
In 1981 Oklahoma passed the Take-Over Bid Act (the Act),
13 6
which sought to regulate tender offers made to Oklahoma "target com-
panies." As defined by the Oklahoma Act, a qualifying target company
was any company organized under Oklahoma law, or having its principal
place of business and substantial assets in Oklahoma, or having signifi-
cant operations and assets in Oklahoma, or having Oklahoma resident
shareholders controlling ten percent or more of the securities subject to
the take-over bid.' 3 7 The Oklahoma Act empowered the Administrator
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
130. 716 F.2d at 1350.
131. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.
1980), vacated sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
132. Id.
133. 716 F.2d at 1351.
134. Id.
135. Id. Accord Federal Employees For Nonsmokers' Rights v. United States, 446 F.
Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978), afd mem., 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
136. 71 OKLA. STAT. §§ 431-51 (1981).
137. Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing 71
OKLA. STAT. § 433(4)(a)-(d) (1981)).
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of the Department of Securities to rule upon the adequacy of any disclo-
sure made in connection with tender offers for qualifying target compa-
nies. Thus, by the terms of the Act, the Administrator could delay or
even prohibit any tender offer involving a "target company."138
In Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Service Co.,1 3° appellees Mesa Petro-
leum (Mesa), Occidental Petroleum (Occidental), and the Bendix Cor-
poration (Bendix) sought to have the Oklahoma Act declared
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the commerce clause
and the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.' 40 The ap-
pellees had each prevailed in separate proceedings, obtaining re-
straining orders to prevent enforcement of the Oklahoma Act.141 The
appellants, the Acting Administrator of the Oklahoma Department of
Securities, and Cities Service Company and Martin Marietta Corpora-
tion, the target companies, appealed.
The circuit court consolidated these cases on appeal because all in-
volved the same dispositive issue: "whether the Oklahoma Act violates
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution as an unreasona-
ble restraint on interstate tender offers for corporate securities."'
142
The consolidated cases all arose out of disputed tender offers. Appellee
Mesa made a cash tender offer for Cities Service, which had substantial
assets and its executive offices in Oklahoma. Subsequently, appellees
Gulf Oil and Occidental made equivalent offers for Cities Service, with
Occidental ultimately prevailing and acquiring Cities Service. 14 3 In a
separate transaction, appellee Bendix tried to acquire appellant Martin
Marietta but failed. 144 All the take-over companies followed the same
procedure: instead of filing an information statement with the state as
required by the Act, they filed successfully for temporary restraining or-
ders (TRO) with the federal district court. 14 5 Upon a hearing on the
merits, the federal district court granted permanent injunctions against
enforcement and declared the Act unconstitutional.
14 6
During this maneuvering, the United States Supreme Court struck
down a similar Illinois act147 on the grounds that it conflicted with the
Williams Act,' 4 8 and that it unnecessarily burdened interstate com-
merce. 149 The problem with the Illinois act, the Supreme Court ob-
served, was that it allowed Illinois state officials to thwart a nationwide
tender offer, even if none of the stockholders of the target company re-
138. 715 F.2d at 1427 (citing 71 OKLA. STAT. § 437 (1981)).
139. 715 F.2d at 1425 (10th Cir. 1983).
140. Id. at 1426.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1427-28.
144. Id. at 1428.
145. Id. at 1427-28.
146. Id.
147. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), where the Court found unconstitu-
tional the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch, § 1211/ (1979).
148. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3.
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sided in Illinois. 150 If the Illinois act were upheld other states could
enact similar statutes, thereby stifling "interstate commerce in securities
transactions generated by tender offers .... .151
The Tenth Circuit held that the Oklahoma Act differed from the
unconstitutional Illinois act only in "inconsequential variants of de-
gree."' 5 2 It therefore declared the Act unconstitutional.
D. Eleventh Amendment: Tenth Circuit Bars Federal Courts from Awarding
Attorney's Fees and Costs arising from State Court Proceeding.
In Wallace v. Oklahoma, 153 the appellant, attempting to collect attor-
ney's fees and costs awarded as a court-appointed counsel for an indi-
gent client, sought a writ of mandamus from the Oklahoma Supreme
Court to compel the Creek County Fund Board to pay the fees. Instead
of issuing the writ of mandamus, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in its
administrative capacity ordered the county board to pay the $8500 owed
Wallace, and agreed to dismiss the suit as moot when the fees were
paid. 1 54 Again, the board did not pay. When Wallace entered a second
motion for mandamus, the board, in response to a new administrative
order from the Oklahoma Supreme Court, paid the $8500 fee. In sus-
taining the actions against the Creek County board, Wallace incurred
court costs and attorney's fees of $3000. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
denied Wallace's motion for mandamus to recover those costs.
155
In federal district court, the appellant sued the State of Oklahoma
to recover both the $3000 and the legal fees incurred by prosecuting the
federal action. 156 The district court dismissed the suit on the grounds
that under the eleventh amendment, a state is immune from suit by its
citizens when brought in federal court. 157 The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The only significant point made by the appellant was that the state,
by entering into a contract with him, waived immunity. 158 The appeals
court quoted Edelman v. Jordan,159 in which the United States Supreme
150. 457 U.S. at 640-43.
151. Id. at 642.
152. 715 F.2d at 1429.
153. 721 F.2d 301 (10th Cir. 1983).
154. Id. at 302.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. The eleventh amendment provides that: "The judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of
any foreign state." This amendment has been construed to preclude suits in federal court
against a state by citizens of that state. 721 F.2d at 303 (citing Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974)); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713 F.2d 1487
(10th Cir. 1983)).
158. As a preliminary matter, the Tenth Circuit stated that the Federal Question Juris-
dictional Amendments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), "should be applied retroactively to
cases pending on appeal." 721 F.2d at 303 (citing Morris v. Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority, 702 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 n. 12 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Eikenberry v. Calla-
han, 653 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); cf Andrus v. Charleston Stone Prods.
Co., 436 U.S. 604, 607-08 n.6 (1978)).
159. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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Court held that a waiver exists only "where stated 'by the most express
language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will]
leave no room for any other reasonable construction.' 1160 Finding
neither an express waiver nor implication of a waiver, the appeals court
rejected the appellant's argument.' 6 1 In dicta the court noted that, even
if the state did waive immunity, that waiver should not be extended to
Oklahoma's immunity under the eleventh amendment absent an express
indication of legislative intent. Without this express waiver, "recovery
must emanate from the state forum."'
16 2
James Peter Cooksey
160. Id. at 673 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (quoting Murray
v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909))).
161. 721 F.2d at 306.




SETTING BOUNDARIES FOR STUDENT DUE PROCESS: RUSTAD
V. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AND THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN DISCIPLINARY DISMISSAL
PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
"Due process " is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefi-
nable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts. I
Chief Justice Warren's short, amorphous and prophetic characteri-
zation of procedural due process 2 has been echoed many times during
the last twenty-five years by the Supreme Court in its interpretations of
the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 3 Dur-
ing this period, judicial examination of the "elusive concept" of proce-
dural due process has occurred in a wide variety of contexts.4 A
significant amount of this recent due process litigation has emerged
from classrooms, schoolhouses and campuses. Initially, courts were re-
luctant to find that students had constitutional rights in an educational
setting.5 Since the federal courts have recognized the right to due pro-
cess in this context, 6 however, there have been numerous attempts to
define the exact parameters of student due process. Courts have devel-
oped different minimum due process requirements for various types of
student-school conflicts.
Currently, the least settled area of student due process law occurs in
the context of educational disciplinary actions involving dismissal.
1. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
2. Procedural due process rights, as opposed to substantive due process rights, exist
only when a government takes action which involves a specific individual. Substantive due
process rights, in contrast, exist when a government takes actions which affect a group of
people. SeeJ. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, B.J. YOUNG, CONSTITrIONAL LAW 417 (2d ed. 1983).
3. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("[D]ue process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."); Cafeteria
and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (" '[Diue process,'
unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances.") (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Due process is not a mechanical in-
strument. It is not a yardstick. . . . It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably
involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the
unfolding of the process.").
4. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1973) (prejudgment replevin of goods purchased
on an installment plan); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (evicting a tenant); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspending a driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970) (terminating public welfare assistance); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969) (garnishing wages before judgment); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1969) (removing
delinquent children from their parent's home).
5. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
6. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
930 (1961).
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There is general agreement that notice and a hearing are mandatory
before a pupil may be permanently expelled;7 but there is considerable
controversy with regard to the procedural rights which must be granted
at dismissal hearings. In particular, the lower federal courts are divided
on the issue of the student's right to legal representation.
8
The following discussion reviews the general development of pro-
cedural due process. It then highlights some recent federal court deci-
sions addressing educational due process and the split of authority in
these decisions on the right to counsel in student dismissal actions. The
article then analyzes the recent Tenth Circuit opinion in Rustad v. United
States Air Force,9 suggests an analytical framework for future student due
process cases, and concludes that Rustad will be interpreted as a case
that sets an outer boundary for procedural due process in an educa-
tional context.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process is derived from the fifth' 0 and fourteenth"
amendments, which only provide protection to individuals faced with
governmental actions that may deprive them of life, liberty or prop-
erty. 12 The threshold question facing courts in procedural due process
cases is whether the private interest affected by government action can
be considered a liberty or property interest. The Supreme Court's defi-
nition of liberty and property interests protected by the due process
clause has undergone an interesting metamorphosis. Sixty years ago the
Court took an expansive view of the concepts of liberty and property; its
broad characterization, though, did not include public sector benefits. 13
In 1970 the Supreme Court extended its definition of protected liberty
and property interests to include government benefits.1 4 From this ini-
tial recognition that certain government "entitlements" could not be
7. Id. See also infra notes 31-36.
8. See infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
9. 718 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1983).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § I provides, in part: "No person shall ... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I states, in part: "[Nior shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
12. See generally Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property ". Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 452 (1977).
13. For example, in attempting to describe the liberty interest, the Court in Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), stated:
[L]iberty. . . denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.
14. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (the Court held that welfare benefits
were "not mere charity, but a 'means to promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessing of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity' ").
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taken away from an individual without minimal procedural safeguards,15
the Court has, since 1972, more narrowly defined the types of public
benefits which are liberty or property interests protected by the due pro-
cess clauses. 16
Once it has been determined that a specific private interest is a lib-
erty or property interest, within the meaning of the due process clause,
judicial due process analysis must address a second question: whether
minimal procedural safeguards were followed before deprivation of the
private interest. The Supreme Court's articulation of the procedures re-
quired by due process when government implicates a protected private
interest has also gone through periods of expansion and retraction.
Early cases established notice and hearing as the minimally required
procedural safeguards. 17 In the early 1970's it appeared that full evi-
dentiary hearings might be mandated. 18 The Court rapidly retreated
from this stance 1 9 in favor of a balancing of private-versus-governmen-
tal interests approach as articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.2 0 In the last
decade the Court has consistently applied the Mathews three-pronged
balancing test 2' which maximizes judicial discretion. 22 Moreover, appli-
cation of the Mathews test triggers different levels of due process
protection.
23
B. Procedural Due Process on Campus
1. The Dawn of Student Due Process
For a long time, the administrative processes of educational institu-
tions, insofar as they concerned students, were not subjected to close
15. See Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 531 (1975) (a
review of procedural due process litigation in the early 1970's).
16. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (a city police officer's interest in contin-
ued public employment is not a protected liberty or property interest unless state law has
granted some form of guarantee of permanent employment); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974) (nonprobationary federal employee's statutorily created property interest in
not being discharged except "for cause," did not require procedural protections beyond
those afforded by statute); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (non-tenured
professor's interest in re-employment is not a protected property or liberty interest). But
see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (non-tenured college professor's property
interest in re-employment protected by the due process clause because professor had ten-
ure under college's de facto tenure program).
17. E.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Grannis v. Or-
dean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
18. See Goldberg v. Kelly. 397 U.S. at 264.
19. Rendleman, supra note 15.
20. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
21. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979); Memphis Light, Gas & Water v.
Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 15 (1978); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977).
22. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-335. The court indicated the following fac-
tors should be considered in determining the "specific dictates" of due process: 1) the
private interest affected by the official action; 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and 3) the government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens which the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
23. See supra note 21 and cases cited therein.
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judicial scrutiny.2 4 Historically, courts had deferred to academic and dis-
ciplinary decisions made by school officials. 2 5 Both courts and school
officials advanced a wide variety of theories to justify judicial abstention
in this area of the law. The justifications included: (1) the doctrine of in
loco parentis, which suggested that schools derived authority to discipline
students by assuming the role of a surrogate parent; (2) contract theory,
under which a student's receipt of an education was conditioned on stu-
dent obedience to school regulations; and (3) the view that attendance
at a public educational institution was a privilege rather than a right.
2 6
In 1961, the Fifth Circuit broke sharply with this tradition ofjudicial
abstention by establishing due process requirements for student disci-
plinary hearings. In the landmark decision of Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education 27 students at a state college who had participated in
demonstrations were expelled without notice or a hearing. The Dixon
court held that, even if attendance at a state-supported school was a
privilege rather than a right, "the state could not condition the granting
of a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to due
process." 2 8 According to the Fifth Circuit, minimum requirements of
procedural due process would be dependent on the particular circum-
stances and interests of the parties involved.2 9 In short, the Dixon court
determined that due process required notice and a hearing which con-
tained the rudiments of an adversary proceeding.
30
Although Dixon radically departed from precedent, other lower fed-
eral courts quickly required that procedural due process be afforded stu-
dents faced with disciplinary dismissal from government supported
educational institutions.3 ' These courts, however, diverged on the
question of whether the due process clause applied to temporary sus-
pensions from school.3 2 The Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez33 provided
24. See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Knapp, Due Process as a Management Tool in Schools and Prisons, 28
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 379 (1979).
25. See, e.g., Comment, The Right to Counsel in Disciplinary Proceedings in Public and Private
Educational Institutions, 9 CuM. L. REV. 751, 758 (1979).
26. See 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 126, 126-27 (1979).
27. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
28. Id. at 156.
29. Id. at 155.
30. Specifically, the Dixon court required that the notice contain a statement of specific
charges and grounds for expulsion. The procedures mandated for the hearing included
the requirement that the student be told the names of the school's witnesses and the facts
to which these witnesses testified. Furthermore, the court held that the student was to be
permitted to testify on his own behalf and to produce his own witnesses or written affida-
vits at the hearing. Additionally, the student was to have the right to inspect the written
results and findings of the hearing. Id. at 158-59.
Significantly, however, the Dixon court rejected the idea that due process in this case
mandated a "full-dress judicial hearing" with the right to cross-examine witnesses, and
reasoned that this type of hearing might be impractical and detrimental to the school's
educational atmosphere. Id. at 159.
31. See, e.g., Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972); Esteban v. Central
Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Wasson
v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
32. For decisions in which the due process clause was found applicable to removals
from school short of expulsion, see for example: Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist.,
475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973); Tate v. Board of Educ.,
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the answer to this question by requiring notice and opportunity to be
heard in student suspensions of ten days or less. At the same time, the
Court rejected the idea that attendance at a state-supported school was a
privilege and concluded that students had liberty and property interests
in their education.3 4 Although notice and a hearing were minimally re-
quired for short-term suspensions, the Goss majority stated that further
procedural protections, such as the right to counsel, and the right to
confront, cross-examine, and call witnesses would be left to the discre-
tion of school officials. 3 5 Observing that longer suspensions or expul-
sions might require more formal procedures, the Court declined to
outline appropriate due process requirements for these situations.
3 6
2. Student Due Process and the Right to Counsel
In the wake of Dixon and Goss, and during a period of widespread
student unrest, the federal judiciary attempted to determine the nature
and extent of procedural due process in various academic contexts. A
considerable amount of student due process litigation has focused on
the right to counsel. The right to counsel controversy has arisen in di-
verse educational settings, including state supported high schools, col-
leges and universities, and federal military service academies. 3 7 There is
not widespread acceptance of the view that students have an absolute
right to counsel in educational proceedings, nor is there widespread ac-
ceptance of the view that students have no right whatsoever to counsel
in these proceedings. Instead, the trend of the decisions has been to
establish procedural guidelines for specific fact patterns. It has become
clear that due process hearings will not usually be required at private
schools3 8 or in academic dismissals;3 9 thus, the right to counsel is not an
453 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1972). In several cases, however, lower federal courts found tem-
porary suspensions not within the scope of the due process clause. See, e.g., Black Coali-
tion v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1973); Murray v. West Baton
Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973); Linwood v. Board of Educ., 463
F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972).
33. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
34. Id. at 572-74.
35. Id. at 583-84.
36. Id. at 584.
37. The due process clause has been found to be applicable both to cadets and mid-
shipmen facing separation at military service academies as well as to students facing dis-
missal at state supported educational institutions. Love v. Hidalgo, 508 F. Supp. 177, 181
(D. Md. 1981); see Andrews v. Knowlton, 509 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
873 (1975); Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972); Wasson v. Trowbridge,
382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); see also Johnson, Due Process Requirements in the Suspension or
Dismissal of Students from Public Educational Institutions, 5 CAP. U.L. REV. 1 (1976).
However, courts have recognized that in the process of balancing private versus gov-
ernmental interests in student due process cases, the government's interest will be greater
in military service academy cases than in cases involving students at other tax-supported
institutions. Courts have reasoned that this stronger government interest in military ser-
vice academy dismissals is based on the necessity for prompt action in the conduct of
military operations and the desirability of instilling and maintaining discipline and morale
in cadets who will be required to bear weighty responsibilities in combat situations. Hago-
pian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 209 (2d Cir. 1972); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807,
812 (2d Cir. 1967).
38. See Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971) (private school actions
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issue in these settings. Similarly, in short-term suspension proceedings
a student has no right to legal representation.
40
The right to counsel seems to be most clearly afforded support in
educational dismissal actions based on criminal charges which are the
subject of a pending criminal action.4 1 In this situation, the dangers of
self-incrimination and the student's "awareness of his own inability to
evaluate the effect" of his statements on the pending criminal proceed-
ings justify the presence of an attorney.
4 2
The students' right to legal representation in disciplinary dismissal
hearings has received divisive treatment in the lower federal courts.
Generally, due process violations are not found where schools have per-
mitted students to be represented by an attorney.43 Conversely, where
legal counsel is denied, many courts rule that such a denial is not viola-
tive of due process. 4 4 The reasons these courts have advanced for deny-
ing legal representation at disciplinary hearings include: (1) the student
can defend himself sufficiently; (2) counsel would create overly adver-
sarial school proceedings; (3) the school will not use counsel; and (4) the
Dixon requirements of notice and hearing are adequate.
4 5
In contrast to the arguments against legal representation, the courts
that recognize the right to counsel in disciplinary dismissals justify their
position in several ways: (1) the risk of dismissal is a serious deprivation
are not state action); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), remanded, 412 F.2d 1128
(D.C. Cir. 1969); see also Wilkinson and Rolapp, The Private College and Student Discipline, 56
A.B.A.J. 121 (1970).
39. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); see also Henderson & Isenberg,
The Law and Academic Evaluation and Dismissal in Higher Education, 13 CuM. L. REv. 475
(1983); Note, Charlotte's Web: Reflections on the Role of Due Process in Academic Decisionmaking,
56 IND. L.J. 725 (1981). However, if the academic suspension or expulsion stems from
disciplinary charges, some courts have interpreted the due process clause to require that
the student be afforded a hearing. See Ross v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147
(M.D. Pa. 1978); Brookins v. Bonnell, 362 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (failure to submit
requisite documentation and failure to attend class regularly).
40. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 583 stated: "We stop short of construing the Due
Process Clause to require, countrywide, that hearings in connection with short suspen-
sions must afford the student the opportunity to secure counsel .... "
41. Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978); cf. Nzuve v. Castleton State
College, 133 Vt. 225, 335 A.2d 321 (1975) (school permits student facing pending crimi-
nal charges to have attorney at disciplinary proceedings).
42. Gabrilowitz, 582 F.2d at 104.
43. See, e.g., Wimmer v. Lehman, 705 F.2d 1402 (4th Cir. 1983); Cody v. Scott, 565 F.
Supp. 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Birdwell v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 710 (D. Colo. 1975);
Center for Participant Educ. v. Marshall, 337 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Fla. 1972); Kelly v. Mar-
tin, 16 Ariz. App. 7, 490 P.2d 836 (1971).
44. As one commentator noted, schools which allow legal representation at discipli-
nary proceedings do so more "as a matter of grace than compulsion." Wright, The Consti-
tution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1075 (1969). For decisions which do not
recognize legal representation in disciplinary proceedings as a minimum requirement of
due process, see Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1028 (1968); Kolesa v. Lehman, 534 F. Supp. 590 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Garshman v.
Pennsylvania State Univ., 395 F. Supp. 912 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F.
Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968), at'Jd, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905
(1969); Due v. Florida A&M Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).




which mandates additional procedural safeguards; (2) legal counsel will
help to protect student's interests at the disciplinary proceedings; and
(3) the intrusions on the school by permitting the student to have coun-
sel present would be minimal. 46 But even in the disciplinary cases
where legal representation is considered a minimal procedural due pro-
cess requirement there are differing views as to whether the proper role
of counsel should be adversarial or advisory.
4 7
It is against this unsettled background of due process in student
disciplinary dismissal proceedings that the Tenth Circuit examined the
right to counsel in Rustad v. United States Air Force.
4 8
II. RUSTAD V. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
A. Facts
On February 12, 1982, Kevin M. Rustad, a First Class Senior Cadet
at the United States Air Force Academy, was charged with several con-
duct violations. 49 Some of the alleged conduct violations involved in-
fraction of cadet rules;50 two of the charges were criminal in nature.
5 1
Rustad was notified by letter that an administrative hearing would be
convened to determine if he should be disenrolled from the Academy.
Pursuant to Air Force regulations, 5 2 Rustad elected to present his case
to a hearing officer and to seek the advice of retained counsel prior to
the hearing. 53 Rustad also requested, and was denied, the right to have
his attorney present at the proceedings against him.54 The report made
by the Hearing Officer 55 and sent to the Academy Board concluded that,
although Rustad was not guilty of the two criminal charges, he had vio-
lated several Academy rules and regulations. 56 Rustad asked that his
retained counsel be allowed to appear with him on April 28, 1982, when
46. French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337-38 (E.D. La. 1969). See also, Manin v.
University of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974).
47. Some courts have suggested that the attorney be allowed to speak at the hearing.
E.g., Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253, 1257-58 (S.D. Miss. 1970), afd, 440 F.2d
1351 (5th Cir. 1971); French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337-38 (E.D. La. 1969).
Other decisions indicate counsel should be admitted in an advisory capacity only. E.g.,
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (W.D. Mo. 1967), afd,
415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). See also Comment, The
Right to Counsel in Disciplinary Proceedings in Public and Private Educational Institutions, 9 CUM. L.
REV. 751, 753-54 (1979).
48. 718 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1983). An earlier Tenth Circuit case addressed the ques-
tion of whether due process was afforded to an Air Force Academy cadet during disenroll-
ment proceedings, but in that case, the right to counsel was not at issue since the student
was represented by counsel. Birdwell v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 710 (D. Colo. 1975).
49. Rustad, 718 F.2d at 349.
50. The alleged infractions included absence from his required duty, maintaining a
residence off the United States Air Force Academy and having an unauthorized guest in
his room. Id.
51. The criminal charges included larceny and use of marijuana. Id.
52. Rustad, 718 F.2d at 349 (citing Air Force Regulation 53-3, entitled "Disenrollment
of United States Air Force Cadets").
53. Rustad, 718 F.2d at 349.
54. Id.
55. The hearing officer in this case was an attorney. Id. at 351 (McKay,J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 349.
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the Academy Board would hear his case. This second request for coun-
sel was denied. 57 At the April 28 meeting the Board decided to dis-
enroll Rustad.
5 8
Rustad sought a preliminary injunction in federal district court to
enjoin enforcement of the Academy Board's order and to bar his dis-
enrollment. The district court denied this preliminary injunction. On
appeal, Rustad argued that since he was charged with felonious miscon-
duct, an "entirely different hue taint[s] the view of the fairness of the
hearings" afforded him. 59 Rustad further asserted that representation
by an attorney in disciplinary proceedings at the Air Force Academy was
a right established by twenty-six years of Air Force common law. 60 Re-
tained counsel, according to Rustad, was minimally required by the due
process clause. He also emphasized that the presence of counsel during
the hearing would not injure any government interest.
6'
The government, on appeal, contended that Rustad's claim for re-
lief was moot, since the time of his final examinations had passed.
62
Further, it argued that Rustad was afforded sufficient due process be-
cause he was permitted to have the assistance of an attorney prior to the
hearing.63 The government also suggested that military academies
could be "crippled by the ready availability of injunctive judicial relief"
if Rustad's request for counsel was granted. 64 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
denying injunctive relief, ruling that the due process clause did not give




The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals viewed the Rustad case as rais-
ing a single constitutional issue for decision.6 6 Both the majority opin-
ion 67 and the dissent6 8 addressed the question of whether minimal
requirements of procedural due process under the fifth amendment
were met when Cadet Rustad was not permitted to have counsel present
57. Id.
58. Judge McKay, dissenting, suggested that the Board's written decision indicated
that the alleged criminal charges influenced the Board's decision to disenroll Rustad. Id.
at 350 (McKay, J., dissenting).
59. Brief for Appellant at 7, Rustad v. United States Air Force, 718 F.2d 348 (10th
Cir. 1983).
60. Id. at 9. The district court characterized the practice of appointing counsel at
disciplinary hearings as a "tradition" rather than as a "right." Id.
61. Id. at 9, 12.
62. Brief for Appellees at 5.
63. Id. at 7.
64. Id.
65. Rustad, 718 F.2d at 349.
66. The majority opinion notes that the appellees raised mootness as an issue which
would require dismissal; however, the court declined to dismiss on this ground, reasoning
that the court could fashion appropriate relief if Rustad won on the merits of the case. Id.
at 349-50.
67. Written by Circuit Judge McWilliams and joined by Circuit Judge Barrett.
68. Authored by Circuit Judge McKay.
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at the disenrollment proceedings. Although the Rustad court had a uni-
form perception of the problem presented by the case, the majority and
dissent split on their interpretation of the facts as well as on their choice
of applicable law.
1. Majority Opinion
In a surprisingly short opinion, Judge McWilliams, writing for the
majority, based the decision to deny counsel on two Second Circuit mili-
tary service academy disciplinary dismissal cases, Wasson v. Trowbridge
6 9
and Hagopian v. Knowlton. 70 These two decisions, not described in the
majority opinion, held that cadets facing expulsion were not entitled to
have an attorney present at proceedings against them; however, these
cases also implied that counsel might be required in hearings involving
criminal charges. 7 1 The court found no "present pertinency" 72 to the
argument that Rustad should be distinguished from Wasson and Hagopian,
remarking that the action against Rustad was "purely a disenrollment
proceeding from the start." 73 Military misdeeds, stated the court, and
not criminal acts, ultimately provided the basis for Rustad's
disenrollment.
74
The majority's minimization of the significance of the criminal
charges initiated against Rustad and its classification of the dismissal
proceeding as purely administrative is pivotal to its ruling. A different
interpretation of the facts, viewed in light of Wasson and Hagopian, sug-
gests that Rustad had a right to counsel. The court did not decide
whether legal representation would have been required at the meeting
of the Academy Board if Rustad had not been exonerated of the criminal
charges by the Hearing Officer.
2. The Dissent
In his dissent, Judge McKay placed great weight on the fact that
Rustad had initially been charged with criminal conduct. 7 5 Judge Mc-
Kay argued that counsel should have been available at all stages of the
disenrollment proceedings to determine procedural mandates, to set
69. 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
70. 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972).
71. Regarding the right to counsel, the Second Circuit stated:
The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all of the
other aspects of the hearing. Where the proceeding is non-criminal in nature,
where the hearing is investigative and not adversarial and the government does
not proceed through counsel, where the individual concerned is mature and edu-
cated, where his knowledge of the events . . . should enable him to develop the
facts adequately through available sources, and where the other aspects of the
hearing taken as a whole are fair, due process does not require representation by
counsel.
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d at 812, cited with approval in Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470
F.2d at 210.
72. Rustad, 718 F.2d at 350.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 351 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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testimonial constraints, and to avoid dangers of self-incrimination.
76
The dissent mentioned two facts, not discussed in the majority
opinion, to add credence to the view that the case presented extenuating
circumstances. The dissent pointed out, first, that appointed counsel
had been provided routinely for twenty-six years in similar proceed-
ings77 and, second, that the hearing officer was an attorney.
78
After citing Goss for the proposition that Rustad was entitled to due
process protection, the dissent applied the Mathews v. Eldrige79 three-
pronged balancing formula and determined that legal representation
was a minimal procedural requisite under the circumstances of this case.
In applying this three part test,80 the dissent found the following inter-
ests. First, Rustad had an interest in the benefits of four years of higher
education, the opportunity to receive a college degree, and his fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination. 8 1 Second, the government
interest was not greater than that of any other college or university be-
cause the Air Force was not required to commission Air Force Academy
graduates. 82 Judge McKay found "unlikely to the point of being fanci-
ful" the risk that the additional procedure of allowing retained counsel
would damage any government interest. 83 Third, the dissent stressed
that the additional procedural safeguard of student legal representation
would be valuable because of the seriousness of the charges brought
against Rustad.84 To support this application of the Mathews test the
dissent relied on two other federal circuit court decisions8 5 that recog-
nized the right to counsel in student expulsion proceedings under "no
more compelling circumstances" '8 6 than those presented in the instant
case.
III. PERSPECTIVES ON RUSTAD
A. Analysis of the Court's Reasoning
There is a hollow ring to the arguments voiced in the Rustad opin-
ion. The majority narrowly and superficially interpreted the facts and
applicable precedents, and the dissent erected a broad analytical frame-
work which proves shaky on close examination.
The majority's decision to deny counsel was based on the assump-
tion that the circumstances of the case were factually identical to those
presented in Wasson and Hagopian. The similarities were evident: all
76. Id. at 351-52.
77. Id. at 351.
78. Id.
79. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
80. See supra note 22 (lists the three Eldridge factors).




85. Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978); Black Coalition v. Portland
School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1973).
86. Rustad, 718 F.2d at 352 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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three cases focused on minimum due process requirements in the disci-
plinary dismissal of a cadet at a military service academy. Since the Was-
son and Hagopian courts had found that a fair hearing could be held
without counsel,8 7 the Rustad court reached the same conclusion. In so
doing, the court ignored important, potentially distinguishing circum-
stances: the criminal nature of the two charges initially filed against Rus-
tad8 8 and the fact that the service academy was represented by an
attorney in its initial hearing.
8 9
The court, furthermore, failed to analyze and correctly apply Wasson
and Hagopian. Both opinions emphasized the importance of the balanc-
ing of interests analysis and stressed that the circumstances of each case
should be carefully examined. 90 The majority opinion in Rustad did not,
however, articulate which private or governmental interests were at
stake nor did it fully analyze the facts; thus, the Rustad court ironically
ignored the dictates of the very cases it purported to follow.
The dissent, in contrast, examined the "big picture." In addition to
presenting important facts omitted in the majority opinion, Judge Mc-
Kay balanced the individual and governmental interests, as was sug-
gested by Wasson and Hagopian. The reasoning of the dissent faltered
though, when it compared the severity of the Rustad case with Gabrilowitz
v. Newman.9 1 Gabrilowitz presented more compelling circumstances than
Rustad. Gabrilowitz recognized the right to counsel in a student discipli-
nary dismissal proceeding when the student faced pending criminal
charges; Rustad, on the other hand, faced only possible criminal charges.
A more forceful argument could have been made by reasoning that
Gabrilowitz established a precedent "for the truly unusual situation."
9 2
The Rustad case should have been distinguished from Wasson and Hago-
pian as an unusual military service academy dismissal because (1) part of
the proceedings were conducted by an attorney; (2) the right to retain
87. See supra note 71.
88. The dismissal proceedings in Wasson and Hagopian, unlike the Rustad disenroll-
ment proceeding, were instituted solely because the cadets had accumulated an excessive
number of conduct demerits. Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d at 203; Wasson v. Trow-
bridge, 382 F.2d at 811.
89. No similar qualifications of service academy disciplinarians were noted in either
Vasson or Hagopian.
90. The importance of this approach was initially enunciated by the Wasson court:
"Thus to determine in any given case what procedures due process requires, the court
must carefully determine and balance the nature of the private interest affected and of the
government interest involved, taking account of history and the precise circumstances sur-
rounding the case at hand." Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d at 811. A similar view was
echoed in Hagopian:
[D]ue process is not a rigid formula or simple rule of thumb to be applied undevi-
atingly to any given set of facts. On the contrary, it is a flexible concept which
depends upon the balancing of various factors ....
Because ... the factors controlling what process is due usually vary from
case to case, prior decisions on the subject cannot ordinarily furnish more than
general guidelines which might give the reader a "feel" for what is fundamentally
fair in a particular instance.
Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d at 207, 209.
91. 582 F.2d 100 (1978).
92. Id. at 106.
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counsel was denied when counsel had been routinely appointed for
many years; and (3) the dismissal was initially based on criminal charges.
Given this unusual situation, the Rustad court should have required the
additional procedural safeguard of retained counsel to assure a truly fair
hearing.
B. Implications of the Decision
The Rustad decision, if followed by other federal courts, may serve
to restrict the types of procedural safeguards granted to students facing
disciplinary dismissal at public educational institutions when there are
no related criminal charges pending against the student.
Critics of the right to counsel in disciplinary dismissals will be heart-
ened by this possible establishment of an outer boundary for procedural
due process. Such critics would argue that if Rustad had recognized a
right to'counsel, the doors would be open to claims to the right in al-
most all student disciplinary proceedings because conduct serious
enough to warrant disciplinary action is likely to involve at least a "col-
orable misdemeanor. ' 9 3 Furthermore, the critics would contend that
the benefits of passive assistance of counsel can be afforded by consulta-
tion between the student and attorney prior to and during breaks in dis-
ciplinary proceedings.
9 4
Those who disagree with the Rustad ruling may conclude that the
outer boundaries of procedural due process established by the case
seem suspiciously similar to minimally required due process protections
for student disciplinary dismissals. Goss definitely mandated notice and
hearing, but it appears that Rustad foreclosed the requirement of an ad-
versarial or even a semi-adversarial proceeding. Even if other rudiments
of an adversarial proceeding such as the right to confront, cross-ex-
amine and call witnesses are recognized as minimally required by the
due process clause, these rights may well be meaningless without the
assistance and advice of an attorney. 9 5
C. Suggestions for Future Judicial Examination of the Right to Counsel in
Disciplinary Dismissals
It is difficult to argue that the analysis of the majority opinion in
Rustad comports witl the traditional approach to procedural due pro-
cess controversies. The court's mechanical application of precedent and
its superficial examination of the factual context of the dispute makes a
troublesome departure from the traditional approach which balances
governmental and private interests on a case-by-case basis. Admittedly,
one can crinicize the balancing approach because it allows a significant
degree ol judicial discretion, making outcomes unpredictable and splits
of authority among jurisdictions more likely. However, these negative
93. 6;abrilowitz, 582 F.2d at 107 (CampbelIJ., dissenting).
!)-I hi. at 107-8.




effects of a flexible approach to student due process and the right to
counsel can be minimized in the future if the lower courts would give
specific consideration to a number of factors which affect the strength of
the student's or the educational institution's interest in a particular situ-
ation. Although additional factors may also be important in a specific
controversy, the following considerations should be evaluated by courts
in each student due process case that reviews the right to counsel in a
disciplinary dismissal.
On the private interest side, several factors should be scrutinized to
determine the weight of the individual's interest: the nature of the
charges brought against the student, the amount of time the student has
spent at the school and the benefits the student expects to attain by com-
pleting his education at the particular school. An analysis of these fac-
tors should aid the court in determining the weight of the private
interest at stake. An analogy can be made to criminal law where the
amount of procedure afforded the defendant increases as the potential
sanction grows more severe. Where the charge against the student not
only subjects him to possible expulsion but also exposes him to poten-
tial civil or criminal proceedings the student's interest in having the
assistance of an attorney is substantial. Thus, if criminal proceedings
are actually pending against the student for acts which are also the sub-
ject of the dismissal hearing, the individual's interest in protecting him-
self from self-incrimination becomes even greater. 9 6 The court should
also consider the severity of the charge and the possible punishment,
with allegations of criminal misconduct or conduct punishable by im-
prisonment being viewed as factors which substantially increase the indi-
vidual's interest in a due process right to legal representation.
The student's status at the school should also be reviewed by courts
when they balance the private interests against the governmental inter-
ests. An individual's interest in completing his education at a particular
institution is necessarily greater the further the student has advanced
toward graduation. This consideration is particularly important given
that a great number of disciplinary dismissal cases involve students in
their final year at school.
9 7
Since Goss, courts have recognized that all students have liberty and
property interests in their education. However, in certain situations the
student's interest in completing a program at a specific school will be
greater than the normal interest. In such situations the amount of pro-
cedural due process which is minimally required should increase. For
example, where the academic program or training offered at the school
is only available at a limited number of schools, the student will have an
interest in receiving the benefits of completing his education at his par-
ticular school. Thus, in cases involving dismissal from military service
academies or professional schools, which are quite limited in number,
96. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
97. E.g., Ruslad, 718 F.2d 348; Gabrilowitz, 582 F.2d 100; Cody v. Scott, 565 F. Supp.
1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Keene v. Rogers, 316 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Me. 1970).
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courts should place the individual interest at a higher level and more
readily find a right to counsel. 9 8
In determining the strength of the government's interest in denying
the right to counsel, the following questions should be considered.
First, what is the scope of the requested participation of counsel? If
the student wishes to have counsel represent him in an adversarial
rather than advisory capacity, with the right to argue the case, make ob-
jections and cross examine witnesses, the school's interest in denying
counsel should be given greater weight. When counsel takes an active,
adversarial role, the proceeding is likely to be more burdensome on the
school in terms of time required for preparation and conduct of the
hearing than it would be if the attorney's services to the student were
strictly consultative.
9 9
Second, what is the nature of the school's representation at the dis-
ciplinary proceedings? It is obvious that the government's interest in
denying counsel will be less when it proceeds with the assistance of its
own legal counsel or if the hearings are conducted by attorneys ap-
pointed by the school, as in the Rustad case.100 Furthermore, it seems to
violate basic principles of fundamental fairness to allow one party legal
representation yet deny it to the other, especially when the party denied
counsel is the one facing the deprivation of a protected liberty or prop-
erty interest.
Third, is appointed counsel requested by the student? The govern-
ment's interest in refusing student legal representation will be less when
the school bears no cost in allowing the student the right to be repre-
sented by an attorney.
Fourth, what type of school wishes to deny the right to counsel? Is
it a military service academy or is it a civilian public educational institu-
tion? Courts have been inclined to weight the government's interest
more heavily if the school is a military service academy.' 0 '
While not providing an exhaustive list of the considerations which
should be reviewed by courts in every disciplinary dismissal case involv-
ing the right to counsel, the above mentioned factors are elements
which should be taken into account by courts in order to avoid the sort
of shallow reasoning displayed in Rustad. If the courts choose to weigh
these factors as suggested, it is likely they will move toward recognition
of a right to counsel not only in cases which are similar to Rustad, but
also in a wide range of student disciplinary dismissal cases in which the
98. To date, courts have not advanced this line of reasoning in student disciplinary
dismissal cases involving the right to counsel.
99. See, e.g., Hart v. Ferris State College, 557 F. Supp. 1379, 1388 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
100. Several decisions have concluded that the use of counsel by the educational insti-
tution in a disciplinary dismissal proceeding is a pivotal factor in determining whether the
student has a right to counsel. E.g., Texarkana Ind. School Dist. v. Lewis, 470 S.W.2d 727,
735 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); see also Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir.
1967); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1075-76 (1969).
101. See supra note 37.
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costs to the government are minimal and the student's interests are ob-
vious and substantial.
IV. CONCLUSION
It seemed that the schoolhouse door had been opened wide for the
expansion of student due process when Goss was decided almost a dec-
ade ago. Some jurists feared this possibility,' 0 2 while some commenta-
tors held their breath hopefully.' 0 3 Inch by inch, though, the door
opened by Goss is closing. Post Goss rulings by the Supreme Court indi-
cate that procedural due process on campus will only be required when
discipline of the student includes the sanctions of suspension or expul-
sion.1 0 4 And, in this one context where due process must be afforded
the student, lower courts have been divided as to the exact procedural
safeguards which must be provided. Unless future decisions re-examine
factors relevant to the traditional procedural due process balancing of
interests analysis, the Ruslad decision will mark another step towards en-
suring that student due process will be rigidly interpreted in almost
every student disciplinary dismissal proceeding to require nothing less,
and nothing more, than notice and a hearing.
Wendy Bliss
102. Justice Powell, dissenting in Goss, first articulated these doubts: "No one can fore-
see the ultimate frontiers of the new 'thicket' the Court now enters. Today's ruling ap-
pears to sweep within the protected interest in education a multitude of discretionary
decisions in the educational process." Goss, 419 U.S. at 597.
103. See, e.g., Comment, The Right to Counsel in Disciplinary Proceedings in Public and Private
Educational Institutions, 9 CuM. L. REv. 751, 765-66 (1979).
104. See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (no hearing necessary
for students dismissed for academic purposes); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)






During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held most trial court convictions, reading the federal criminal statutes
broadly to expand federal jurisdiction over various forms of criminal
conduct. Conspirators' claims of guilt by association, allegedly a result
of their multiple-defendant trials, continued to fail. The court approved
the use of the Mail Fraud Act and the Hobbs Act as federal tools to
combat local political corruption. Many of the political corruption cases
resulted from a cooperative investigation, by United States and
Oklahoma law enforcement officials, undertaken to discover and elimi-
nate the wide-spread corruption among Oklahoma County
Commissioners.
A large number of appeals arose out of the anti-nuclear protests
which occurred in April of 1979 at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Plant in Col-
orado. The issues raised in these appeals, however, were controlled by
Tenth Circuit decisions handed down during the previous survey pe-
riod. Therefore, this survey will focus on the Tenth Circuit's significant
decisions concerning drug distribution conspiracies and those decisions
which expanded federal jurisdiction under various federal criminal stat-
utes included in Title 18 of the United States Code.
I. CONSPIRACY
For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or cause to
be committed a breach of the criminal laws, is an offense of the gravest
character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to the public, the mere
commission of the contemplated crime.
Justice Mahlon Pitney'
If there are still any citizens interested in protecting human liberty, let
them study the conspiracy law, of the United States.
Clarence Darrow
2
In criminal conspiracy trials, as in all trials with multiple defendants,
the need for efficient prosecution must be weighed against each defend-
ant's right to have his guilt individually determined.3 Defendants fre-
quently charge that juries allow the guilt of alleged co-conspirators to
"spill over" on to themselves. Federal courts have been accused of ig-
noring these sometimes legitimate claims by mechanically applying in-
1. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915).
2. C. DARROW, THE STORY OF My LIFE, 64 (1932).
3. Prosecutors argue that only by trying all members of a conspiracy together can a
jury. get a clear picture of the whole operation. See Note, Connecting Defendants to Conspira-
cies: The Slight Evidence Rule and the Federal Courts, 64 VA. L. REv. 881, 884 (1978); Note,
Application of Conspiracy Statute to Prosecution for Sale of Counterfeit Money, 48 YALE L.J. 1447,
1450 (1939).
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adequate standards and methods of inquiry.
4
The Tenth Circuit recently reaffirmed its tests for determining the
existence of a conspiracy as well as its tests for determining an individual
defendant's involvement in a conspiracy. The most detailed treatment
of these issues occurred in United States v. Dickey 5 and United States v.
Pilling.6 Both cases arose out of wide-ranging drug ventures involving
numerous actors and transactions.
This portion of the criminal law survey will, through an analysis of
the Dickey and Pilling decisions, criticize the Tenth Circuit's treatment of
criminal conspiracy law. In particular, this analysis questions whether
the Tenth Circuit's treatment is consistent with the nature and elements
of the crime of conspiracy, and with the ideal of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt.
A. An Overview of Criminal Conspiracy
The crime of conspiracy consists of an agreement to accomplish an
unlawful purpose. 7 Conspiracy is punishable separately from the sub-
stantive offense contemplated or committed. The rationale for this
treatment is that the law of criminal conspiracy serves purposes distinct
from those involved in the punishment of substantive crimes. Accord-
ingly, the criminalization of conspiracy prevents criminal activity before
it occurs and protects society from the dangers inherent in partnerships
in crime.8 Group criminality is said to increase the likelihood that crime
will be committed. Furthermore, a group of conspirators, through an
efficient division of labor, may be able to achieve more sophisticated and
harmful objects than an individual could otherwise achieve. 9 Group ac-
tivity may also prepare individuals to commit crimes on a regular ba-
sis. 10 Critics have argued that these justifications are either overstated
or can be adequately served by the law of attempt."1
4. Note, "Single vs. Multiple" Criminal Conspiracies: A Uniform Method of Inquiry for Due
Process and Double Jeopardy Purposes, 65 MINN. L. REV. 295, 304 (1980). Some judges also
lament this development. See, e.g., United States v. Heath, 580 F.2d 1011, 1026 (10th Cir.
1978) (McKay, J., dissenting).
5. 736 F.2d 571 (10th Cir.), stay denied, 105 S. Ct. 24 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
957 (1985).
6. 721 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1983).
7. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893). The doctrine that agree-
ment is at the heart of conspiracy originated in The Poulterer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 813
(1611).
8. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAw 534 (1978); Marcus, Conspiracy: The
Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEO. L.J. 925, 929 (1977).
9. See Garland & Snow, The Co-Conspirators Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Procedural Im-
plementation and Confrontation Clause Requirements, 63 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
1, 2 (1972); Note, Conspiracy: Legitimate Instrument or Unconstitutional Weapon?, 3 COLUM.
SURV. HUM. RTS. 94, 102 (1971). See also, W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-rr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW 459 (1972).
10. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915).
11. See, Marcus, supra note 8, at 937-38. See also Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecu-
tion of Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 HARV. L. REV. 276, 285 (1948)
(arguing that conspiracy should only be punished if it greatly increases the likelihood that
a crime will be committed or where the crime contemplated is so serious that even a slight
increase in the possibility of its successful execution should be punished).
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In order to show the existence of an agreement involving each de-
fendant, the prosecution must prove: (1) knowledge of the main object
of the conspiracy; 12 (2) knowledge of the scope of the conspiracy, or at a
minimum knowledge of the involvement of another; and (3) specific in-
tent' 3 to join the conspiracy and commit the object offense.
14
Proving these elements can present substantial problems: because
of the secretive nature of the crime, there is usually little documentary
evidence indicating the existence of a conspiracy. However, most evi-
dentiary problems have been resolved in favor of the prosecution. Due
to the lack of documentary evidence, proof will normally be of three
basic types: (1) circumstantial evidence, 15 (2) the hearsay testimony of
co-conspirators, 16 and (3) evidence of out-of-court declarations or acts
of a co-conspirator or the defendant himself. 17 This evidence may give
rise to reasonable inferences from which a jury could find the existence
of an agreement. Conspiracy convictions are routinely based solely
upon such inferences and presumptions, a fact which has troubled many
commentators-but few courts.' 8 These commentators fear that, by pil-
ing inference upon inference, defendants may become victims of guilt by
association. Furthermore, the acts of one conspirator may be imputed
to a defendant with whom the conspirator has associated because of the
tendency to believe that "birds of a feather flock together."' 19 In re-
sponse, defenders of the conspiracy laws argue that less restrictive evi-
dentiary standards are necessary because of the secretive nature of
conspiracy and because society's general interest in preventing crime is
greater than its specific interest in avoiding erroneous punishment for
12. "If the parties are attempting to achieve different objects, an agreement cannot be
inferred." Tarlow, Defense of Federal Conspiracy Prosecution, 4 NAT'LJ. CRIM. DEF. 183, 187
(1978). See also United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1975), overruled
as to withdrawal from a conspiracy, United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1232-36 (7th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Kates, 508 F.2d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 1975).
13. Mere knowledge of a conspiracy will normally not support an inference of active
participation in the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d 1337, 1343 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974); Causey v. United States, 352 F.2d 203, 207 (5th
Cir. 1965). Intent can be inferred if a defendant supplies goods or services that have no
lawful use or where the quantity of goods supplied is more than is needed for any legiti-
mate purpose. See, e.g., Direct Sales Co. v, United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711-12 (1943).
14. Note, supra note 4, at 298.
15. United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 207, 214 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
941 (1976).
16. Before co-conspirator hearsay evidence can be admitted "independent non-hear-
say evidence must establish the participation in the conspiracy of the person against
whom" the hearsay is to be admitted. United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1234 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979). See also United States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d 961, 964
(10th Cir. 1978).
17. Note, Developments in the Law--Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920, 983-84
(1959).
18. "[A] common purpose and plan may be inferred from a 'development and a collo-
cation of circumstances.' " Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942) (quoting
United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1939)). But see Iannelli v. United
States, 420 U.S. 770, 778 n.10 (1975) ("reliance on [circumstantial evidence and infer-
ences drawn therefrom] has tended to obscure the basic fact that the agreement is the
essential evil at which the crime of conspiracy is directed.").
19. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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the substantive offense. 20
Complicated drug distribution conspiracies magnify problems of
proof. Such schemes often involve many participants, multiple objects,
long periods of time and large geographical areas. 2 1 To confront the
obvious problems of proof involved in such conspiracies, most courts,
the Tenth Circuit included, look to the "nature of the enterprise" 22
rather than the existence of an agreement. Under this test, courts often
characterize a venture as a "chain" conspiracy or a "hub and spoke"
conspiracy. After finding one of these forms, slight evidence is sufficient
to connect an individual defendant to the conspiracy. The Tenth Circuit
recently used these conspiracy models in the cases of United States v.
Dickey 23 and United States v. Pilling.
24
B. United States v. Dickey: "Chain" Conspiracy
1. The Facts
Each of ten defendants was convicted in district court of one count
of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute mari-
juana and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.25 The
charges arose out of dozens of transactions involving many conspirators
over a period of approximately four years. Deals and meetings occurred
in states from Florida to California and millions of dollars changed
hands. 26 Two of the major participants pled guilty and testified as gov-
ernment witnesses. 2 7 The defendants included suppliers, distributors,
and retailers; some of the defendants performed more than one func-
tion. 28 Both the quality and quantity of the evidence, however, varied
greatly among the defendants.
On appeal, all ten defendants asserted that the evidence at trial es-
tablished multiple conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy
charged in the indictment. 29 All but two defendants also challenged the
20. See Note, 64 VA. L. REV., supra note 3, at 884-85.
21. Note, Resolution of the Multiple Conspiracies Issue Via A "Nature of the Enterprise" Analy-
sis: The Resurrection of Agreement, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 243, 253-54 (1975).
22. P. MARCUS, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES 4-20
(1984). This is particularly true in narcotics conspiracy cases where courts are quick to
infer knowledge of the entire scheme based on the nature of drug distribution operations.
See infra notes 79-82, 98-103 and accompanying text.
23. 736 F.2d 571 (10th Cir.), stay denied, 105 S. Ct. 240 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
957 (1985).
24. 721 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1983).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982) states in pertinent part: "Any person who attempts or
conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment
or fine or both .... " 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1982) sets forth the prohibited activities relating
to controlled substances and also states the penalties for violating those prohibitions.
26. 736 F.2d at 577-81.
27. Id. at 578. The government witnesses were Rodney Bragg and Doc Clanton.
Their testimony made up the vast majority of the evidence.
28. Id. at 578-81. For example, Robert Best took delivery of several hundred pounds
of marijuana on more than one occasion. He also made deliveries and several individual
sales of marijuana and cocaine.
29. Id. at 581. The importance of this distinction is discussed in note 33 infra.
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sufficiency of the evidence linking them to the overall conspiracy.3 0
These arguments are typical in conspiracy cases with multiple defend-
ants and complicated fact patterns.
3'
2. The Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Barrett writing for the majority,3 2 found
no merit to the appellant's contention that the evidence showed the
existence of multiple conspiracies.3 3 The court held that a single con-
spiracy exists if the evidence shows that all of the defendants had a
"common, illicit goal."'3 4 This is known as the "common objective" test.
To determine if a common objective existed, the court examined
the nature of the enterprise and characterized the entire operation as a
"chain" conspiracy.3 5 In a chain conspiracy, the government must prove
that each defendant was dependent upon the success of each "link" in
the chain.3 6 Without much discussion, the court found that the evi-
dence clearly supported the finding that each participant, even the re-
mote members, was dependant upon the success of each transaction to
ensure the continued success of the enterprise.3 7 The court defined the
common objective of this chain as a goal "to possess and distribute drugs
(marijuana and cocaine) for profit. "38
As support for its conclusion that a common objective existed, the
court relied heavily on the volume of the drugs involved. Most circuits,
the Tenth Circuit included, readily presume that each major buyer knows
he is involved in a "wide-ranging venture." °39 If large quantities are in-
30. Id. at 583-86.
31. P. MARCUS, supra note 22, at 4-10.
32. Judge Logan joined Judge Barrett. Judge Mckay filed a separate opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part, 736 F.2d at 599-601. See infra text accompanying notes
46-56.
33. If a defendant can show that the evidence at trial disclosed the existence of multi-
ple conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy charged in the indictment, the convic-
tion may be reversed because of the tendency of jurors to transfer guilt. See Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 766-67 (1946). The variance, however, between the indict-
ment for a single conspiracy and proof of separate conspiracies must be more than harm-
less error; it must be prejudicial to the rights of the defendant:
The Supreme Court has looked to the following factors to determine whether this
type of variance is prejudicial: (1) surprise to the defendant . . . , (2) possibility
of subsequent prosecution for the same offense, (3) likelihood of jury confusion
as measured by the number of conspirators charged and the number of separate
conspiracies proven, and (4) likelihood of jury confusion in light of the instruc-
tions given the jury limiting or excluding the use of certain evidence not relating
to the defendant.
United States v. Lindsey, 602 F.2d 785, 787 (7th Cir. 1979).
34. 736 F.2d at 582.
35. Id.
36. Id. See also infra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
37. Id. at 582. This may be an overstatement since the facts showed that each transac-
tion was not successful. For example, several of the participants met in Las Cruces to
purchase marijuana. After testing the marijuana, they rejected it and all of the individuals
left. Id. at 578. This failure, however, is not crucial when viewed in the context of the
entire conspiracy.
38. Id. at 582 (emphasis in original).
39. Id. See also United States v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431,434 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1091 (1977).
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volved, the existence of multiple drugs or multiple transactions will not
necessarily translate into the existence of multiple conspiracies.
40
Citing United States v. Andrews,4 ' the court reaffirmed its approval of
the "slight evidence" test. Under the test, once the prosecution estab-
lishes a conspiracy it may connect a co-conspirator to it using only slight
evidence. 4 2 The court examined the evidence against each defendant
under the slight evidence standard and found sufficient evidence to con-
nect each defendant with the chain conspiracy.
43
Some defendants contended that the evidence showed only a buyer-
seller relationship between them and other actors. While admitting that
the existence of such a relationship would be insufficient to convict one
as a co-conspirator, the court found in each case that the testimony and
circumstantial evidence 44 gave rise to permissible inferences and pre-
sumptions that each defendant knew of the scope of the conspiracy.
45
3. Judge McKay's Opinion
Judge McKay filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment as
to all of the defendants except Friedrich.46 In his view, there was insuffi-
cient evidence to connect Friedrich to the overall conspiracy. Judge Mc-
Kay expressed his concern, previously stated in United States v. Heath,
4 7
that the Tenth Circuit's analysis of conspiracy appeals is inconsistent
with the very nature of the offense. By substituting proof of "knowl-
edge" for the proof of an agreement, McKay argued that the court took
an undisciplined approach. 48 In his view, the knowledge test results in
the conviction of persons engaged only in a buyer-seller relationship. 4 9
Judge McKay felt that the evidence against Friedrich showed only a
buyer-seller relationship and no agreement to join the larger conspir-
acy. 50 Friedrich sold two kilograms of cocaine to a government witness,
Clanton, on two separate occasions. 51 Judge McKay stated that this
showed only illicit sales and that proof of illicit sales, without showing
knowledge of the broader drug distribution conspiracy or its objective,
40. 736 F.2d at 582 (citing United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 454 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982)).
41. 585 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1978).
42. Id. at 964. See also infra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
43. 736 F.2d at 583-86. Two defendants did not challenge the sufficiency of the evi-
dence but the court nevertheless reviewed the record as to them and found the evidence
sufficient. Id. at 583-84.
44. The circumstantial evidence consisted entirely of evidence of phone calls, cash-
ier's checks, and an airplane used to transport drugs and conspirators. This evidence did
not relate to all of the defendants; the testimony of the government witnesses was the
primary source of evidence against each defendant.
45. 736 F.2d at 583-86.
46. Id. at 599 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. 580 F.2d 1011 (10th Cir.) (McKay, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075
(1978).
48. 736 F.2d at 599, 601.
49. Id. at 600.
50. Id. at 600-01.
51. Id. at 600.
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is insufficient to connect a defendant to the conspiracy. 52 Friedrich also
made fifty-one telephone calls to defendant Hall. 5 3 Citing United States
v. Galvan,54 Judge McKay stated that evidence of phone calls is also in-
sufficient to link a defendant to a conspiracy.
55
Although Judge McKay's analytical separation of the sales from the
phone calls is questionable (taken together, they present a closer ques-
tion of guilt than Judge McKay admits), his main point is well taken.
Many federal courts have adopted standards and tests for conspiracy
cases which are inconsistent with the basic elements of, and the ratio-
nales for, the crime of conspiracy.
56
C. United States v. Pilling: "Hub and Spoke" Conspiracy
1. The Facts
In Pilling,57 four defendants (Pilling, Penix, Varley, and Christen-
sen) were convicted by a jury of conspiring with three other persons 58
to import cocaine from Peru into the United States in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 952. 59 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions of each de-
fendant. Three core, or hub, conspirators made two separate visits to
Peru for the purpose of obtaining cocaine to distribute in the United
States. The four defendants each invested thousands of dollars in each
trip. With the exception of Penix and Christensen, who were business
partners, the defendants were contacted separately by the hub
conspirators.
6 0
The "front" (or "cover") for the first trip was the promotion of Pro-
methean Tile of Eagle, Colorado (a financially-troubled business owned
by hub conspirators Kleist and Richards), in South America. 6 1 For the
second trip, Five Star Chemical Company, owned by defendant Pilling,
was used as the front.6 2 Peruvian officials spotted the second shipment
of cocaine before it left the country and notified the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) which then kept the shipment under sur-
veillance. When Kleist, Richards, and James attempted to claim the
52. Id. at 600-01 (citing Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 712 (1943)).
53. 736 F.2d at 600-01.
54. 693 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1982).
55. Id. at 419-20.
56. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
57. 721 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1983).
58. The three, James, Richards, and Kleist, did the actual smuggling. Each plead
guilty to drug smuggling charges and James and Richards were government witnesses in
the Pilling trial. Id. at 289-90.
59. 21 U.S.C. § 952 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful to import into the customs territory of the United States
from any place outside thereof but within the United States, or to import into the
United States from any place outside thereof. any controlled substance in sched-
ule I or II of subchapter I of this chapter. or an. narcotic drug in schedule III, IV,
or V of subchapter I of this chapter. ...
60. 721 F.2d at 290-92.
61. Id. at 290.
62. Id. Five Star was also in desparate linancial straits.
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shipment, they were arrested. 63
The defendants were implicated through the testimony of James
and Richards. None of the defendants was charged with the actual pos-
session or distribution of cocaine.6 4 Furthermore, with the exception of
Penix and Christensen, there was no evidence that any of the defendants
had any actual knowledge of the participation of the other defendants.
On appeal, each defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evi-
dence against him. Each appellant also asserted that the evidence, if it
showed any conspiracy at all, showed the existence of multiple conspira-
cies and not the single conspiracy charged in the indictment.
6 5
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
All the defendants denied having knowledge of the scheme to im-
port cocaine from Peru. They strenuously asserted that they believed
they were investing in legitimate business ventures. 6 6 In an opinion
written by Judge Barrett, 67 the Tenth Circuit found that the testimony of
the hub conspirators, along with the circumstantial evidence presented,
was sufficient to support the jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. 6 8 The court attached great weight to the fact that there was no
written documentation for any of the investments. In effect, the court
stated that experienced businessmen, such as the defendants, record
large investments in writing if the purpose is legitimate. 69
The court found that the evidence supported the existence of one
conspiracy with one "common objective"-importation of cocaine from
Peru to the United States for profit. 70 In the Tenth Circuit's view, the
facts revealed a "hub and spoke" conspiracy. 7 1 The "hub and spoke"
conspiracy is not typical of drug smuggling enterprises but is used to
describe conspiracies involving a common "hub" of conspirators who
deal with independent investors, or "spokes." ' 72 After first finding that
the hub conspirators formed the conspiracy, the court had no trouble
finding that each of the defendants knowingly joined the conspiracy at
various points in its progression.
The hub and spoke conspiracy presents conceptual problems dis-
tinct from those of the chain conspiracy in Dickey. But the ultimate ques-
tion raised by the application of each is the same: do these models help
to show the existence of an agreement or do they "obscure as much as
63. Id. at 291.
64. Id. at 288. This is because none of the defendants, with the exception of Varley,
who received five ounces of cocaine, actually saw or received any cocaine. Id. at 290. The
defendants merely invested money with the smugglers with the understanding that they
would receive a substantial return on their investment. Id. at 293.
65. Id. at 292. The significance of this charge is discussed at note 33 supra.
66. Id. at 291.
67. Judges Seymour and Kerr joined Judge Barrett in the opinion.
68. 721 F.2d at 292.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 290-92.
72. See infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
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[they] clarifly]? ' 73
D. Single v. Multiple Conspiracies: Use of the Common Objective Test
Defendants often assert that the evidence presented at trial shows
the existence of multiple conspiracies, rather than the single conspiracy
most frequently charged in an indictment. The distinction between sin-
gle and multiple conspiracies is crucial in practical and theoretical terms.
If the evidence does indeed show multiple conspiracies, the convictions
will often be reversed because of the tendency ofjurors to let guilt spill
over from one defendant to another. 74 A defendant could thereby be
connected to a conspiracy with which he had no contact. Guilt by associ-
ation is a potential problem in this context.
The prosecution will also enjoy several procedural and evidentiary
advantages if defendants are lumped together under a single conspiracy
charge. 7 5 The most significant of these advantages is that the govern-
ment can introduce the acts and statements of participants in transac-
tions both involving and not involving the defendant through the use of
the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. 76 Also, other eviden-
tiary rules or doctrines may be loosened so that evidence that is poten-
tially irrelevant as to a particular defendant will be admitted. 7 7 These
advantages pose the danger that an individual will be caught up in a
"dragnet" of confusing, irrelevant, and often voluminous testimony and
evidence.
78
The federal courts have adopted several tests to determine the
existence of a single conspiracy. 79 Many courts concede that they will
go to great lengths to find a single conspiracy, especially in cases involv-
ing drug operations.8" The Tenth Circuit adopted the "common objec-
73. United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 383 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960
(1964).
74. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 766-67 (1946).
75. The procedural advantages include the selection of venue and jurisdiction. Fur-
thermore, a showing of multiple conspiracies can "extend a statute of limitations by al-
lowing the imputation of acts of participants in one transaction, that occurred within the
statutory period, to participants in an earlier transaction who would otherwise be pro-
tected by the statute." See Tarlow, supra note 12, at 225. See also Note, 65 MINN. L. REV.
295, supra note 4, at 298-99 nn. 15 & 16.
76. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). See generally Note, 64 VA. L. REV. 881, supra note 3.
See also Note, Inconsistencies in the Federal Circuit Courts' Application of the Coconspirator Exception,
39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 125 (1982); Note, Evolution of the Coconspirator Exception to the Hear-
say Rule in the Federal Courts, 16 NEw EvG. L. REv. 617 (1981).
77. "Most conspiracy convictions are based on circumstantial evidence, and this evi-
dence is often admitted under rather loose standards of relevance." W. LAFAVE & A.
Scorr, supra note 9, at 457.
78. United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.), afd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940).
See also United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1344-45 (10th Cir.) (McKay, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979); United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 57 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974).
79. For a detailed discussion of these various tests, see Note, supra note 4.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1975):
This Circuit has gone quite far in finding single conspiracies in narcotics
cases. . . . Despite the existence of multiple groups within an alleged conspir-
acy, we have considered them as part of one integrated loose-knit combination in
instances where there existed "mutual dependence and assistance" among the
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tive" test. 8 1 Under this test, if it can be shown that the defendants
shared a common objective and that each defendant acted in further-
ance of that objective, the court will infer that each defendant had
knowledge of the scope of the conspiracy. From that knowledge it will
infer that each defendant agreed upon the common goal and intended
to further that goal.
8 2
In drug conspiracy cases the Tenth Circuit often resorts to the use
of figurative models, such as the "chain" or "hub and spoke," to help
determine the existence of a common objective.8 3 These models pres-
ent distinct and troublesome problems in the context of proving the
existence of an agreement as to each defendant.
1. The Hub and Spoke Conspiracy: A Poor Model
The "hub and spoke" or "wheel" conspiracy consists of a "hub"
made up of one or several persons, and "spokes," peripheral members
that have no contact with each other.8 4 Each spoke deals only with the
hub. This model is not as typical of drug distribution schemes as is the
"chain," but it does traditionally involve situations like that in Pilling8 5
where individual investors deal directly with a person or group who con-
tacts investors on an individual basis.8 6 Unless it can be shown that the
spokes knew, or had reason to know, of each other's existence, there will
be several separate conspiracies. If that knowledge is shown, the jury
can infer that the spokes agreed to join the larger conspiracy.
8 7
The Tenth Circuit has used the "common objective" test as a sub-
stitute for a showing of knowledge and agreement. If the jury finds that
the spokes had a "common, illicit goal" (for example, importation of
spheres,. . . a common aim or purpose among the participants, or a permissible
inference, from the nature and scope of the operation, that each actor was aware
of his part in a larger organization where others performed similar roles equally
important to the success of the venture.
Id. at 154.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1340 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 840 (1979); United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1326 (10th Cir. 1979) (quoting
United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 901 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978)), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980).
82. See Note, supra note 4, at 315-16. The parties must each intend to cooperate in
furthering the common goal. United States v. Downen, 496 F.2d 314, 319 (10th Cir.)
(knowledge or acquiescence in the object of the conspiracy without agreement to cooper-
ate does not make out a conspiracy), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974). See generally Marcus,
Criminal Conspiracy: The State of Mind Crime-Intent, Proving Intent, and Anti-Federal Intent,
1976 U. ILL. L.F. 627.
83. See, e.g., Dickey, 736 F.2d at 582; Pilling, 721 F.2d at 289-90; Petersen, 611 F.2d at
1325-27.
84. Note, Federal Treatment of Multiple Conspiracies, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 385, 388-89
(1957).
85. United States v. Pilling, 721 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1983).
86. Such a situation existed in a non-narcotics context in Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750 (1946). Several independent conspirators hired a person to act as a broker in
securing federal loans with fraudulent applications. No "rim" was shown to tie these
spokes together and the convictions were reversed because the Court found that the evi-
dence showed several small conspiracies rather than one large conspiracy. Id. at 772-74.
87. See generally Note, supra note 84.
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cocaine from Peru for profit), 88 then the court will infer knowledge.8 9
Knowledge of the other spokes is the "rim" that ties the spokes together
into a single conspiracy.9 0
The problems with the common objective test, in the context of the
hub and spoke conspiracy, are substantial. The test does not reveal if
the spoke members reached an agreement. By inferring the element of
knowledge, the courts make the mistake of treating an agreement be-
tween the hub members and individual spokes as an agreement among
the spokes.9 ' Since the core members have actual knowledge of the
scope of the operation and are dependent upon the participation of the
spokes, it follows that the hub agrees with each spoke. It does not follow
that the spokes agree with each other.
A common objective is not the same as an agreement. Application
of the common objective test to a "hub and spoke" conspiracy tends to
bring "crimes of a similar nature" under the umbrella of a single con-
spiracy. 92 The common objective test shifts the focus away from the
existence of an agreement among the spokes. Indeed, each spoke mem-
ber may have contemplated a separate conspiracy.
The Tenth Circuit's analysis in Pilling falls prey to these problems.
The court simply equated a common goal with a single conspiracy, a
misconception common to the federal courts' application of the com-
mon objective test.9 3 No attempt was made to show that the spoke de-
fendants had any knowledge of each other's involvement. The court did
state that the defendants knew about the cover-up plans, 9 4 but it is un-
clear if this knowledge included knowledge of Pilling's involvement or
merely knowledge that the hub conspirators intended to falsely promote
a business in Peru. If the individual spokes had no knowledge of the
involvement of the other spoke members, then the spokes were attached
to the single conspiracy simply because of association with the hub con-
spirators. 9 5 Without knowledge of other spokes, Kotleakos v. United
States9 6 would control. The hub and spoke conspiracy alleged in Kot-
teakos was "rimless" as the spoke defendants were not aware of the
larger conspiracy; accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the conspir-
acy conviction due to prejudicial variance between the evidence and the
88. See Pilling, 721 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1983).
89. See United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1337 (10th Cir.) (knowledge may be
inferred from a single act, depending upon the nature of the act), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840
(1979).
90. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 755. See also United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658, 663 (5th
Cir. 1977).
91. Note, supra note 84, at 389.
92. Goldstein, The Krulewitch Warning: Guilt by Association, 54 GEo. l.J. 133, 147-48
(1965).
93. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
94. 721 F.2d at 292.
95. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 766-67.
96. 328 U.S. 750 (1946). It is also argued that the hub conspirators, and not the
spoke conspirators, represent the true danger to society. Tarlow, supra note 12. at 230-3 1.
The threat to society from the crime of conspiracy is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 7-11 supra.
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indictment.
9 7
2. The Chain Conspiracy
Goods tend to travel along a chain of distribution from manufac-
turer to supplier to ultimate purchaser. The purpose of each participant
in the distribution chain is to assure that the commodity reaches its des-
tination. That too is the common objective of chain conspirators. Each
link or level in the chain is dependent upon the successful operation of
each of the other links. This is the basis of the chain conspiracy model,
and is typically used in cases involving large-scale narcotics
operations.98
If the requisite element of interdependence is shown, a jury
presented with evidence of each defendant's actions may infer that each
link knew or had reason to know of the other links. 99 Thus, the jury can
find that each knowledgeable link agreed with all other links in the chain
to join the larger conspiracy.10 0 Because direct proof that a defendant
knew of his dependence upon the other links is seldom available, the
fact finder can infer knowledge from the nature of the enterprise and the
facts and circumstances surrounding each participant.' 0 '
The courts almost automatically apply this model to narcotics enter-
prises. They quickly characterize a drug conspiracy as a chain because
the very nature of that form of enterprise lends itself to an inference of
interdependence.' 0 2 As a threshold requirement, thejury must find that
the links were truly dependent upon each other for their individual suc-
cesses. Once the jury finds dependence, a single chain conspiracy exists,
and only slight evidence is needed to connect an individual defendant to
that conspiracy.10 3 This implies that each link knew or must have known
that the venture did not begin and end with his actions.
Conspiracies, however, are usually too complex to be characterized
by a simplistic structural form. The danger with the chain conspiracy
model, and all structural models, is that it characterizes the conspiracy
97. 328 U.S. at 772-77. The Court noted that "as [the conspiracy charge] is broad-
ened to include more and more, in varying degrees of attachment to the Confederation,
the possibilities for miscarriage of justice to particular individuals becomes greater and
greater." Id. at 776.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Duckett, 550 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1977); See also United
States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1962); Valentine v. United States, 293 F.2d 708,
711 (8th Cir. 1961) (commenting that the law of conspiracy is somewhat broader when
drug conspiracies are involved), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 830 (1962); United States v. Bruno,
105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1939), r,'d on other grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 907 (1980); United States v. Kostoff, 585 F.2d 378, 380 (9th Cir. 1978).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 434 (2d Cir. 1976) ("nature of
the enterprise determines whether this presumption or inference of knowledge of broader
scope and participation in it single conspiracy is justified"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091
(1977). See also P. MARtCtUs. supra note 22, at 4-13, 4-20, and 4-25.
101. Such facts otttn include the size and frequency of the transaction involved. See
inf'a notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
102. See generallr Note. supra note 21.
103. Sri infra tt's 114-29 and accompanying text.
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as a group of people rather than as an agreement. 10 4 The finding of
interdependence, commonly inferred from the volume of the transac-
tions, leads to an inference of knowledge which ultimately permits the
jury to conclude that an individual defendant agreed to join the larger
conspiracy. 105
The relationship of the evidence to an agreement can become so
tenuous as to be nonexistent. Although agreements may rarely be
proved by direct evidence, the government should at least have to show
that the participants knew, or should have known, of each other's in-
volvement. Unfortunately, knowledge of interdependence is frequently
inferred solely on the basis of the quantity of drugs involved. 10 6 Even
though the courts have "recognized" that a buyer-seller relationship is
not sufficient to connect an individual to a conspiracy,' 0 7 many circuits
continue to hold that where large quantities of drugs are involved, a
buyer knows that he is part of a wide-ranging venture.' 0 8 The rationale
for this conclusion is that a purchaser of large quantities of narcotics
must know that the chain of distribution did not begin with his seller. 10 9
The logical fallacy in this reasoning is subtle but nonetheless crucial.
Courts use the nature of the enterprise (the chain) in combination with
the transaction of a large quantity of drugs to infer interdependence.
But interdependence must first be shown to prove the existence of the
chain. Therefore, the courts are implicitly assuming the existence of a
chain conspiracy in order to ultimately prove that one actually exists.
A common objective should be no substitute for an agreement.
The fact that one actor desires to possess and distribute marijuana for
profit does not mean that he knows of others who intend to do the same.
The objective of the actors would be "common" only in the sense that
they intend to commit similar crimes. I 10
104. United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 384 (2d Cir. 1964) (citing Note, supra note
17, at 923), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965). See also Note, supra note 21, at 265. The
requirement of agreement has been minimized, especially in narcotics cases. See Tarlow,
supra note 12, at 189.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921, 922 (2d Cir. 1939), rev'd on other
grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939). See also Note, supra note 86, at 390; Note, supra note 4, at
303.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 454 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 991, 457 U.S. 1137,459 U.S. 832 (1982); United States v. Heath, 580 F.2d 1011,
1022 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1979); United States v. Leong, 536 F.2d
993. 995-96 (2d Cir.) (knowledge of scope inferred from large amount of heroin distrib-
uted), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976). It has been argued that "under accepted theories
of criminal intent, knowledge that actions are substantially certain to have a prohibited
result has the same legal effect as intending that result." Tarlow, Defense of a Federal Crimi-
nal Prosecution, 4 J. CRIM. DEF. 183, 197 (1978). See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 9, at
196; PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 746-47 (2d ed. 1969). ContraJ. SALMONO,JURISPRUDENCE 280
(I0 .h ed. 1947). Since a defendant should know from the purchase of a large amount of
narcotics that a conspiracy will be furthered, that knowledge could then lead to an infer-
ence that he intended that result.
107. United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1337 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840
(1979).
108. Dickey, 736 F.2d at 582 (citing Heath, 580 F.2d at 1022).
109. See supra note 106.
110. Goldstein, supra note 92, at 147-48.
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As Judge McKay suggested, the approach taken by the majority in
Dickey was undisciplined."I  The mechanical application of the chain
conspiracy model was inappropriate. Even the summary of facts set
forth in the Tenth Circuit's opinion shows that participants performed
various functions at various times in various combinations with other
participants.' 12 This elaborate set of facts does not lend itself to a sim-
ple structural characterization. Regardless of the quantity and quality of
evidence against each defendant, the courts should more carefully ex-
amine each defendant's connection to the conspiracy. Automatic char-
acterization of transactions as single rather than multiple conspiracies
endangers the right of defendants to an individual determination of
guilt. 113
E. The Slight Evidence Rule.- An Inadequate Standard
The "slight evidence rule," as originally formulated, is a standard of
appellate review used to examine the sufficiency of evidence required to
uphold a jury's verdict connecting a defendant to a conspiracy. 114 This
rule is the accepted standard in most circuits but it is expressed and
applied in a variety of ways.' 15 The Tenth Circuit's version, applied in
both Dickey and Pilling, reads: "In conspiracy cases, . . . the record need
only show 'slight evidence of a particular defendant's connection with a
conspiracy that has already been established through independent
evidence.' "1 16
There are several problems with this rule. First, the rule has been
111. 736F.2dat601.
112. Id. at 578-81.
113. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946).
114. The rule first appeared in Tomplain v. United States, 42 F.2d 202, 203 (5th Cir.
1930) ("The conspiracy was conclusively established, and but slight evidence connecting
the defendants was necessary."), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 886 (1930).
115. United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852, 866 (1st Cir. 1984) ("Once the existence of
a conspiracy has been established, even slight evidence implicating a defendant may be
sufficient proof of his involvement."); United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 988 (7th Cir.)
("Once a conspiracy is shown to exist evidence that establishes a particular defendant's
participation beyond a reasonable doubt, although the connection between defendant and
conspiracy is slight, is sufficient to convict."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 486 (1983); United
States v. Smith, 561 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir.) ("Once the existence of a conspiracy has been
established, only slight additional evidence is required to connect a particular defendant
with it."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 958, 972, 1019, 1048 (1977). United States v. Dunn, 564
F.2d 348, 357 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Once the existence of a conspiracy is established, evidence
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt a connection of a defendant with a conspiracy,
even though the connection is slight, is sufficient to convict him of knowing participation
in the conspiracy."), followed in United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1076 (4th Cir.
1980); United States v. Overshon, 494 F.2d 894, 896 (8th Cir.) ("Once the government
has established the existence of a conspiracy, even slight evidence connecting a particular
defendant to the conspiracy may be substantial and therefore sufficient proof of the de-
fendant's involvement in the scheme."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 853, 878 (1974). The Second
Circuit has a completely different test. See United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 45
(2d Cir.) (requiring "active participation with intent to further the objectives of the con-
spiracy"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 953 (1980).
116. Dickey, 736 F.2d at 583 (quoting United States v. Peterson, 611 F.2d 1313, 1317
(10th Cir. 1979)); see Pilling, 721 F.2d at 293 (quoting United States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d
961, 964 (10th Cir. 1978)).
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applied by some circuits in such a way that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt may no longer be needed to connect a defendant to a conspiracy,
despite bromides to the contrary. 1 7 When properly applied, the word
"slight" should be used to modify "connection" and not "evidence."" 8
Some circuits, however, have used the test to require only slight evi-
dence, sometimes with the rationale that the essence of the proof re-
quirement goes to the establishment of the conspiracy and not to the
connection of a defendant to the conspiracy." 9 Therefore, if an appel-
late court finds only slight evidence in the record to connect a defendant
to a conspiracy, it need not determine if the evidence is sufficient to
support a jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
120
The slight evidence standard reduces the level of scrutiny given by
appellate courts to jury verdicts below the standard normally required in
criminal cases. Evidence of a defendant's connection to a conspiracy
will not be examined in any detail and the court is much more likely to
defer to ajury's findings when this standard is mechanically applied.' 2 '
Furthermore, it is highly doubtful that slight evidence can ever support a
jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Recognizing this prob-
lem, the Fifth Circuit (with whom the rule originated) now requires
"substantial" evidence of a defendant's connection with a conspiracy.122
A second, less serious problem arises even when the rule is charac-
terized as requiring "substantial" evidence of a "slight" connection.
2 3
A defendant may be convicted by evidence that he had any contact, how-
ever slight that contact might be, with the conspiracy. This difficulty is
partially alleviated by requiring, as the Tenth Circuit does, that the de-
fendant have knowledge of the conspiracy's general scope. 124 However,
since knowledge is usually proved by inference, even this formulation of
the slight evidence rule can serve to sweep a defendant into the overex-
tended "fishnet" of a single conspiracy.
125
Third, the rule has begun to find its way into the jury room. Confu-
sion over the origin and proper formulation of the rule has led to its
inclusion in some jury instructions. 126 This practice is condemned by
most circuits, but the Ninth Circuit approved the practice in United States
117. See, e.g., Pilling at 292. The Tenth Circuit used the defendants' lack of business
records to infer their connection with the conspiracy. This seems to reverse the traditional
burden of proof, forcing defendants to prove their innocence.
118. Dunn, 564 F.2d at 357. (The word "slight" "is tied to that which is proved, not the
type of evidence or the burden of proof.")
119. United States v. Schmaltz, 562 F.2d 558, 560 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 957
(1977).
120. Note, 68 VA. L. REv., supra note 3, at 888.
121. Id.
122. United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 962 (1979). This test was adopted recently by the Eleventh Circuit in United
States v. Bulman, 667 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1010 (1982).
123. See, e.g., Dunn, 564 F.2d at 357; Xheka, 704 F.2d at 988.
124. Dickey, 736 F.2d at 583 (citing Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557
(1947)).
125. See United States v. Heath, 580 F.2d 1011, 1026 (10th Cir.) (McKay, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 105 (1978).
126. Note, 68 VA. L. REv., supra note 3, at 895 & n.73.
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v. Lustig.12 7 It is possible that juries will, in some cases, let insubstantial
evidence connect an individual to a conspiracy. 128 The requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is replaced by guilt by association.
No formulation of this rule can bejustified. As is true with much of
the body of conspiracy law, confusion, inadequate appellate review, and
guilt by association are all possible outcomes of any application of the
slight evidence rule. Regardless of the evidence against the combined
defendants in Dickey and Pilling, the individual defendants in each case
deserved close scrutiny of the evidence relating to their individual
guilt.129 The Tenth Circuit should discard the slight evidence rule and
replace it with a substantial evidence test. The evidence must be able to
support, beyond a reasonable doubt, a finding that each defendant
agreed to join the conspiracy. Mere knowledge of the general scope of
the conspiracy is no substitute for proof of an agreement.
F. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit's holdings in Dickey and Pilling perpetuate the
mechanical application of inadequate methods of review in criminal con-
spiracy cases.13 0 The danger of guilt by association will continue to ex-
ist unless these methods are abandoned and replaced by a conscientious
and disciplined approach that speaks to the nature of the crime of con-
spiracy-the agreement. Structural models, the common objective test,
and the slight evidence rule all cloud and confuse any attempt to find the
existence of an agreement.
Prosecutors should not be allowed to ensnare multiple defendants
with the net of the single conspiracy without showing defendants' actual
knowledge of the existence of others in the conspiracy and proving that
each individual defendant intended to join the conspiracy. The current
tests and standards employed by the Tenth Circuit permit too may pre-
sumptions and inferences; it is impossible to predict what additional in-
ferences a jury will make when a defendant stands trial next to a host of
conspirators.
127. 555 F.2d 737, 750 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926, 1045 (1978).
128. See United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 1977) (Goodwin, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 927 (1978). See also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Toliver, 541 F.2d 958, 962-63 (2d
Cir. 1976). A jury may have difficulty distinguishing defendants, remembering each de-
fendant's role in the conspiracy, and determining what evidence applies to each defendant.
See, e.g., United States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 6 F.R.D. 526, 528, 533-35 (N.D. Ohio 1947)
(76 defendants tried, 1616 exhibits in evidence).
129. "The need for safeguarding defendants from misunderstanding by the jury is pe-
culiarly acute in conspiracy trials .... " United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995, 1003 (2d Cir.
1943) (FrankJ, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943). Conspiracy proceed-
ings "call for use of every safeguard to individualize each defendant in his relation to the
mass." Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 753 (1946).
130. United States v. Hines, 728 F.2d 421 (10th Cir.) (conspiracy to burglarize a post
office), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3523 (1984); United States v. Holt, Nos. 81-1813, 81-1814,
slip op. (10th Cir. Aug. 22, 1983) (conspiracy to receive, barter, sell, and dispose of an
automobile); See also Fitzgerald v. United States, 719 F.2d 1069 (10th Cir. 1983) (posses-
sion of controlled substances with intent to distribute).
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Although some argue that conspiracy is an unnecessary part of
criminal law, 13 1 the rationales behind the criminalization of conspir-
acy' 3 2 are substantial enough to justify its use, provided that individuals
are allowed every appropriate procedural safeguard to assure an individ-
ual determination of guilt.
II. MAIL FRAUD
The federal mail fraud statute' 3 3 has been characterized as the
"first line of defense" against fraud.13 4 Because new types of fraud are
developed faster than Congress can counteract them, the courts and
Congress have treated the mail fraud statute as a stopgap measure to
combat frauds before Congress acts to address them specifically.' 3 5 Fre-
quently, the mail fraud statute is the only means by which a defrauder
can be brought to justice. In recognition of this, Congress has steadily
expanded the scope of the statute and the federal courts have read it
liberally to apply it to virtually any scheme to defraud.1
3 6
Fraudulent schemes have been divided into two general classes:
those which are intended to defraud individuals of money or other tan-
gible property, and those which operate to deprive citizens of certain
"intangible rights or interests."' 3 7 The term "fraud" also has been held
to encompass activities which are contrary to notions of "moral up-
rightness . . . fundamental honesty, [and] fair play."' 3 8
131. See, e.g.,Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1137 (1973)
(arguing that conspiracy adds only confusion to the law).
132. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). It provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises . . . for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered
by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon...
any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
134. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
135. See Morano, The Mail Fraud Statute: A Procrustean Bed, 14J. MAR. L. REv. 45, 47-48
(1980).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) has been revised five times since its enactment in 1872.
See Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DUg. L. REV. 771, 772 (1980). See also
United States v. Boyd, 606 F.2d 792, 794 (8th Cir. 1979) (the statute should be read ex-
pansively to effectuate its purpose of punishing any scheme to defraud in which the mails
are used).
137. Morano, supra note 135, at 48. The courts have interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1341 as
allowing prosecution of these two classes of fraud by treating the statutory language
"scheme ... to defraud, or for obtaining money or property" as mutually exclusive dis-
juncts. United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 763-64 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
909 (1974). In recent years the "intangible rights" theory has been applied broadly to
allow increased use of the mail fraud statute as a tool to combat local corruption. This
effort has met with opposition among legal writers. See, e.g., Comment, Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction: a Case Against Mahing Federal Cases, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 574 (1984); Com-
ment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political Corruption Prosecutions Under the Federal Mail
Fraud Statute, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. 562 (1980).
138. Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958). See also Badders v.
United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393 (1916) ("Whatever the limits to [Congress's] power, it
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The elements of the offense of mail fraud "are (1) a scheme to de-
fraud, and (2) the mailing of a letter, etc., for the purpose of executing
the scheme." 139 It is the second element of the offense, use of the mails,
which converts what would, in most cases, be a state crime into a federal
offense. 140
The original purpose of the mail fraud statute was to protect "the
public against all . . .intentional efforts to despoil, and to prevent the
post office from being used to carry [fraudulent schemes] into ef-
fect."' 4 1 It has been argued that the legislative history of the act indi-
cates that it was meant to reach frauds in which the use of the mails was
an indispensible method for carrying out the scheme.142 However, ex-
pansive interpretation by the federal courts now only requires that the
mailing be "sufficiently closely related"' 14 3 to the scheme or incidental
to an essential part of the scheme to trigger the jurisdiction of the mail
fraud statute.14 4 It is not necessary that a party actually contemplate use
of the mails or even that he do the mailing, as long as the defrauder
"causes" the mailing to be done and acts with the "knowledge that the
use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where
such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually
intended."1
4 5
The Tenth Circuit recently dealt with both of the general types of
fraudulent schemes. In United States v. Primrose,146 the scheme involved a
violation of the public's right to honest government, an excellent exam-
ple of using 18 U.S.C. § 1341 to combat local political corruption. 14 7 In
United States v. Glick, ' 48 the scheme was designed to deprive persons of
money.
A. Sufficiency of the Mailing: United States v. Primrose
Primrose'49 was an unsuccessful appeal by the County Commissioner
may forbid any such acts done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to
public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not.").
139. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d
1376, 1379 (10th Cir. 1977).
140. Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 385 (1960). It has been argued that this sec-
ond element is not purely jurisdictional in that it requires something akin to proximate
cause ("sufficiently closely related") and foreseeability ("reasonable foreseeable"). See
Rakoff, supra note 136, at 775-76 (citing United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399, 405
(1974) and Pereira, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9). In these respects, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 resembles in some
ways the federal conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982)). Rakoff, supra note 136, at
776.
141. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896).
142. See Comment, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 137, at 580-81.
143. Maze, 414 U.S. at 399.
144. Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8.
145. Id. at 8-9 (citing United States v. Kenofsky, 243 U.S. 440 (1917) (superintendent,
ignorant of defendant's scheme, mailed false death certificate filed by defendant)); see also
United States v. Moss, 591 F.2d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 1979) (mails used by nondefendant to
obtain insurance for target of murder scheme).
146. 718 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1983).
147. See supra note 137.
148. 710 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1983). See infra text accompanying notes 178-220.
149. 718 F.2d 1484 410th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2352 (1984).
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of Murray County, Oklahoma, of a federal district court conviction for
thirteen counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).150
As county commissioner, Primrose was empowered to purchase materi-
als and supplies for the purpose of maintaining the roads and bridges of
the county. 15 Primrose was charged with defrauding the citizens of
Murray County by purchasing the materials and supplies in return for
kickbacks paid by the vendors at the time orders were placed. He was
also charged with placing orders for materials which, by arrangement
with the vendors, were not to be delivered. He then divided the pay-
ment for the undelivered goods with the vendors. The vendors would
later bill the county for the materials by mailed invoices, and receive
warrants, the county's "checks," through the mail.
152
Primrose first argued that because the mailings occurred after the
kickbacks had been paid, the mails were not a part of the scheme to
defraud. In Primrose's view, the scheme had reached fruition and was
fully executed before the mailings were made, rendering the mail fraud
statute inapplicable. '
5 3
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Seymour writing, rejected this defense by
applying the holdings of United States v. Bottom 154 and United States v.
Boyd. 15 5 In those cases the Fifth and Eighth Circuits respectively had
rejected the completed-scheme defense made under circumstances simi-
lar to those in Primrose. Both Bottom and Boyd emphasized that payments
made by mail after receipt of kickbacks were necessarily a part of the
fraudulent scheme because the mailings ensured that the parties making
the kickbacks were paid. 15 6 Without the final payment by mail to the
party issuing the kickback to the defendant, the plan would fail. Each
payment was therefore essential to the success of the overall scheme.
Furthermore, the Bottom court observed that the citizens were not actu-
ally defrauded until Bottom paid for the illegally obtained materials.
15 7
The Tenth Circuit adopted both Bottom and Boyd, and held that the mail-
ing of the invoices and warrants were an essential part of Primrose's
scheme. 1
5 8
The court also considered the effect of the affidavits of noncollusion
mailed with each invoice by the vendor to the county, as required by
local law. Citing United States v. Sampson,' 5 9 the court held that a mailing
150. See supra note 133. Primrose was originally charged with thirty-eight counts of
mail fraud and three counts of extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982). 718 F.2d
at 1485.
151. 718 F.2d at 1486.
152. Id. at 1486-88.
153. Id. at 1489.
154. 638 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1981).
155. 606 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1979).
156. Bottom, 638 F.2d at 785-86; Boyd, 606 F.2d at 794. It is immaterial whether the
checks could have been delivered in a way other than by the mails. United States v. Diggs,
613 F.2d 988, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980); United States v. Tal-
bott, 590 F.2d 192, 195 (6th Cir. 1978).
157. 638 F.2d at 785.
158. 718 F.2d at 1491.
159. 371 U.S. 75 (1962).
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made in an effort to convince the victim that no fraud had taken place
could be considered part of the overall plan. 160 The court found that
the affidavits of noncollusion "helped to conceal Primrose's kickback
scheme" and were therefore part of that scheme. 16 1 The court did not
address the issue of whether Primrose "caused" these particular mail-
ings to be made within the meaning of section 1341. Because Primrose,
however, was certainly aware that the mails would be used in the normal
course of business to forward the checks, invoices and noncollusion
agreements, there can be no real question that he "caused" the mailings
under current judicial doctrine.1
62
Primrose cited three cases, United States v. Maze,16 3 Kann v. United
States, 16 4 and United States v. Wolf, 165 in support of his defense that mail-
ings done after a fraudulent scheme has reached fruition are not made
"for the purpose of executing" the fraud, within the meaning of the mail
fraud statute.' 6 6 Maze involved the fraudulent use of a stolen credit card
at various motels. The Supreme Court ruled that the motels' mailings of
the credit card sales slips to the bank which issued the card were not
sufficiently closely related to the scheme to bring the defrauder's con-
duct within the mail fraud statute.16 7 Similarly, in Kann the defendants
had fraudulently obtained checks which they subsequently cashed or de-
posited. The bank then mailed the checks to the banks from which the
funds were to be drawn. The Supreme Court ruled that the fraud was
complete when the defendants cashed the checks. The manner in which
the bank collected from the drawee bank was irrelevant. 168 Wolf in-
volved a scheme in which the defendant, through his corporations, sold
outstanding customer accounts receivable to a financing corporation.
The financing corporation then mailed invoices to the customers re-
questing that they make future payments directly to it. The defendant,
however, continued to accept payment for the sold accounts; in some
cases the accounts sold were entirely fictitious. 169 The Tenth Circuit,
relying on Kann, held that the fraudulent transaction was complete at
the time the accounts were sold and that the subsequent mailings by the
assignee financing corporation were not made in furtherance of the
scheme. '
70
The Tenth Circuit distinguished all of these cases on the basis of
facts.171 Quoting United States v. Knight,172 the court said that the cases
160. 718 F.2d at 1490-91.
161. Id.
162. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
163. 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
164. 323 U.S. 88 (1944).
165. 561 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1977).
166. 718 F.2d at 1491.
167. 414 U.S. at 402-05.
168. 323 U.S. at 94.
169. 561 F.2d at 1378-79.
170. Id. at 1380.
171. 718 F.2d at 1491.
172. 607 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Kent, 608 F.2d 542,
546 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The dependence test is not met if use of the mails is made after the
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cited by Primrose had not ruled that where a fraudulent scheme contin-
ues after the money from the scheme is received by the defrauder, sub-
sequent mailings could never be considered as part of the fraudulent
scheme. Rather, the cases held that the particular schemes involved had
been completed before the mailings in question.
Alternatively, Primrose argued that since he was legally required to
purchase materials and supplies as a part of his job, mailings made pur-
suant to his duty were not criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 1341.173 This
argument rested entirely on the case of Parr v. United States, 174 in which
the Supreme Court held that absent a showing that contents of a mailing
are "excessive, 'padded' or in any way illegal," mailings made as a result
of a legally imposed duty are not actionable under the mail fraud stat-
ute. 175 The Tenth Circuit distinguished Parr by noting that unlike the
parties in Parr, Primrose and the vendors were all willing participants in
the scheme. While Primrose may have had a duty to buy materials and
supplies, he did not have a legal duty to purchase them from vendors
who offered him kickbacks. In fact, under the state's Anti-Kickback Act
of 1974,176 Primrose was legally required not to accept kickbacks.
177
B. "Deliberate Ignorance" of Fraudulent Acts: United States v. Glick
In United States v. Glick, 178 the Tenth Circuit faced the task of deter-
mining whether the use and form of a jury instruction on "deliberate
ignorance" were proper in light of the specific intent requirement of the
federal mail fraud statute. 179 The court held that deliberate ignorance,
rather than positive knowledge, can satisfy the specific intent require-
ment and that the form of the instruction adequately, if imperfectly,
charged the jury on the concept of deliberate ignorance.1
8 0
Glick involved a scheme to defraud would-be financial borrowers
from 1975 to 1976.181 Reginald Chisholm, the instigator of the scheme,
represented himself as a wealthy man who would, for a fee, put together
loans for people seeking financing from various lending institutions. As
part of the deal, Chisholm promised to tell the potential lenders that he
would personally guarantee the loans.' 8 2 As proof of his wealth,
scheme has been fully consumated, but a fraudulent scheme may depend on a mailing
even after the defrauders have received the sought-after money . . . , because 'the use of
the mails after the money is obtained . . may be for the purpose of executing the fraud
. .") (quoting United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 799 (5th Cir. 1975)).
173. 718 F.2d at 1491.
174. 363 U.S. 370 (1960).
175. Id. at 387, 391.
176. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 3404 (1981) provides:
Any person who shall knowingly make or receive, either directly or indirectly,
a kickback shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be fined not more
than Ten Thousand Dollars ($ 10,000.00) or double the amount of the financial
gain or be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years, or both.
177. 718 F.2d at 1491 (emphasis added).
178. 710 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 995 (1984).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). See supra note 133.
180. 710 F.2d at 642.
181. Id. at 641.
182. Id.
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Chisholm showed his potential clients financial statements prepared by
Steven Glick, a certified public accountant. The statements included in-
formation about Chisholm's personal finances as well as those of three
corporations which he owned or controlled. 183 Included with these
statements were letters by Glick in which he represented that the state-
ments had been prepared in accord with generally accepted methods,
principles, and standards and that they were accurate representations of
Chisholm's financial status.
184
Both Chisholm and Glick were indicted and Chisholm plead guilty
before trial. 18 5 The major issues at Glick's trial centered around the
value of Chisholm and his corporation's principal asset, mineral rights
to limestone formations on certain national forest lands.' 8 6 Expert wit-
nesses for the government testified that the statements prepared by
Glick greatly overestimated the value of the mineral rights and that Glick
had committed "blatant violations of basic accounting principles."'
' 8 7
Glick testified that four separate appraisals substantially supported his
evaluation. Glick was, however, unable to produce three of these ap-
praisals or give any details as to their contents. A fourth appraisal was
prepared by someone who had interests in Chisholm's businesses.'
8 8
Much of Glick's testimony worked against him. Most important, Glick
stated that he knew that no lender would grant a loan based on the state-
ments, that he knew that Chisholm was collecting fees in return for use
of the statements, and that as early as 1975 he personally believed the
mineral rights evaluations to be unrealistic.' 8 9 But despite this belief,
Glick testified that he thought the mineral rights possessed substantial
value. He also expressed his belief that Chisholm's scheme was legiti-
mate at the time he prepared the financial statements.190
The jury convicted Glick on eight counts of mail fraud in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 134119' and two counts of travel in interstate commerce
to execute a scheme to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314.192 On
appeal, Glick raised two issues, only one of which will be addressed in
183. Id.
184. Id. Government experts testified to the contrary. See infra note 187 and accompa-
nying text.
185. 710 F.2d at 641. "Chisholm had previously been convicted in a federal criminal
proceeding in Portland, Oregon, on charges apparently arising from other acts involving
the same fraudulent plan." Id.
186. Id. Chisholm indicated to potential investors that he would mine the limestone or
construct a real estate development on the property above the minerals. A government
expert testified at trial that Chisholm would not have been able to do either. Id.
187. 710 F.2d at 641, 642.
188. Id. at 641. A fifth appraisal was obtained by Chisholm in preparation for his Port-
land trial. That appraisal was admitted into evidence in Glick's trial and stated that com-
mercial mining could be considered given the amount of limestone in the deposits. Id.
189. Id. at 642.
190. Id. at 641-42.
191. See supra note 133.
192. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transports or causes to be transported, or induces
any person to travel in, or to be transported in interstate commerce in the execu-
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this survey.' 93 Glick claimed that the trial court's instruction on the
doctrine of "deliberate ignorance" was not warranted by the evidence
and that, even if warranted, the form of the instruction permitted the
jury to convict him on "proof of a lesser degree of knowledge than that
required by the statute."' 194 The instructions at issue read in relevant
part:
In order to convict the defendant in this case, you must find
that he acted knowingly.
However, the element of knowledge may be established by
proof that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what
otherwise would have been obvious to him. In other words, the
requirement that the defendant has acted knowingly does not
mean that the defendant needed to have positive knowledge. If
the defendant failed to have positive knowledge only because
he conscientiously avoided acquiring it, the requirement of
knowledge is satisfied.
... . It is not sufficient to merely prove that . . .Glick
prepared fraudulent financial statements. The prosecution
must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Glick
knowingly participated in the scheme or artifice involved in this
case. Thus, if you find that Mr. Glick prepared fraudulent fi-
nancial statements but did not intentionally and knowingly par-
ticipate in the scheme or artifice involved in this case, you must
find him not guilty.
19 5
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Seymour writing, upheld Glick's convic-
tions despite imperfections in the instruction on deliberate igno-
rance.' 96 The court first examined whether the instruction was proper
in light of the fact that the government, prosecuting pursuant to the mail
fraud statute, was required to prove that Glick specifically intended to
defraud. 197 Judge Seymour implicitly agreed with the part of the in-
struction that stated positive knowledge of a fraudulent scheme is not
tion or concealment of a scheme or artifice to defraud that person of money or
property having a value of $5,000 or more; ....
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both.
Glick was also charged with aiding and abetting the above crimes in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(a) (1982). 710 F.2d at 640 & n.2.
193. Glick also argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. 710 F.2d at
644-45.
194. Id. at 642.
195. Id. at 643-44 n.4 (quoting Record, vol. VIII, at 672-73). The trial court also in-
structed the jury on the definition of "'knowingly":
An act is done knowingly if done voluntarily and intentionally and not be-
cause of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.
The purpose of adding the word "knowingly" is to ensure that no one would
be convicted for an act done because of mistake, or accident or innocent reason.
Id. at 643 n.4 (quoting Record, vol. VIII, at 670).
196. Id. at 643-44.
197. Id. at 642 (quoting United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485, 492 (7th Cir.
1982)). Specific fraudulent intent is crucial because it can turn otherwise innocent actions
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required. In the court's view, conscious avoidance of knowledge is
equally as culpable as positive or actual knowledge. The court pointed
out, however, that in order to avoid convictions based on mere negli-
gence, a deliberate ignorance instruction should only be given where the
evidence points to such conduct. 198
The court found no merit in Glick's argument that the evidence at
trial did not justify the instruction. Several facts, taken together, could
have led a reasonable juror to conclude that Glick was aware of facts
which indicated that Chisholm was involved in a fraudulent scheme, but
that he nevertheless chose to remain ignorant concerning the propriety of
the venture. 19 9 These facts included Glick's knowledge that Chisholm
was collecting fees for financial statements which Glick knew to be inad-
equate to obtain a loan, as well as his personal belief that Chisholm's
mineral rights were overvalued. Furthermore, Glick had repeatedly vio-
lated basic accounting and auditing principles in the preparation of the
financial statements. 20 0 The court found that a reasonable juror could
conclude that Glick either knew of the fraudulent purpose of Chisholm's
scheme or deliberately avoided gaining such knowledge.
2 0 '
Glick also argued that the instruction was fatally incomplete be-
cause it did not require the jury to find that "the defendant was subjec-
tively aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact whose
knowledge is imputed, and that knowledge of that fact may not be im-
puted if the defendant actually believed that such fact did not exist."
20 2
As the court noted, this instruction is designed to assure that a defend-
ant's ignorance is deliberate or willful. If a defendant is merely negli-
gent or has only made a mistake, then the required knowledge cannot be
imputed. 20 3 The court admitted that this added language would have
resulted in a better instruction, but found that its exclusion did not con-
stitute plain error.20 4 Examining the instruction given, the court found
that it contained sufficient language concerning deliberate and inten-
tional ignorance of facts which would have been obvious to Glick had he
into an actionable crime. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916). See aLso supra
note 139 and accompanying text.
198. 710 F.2d at 642. See also infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
199. 710 F.2d at 642.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 642-43 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 17). Such language is similar to that
adopted by the Tenth Circuit from the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Jewell, 532
F.2d 697, 704 n.21 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). The preferable
instruction would require, in addition to the instruction given to the jury in Glick: "(1) that
the required knowledge is established if the accused is aware of a high probability of the
existence of the fact in question, (2) unless he actually believes it does not exist." 532 F.2d
at 704 n.21. See also infra note 212 and accompanying text.
203. 710 F.2d at 642 (quoting Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir.
1962)).
204. 710 F.2d at 643-44. Glick was required to show that the omission constituted
plain error because defense counsel was given several opportunities to alter the language
at trial (the trial judge even offered to use the quote fromJewell) but did not do so. There-
fore, FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) permits the appellate court to reverse only if failure to include
the added language was plain error. Id.
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not closed his eyes to them.20 5
The jury instruction on deliberate ignorance given in Glick was im-
portant because it concerned the statutory requirement of specific intent
under the mail fraud statute. 20 6 Specific intent to defraud can some-
times be shown by direct evidence. This is possible where a party ac-
tively misrepresents material facts to his victims, as Chisholm did in the
Glick case. However, circumstantial evidence is usually required to
prove intent. Actions of a defendant may permit the inference that he
was involved in a scheme which he knew, or should have known, was
fraudulent.
20 7
Frequently, a relatively minor actor will take steps to remain igno-
rant of facts which he suspects will show his complicity in a fraudulent
scheme, with the hope that ignorance will excuse his conduct. For this
reason the federal courts have accepted deliberate ignorance, willful
blindness, or conscious avoidance as a substitute for positive or actual
knowledge. 20 8 The courts have long recognized that deliberate igno-
rance is equally as culpable as positive knowledge. 20 9 Therefore, one
who consciously avoids obtaining knowledge which a reasonable man
exercising due diligence would discover "has sufficient mens rea for an
offence based on such words as . . . 'knowingly'."
2 10
The federal circuit courts have adopted several different formula-
tions of the deliberate ignorance instruction. Unlike rules of law in
other statutory contexts, these different formulations are substantially
similar and reflect a high degree of concern for consistency among the
circuits.2 1 1 The courts agree that a proper jury instruction has three
205. Id. at 643-44.
206. See Note, A Survey of the Mail Fraud Act, 8 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 673, 677-78 (1978).
See also Note, White-Collar Crime: A Survey of Law-Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud, 18 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 197, 200 (1980). The government must also show that the mails were used to
further the fraudulent scheme. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); United
States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Azzarelli Constr. Co.,
612 F.2d 292, 298 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir.
1979). See also supra note 139 and accompanying text.
207. See Note, 8 MEM. ST. U.L. REV., supra note 76, at 678. See also Note, Survey of the
Law of Mail Fraud, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 237, 242.
208. The term for conduct showing deliberate ignorance varies among the federal cir-
cuits because of repeated attempts to clarify the concept. See infra note 211.
209. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw, 776 (2d
ed. 1969); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART, § 57 at 157 (2d ed. 1961). See
also Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1940) ("Ignorance of inculpatory fact is
no more a defense than ignorance of inculpatory law. There is evidence that each of the
appellants knew, or could have known by the exercise of reasonable diligence, that the
statements made to prospective purchasers concerning the value of the stocks of the re-
spective corporations were false.").
210. Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 MoD. L. REv. 294, 298 (1954)
(quoted inJewell, 532 F.2d at 700).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 642 (1st Cir.) (deliberately
closing eyes to the obvious; refusal to be enlighted and take notice; "willful blindness to
the existence of the fact"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); United States v. Aulet, 618
F.2d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 1980) (purposeful ignorance of evidence); United States v. Eaglin,
571 F.2d 1069, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1977) (suspicion aroused but defendant deliberately
failed to make further inquiries so as to remain in ignorance; closing eyes to facts which
should prompt investigation), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978); Griego v. United States,
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characteristics: 1) it must refer to purposeful avoidance of the knowl-
edge of a material fact or facts; 2) the defendant must have been aware
of a high probability that the fact exists; and 3) deliberate ignorance can
not be found if the defendant had an actual belief that the fact did not
exist.2 12 The Tenth Circuit, as Glick demonstrates, follows this con-
struction of the doctrine of deliberate ignorance. As stated in Glick,
however, failure to include the final two elements is not plain error
where the jury is properly instructed on conscious avoidance.
2 13
Use of a deliberate ignorance instruction is strictly limited by the
courts. The instruction may only be given when there is evidence that
points toward deliberate action with the purpose of remaining in the
dark.2 14 This restriction is necessary to ensure that a jury will not im-
pute specific intent based merely on negligence.
2 15
Certainly in Glick's case there seemed to be evidence which pointed
toward deliberate ignorance. By testifying that four appraisals substan-
tiated the stated value of Chisholm's mineral rights (as included in the
financial statements), Glick seemed to implicitly claim that he had an
actual belief that that value was legitimate.2 1 6 However, his own testi-
mony that he personally thought the value to be overstated 2 17 effectively
defeated that contention. Furthermore, despite Glick's belief and
knowledge of how Chisholm was using the financial statements, Glick
included the "unrealistic" value in the statements. 21 8 Apart from this
fact, the statements contained blatant and numerous violations of
proper accounting procedures.2 19 The Tenth Circuit was undoubtedly
correct in upholding the trial court's instruction. The evidence, taken as
a whole, pointed to deliberate ignorance. Glick purposefully attempted
to avoid culpability by closing his eyes to facts which a reasonable man
would discover after exercising due diligence. In short, Glick tried to




In United States v. Montoya,221 the defendant had contracted, through
his corporation, with the State of New Mexico to weatherize the homes
298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir. 1962) ("willfully and intentionally remaining ignorant of a
fact"; "conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment").
212. Autet, 618 F.2d at 191.
213. 710 F.2d at 643-44. See also Eaglin, 571 F.2d at 1074-75.
214. United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632,642-43 (1 st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); United States
v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1977).
215. Garzon, 688 F.2d at 609.
216. If a defendant has an actual belief that a fraudulent fact does not exist, knowledge
of that fact may not be imputed. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 704 n.2 1. See also supra note 202 and
accompanying text.
217. 710 F.2d at 642.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
221. 716 F.2d 1340 (10th Cir. 1983).
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of elderly, low income New Mexico citizens.2 22 The weatherization pro-
ject was funded by a lump sum grant from the United States Department
of Energy. 2 23 Montoya submitted claims to the Governor's Office of
Community Affairs, the administrator of the program, for work which he
had not done. 224 The United States then indicted Montoya on six
counts of submitting false claims to the federal government in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1976).225
Before trial, Montoya moved the district court to dismiss the case
for lack of federal jurisdiction, arguing that because his claims were
presented to a state agency receiving no apparent supervision from the
federal government his conduct did not violate federal law. The district
court denied the motion and convicted Montoya on all counts.
2 26
On appeal, Montoya again raised the claim that because he con-
tracted with and was paid by a state agency he could not have presented
false claims to the United States government. 2 27 The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the convictions and held that it is not necessary that a false claim
be presented directly to the United States or one of its agencies or de-
partments in order to be actionable under the criminal version of the
False Claims Act.
2 28
The court first established that claims presented to an intermediary
could be actionable under section 287 if the payment ultimately comes
from the United States. 22 9 The court reached this holding from an ex-
amination of the analysis in both United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess 2 30 and
United States v. Catena.2 3 ' Hess involved a violation of the precursor of 18
U.S.C. § 287 (section 5438 of the Revised Statutes 23 2 ) in which Hess
made false claims to a municipality with which he had contracted to do
public works projects funded largely by the United States Public Works
Administration. 23 3 The Supreme Court held that section 5438 did not
222. Id. at 1341.
223. The funds were granted pursuant to the Energy Conservation in Existing Build-
ings Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6851-73 (1982).
224. 716 F.2d at 1341.
225. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever makes or presents to . . . the United States, or to any department
or agency thereof, any claim upon or against the United States, or any depart-
ment or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
226. 716 F.2d at 1341. "Montoya was sentenced to five years on each count, the
sentences to run concurrently." Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1341-44. Judge Timbers of the Second Circuit sat by designation and wrote
the opinion of the court.
229. Id. at 1342-43.
230. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
231. 500 F.2d 1319 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974).
232. Section 5438 provided in pertinent part:
Every person who makes or causes to be made, or presents or causes to be presented,
for payment or approval to . . . the United States, any claim upon or against the
Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, knowing
such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent . . . [shall be punished].
Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (emphasis added).
233. 317 U.S. at 542-43.
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require that the false claim be presented directly to the federal govern-
ment as long as federal funds would ultimately be used to pay the
claims.
23 4
The Tenth Circuit then rejected the potentially troublesome argu-
ment that section 5438 should be distinguished from 18 U.S.C.
§ 287.235 The two statutes differ in that section 5438 contained lan-
guage that expressly prohibited a defendant from causing claims to be
presented to the United States government. The court relied on Catena,
where the Third Circuit rejected the distinction. 23 6 In Catena, the Third
Circuit held that the "causes" language of section 5438 was replaced by
18 U.S.C. § 2(b), which provides that "[w]hoever willfully causes an act
to be done, which if directly performed by him or another would be an
offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.''237
Therefore, by reading sections 287 and 2(b) together the Tenth Circuit
agreed with the Third Circuit that section 287 prohibits causing, directly
or indirectly, a false claim to be presented to the federal government.
23 8
Montoya also argued that federal involvement in a program should
have to be substantial, if not direct.23 9 Because the Department of En-
ergy exercised only minimal day to day control over the program after it
granted the funds to New Mexico, Montoya claimed that the state and
not the federal government truly controlled the money.240 The court
noted that the Department of Energy was the source of the funds,
promulgated regulations for the states to follow, was required to moni-
tor each program, and received audits from the state agencies. 24 1 The
court held that the source of the funds and the nature of the program
are critical rather than the timing of the federal payment. 24 2 The court
pointed out that the federal government would have more interest in
preventing false claims where funds are spent on a particular project
than in preventing claims where funds are spent "pursuant to a compre-
hensive federal program or project."-
2 43
As a final challenge, Montoya asserted that absent day-to-day fed-
eral control, a defendant must have knowledge of the federal involve-
ment. 24 4 The court held that this knowledge is irrelevant by analogizing
section 287 to cases interpreting the False Statements Act.2 4 5 Those
cases hold that knowledge of federal involvement is irrelevant and
234. Id. at 543-45.
235. 716 F.2d at 1342-43.
236. 500 F.2d at 1322-23.
237. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1982). The failure of the indictment to charge Montoya with
violation of § 2(b) was not fatal because the indictment provided sufficient notice of the
criminal violation charged. 716 F.2d at 1343 & n.1. See also Catena, 500 F.2d at 1323 & n.7;
United States v. Koptik, 300 F.2d 19, 22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 957 (1962).
238. 716 F.2d at 1343.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 6866-68 (1982)).
242. Id. at 1344.
243. Id. at 1344 n.2.
244. Id. at 1344.
245. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
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would give the False Statements Act a narrow and unintended construc-
tion.2 46 Knowledge of federal involvement is not required to form a
mens rea under section 1001 and should not be required under section
287.247
In Montoya, the Tenth Circuit held for the first time that a person
may be convicted under the federal False Claims Act even if he submits
his claims to a state or local intermediary. The focus is on the source of
the money and the nature of the program rather than whether the funds
flow directly from the United States Treasury to the accused. The new
test is sound in that it best serves section 287's purpose of protecting
federal funds from false, fraudulent or fictitious claims. 2 48 Accepting
Montoya's claims would divert the focus of a rule away from this pur-
pose. Just because the federal government has entrusted state and local
governments with the administration of many federal programs, it does
not follow that the federal government has any less interest in punishing
the fraudulent use of those funds.
24 9
A rule that would focus on the technical and day to day control of a
federally funded program would result in a quagmire of factual disputes
and judicial inconsistency. As the Supreme Court aptly stated in Hess,
"funds [given to the states in the form of grants in aid] are as much in
need of protection from fraudulent claims as any other federal money,
and the statute does not make the extent of their safeguard dependent
upon the bookkeeping devices used for their distribution. ' 250 While the
rule enunciated by the Tenth Circuit may broaden the power of the fed-
eral government to prosecute persons under 18 U.S.C. § 287, it should
serve to protect the integrity of federal funds and programs.
IV. EXTORTION-EXPANDING JURISDICTION UNDER
THE HOBBS ACT
2 5 1
In United States v. Boston,2 52 a case of first impression in the Tenth
Circuit, 2 53 the Tenth Circuit assessed the degree of impact a robbery or
extortion scheme must have on interstate commerce to sustain federal
246. 716 F.2d at 1344 (citing United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979)).
247. 716 F.2d at 1345. The mens rea derives from the intent to present a fraudulent
claim. Id. See also 716 F.2d at 1345 n.3 suggesting that Montoya had at least constructive
knowledge of the federal involvement.
248. Note, False Claims, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371 (1981).
249. See Hess, 317 U.S. at 544 ("Government money is as truly expended whether by
checks drawn directly on the Treasury to the ultimate recipient or by grants in aid to
states.").
250. Id. (citation omitted).
251. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982). The Hobbs Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation
of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both.
252. 718 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2352 (1984).
253. Id. at 1516.
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jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act.2 54  Defendant Boston was an
Oklahoma County Commissioner charged with taking "kickbacks" from
sellers of equipment and supplies. 25 5 The Tenth Circuit sustained his
conviction under a "depletion of assets" theory, holding that the kick-
backs depleted both the sellers' assets and the county's assets, and that
the depletion of assets affected interstate commerce because the sellers
and the county both were engaged in interstate commerce. 2 56 The
court sustained the conviction even though the indictment did not spe-




The Hobbs Act prohibits interfering with interstate commerce by
way of extortion or robbery. Originally, the Hobbs Act was enacted to
combat labor-related racketeering. 2 58 In United States v. Culbert,259 how-
ever, the Supreme Court held that all criminal conduct, racketeering or
otherwise, within the reach of the statutory language is criminal under
the Act.2 60 In recent years the Hobbs Act has become the primary fed-
eral tool for fighting local political corruption.
Extortion is "the obtaining of property from another, with his con-
sent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right."'2 6 1 The courts have read this pro-
vision disjunctively so that extortion "under color of official right" need
not be by force, violence, or fear. 2 6 2 Furthermore, a public official need
not induce an extortionate payment, as long as "the motivation for the
payment focuses on the recipient's office."' 26 3 As long as the public offi-
cial wrongfully takes money not due him or his office he is guilty of ex-
tortion within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.
26 4
254. Id. at 1516-17. The federal government obtains jurisdiction through the com-
merce clause: "The Congress shall have Power to ... regulate commerce. . . among the
several States." U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8.
255. 718 F.2d at 1513.
256. Id. at 1516.
257. Id. at 1514-16.
258. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforce-
ment Polio,, 65 GEo. L.J. 1171, 1174-75 (1977).
259. 435 U.S. 371 (1978).
260. Id. at 380. See also Ewing, Combating Official Corruption by All Available Means, 10
MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 423, 446-47 (1980).
261. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1982).
262. United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914
(1972). See also United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 424 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1043 (1980); United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 372 (8th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 321 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v.
Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.), cert. denied; 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
263. United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1195 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 965 (1981); see United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 417-19 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 927 (1980). Originally the courts required a showing that the public official had
threatened the subject of the extortion by coercion or duress. See, e.g., United States v.
Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972).
264. Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1229.
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The second element of the offense, interference with interstate
commerce, gives the federal government jurisdiction over the extortion-
ate act. While the legislative history of the Hobbs Act seems to have
contemplated a direct and substantial effect on interstate commerce,
26 5
courts have interpreted the Act as requiring only a minimal effect.
26 6
Several circuits have held that any de minimis effect is sufficient to sustain
federal jurisdiction.2 6 7 Furthermore, the effect need only be probable
or potential; it does not have to be direct or clearly demonstrated.
26 8
Frequently, the government will attempt to show the requisite interfer-
ence by proof that the victim's assets were depleted as a result of the
extortion, thus reducing the purchasing power of the victim to further
obtain goods which have moved in interstate commerce. It is this "de-
pletion of assets" theory which was at issue in Boston.
B. United States v. Boston
The defendant, William Boston, was County Commissioner of Ma-
jor County, Oklahoma. In his role as County Commissioner, Boston
was obligated to purchase equipment and supplies for maintaining the
county's infrastructure. Boston was charged with accepting and solicit-
ing kickbacks from suppliers in return for purchasing equipment and
materials from those suppliers. The indictment charged seven counts of
extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951,269 and fifty
counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341270 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2.271
At trial, seven suppliers testified that Boston had accepted, and in
some cases solicited, kickbacks. The kickbacks were paid in cash at pri-
vate meetings which occurred after Boston had mailed County checks to
the suppliers in payment for the materials purchased. Boston offered
the testimony of several suppliers who stated that Boston had never
asked for or received kickbacks from them. He also took the stand and
265. See Note, Prosecution Under the Hobbs Act and the Expansion of Federal Criminal Jurisdic-
tion, 66J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 306, 307-11 (1975).
266. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960). See also Note, Extortion, 19
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 396, 402-03 (1981).
267. United States v. Richardson, 596 F.2d 157, 160 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Phillips, 577 F.2d 495, 501 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978); United States
v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 642-43 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975); see United
States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 373 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d
386, 396-97 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d
53, 59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975).
268. United States v. Rindone, 631 F.2d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1980) ("realistic
probability" that interstate commerce would have been affected if threat to victim's busi-
ness had been carried out); United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 831 (1978); United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 301-02 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978); United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 59-60 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975). The Boston trial judge instructed the jury that the government
was required to prove that Boston "actually or potentially obstructed, delayed, or affected
interstate commerce or attempted to do so." 718 F.2d at 1516 (citing Record at 264).
269. See supra note 251; 718 F.2d at 1513.
270. The statute prohibits using the Postal Service in counterfeiting or fraudulent
schemes. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
271. Section 2 prohibits offenses against the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
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testified that he had never accepted any kickbacks. Nevertheless, the
jury convicted Boston on all counts of violating the Hobbs Act and on
forty-seven of the fifty counts of mail fraud. 2 72
On appeal, Boston argued that the jury should not have been in-
structed on the "depletion of assets" theory and that the evidence
presented at trial did not establish that his actions had a sufficient effect
on interstate commerce as required by the Hobbs Act. 2 73 The Tenth
Circuit, Judge Holloway writing, affirmed the convictions, holding that
evidence of the depletion of the assets of a company involved in inter-
state commerce is sufficient to establish an interference with interstate
commerce. 2 74 The court also held that an indictment charging a viola-
tion of the Hobbs Act need not allege the exact nature of the effect on
interstate commerce so long as the indictment notifies the defendant of
the acts for which he is charged.
27 5
Boston first argued that the jury instruction given at trial on the
depletion of assets theory amounted to a broadening of the charges
against him in violation of his fifth amendment right to have a conviction
based solely on the charges included in the indictment. 2 76 In effect,
Boston argued that the indictment charged one type of interference,
while the depletion of assets constitutes another type. Boston relied on
the case of Stirone v. United States,2 77 in which the Supreme Court re-
versed a conviction under the Hobbs Act because the jury was instructed
that it could convict Stirone if it found the specific effect on interstate
commerce charged in the indictment, or if it found another specific ef-
fect which the government had introduced at trial.
2 78
The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument citing language from
Stirone. In Stirone, the Supreme Court stated that a conviction could rest
on any sufficient effect on interstate commerce shown at trial if the in-
dictment charges the effect in general terms. 2 79 The indictment in Bos-
ton charged that Boston had knowingly and willfully attempted "to
obstruct, delay or effect (sic) commerce and the movement of articles
and commodities in commerce, as the term is defined in [the Hobbs Act]
by extortion." 28 0 Because this charge was general in nature, the deple-
tion of assets theory fell within its bounds. 2 8 1
Boston also challenged the depletion of assets theory on the basis
272. 718 F.2d at 1513-14.
273. Id. at 1514, 1516.
274. Id. at 1516. The court also rejected Boston's challenge of the trial court's voir
dire examination and his argument that the use of the mails was not sufficient to bring the
scheme within the federal mail fraud statute. Id. at 1517-18. The court reversed his con-
viction on two of the mail fraud courts for insufficient evidence and because, in one case,
the mails were not used.
275. Id. at 1515-16.
276. Id. at 1514-15. Such a variance would have mandated reversal of the Hobbs Act
convictions. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217-18 (1960).
277. 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
278. Id. at 218-19.
279. Id. at 218.
280. 718 F.2d at 1515-16 (quoting Record at 1-2).
281. 718 F.2d at 1516.
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that such an interference is not a sufficiently substantial interference
with interstate commerce. 28 2 Because the Tenth Circuit had not previ-
ously decided how much interference is required, it looked to the deci-
sions of several other circuits concerning the issue. The court adopted
the decisions of several circuits which hold that any de minimis effect on
interstate commerce is sufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction under the
Hobbs Act.2 83 The specific language of the Act prohibits interference
"in any way or degree."'2 84 The court then followed the other circuits by
holding that evidence of depletion of assets can show a large enough
effect to meet this "de minimis" standard.
2 85
By adopting the depletion of assets test, the Tenth Circuit has given
federal prosecutors within the circuit a powerful tool to bring more
crimes into federal jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act. But this test may
not be applied to every entity which may deal in interstate commerce.
The extortionate act must deplete the assets of a business and not an
individual. 286 As stated in United States v. Boulahanis,2 8 7 the justification
for this distinction is that "extortion is likely to have a greater effect on
interstate commerce when directed at businesses than at
individuals.,"288
The required nexus between the extortionate act and the effect on
interstate commerce has become increasingly tenuous. Because inter-
ference with interstate commerce need only be a "potential" result of
the depletion of assets, the required effect upon interstate commerce is
in danger of becoming "assumed by the courts for jurisdictional pur-
poses." 2 89 In order to resist this trend, the Tenth Circuit should apply
the depletion of assets test only where the business whose assets are
depleted is engaged in customary or ongoing dealings in interstate com-
merce.2 90 Such a limitation would give substance to the interference re-
quirement. If limits are not placed on the interference requirement the
scope of the Hobbs Act will continue to expand to the point where any
extortion or robbery would fall within its purview. Such a situation
would amount to an undesirable usurpation of jurisdiction from state




283. Id. (citing United States v. Glynn, 627 F.2d 39, 41 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Harding, 563 F.2d 299. 301-02 (6th Cir. 1977). cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978)).
284. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982).
285. 718 F.2d at 516 (citing United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 589-90 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982); United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1173 n.20
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916, 985; 452 U.S. 905 (1981); United States v.
French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1075-78 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); United States
v. Daley, 564 F.2d 645, 649-50 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978)).
286. United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (7th Cir. 1982).
287. 677 F.2d 586 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982).
288. Id. at 590.
289. Note, Prosecution Under the Hobbs Act, supra note 265, at 314.
290. See United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 590; United States v. Elders, 569 F.2d
1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Merolla, 523 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1975).





During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
sidered cases involving a wide variety of criminal procedure issues.
There were, however, no extraordinary or breakthrough decisions.
Overall, the Tenth Circuit opinions displayed a well-balanced approach
to upholding the constitutional rights of the defendant, while meeting
the legitimate concerns of the government and the public. The Tenth
Circuit was more protective of fourth amendment rights than was the
United States Supreme Court in its decision regarding the government's
use of electronic tracking devices. In its decisions in other areas, in par-
ticular involving the fifth and sixth amendments, the court effectively
used precedent to further develop the law. This article will discuss some
of the more important and timely decisions of the Tenth Circuit during
the survey period, with special emphasis on the court's decisions involv-
ing the right to counsel, security sweep searches, consensual police




In United States v. Karo,i the Supreme Court reversed a Tenth Cir-
cuit decision 2 suppressing evidence obtained with an electronic tracking
beacon (beeper).
3
In September 1980, the government obtained an order authorizing
a beeper to be placed in a can of ether defendants Karo, Horton, and
Harley had ordered through a government informant. The government
used the beeper and other types of surveillance to follow the ether can's
travels for five months. 4 Agents used both visual and beeper surveil-
lance to trace the ether to Karo's home in Albuquerque, New Mexico
and then used the beeper to verify that the ether remained in Karo's
home.5 Later that day, the beeper alone was used to locate the ether in
defendant Horton's home. Two days later, the beeper alone was again
used to locate the ether can in Horton's father's home. The next day.
agents used the beeper to locate the ether in a commercial self-storage
facility where it stayed for approximately three weeks. After the man-
ager of the storage facility informed the agents the ether can had been
I. 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
2. United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3296
(1984).
3. Id. at 1440.
4. Id. at 1435.
5. Id. at 1437.
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removed, the beeper located the ether can at another self-storage
facility.
6
Over three months later, using a closed circuit video camera, the
agents watched defendant Rhodes take the ether from the locker and
then used visual and beeper surveillance to follow the ether to Rhodes'
home where it remained in a truck parked in the driveway. Later that
day, agents followed the truck to a residence in Taos, New Mexico. The
beeper was used to monitor the ether while it was in the Taos residence.
The agents obtained a search warrant for the residence and then seized
cocaine and laboratory equipment.7 Because the order authorizing the
beeper had been obtained with affidavits containing deliberate misrepre-
sentations, the district court declared the order invalid and granted the
defendants' motion to suppress the evidence.8
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the government did not challenge the district court's
finding that the order authorizing the beeper was invalid. Instead, it
argued the order was unnecessary because the beeper constituted a min-
imal intrusion and because the government informant had given permis-
sion to have the beeper installed in the can. 9
The Tenth Circuit struck down each of the government's argu-
ments. First, the court found the government informant's permission to
place the beeper in the can was irrelevant because all individuals have a
legitimate expectation that objects coming into their rightful possession
do not have electronic devices attached to them. 10 The court found
electronic devices to be particularly intrusive because they give law en-
forcement officials the opportunity to monitor the location of the objects
at all times and in all places, including private residences and other areas
where a person has an unquestioned right to be free of governmental
intrusions.'" Based on this reasoning, the court found that the fourth
amendment violation occurred when the ether can with an attached
beeper came into the defendants' possession without a valid warrant.
12
The Tenth Circuit also determined that legitimate expectations of
privacy are violated when a beeper is used to trace the movement of an
object while in private residences or similarly protected places without
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1435.
9. Id. at 1436, 1438. The government also argued the order was unnecessary be-
cause the defendants had no expectation of privacy in the can because ether is contraband.
The Tenth Circuit found, though, that the defendants had a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in the can of ether because ether is not contraband; at most, it is a substance rightfully
possessed but suspected of use in criminal activity. Id. at 1436. Accord, United States v.
Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st
Cir. 1977).
10. Karo, 710 F.2d at 1438.
1i. Id. The court also noted that, because items of personal property rarely travel on
their own, a beeper, out of necessity, traces the movements of a person who possesses an
object with a beeper. Id.
12. Id. at 1439.
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first obtaining a warrant. 13 Because the beeper in Karo had been in-
stalled with an invalid court order' 4 and had been used to monitor a can
of ether while in private residences and storage lockers, areas in which a
person holds legitimate expectations of privacy,15 the Tenth Circuit up-
held the district court's suppression order.' 6
3. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's suppression of ev-
idence in Karo. 17 Although the majority, per Justice White, found that
the government is not free to monitor a beeper in private residences
without a warrant,' 8 the Court determined that there were sufficient as-
sertions in the search warrant affidavit that would have allowed the
agents to secure the warrant without relying on information unlawfully
obtained with the beeper.1 9 The Court determined that the evidence
seized in the Taos residence was not tainted by any unconstitutional sur-
veillance by breaking the five-month surveillance into separate parts.
The Court first impliedly determined that any evidence obtained
through use of the beeper prior to the ether can's arrival in the second
storage facility was unnecessary to establish probable cause for the issu-
ance of the search warrant. The Court then determined that, because
the beeper alone was used to trace the ether to the second storage facil-
ity, the discovery was untainted by any possible prior illegal monitoring
of the beeper. Next, the Court found that locating the ether at the sec-
ond storage facility was not an illegal search because the beeper did not
identify the specific locker in which the ether was located and did not
reveal anything about the contents of the locker which defendants Hor-
ton and Harley had rented. The Court then found that the surveillance
of the ether after it was removed from the second storage facility was
constitutional under United States v. Knotts20 because the ether was fol-
13. Id. The court distinguished Karo from United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276
(1983), in which the Supreme Court held that the monitoring of a beeper did not violate
the defendants' expectations of privacy because the chloroform container, to which the
beeper was attached, was followed only on public roads. Once the chloroform reached a
private residence, the beeper was not used. Id. at 284-85. The Tenth Circuit found other
differences between Karo and Knolts which dictated a different outcome. These differences
include the following:
The Knotts case involved surveillance over only a few days; monitoring in the in-
stant case took place over five months. . . . In Knotts the officers lost track of the
automobile carrying the drum once on the public highway; here the officers lost
track of the ether can for significant periods of time, after the ether had come to
rest in residences and a rented locker. In the instant case, most of the tracing to
new locations was possible only by use of the direction finder to locate the
beeper.
Karo, 710 F.2d at 1439.
14. Karo, 710 F.2d at 1435.
15. Id. at 1439.
16. Id. at 1440.
17. 104 S. Ct. at 3307.
18. Id. at 3304.
19. Id. at 3306.
20. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
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lowed while it travelled on public highways. 2 '
The Supreme Court also rejected the Tenth Circuit's determination
that the transfer by the government of an object containing a beeper
infringes on the transferee's privacy interests. 22 The Court stated that
the transfer of the can with an "unmonitored beeper" created only a
potential for an invasion of privacy. As a result, the Court held that any
invasion of privacy occurred only through the monitoring of the
beeper.23
The Supreme Court's decision in Karo substantially expands the
government's authority to use beepers without a warrant. In effect, the
government is free, based on any circumstances, to install a beeper in an
object it knows will be transferred to a third party and to monitor that
beeper everywhere it goes as long as it is not monitored while actually
inside one's own private residence or similarly protected area. The
Supreme Court's holding that only the monitoring of an unwarranted
beeper while inside one's own private residence is a fourth amendment
violation 24 does not adequately protect against this invasive form of
governmental conduct. 2 5 As one Sixth Circuit judge observed, "ordina-
rily we can protect our privacy by insuring that we are not being fol-
lowed, and that others do not know where we are going. The beeper
21. 104 S. Ct. at 3306.
22. Id. at 3302.
23. Id. Justice O'Connor, withJustice Rehnquist, concurred in part and concurred in
the judgment. Justice O'Connor felt that the privacy interests involved in the use of a
beeper to track the movements of a container are "unusually narrow." Id. at 3307
(O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor then concluded that a person's right not to have a
container tracked by a beeper exists only when the beeper is monitored when visual track-
ing of the container is not possible and the person has an interest in the container sufficient
to empower him or her to give effective consent to a search of the container. Id. at 3310.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred in part and dis-
sented in part. Stevens agreed with the majority's conclusion that beeper surveillance of
property concealed from public view is a search, id. at 3310 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), but would have gone one step further than the majority. Stevens
would have found that the attachment of the beeper to the container of ether constituted a
seizure, id. at 3310-11, because a private citizen has the right to assume his or her posses-
sions "are not infected with concealed electronic devices." Id. at 3314.
24. Prior to Karo, at least two other circuits had held that beeper surveillance of per-
sonal property in private areas constituted a search and seizure within the fourth amend-
ment. United States v. Cassity, 720 F.2d 451, 455-56 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 113-14
(1st Cir. 1977). The Ninth Circuit and, surprisingly, the Tenth Circuit had held that
beeper surveillance constituted only a slight intrusion into legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy. United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Clayborne, Jr., 584 F.2d 346, 351 (10th Cir. 1978).
25. Prior to Karo, at least one other circuit recognized that the transfer of an object
containing a beeper violated the fourth amendment. In United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d
938 (6th Cir. 1980), the court held that governmental consent to a warrantless beeper
installation lasts only as long as the government has possession of the object containing
the beeper. At the point of transfer, any governmental consent would become ineffectual.
Id. at 944.
At least two circuits, though, stated that no fourth amendment violation occurred if
the beeper was installed while the object was in the government's possession. United
States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1319 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982) (dicta); United States v. Knotts,
662 F.2d 515, 517 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
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destroys our ability to protect the privacy of our movement." '2 6 The
Karo decision condones the erosion of what was once a legitimate pri-
vacy expectation. If indeed one accepts the proposition that an elec-
tronic beeper attached to one's personal property constitutes a
substantial invasion of privacy, then the Karo decision fails to uphold the
fourth amendment purpose of requiring a warrant to issue upon prob-
able cause prior to such an invasion.
B. Security Sweep Searches
Both United States v. Riccio2 7 and United States v. Tabor 28 involved the
"protective search, emergency situation" exception to the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement. In both cases, the Tenth Circuit
found that emergency situations existed and, therefore, warrants were
unnecessary.
29
1. United States v. Riccio
OnJune 11, 1982 the Durango Police received notice that the Burns
National Bank had been robbed by a lone gunman wearing a ski mask.
After collecting the money in a brown bag, the robber forced a passing
motorist to take him to the outskirts of town where he disappeared into
the hills on foot.3 0 Later, the teller told police she thought she recog-
nized the robber's voice as belonging to "Steve," a man who worked for
the Federal Lumber Company.
3 '
When the police contacted Federal Lumber, an employee told them
Steve Riccio had recently been fired. The employee then gave the police
Riccio's address and a physical description. The police went to Riccio's
trailer house, but Riccio was not there. The police showed a bank sur-
veillance photo to one of Riccio's roommates who stated that the man in
the picture looked like Riccio. The roommates left after agreeing not to
return without permission, and the trailer was placed under
surveillance.
32
About 10:30 p.m. that evening, Riccio entered the trailer. Over a
loudspeaker, the police told Riccio the trailer was surrounded and or-
dered him to surrender. Riccio responded with gunfire. Eventually,
Riccio tried to escape from the trailer but was shot in the attempt.
33
After Riccio was shot, some officers administered first aid while
others conducted a sweep or security search. An officer saw a large
amount of money on a bed, part of which was wrapped in Burns Na-
tional Bank bands, but did not seize it at that time. A search warrant was
26. United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 949 (6th Cir. 1980) (Keith, J., concurring).
27. 726 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1984).
28. 722 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1983).
29. Id. at 598; Riccio, 726 F.2d at 642.
30. Riccio, 726 F.2d at 639.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 639-40.
33. Id. at 640.
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later obtained, and the money was then seized, along with other items. 34
On appeal from his conviction for armed robbery, Riccio claimed
the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant invalidated the search
warrant because it contained knowingly-made false statements. 3 5 One
of the statements under attack in the affidavit 36 claimed the security
search was made to locate anyone else who may have been in the trailer.
Riccio challenged this statement, arguing that the officers knew no one
else was in the trailer because it had been under surveillance.3 7 The
court found that because the surveillance covered only the front of the
trailer, it would have been possible for someone to enter the trailer
through the rear windows without being seen. Additionally, because the
officers were shot at from the trailer at different times and from different
areas, the officers had not been unreasonable in suspecting that some-
one else was in the trailer.38 The court held that sufficient exigent cir-
cumstances existed to support a "security search" of the trailer.
39
2. United States v. Tabor
In United States v. Tabor,40 the Tenth Circuit also upheld a "security
search." Tabor was suspected of running an illegal book-making opera-
tion, and a search warrant was obtained covering Tabor's home and list-
ing certain gambling "necessities. ' 4 1 Federal agents executed the
search warrant and patted down Tabor, who told the agents he had no
weapons other than the pocketknife found on him and that no one else
was in the house. But upon searching Tabor's home the agents discov-
ered four guns. 4 2 The agents then began a security search of the area
and buildings surrounding the house, during the course of which they
heard a noise coming from the barn. One of the agents checked the loft
of the barn, claimed to see a cat, and subsequently discovered 150
pounds of marijuana, which was seized at that time.4 3 Tabor was later
convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
34. Id.
35. Id. at 640-41.
36. Riccio also argued that a statement in the affidavit, indicating that both Riccio's
roommates thought the picture taken by the bank camera could be of Riccio, was false and,
thus, tainted the affidavit. The court determined that although the statement was inaccu-
rate, in that one of the roommates had said he could not identify the picture as being one
of Riccio, it did not invalidate the warrant. According to the Tenth Circuit, there were
enough accurate statements in the affidavit to support the warrant. Id. at 64 1.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 642. The court focused on United States v. Astorga-Torres, 682 F.2d 1331
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982), because of its similarity to this case. InAstorga-
Torres, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[wlhile the presence of anyone else in the cabin was
most unlikely (citation omitted), officers who have been subjected to pistol fire from the
front door and bathroom window can hardly be said to be acting unreasonably when they
take steps to make sure of their safety." Id. at 1334-35.
39. Riccio, 726 F.2d at 642.
40. 722 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1983).
41. Id. at 597.
42. Id.
43. Id. Meanwhile, the search pursuant to the warrant was taking place at the house.






On appeal, Tabor objected to the exploratory nature of the search
beyond the described residence and the continuation of the search after
the designated items had been found. 4 5 The court agreed with the dis-
trict court's findings that Tabor's barn, which was not included in the
search warrant, was sufficiently close to the house to come within the
curtilage and receive fourth amendment protection. However, the court
stated that a security search may be justified by fear that an officer's life
or the lives of those around him might be in danger.46 Adding that a
suspicion of danger must be clear and reasonable in light of all the sur-
rounding circumstances, 4 7 the court found that the exigent circum-
stances present in this case justified a cursory search of Tabor's
property. 4 8 A broader search was then justified by the noise the agents
heard in the barn and their suspicion that another, possibly armed, per-
son might be on the premises. Once the agent was legally inside the
barn, the plain view doctrine legitimated the seizure of the marijuana.
4 9
C. Terry Stop vs. Arrest
United States v. Cooper5 0 involved the Tenth Circuit's application of
Terry v. Ohio.5 1 In Cooper, the court was forced to determine whether the
stopping of defendants' car and subsequent events constituted an inves-
tigatory stop or an arrest.
5 2
The dispute in Cooper revolved around pinpointing the exact time
the defendants Cooper and Threat were arrested. On October 14,
1982, Cooper bought some children's clothing with a $100 bill at aJ.C.
Penney's in Kansas City, Kansas. When Cooper came out of the store,
Threat met her. They then got into a pink and white Cadillac which
secret service agents had under surveillance because it had been con-
nected with prior incidents of passing counterfeit money. The agents
followed the Cadillac through the parking lot, but when the car acceler-
ated to an excessive speed, the agents used the flashing red lights and
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1980)).
47. Tabor, 722 F.2d at 598. The court stressed this point by stating: "Officers of the
law are not given free reign to conduct sweep searches on the pretense that a dangerous
situation might be imminent." Id.
48. id. These circumstances included:
(1) The confidential informant had allegedly provided information which led the
agents to believe appellant was frequently in possession of a .357 Magnum re-
volver. A box of .357 Magnum ammunition was found on the premises lending
support to this allegation, but no weapon of that type was found; (2) vehicles were
present in the area which were not identified as belonging to appellant; (3) appel-
lant's dog was behaving in an agitated manner; and (4) appellant had lied about
the existence of other weapons on the premises and had at the same time told the
agents that no other persons were on the premises.
Id.
49. Id.
50. 733 F.2d 1360 (10th Cir. 1984).
51. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
52. Cooper, 733 F.2d at 1363.
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sirens on their car to stop the Cadillac. At this time, the agents did not
have probable cause to stop the defendants.
53
Cooper and Threat claimed they were told they were under arrest
when the agents reached their car. 54 The government maintained that
Cooper voluntarily got out of the Cadillac and accompanied the agents
to J.C. Penney's, where a counterfeit bill was located and Cooper was
identified by the clerk as the one who had passed it.5 5 The government
contended both defendants were arrested at this time. While Cooper
went back to the store with the agents, Threat stayed in the Cadillac.
Once again the government maintained this was voluntary, while Threat
claimed he remained because he was under arrest. The trial court found
the stop was a justified investigatory stop and that the defendants volun-
tarily cooperated with the agents.
56
The Tenth Circuit recognized that it is difficult to determine the
difference between a Terry stop and an arrest. 5 7 In making its determi-
nation, the court distinguished a case relied on by the defendants, United
States v. Hill.58 In Hill the Fifth Circuit determined that although the
defendant, Hill, was not formally arrested, he had in fact been arrested.
When stopped by a federal agent at an airport, Hill had agreed to speak
with the agent but refused to be searched without a warrant. The agent
then asked Hill to accompany him to an office a short distance away.
Hill -silently began walking toward the office but then began running
down the hall. The Fifth Circuit determined that the agent's request
that Hill accompany him to the office constituted an arrest. Because the
arrest was not supported by probable cause and because Hill had not
consented to go to the office, the arrest violated the fourth amend-
ment.5 9 Because the district court had specifically found that there was
a legitimate Terry stop after which Cooper and Threat consented to co-
operate with the officers, 60 the Tenth Circuit found Hill to be
unpersuasive.
6 '
53. Id. Although not expressly stated in the facts, it was implied that, at the time
Cooper and Threat were stopped, the agents did not know the defendants had used a
counterfeit bill to acquire clothing at the store. The court, however, did find that the fact
that the Cadillac had been connected with other transactions involving counterfeit money
and Threat was enough to create at least a high degree of suspicion. Id. at 1365.
54. Id. Cooper and Threat also claimed that the manner of the stop and the subse-
quent show of authority amounted to an arrest. Id.
55. Id. at 1363.
56. Id.
57. Id. The court first discussed the three types of police/citizen encounters: volun-
tary encounters; Terry stops, which must be based on reasonable suspicion; and arrests.
58. 626 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1980).
59. Id. at 431-37.
60. Cooper, 733 F.2d at 1364.
61. Judge McKay wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the majority's
finding that the stop in Cooper was a reasonable Terry stop. He found there was an abun-
dance of evidence to support an articulable suspicion even though a substantial show of




In United States v. Johnson,62 the Tenth Circuit confirmed the propri-
ety of an inventory search of an automobile pursuant to an arrest.
At 2:30 a.m. the Tulsa Police Department received a call reporting
that a man with a gun was sitting in a yellow Cadillac in Brandy's Club
Lounge parking lot. When the police arrived, they found Johnson,
highly intoxicated in his Cadillac with a .357 caliber Magnum revolver
on the passenger seat. 63 Johnson was arrested, handcuffed, searched,
and placed on the ground where he later passed out. The police then
conducted an inventory search of the Cadillac and had the car towed.
During the course of their search, the police found 26.63 grams of co-
caine, a box of .45 caliber ammunition, and various drug parapherna-
lia. 6 4 Johnson was later found guilty in federal court of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute.
6 5
On appealJohnson claimed, among other things, that the inventory
search of his car was unconstitutional. The Tenth Circuit found that it
was a search pursuant to arrest and, therefore, the search of the passen-
ger compartment of the Cadillac was constitutional6 6 under New York v.
Belton6 7 and United States v. Martin.
68
Martin, which had facts similar toJohnson, upheld the constitutional-
ity of an inventory search of an automobile. As in Johnson, the police had
the car towed because the owner was noticeably drunk and unable to
drive. Prior to towing the car, the police conducted an inventory
search. 6 9 The Martin court found that the inventory search was a rou-
tine procedure for securing an automobile's contents 70 and that the
search and towing were proper under South Dakota v. Opperman.
7 1
The Tenth Circuit foundJohnson to be indistinguishable from Mar-
tin. The court went so far as to state that the police had a responsibility
to tow and search Johnson's car as part of their "community caretaking
functions." 72 In fact, the court found further justification for the search
in Johnson because a revolver was found on the front seat of the Cadillac.
The court felt the presence of the revolver and the unmatching bullets
62. 734 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1984).
63. Id. at 504.
64. The cocaine was found in Johnson's pocket. The .45 caliber ammunition was
found in the passenger compartment of the Cadillac and the drug paraphernalia, including
scales, a sifter, a cocaine analysis kit, and a plastic bag of white powder, was found in two
brown cases in the trunk. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). In Belton, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
a search of the passenger compartment of an automobile pursuant to the arrest of the
automobile's passengers as part of the "within the arrestees' control" exception to the
warrant requirement, even though the arrestees were not in the car, were handcuffed and
were placed on opposite sides of the highway.
68. 566 F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 1977).
69. Id. at 1144.
70. Id. at 1145.
71. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
72. 734 F.2d at 505 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1976)).
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in the passenger compartment justified the suspicion that another
weapon or matching bullets would be found elsewhere in the car.
7 3
II. FiFrH AMENDMENT
A. Right Against Self-Incrimination in a Multiple-Defendant Trial
United States v. McClure7 4 involved two important issues for the
Tenth Circuit. The first issue involved the determination of the right to
separate trials when co-defendants have antagonistic defenses. The sec-
ond issue involved the question of whether defense counsel has a duty
to comment on a co-defendant's failure to testify, which would in turn
require separate trials based on the co-defendant's fifth amendment
rights.
McClure and Tafoya were charged with drug trafficking. 75 At trial,
McClure elected to testify, while Tafoya asserted his fifth amendment
right not to testify. 7 6 In closing arguments, McClure's attorney stated
that McClure's willingness to testify showed he had nothing to hide.
Tafoya's counsel objected, claiming the remarks indirectly implicated
Tafoya for his failure to testify. 7 7 Both defendants were convicted of
distribution of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute.
78
On appeal, the defendants argued that the district court should
have used its discretionary power under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure to order separate trials, based on the actual and in-
herent prejudice which would result from a joint trial. 79 First, the de-
fendants argued that their defenses were directly antagonistic and
mutually exclusive. 80 Second, they argued that the joint trial resulted in
a confrontation between Tafoya's fifth amendment right to remain silent
and McClure's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses.
8 1
The Tenth Circuit stated that in order to establish that a trial court
abused its discretion in denying a defendant's request for severance, the
defendant must prove his or her joint trial resulted in actual prejudice.
82
Additionally, in order to receive a new trial based on antagonistic de-
fenses, the court determined that the co-defendants must have irrecon-
cilable defenses. The existence of mere conflicting defenses is not
sufficient to show prejudice. 83 From United States v. Crawford84 and
United States v. Johnson,8 5 the Tenth Circuit implicitly adopted the stan-
73. 734 F.2d at 505 (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 443 (1973)).
74. 734 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1984).
75. Id. at 486-87.
76. Id. at 489.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 486.
79. Id. at 487.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 489.
82. Id. at 487 (citing United Stiucs v. Long, 705 F.2d 1259, 1263 (10th Cir. 1983)).
83. McClure, 734 F.2d at 488.
84. 581 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1978).
85. 478 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1973).
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dard that irreconcilable defenses can be established if each co-defendant
was "the government's best witness against the other.''86 The court
then found that little actual prejudice resulted from the trial, implying
that there was no generalized antagonism between the defendants and
that neither defendant was the government's best witness against the
other.
87
The defendants based their second argument on dictum from De
Luna v. United States 88 which stated that a defendant's right to confront
witnesses allows and sometimes requires his or her attorney to draw all
rational inferences from a co-defendant's failure to testify.8 9 Under
these circumstances, separate trials would be required if one defendant
invoked his or her fifth amendment privilege while the other elected to
testify.
9 0
The court rejected the De Luna dictum, stating that under no cir-
cumstances is a defendant's attorney obligated to comment on a co-de-
fendant's failure to testify. 9 ' The court emphasized that the fifth
amendment is properly no part of the evidence submitted to the jury
and no inferences can be drawn from the invocation of the privilege be-
cause it is without probative value on the issue of a defendant's guilt or
innocence.9 2 The court also stated that its holding does not impair a
defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses.9 3 If a defend-
ant wants to blame a non-testifying co-defendant, he or she can always
testify against the co-defendant.9 4 Thus, the defendants in McClure were
not entitled to separate trials based on conflicting fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights. The court also added that Tafoya's fifth amendment rights
were not violated during McClure's closing argument because Mc-
Clure's attorney made no direct reference to Tafoya.
95
The De Luna dictum has not been well received by other circuits. At
least one other circuit has rejected it 9 6 and numerous other circuits, in-
86. McClure, 734 F.2d at 488 (quoting Crawford, 581 F.2d at 492 and johnson, 478 F.2d
at 1133).
87. McClure, 734 F.2d at 492.
88. 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962).
89. Id. at 143.
90. McClure, 734 F.2d at 490.




95. Id. Accord United States v. Petullo, 709 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir. 1983) (statement
by counsel asking the jury only to draw favorable inferences from his client's willingness to
testify is not per se prejudicial to a co-defendant who does not testify).
96. United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1967). In dictum, the Sixth
Circuit rejected De Luna and stated that any comment by a defendant's attorney on a co-
defendant's failure to testify at trial would not be permissible. Id. at 265.
The De Luna dictum was also rejected in United States v. Marquez, 319 F. Supp. 1016,
1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 449 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1971). In Marquez, the district court
rejected a defendant's contention that his co-defendants' refusal to testify was evidence of
his innocence. The court also said any comment by the defendant on his co-defendants'
failure to testify would constitute a fifth amendment violation. Id. at 1018-19.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and loumd it
unnecessary to decide the De Luna question because the defendant had failed to show
1984]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
cluding the Fifth Circuit, 97 have substantially restricted its scope. These
cases fall into two categories. The first states that a defendant is not
entitled to a severance based on a desire to comment on a co-defend-
ant's failure to testify unless the defendant shows real prejudice and sub-
stantial benefit to the defense.9 8 The second category of cases refuses
to grant a severance unless the defendant and co-defendant have mutu-
ally exclusive and irreconcilable defenses. 99
The Tenth Circuit's rejection of De Luna in McClure'0 0 is the only
logical approach to this situation if one accepts the basic premise that
the assertion of the fifth amendment privilege carries no implication of
guilt. 10 ' As McClure seems to indicate, it would be a paradox to accept
the premise that silence is not to be implied as guilt but nevertheless
hold that a defendant has the right to infer that it does. As the Tenth
Circuit pointed out in McClure, the fifth amendment privilege is without
probative value on the issue of a defendant's guilt or innocence.'
0 2
B. Spontaneous Questioning in a Prison Setting
United States v. Scalf 10 3 concerned the fifth amendment rights of a
federal inmate. The appellant, Scalf, was questioned in his cell within a
disciplinary segregation unit at the Federal Correctional Institution in El
Reno, Oklahoma. On the morning of August 28, 1982, Scalf attacked
another inmate, Spence, with two homemade knives. Scalf chased
Spence and stabbed him five or six times. After the inmates had been
returned to their cells, Officer Sanchez, a security officer, went to Scalf's
cell and asked him what was going on. Scalf replied that he did not want
any problems with the officer and that he did not like Spence. Scalf also
told Officer Sanchez he threw the knives out the window.' 0 4 Scalf was
later charged with and convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and
sufficient inconsistencies between his defense and those of his co-defendants to justify a
severance. Marquez, 449 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1971).
97. United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 831-32 (5th Cir. 1971); Burleski v. United
States, 405 F.2d 253, 265 (5th Cir. 1969). The Fifth Circuit has narrowed but still follows
De Luna. In United States v. Aguiar, 610 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1980), the court stated that
the defense attorney's "proper decision to draw the jury's attention to her co-defendants'
silence would penalize the fifth amendment privilege of her co-defendants and would cre-
ate the sort of incompatibility between their defenses that under De Luna requires a sever-
ance." Id. at 1301 (emphasis added).
98. United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1319 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v.
De La Cruz Bellinger, 422 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Caci, 401 F.2d
664, 672 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824, 840 (7th Cir. 1967).
99. United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 633, 652 (11 th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977); United
States v. White, 482 F.2d 485, 488 (4th Cir. 1973).
100. In an earlier case, Kolod v. United States, 371 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1967), the
Tenth Circuit questioned the validity of the De Luna dictum because of the procedural
problems it creates, such as the elimination ofjoint trials or vesting in the defendant the
right to a mistrial during final arguments. Id. at 991 (quoting United States v. De Luna,
308 F.2d 140, 156 (5th Cir. 1962) (Bell, J., concurring)).
101. See Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1943).
102. McClure, 734 F.2d at 491.
103. 725 F.2d 1272 (10th Cir. 1984).
104. Id. at 1273.
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conveying a weapon from place to place within a federal penitentiary.
0 5
On appeal, Scalf claimed his statements to Officer Sanchez should
not have been admitted into evidence because they were obtained in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona.10 6 The Tenth Circuit disagreed and con-
cluded that Scalf's fifth amendment rights had not been implicated be-
cause Sanchez' brief "conversation" with Scalf was nothing more than
an "on-the-scene" inquiry. 10 7 The court emphasized that Scalf was
neither under arrest, deprived of his freedom, nor questioned in a coer-
cive environment. 108
In deciding that Scalf's fifth amendment rights were not implicated,
the court relied on Cervantes v. Walker' 09 which involved a similar situa-
tion.'10 In Cervantes, the Ninth Circuit determined that the officer's
question was merely a spontaneous reaction and constituted "on-the-
scene" questioning rather than a Miranda-type interrogation. The
Tenth Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's "on-the-scene" language and
found that Scalf had not been subjected to a custodial interrogation re-
quiring Miranda warnings. I I 
C. Limited Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Compelled Production of
Documents
In re Grand Jury Proceedings"12 (Vargas II) further limited the fifth
amendment privilege as it applies to compulsory production of evidence
other than oral testimony. In Fisher v. United States," 3 the Supreme
Court found that a limited fifth amendment privilege applies to the pro-
duction of evidence in response to a subpoena."14 In Vargas II, the
Tenth Circuit determined that this limited privilege does not extend to
an attorney subpoenaed by a grand jury to produce the files of a
client. ' 15
Vargas II was an appeal from a contempt order entered against at-
torney Vargas for his continued refusal to produce the files of his client,
Sangre de Cristo Community Mental Health Service.' 1 6 In Vargas H,
105. Id. at 1272-73. Scalf's defense at trial was self-defense.
106. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
107. Scatf, 725 F.2d at 1276.
108. Id.
109. 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1978).
110. As a result of a fight with another inmate, Cervantes was being moved from one
cell to another. Pursuant to jail procedure, Cervantes was searched. One of the officers
found a matchbox which he thought contained marijuana and immediately questioned
Cervantes about it, to which Cervantes replied, "That's grass, man." Id. at 426-27.
111. Scatf, 725 F.2d at 1276.
112. 727 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1984).
113. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
114. Id. at 410.
115. Vargas II, 727 F.2d at 945 cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 90 (1984).
116. Id. at 942. In the initial proceeding, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Vargas, 723
F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1983) (hereinafter cited as Vargas I), Vargas and his client, Sangre de
Cristo, challenged a subpoena duces tecum from a giandjury investigating fraud involving
government grants to Sangre de Cristo. Vargas was also a target of the grand jury in
connection with alleged false or excessive billings to his client. In Vargas I, the Tenth
Circuit refused to reach the merits because the appeal was premature.
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Sangre de Cristo had dropped its earlier resistance to a subpoena and
ordered Vargas to turn its files over to the grand jury. Vargas refused,
as he was also the target of grand jury investigation in connection with
alleged false or excessive billings to his client, and he was held in con-
tempt by the trial court.' 17
On appeal, Vargas argued that the files were protected by the fifth
amendment privilege under Fisher v. United States, 1 8 or, in the alterna-
tive, by the attorney work-product privilege. 1 9 In support of his first
argument, Vargas stated that the compulsory surrender of his client files
would be an incriminating act because his possession of those files
would form a significant link in the government's proof of fraudulent
billings by Vargas to his client. 120 Despite Fisher, the Tenth Circuit
stated that it believed an analysis of the Supreme Court's cases showed
that the fifth amendment privilege regarding production of evidence
other than oral testimony is very weak. Fisher itself refused to extend the
privilege to the custodian of documents belonging to a corporation or
other collective entities.121
The Tenth Circuit found that the Supreme Court's emphasis in Bel-
lis v. United States1 2 2 on the ownership of the documents to be produced
applied in Vargas H. The court felt Vargas had held the files at issue in a
representative capacity for his client, Sangre de Cristo. Sangre de Cristo
had ownership rights to the files because it had paid Vargas for the
work. 12 3 The only interest Vargas had in the files was the right to be
paid for his work; he had no ownership or privacy interests. 124 As a
result, the court determined that an attorney ordered by a court to sur-
render client files at the request of the client is not protected by a fifth
amendment privilege. The court explicitly limited its holding to the sit-
uation where the client has directed its attorney to turn over the files. 1
2 5
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
The Tenth Circuit decided two conflicting cases concerning issues
117. Vargas H, 727 F.2d at 942.
118. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
119. The court rejected Vargas' attorney work product argument and cited Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), for the rule that an attorney's work product is protected only
if it was prepared in preparation for litigation. Because the Sangre de Cristo files were not
prepared in preparation for litigation, the court found they were not protected under Hick-
man. Vargas 11, 727 F.2d at 945-46.
120. 727 F.2d at 943.
121. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
122. 417 U.S. 85 (1974). The Court in Bellis held that an individual partner of a small
law partnership kept the firm's records in a representative capacity and could not assert a
fifth amendment privilege with reference to those documents. Id. at 100-01.
123. Vargas 11, 727 F.2d at 944.
124. Id. at 944-45.
125. Id. at 945. In an addendum to its opinion, written when the court affirmed the
Vargas H decision on rehearing, the Tenth Circuit stated that its decision in Vargas II is not
affected by United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237 (1984), because Doe did not deal with a
person holding files in a representative capacity. Vargas H, 727 at 946.
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affecting a defendant's sixth amendment right to adequate assistance of
counsel, Rutledge v. Winans126 and United States v. Winkle. 12 7 Prior to
these decisions, the United States Supreme Court had not provided the
lower courts with a workable standard for determining whether the per-
formance of counsel constitutes reversible error. 128 The Tenth Circuit,
therefore, relied on its own standard, first advanced in the 1980 Dyer v.
Crisp decision.' 2 9 Shortly after the Tenth Circuit decided Rutledge and
Winkle, the Supreme Court decided Strickland v. Washington,130 which
clarified the appropriate standard for judging claims of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel.'
3 '
1. Background on Effective Assistance of Counsel Standards
The "farce and mockery" standard was the first standard used by
the circuit courts to determine whether a defendant received adequate
assistance of counsel. This standard, originally formulated by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in Diggs v. Welch, '3 2 required a showing that the
representation received by the defendant at trial "shocked the con-
science of the court" and made the trial "a farce and mockery of jus-
tice."' 13 3 The defendant had the burden of proving counsel had
adversely affected the defense, as well as the nature of the trial itself. All
eleven circuits had adopted this standard by 1970.134 The Fifth Circuit
126. No. 82-1606 (10th Cir. July 21, 1983) (attorney's failure to prepare and
investigate).
127. 722 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1983) (attorney's conflict of interest).
128. Supreme Court cases have focused more on the extent of the sixth amendment
right to counsel, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963). However, in certain cases the Supreme Court has determined what is not
effective assistance of counsel. Counsel is not effective if the government places restraints
on the performance of counsel, Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), or if counsel
represents multiple defendants with conflicting interests. Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
129. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (reh'g en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980). "The
Sixth Amendment demands that defense counsel exercise the skill, judgment and diligence
of a reasonably competent defense attorney." Id. at 278.
130. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
131. On the same day Strickland was decided, the Court handed down United States v.
Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984), which also addressed effective assistance of counsel. The
decision is discussed at length in a comment located at the end of this issue. In Cronic, the
Court discussed the situation in which the circumstances surrounding a trial make it un-
likely that counsel could have performed as an effective adversary. The Court held that
"only when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a sixth
amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial."
Id. at 2048.
132. 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). This standard was
based on the fifth amendment due process clause which guarantees a defendant a fair trial,
as opposed to the sixth amendment right to counsel. Id.
133. Id. at 670; United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 950 (1950).
134. Bottiglio v. United States, 431 F.2d 930, 931 (1st Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Wil-
liams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965); Frand v. United States, 301 F.2d 102, 103
(10th Cir. 1962); O'Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733, 734 (6th Cir. 1961); In re Ernst,
294 F.2d 556, 558 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 917 (1961); Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d
838, 842 (4th Cir. 1959); Cofield v. United States, 263 F.2d 686, 689 (9th Cir.), revdper
curiam on other grounds, 360 U.S. 472 (1959);Johnston v. United States, 254 F.2d 239, 240
(8th Cir. 1958); United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
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then revised the standard by defining the right to counsel as the right to
effective counsel-"counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering rea-
sonably effective assistance."'13 5 To date, every circuit has replaced its
"farce and mockery" standard with some form of the "reasonably effec-
tive assistance of counsel" standard.1
36
Under the current standard, a defendant generally must prove
counsel failed to meet the standard of care of a reasonably competent
attorney 13 7 and that the violation of the "reasonable assistance" stan-
dard prejudiced the defendant's trial in some way. 138 There is consider-
able conflict among the circuits concerning which party has the burden
of proof of prejudice.139 This conflict is manifested within the Tenth
Circuit in the Rutledge14 0 and Winkle14 1 tests. Each panel agreed that an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim must first satisfy the "reasonably
effective" standard set down in Dyer v. Crisp.142 Beyond this, however,
the panels diverged: the Rutledge court held that the government had
the burden of proving lack of prejudice, ' 43 while the Winkle court placed
the burden of proving prejudice on the defendant.144 This conflict was
U.S. 950 (1950); United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 980-81 (7th Cir.
1948).
135. Caraway v. Beto, 421 F.2d 636, 637 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting MacKenna v. Ellis,
280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960), modified, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
877 (1961)).
136. Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 1983) ("reasonably compe-
tent assistance"); Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11 th Cir. 1981) (en
banc) ("reasonably effective assistance"); Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir.)
(reh'g en banc) ("reasonably competent assistance"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980);
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) ("reasonably compe-
tent and effective" assistance), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States v. Bosch, 584
F.2d 1113, 1120-21 (1st Cir. 1978) ("reasonably competent assistance"); Marzullo v.
Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543-44 (4th Cir. 1977) ("normal competency"), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1011 (1978); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976) ("customary
skill and diligence" of"a reasonably competent attorney"); United States ex rel. Williams v.
Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.) ("minimum standard of professional representa-
tion"), cert. denied sub nom. Sielaffv. Williams, 423 U.S. 876 (1975); Beasley v. United States,
491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) ("reasonably effective assistance"); United States v. De
Coster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("reasonably competent assistance"); Moore
v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc) ("normal competency").
137. E.g., Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (reh'g en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
945 (1980).
138. E.g., United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
995 (1984).
139. United States v. Baynes, 687 F.2d 659, 670 (3d Cir. 1982) (defendant must
demonstrate there is a "reasonable possibility" that had the error of which he or she com-
plains not occurred, the jury might have arrived at a different outcome); Taylor v. Starnes,
650 F.2d 38, 41 (4th Cir. 1981) (government has burden of proving counsel's errors were
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in order to avoid reversal).
140. No. 82-1606 (10th Cir. July 21, 1983).
141. 722 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1983).
142. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (reh'g en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980).
143. Rutledge, No. 82-1606, slip op. at 9 (citing United States v. Porterfield, 624 F.2d
122 (10th Cir. 1980)).
144. Winkle, 722 F.2d at 609 (citing United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639, 644 (10th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 995 (1984)). The court then noted that the particular claim at
issue in the case, conflict of interest, involves special considerations and concluded that if a
defendant shows his or her attorney's conflict of interest affected the adequacy of the rep-




recently resolved by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington. 1
45
2. The Supreme Court's Effective Assistance of Counsel
Standard
Strickland involved a claim that the defendant, Washington, received
ineffective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing.146 Washing-
ton had pled guilty to kidnapping, murder, robbery, breaking and enter-
ing, and assault charges14 7 and had been sentenced to death on each of
the three murder counts and to prison terms for the other counts.1
4 8
In arriving at a standard, the Supreme Court, perJustice O'Connor,
emphasized that the purpose of the constitutional right of effective
assistance of counsel is to ensure a fair trial.' 49 The Court then stated
that "[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced
a just result."' 150 The Court also set up a two-part test which must be
satisfied before a conviction will be reversed. First, the defendant must
show that his or her counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, measured by prevailing professional
norms.' 15 Second, the defendant must prove his or her counsel's defi-
cient performance prejudiced the defense such that the defendant was
deprived of a fair trial. 15 2 The court then stated that prejudice exists if
there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's errors, the fact
finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting the defendant's
guilt. 153
145. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
146. Id. at 2058. Washington claimed his counsel was ineffective because he failed to
request a psychiatric report, to investigate and prepare character witnesses, to seek a pre-
sentence investigation report, to present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge,
and to investigate the medical examiner's reports or cross-examine the medical experts.
Id. at 2058, 2060.
147. Id. at 2057.
148. Id. at 2058.
149. Id. at 2064.
150. Id. The court noted that this standard also applies to a capital sentencing hearing,
like the one at issue in Stnchland, because it is "sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial
format and in the existence of standards for decision (citations omitted) that counsel's role
in the proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial-to ensure that the adversarial
testing process works to produce a just result under the standards governing decision."
id.
151. Id. at 2065.
152. Id. at 2064. The Court describes a fair trial as one whose result is reliable. Id.
153. Id. at 2069. This test is also used in determining the materiality of exculpatory
information not disclosed to the defense by the prosecution and in determining the mate-
riality of testimony made unavailable to the defense by government deportation of a wit-
ness. Id. at 2068.
The Court applied the facts of the Strichland case to its new standard and found that
Strickland could not prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim because his coun-
sel's strategy choice was well within the range of professional judgment. Id. at 2070-7 1.
Brennan concurred with the majority's opinion but, because he considers the death
penalty to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment,
he dissented from the majority's judgment. Id. at 2071-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall dissented from both the majority's opinion and its judgment. He
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3. The Tenth Circuit Cases
Rutledge v. Winans154 came before the Tenth Circuit on a writ of
habeas corpus in which Rutledge claimed he had received ineffective
representation at trial. 15 5  Rutledge's claim was based on allegations
that his trial counsel did not properly investigate his case prior to trial
and was incompetent at trial.1
56
At the evidentiary hearing held on Rutledge's habeas corpus peti-
tion, testimony of Rutledge's trial counsel (counsel) contradicted the
testimony of both the co-defendant's trial counsel and the prosecutor
regarding Rutledge's trial representation. 157 Rutledge's counsel testi-
fied that he met and discussed the case at length with Rutledge and his
co-defendant's counsel. He also testified that co-defendant's counsel
made his pretrial preparation and investigation materials available to
him, that he discussed the case with co-defendant's counsel's investiga-
tor, and that he and co-defendant's counsel had agreed that co-defend-
ant's counsel would enter all the objections at trial.' 5 8 Although co-
defendant's counsel recalled talking on the phone with Rutledge's coun-
sel on several occasions, he denied sharing his materials with counsel,
using an investigator, and making an agreement with counsel regarding
objections at trial.15 9 Rutledge's counsel also testified that he reviewed
the prosecutor's file prior to trial. The prosecutor testified that he did
not recall meeting with counsel. He claimed his sole contact with coun-
sel was a fifteen minute phone conversation regarding a plea bargain
and arranging for Rutledge's return to jail prior to trial.160 Rutledge's
counsel admitted he did not remember interviewing any witnesses, pros-
ecution or defense, prior to trial.'
6 '
In United States v. Winkle, 16 2 Winkle was convicted of knowingly and
intentionally distributing methylphenidate and oxymorphone-two con-
objected to the standard adopted by the majority because "it is so malleable that, in prac-
tice, it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in which
the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts." Id. at 2075 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
Marshall also objected to the majority's prejudice standard. He felt a defendant
should be granted a new trial if it is shown that defendant's attorney departed from consti-
tutionally prescribed standards, regardless of whether the defendant suffered demonstra-
ble prejudice. Id. at 2077 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154. No. 82-1606 (10th Cir. July 21, 1983).
155. Rutledge was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance. Id., slip op. at 2.
156. Id. at 2-3. Rutledge claimed his trial counsel met with him only once for one hour,
did not attempt to locate any witnesses to testify on Rutledge's behalf, and did not inter-
view any of the government's prospective witnesses. Id. at 4. He also claimed his trial
counsel stipulated to the admission of crucial prosecution evidence, did not voir dire the
jury, did not deliver an opening statement, did not adequately cross-examine prosecution
witnesses at trial, delivered a damaging closing statement, and submitted ajury instruction
on the defense of entrapment without laying a foundation at trial for the defense. Id. at 3.




161. Id. at 5-6.
162. 722 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1983).
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trolled substances.' 63 The prosecution's key witness at Winkle's trial
was Wood Lee Cox, the man who had helped police investigate Winkle.
During this investigation, Cox had asked Winkle to sell him the drugs
and then paid for them with $400 in marked bills supplied by the gov-
ernment. 164 Cox had previously worked for Winkle and had been in-
volved in litigation with him. Several of Winkle's witnesses testified that
Cox held a grudge against Winkle as a result of that litigation.165
On appeal, Winkle claimed, inter alia, that he was denied his sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The court found a
possible conflict of interest during the cross-examination of Cox by
Thompson, 166 Winkle's trial attorney, because Thompson had repre-
sented Cox in the previous litigation. During this cross-examination,
Thompson asked Cox if he had ever borrowed money from Winkle.
Cox said that he had not. Thompson then asked Cox how he had paid
his attorney (Thompson) in the earlier litigation. 16 7 An objection was
made as to the relevance of this question, and the attorneys approached
the bench. Thompson then told the judge that he had personal knowl-
edge that Cox had borrowed money from Winkle in order to pay
Thompson's bill. At that point, the judge stated that Thompson was
"getting close to some kind of a conflict."168 He did not see what the
borrowed money had to do with the case, told Thompson to drop the
subject, and sustained the objection.
169
4. Tenth Circuit Holdings Compared with Strickland
Both the Rutledge and the Winkle panels of the Tenth Circuit agreed
that the proper standard for reviewing an ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim is found in Dyer v. Crisp. 170 On the issue of the burden of proof
of prejudice, however, the panels diverged. Both panels cited Tenth
Circuit cases as supporting their respective rules regarding the prejudice
required in an ineffective counsel claim. 17 1 Neither Rutledge nor Winkle
acknowledged that an opposing view on the prejudice requirement even
163. Id. at 608. Winkle was a horse trainer and owned a horse ranch. Apparently, the
drugs Winkle was convicted of selling could increase a horse's performance in a race. Id.
at 607.
164. Id. Prior to this transaction, Cox bought $20 worth of controlled substances from
Winkle. Although Cox was working for the police at the time of the sale, no charges were
filed against Winkle. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 610.
167. Id. at 613 (appendix). Through this questioning, Thompson sought to show that
Cox had borrowed $350 from Winkle in order to pay Thompson's legal fee for the prior
litigation. The court stated that this line of testimony could appear to support Winkle's
contention that the $400 was for repayment of the loan rather than for the purchase of
drugs. Id. at 610.
168. Id. at 614 (appendix).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 609. Rutledge, No. 82-1606, slip op. at 8.
171. Rutledge, No. 82-1606, slip op. at 9 (citing United States v. Porterfield, 624 F.2d
122 (10th Cir. 1980)); Winkle, 722 F.2d at 609 (citing United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639
(10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 995 (1984)).
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existed. Washington v. Strickland' 72 spared the Tenth Circuit from resolv-
ing its own inconsistency by specifically addressing this issue.
1 73
The Supreme Court in Strickland used the same approach as the
Winkle court. Strickland held that any deficiency in counsel's perform-
ance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court also held that the defendant
must affirmatively prove prejudice. 174 The Court, however, stated that
in some instances, prejudice will be presumed. This presumption ap-
plies only in the most extreme cases-where there has been actual or
constructive denial of counsel or affirmative state interference with
counsel's performance.17 5 There is also a more limited presumption of
prejudice when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest.
17 6
The Court emphasized, though, that "[pirejudice is presumed only if
the defendant demonstrates that counsel actively represented conflict-
ing interests and that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer's performance."' 77 The Tenth Circuit dealt with such a conflict
of interest in Winkle.
Although the Winkle court stated that a defendant must show preju-
dice in order to prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it added
that special considerations apply when an attorney has a conflict of inter-
est. 178 The Tenth Circuit analyzed the situation in much the same way
the Supreme Court did in Strickland. First, the court cited Cuyler v. Sulli-
van 179 for the proposition that a defendant, who was subject to joint
representation at trial and showed that a conflict of interest actually af-
fected the adequacy of his representation, need not demonstrate preju-
dice in order to obtain relief.'8 0 The court recognized that joint
representation of co-defendants by one attorney may lead to conflicts
which compel an attorney to refrain from doing things he or she would
normally do in a case of single representation. 18 1 Citing Wood v. Geor-
gia, 182 the court determined that the Cuyler holding is not limited to con-
flicts arising from joint representation.' 83 The Winkle court concluded
that an actual conflict of interest would arise when defense counsel was
unable to effectively cross-examine a government witness because the
attorney had previously represented the witness.' 84 The court pointed
172. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
173. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
174. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2067.
175. Id. The Court felt that prejudice is so likely in these cases that a case-by-case
inquiry into prejudice would not be worth the cost. These cases involve easily identifiable
impairments of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350 (1980)).
178. Winkle, 722 F.2d at 609.
179. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
180. Winkle, 722 F.2d at 609.
181. Id.
182. 450 U.S. 261 (1981). In Wood, the Supreme Court found that inherent conflicts
arise when a defendant is represented by an attorney who is hired and paid by a third
party-particularly when the third party is the defendant's employer. Id. at 268-69.




out, again, that a conflict arises because an attorney feels compelled to
refrain from aggressively defending his or her client.' 8 5 In this situa-
tion, the defendant need not show prejudice to obtain relief.
18 6
The Tenth Circuit's Winkle opinion appears to conform with Strick-
land. Although the Supreme Court did not specifically state that its lim-
ited presumption of prejudice applies to all types of attorney conflicts of
interest, the generality of the Court's language seems to imply this
result. 187
The Rutledge court's approach to prejudice would not be approved
by the Supreme Court. Rutledge did not involve an actual or constructive
denial of counsel, affirmative state interference with counsel's represen-
tation, or an actual conflict of interest. In the absence of these types of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Strickland requires the defendant
to prove prejudice.' 8 8 In fact, part of Strickland's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim was similar to Rutledge's claim-it centered around
Strickland's allegations that his attorney failed to investigate prior to his
sentencing hearing. 189 Contrary to the Tenth Circuit in Rutledge, the
Supreme Court required Strickland to show that any deficiencies arising
from a failure to investigate prejudiced the defense. 190 Moreover, the
Supreme Court did not suggest switching the burden of proof of preju-
dice to the government, once the defendant had shown counsel's repre-
sentation was inadequate, as an option under any circumstances. 19 1
5. Strickland's Impact on Tenth Circuit Ineffective Counsel
Claims
In Strickland, the Supreme Court stated that its holding should not
significantly affect the way the various circuits approach sixth amend-
ment ineffective assistance of counsel claims. "In particular, the minor
differences in the lower courts' precise formulations of the performance
standard are insignificant: the different formulations are mere variations
of the overarching reasonableness standard."' 19 2 In light of this lan-
185. Id.
186. Id. The court applied the facts to this standard and found that an actual conflict of
interest may have affected Winkle's trial counsel. Thompson was unable to effectively
cross-examine Cox because he had formerly represented Cox and certain attorney client
privileges may have applied. The court remanded the case for an inquiry into the exist-
ence of a conflict of interest. Id. at 610-12.
187. Se supra text accompanying notes 174-77.
188. 104 S. Ct. at 2067.
189. Id. at 2058.
190. Id. at 2071.
191. It seems unlikely, though, that the Supreme Court would dispute the Tenth Cir-
cuit's finding that Rutledge received inadequate trial representation. In Strickland, the
Supreme Court stated that an inquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant may
be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's investigation decisions. Id. at 2066-67. In
Rutledge, though, counsel only briefly discussed the case with the defendant. He also failed
to interview any witnesses. Rutledge, No. 82-1606, slip op. at 4, 9.
192. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. Justice Brennan emphasized this point in his concur-
ring opinion by stating that the majority's suggestion that its decision is largely consistent
with the approach taken by the lower courts "simply indicates that those courts may con-
tinue to develop governing principles on a case-by-case basis in the common law tradition,
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guage, it is unlikely that Strickland will drastically change the Tenth Cir-
cuit's approach to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Dyer is likely
to remain the definitive case in the Tenth Circuit in this area.
193
B. Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel
In Nees v. Bishop, 194 a civil action, Nees claimed Bishop, a special
agent for the FBI, and five other defendants violated his sixth amend-
ment right to counsel during critical stages of both a state and federal
investigation.19 5
On March 30, 1976, Nees was arrested by Bishop and booked into
the La Plata County jail in Durango. 19 6 Prior to his arrest, Nees had
been questioned by Wiggins of the Durango Police Department and by
Bishop. At that time, Nees signed a form which waived his right to "a
lawyer at this time."' 9 7 After Nees was arrested, Bishop obtained per-
mission from the United States Attorney in Denver to charge Nees with
extortion under the Hobbs Act. Nees then signed a second form waiv-
ing his right to "a lawyer at this time."' 198 After a search of Nees' hotel
room, 19 9 he became a suspect in a state criminal investigation.
200
Sometime during the evening of March 30th, a note was posted at
the La Plata County jail which stated: "Nees is to be kept alone (Sheriffs
Orders). He has no bond and he is not to be seen by the Public De-
fender. Bishop says that he has to have his own private attorney."
20 1
During the morning of March 31 st, Nees asked the jail commander
if he could see an attorney and was informed that he could not. Later
that day, Nees was booked on a state charge of armed robbery. That
evening the state public defender, David West, requested to see Nees,
but based on the note the jailer on duty refused the request.
20 2
On April I st, Nees was taken for his initial appearance before a fed-
eral magistrate. Nees did not request an attorney at that time. Public
defender West again requested to see Nees but was refused permission,
as they have in the past." Id. at 2073 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
193. Dyer, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1980) (reh'g en banc).
194. 730 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984).
195. Id. at 607. Nees' suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), but, as to
Bishop, the district court determined that the cause would be construed under Bivens v.
Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), as a suit for money damages
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). Nees v. Bishop, 524 F. Supp. 1310, 1311 (D. Colo. 1981).
196. Nees, 730 F.2d at 608.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Shortly after Nees signed his second waiver of attorney, Nees gave the police writ-
ten permission to search his room at the Silver Spruce Motel in Durango. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. There was considerable debate at trial concerning whether Bishop posted the
note or authorized it to be posted. See id. at 608-09. The district court found, though, that
the following (referring to the testimony of Sheriff Schilthius) was credible: "Agent
Bishop told him on the night of plaintiff's arrest that the public defender was not to see
plaintiff... Schilthius passed this information to Prouty who wrote and posted the note."
.ees, 524 F. Supp. at 1312.
202. Nees, 730 F.2d at 609.
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this time by the jail commander. Later that afternoon West was asked to
represent Nees at a lineup, which he did. On April 2nd, West appeared
with Nees in the Durango District Court on the state armed robbery
charges. On April 3rd, Nees was taken to the Denver County Jail, and
on April 5th, Nees saw a federal magistrate who made arrangements for
a federal public defender to represent Nees.
2 0 3
In deciding whether Nees' sixth amendment right to counsel had
been violated, the Tenth Circuit considered whether adversary judicial
proceedings had been initiated against Nees, and if so, whether Nees
was denied counsel during a "critical stage" of those proceedings.
20 4
The Tenth Circuit quoted Kirby v. Illinois 205 as setting out the start-
ing point in determining when a person is entitled to the aid of an attor-
ney: "It has been firmly established that a person's Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the
time adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him."
'20 6
The Tenth Circuit also noted that United States v. Ash 20 7 added the re-
quirement that a proceeding which occurred after the initiation of adver-
sary judicial proceedings must be a "critical stage" in order to
necessitate the presence of counsel.
20 8
Although the court expressed concern over the "inconceivable and
unreasonable" instructions given by Bishop 20 9 and the fact that Nees
had been in jail for two days without being permitted to see a public
defender, 2 10 the court determined that Nees' sixth amendment rights
had not been violated. 2 11 In reaching that conclusion, the court found
that Nees' right to counsel had not attached at the time he asked to see
an attorney because judicial proceedings had not begun against Nees,
2 12
nor was he being interrogated, 2 13 nor was he at a critical stage of the
proceedings. 2 14 The court found that Nees was represented by counsel
at critical stages of the proceedings, such as the lineup on April 1st and
the initial state proceedings on April 2nd.2 '5 The court also found that
203. Id.
204. Id. at 611. The Tenth Circuit considered only whether Nees was denied his right
to counsel in connection with his state charges because, during his testimony at trial, Nees
specifically limited his complaint to the state charges. Id. at 611 n.2.
205. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
206. Id. at 688.
207. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
208. Nees, 730 F.2d at 611 (citing Ash, 413 U.S. at 306-21).
209. Mees. 730 F.2d at 611.
210. Id. at611-12.
211. Id. at 612.
212. Id. at 612-13.
213. Id. at 612. Because Nees was not interrogated during the time he was held in jail
without access to counsel, the Tenth Circuit found that Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), did not apply. In Escobedo. the Supreme Court held that confessions obtained from
the defendant during extensive interrogation were not admissible into evidence because
the defendant had been denied access to an attorney. Even though judicial proceedings
had not been initiated, the police had begun to focus on the defendant as a suspect. Esco-
bedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91.
214. Nees, 730 F.2d at 612.
215. Id. at 613.
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Bishop's instructions, although clearly improper, did not violate the
sixth amendment.
2 16
The court's decision in Nees is consistent with the analysis of
Kirby2 17 and Ash 2 18 as well as the more recent decision of United States v.
Gouveia.2 19 Nees shows that the Supreme Court's position on the timing
of the attachment of the right to counsel is subject to abuse. Although
strictly speaking Nees was not unconstitutionally denied counsel nor was
he interrogated during his two days without counsel, he did give up im-
portant constitutional rights during that time. Nees signed two waivers
of his right to counsel, as well as consents to search his truck and his
motel room.
2 20
Certain questions are left unanswered by the Supreme Court and
the Nees decision. At what point prior to a defendant's first appearance
in adversarial proceedings is the defendant entitled to meet with coun-
sel? If the right attaches only immediately prior to this first appearance,
the right to counsel at this appearance may be meaningless without ade-
quate consultation time.
2 2 1
C. Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury
In Haar v. Hanrahan,22 2 Haar was tried by a jury in the magistrate
court of Bernalillo County, New Mexico and was found guilty of simple
battery and criminal damage to property.2 2 3 The magistrate imposed
216. Id.
217. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
218. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
219. 104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984). In Gouveia, six inmates were placed in administrative seg-
regation pending investigation of the murders of two inmates. Four of the inmates re-
mained in segregation without appointed counsel for approximately 19 months while the
other two were in segregation for eight months without appointed counsel. All six inmates
were appointed counsel at their respective arraignments. d. at 2295-96.
Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, reaffirmed the Supreme Court's prior holdings
that the right to counsel attaches only at or after the initiation of adversarial judicial pro-
ceedings which in this case occurred at the arraignments of the defendants. Id. at 2297.
In his concurring opinionJustice Stevens disagreed with the majority's statement that
the right to counsel attaches only after the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings. Id.
at 2300 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Stevens felt that if authorities take a
person into custody to interrogate or to otherwise facilitate building a case against him or
her, the person is sufficiently "accused" to be entitled to counsel even though formal
charges have not been filed. Id. at 2302 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)). Stevens stated, though, that the defend-
ants' administrative segregation did not serve an accusatorial function and, thus, con-
curred with the majority's judgment. Id. at 2303.
Justice Marshall dissented based on his finding that the administrative segregation did
serve an accusatorial function. Id. at 2304 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
220. Nees, 730 F.2d at 608.
221. In Nees, the defendant was denied access to a public defender. See Nees, 730 F.2d
at 607, 609. In Gouveia,Justice Rehnquist seemed to imply that the defendants had a right
to retain and consult with private counsel prior to the initiation of adversarial proceedings.
Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2296, n.l.
222. 708 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1983).
223. Id. at 1547-48. The criminal damage to property charge carried a maximum sen-
tence of six-months imprisonment. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-6(C) (1978). Haar was
originally charged with aggravated battery, which carries a maximum penalty of one year's
imprisonment, but was acquitted on that charge and found guilty of the lesser included
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two consecutive 90-day prison terms. 224 Haar exercised his right to ap-
peal through a trial de novo in the district court. 22 5 The district court
denied Haar's request that his case be reheard by a jury and reconvicted
him. The district court, though, sentenced Haar to two concurrent six-
month prison terms.
22 6
In the New Mexico Court of Appeals, Haar argued that he was enti-
tled to a jury at his trial de novo in the district court. 22 7 The court of
appeals rejected this argument based on its finding that the local court
rules prohibit the district court from imposing a sentence in excess of
that imposed by the magistrate. 2 28 The court of appeals reasoned that,
because Haar was subjected to no greater jeopardy in the de novo pro-
ceedings than in the magistrate court, he was not entitled to a jury in the
district court. 2 29 The court of appeals did, though, remand for proper
sentencing because it felt the two concurrent six-month sentences im-
posed by the district court were an impermissible enhancement of the
two consecutive ninety-day sentences.
2 30
After Haar's petitions to both the New Mexico Supreme Court and
United States Supreme Court were rejected, 2 3 1 he filed a petition for
habeas corpus. In this petition, Haar argued he was entitled to a jury
trial in the district court because he had been subjected to an aggregate
penalty in excess of six-months imprisonment upon conviction of two
crimes arising out of the same act.
23 2
The Tenth Circuit accepted Haar's argument but, based on the
facts, decided it did not justify a reversal of Haar's conviction. First, the
court outlined the sixth amendment right to jury trial. 2 33 In doing so,
the court emphasized that there is no right to a jury trial for prosecu-
tions of petty crimes. 23 4 The court then cited Baldwin v. New York 2 35 as
drawing the line between petty crimes and serious offenses. Baldwin de-
fined a serious offense as any crime in which a defendant faces a prison
sentence in excess of six months.23 6 Next, the court applied United States
v. Potvin,23 7 which stated that multiple charges, even though petty, can
offense of simple battery, which carries a maximum penalty of six-months imprisonment.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-1-6(B) and (C) (1978).
224. Haar, 708 F.2d at 1548.
225. Id. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 35-13-2 (1978) (amended 1981).
226. Haar, 708 F.2d at 1548.
227. State v. Haar, 94 N.M. 539, 540, 612 P.2d 1350, 1351 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
228. Id. at 540-41, 612 P.2d at 1351-52.
229. Id. at 540, 612 P.2d at 1351. The New Mexico Court of Appeals also noted that
Haar's acquittal on the aggravated battery charge prohibited the state from re-prosecuting
him on that charge in the district court. Id. at 541, 612 P.2d at 1352.
230. Id. at 542, 612 P.2d at 1353. Upon remand, Haar was sentenced to two concur-
rent ninety-day terms. Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d at 1548.
231. Haar v. State, 94 N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 991 (1980); Haar v. State, 449 U.S. 1063
(1980).
232. Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d at 1548.
233. Id. at 1548-49.
234. Id. at 1549 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968)).
235. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
236. laar, 708 F.2d at 1549 (citing Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69).
237. 481 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973).
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threaten a defendant with the consequences of a serious crime.
23 8
Based on Potvin, the Tenth Circuit found that Baldwin's definition of a
serious offense may not always protect a defendant from an oppressive
prosecution. 2 39 The threat of governmental oppression is greater with
aggregate penalties because of the increased possibility of a long sen-
tence.2 40 As a result, the Tenth Circuit determined that a court must
look at the aggregate penalty that could arise out of a discrete criminal
transaction in order to determine whether a defendant has a right to a
jury trial.
2 4 '
The remaining question for the Tenth Circuit in Haar was whether
the right to a jury trial should be based on the potential penalties faced
by a defendant according to the statutory definitions of the crimes, or
whether it should be based on the actual penalties faced by the
defendant.
2 42
The court discussed an objective and subjective approach in reach-
ing a solution to this issue. Under the objective approach, the right to a
jury would be based on the potential aggregate penalty allowable under
statute upon conviction of multiple petty crimes arising out of the same
criminal act. 24 3 Alternatively, the subjective approach would focus on
the aggregate penalty actually faced by the defendant. Under this ap-
proach, a defendant would be entitled to a jury trial only when he or she
was actually threatened with a serious penalty. 24 4 The court felt that the
subjective approach was adequate because it ensures a jury trial in all
cases where a defendant is actually threatened by a serious penalty, re-
gardless of the objective seriousness of the individual charges.2 45 The
court seemed to be uneasy with its choice between the objective and
subjective approaches; neither approach squared with Duncan v. Louisi-
ana24 6 and Baldwin v. New York 2 47 because those cases did not deal with
aggregate penalties. 2 48 In the end, the court settled on the subjective
approach because it felt the Supreme Court, rather than the Tenth Cir-
cuit, is the proper court to broaden the scope of the sixth amend-
ment.2 49 Haar's holding that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial only if
actually threatened at the commencement of trial with an aggregate po-
tential penalty of greater than six-months imprisonment limits the im-
pact of Potvin and yet leaves it with plenty of vitality. Because Haar was
238. Id. at 382.
239. Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d at 1551.
240. Id. at 1551 n.17.
241. Id. at 1551.
242. Id. at 1552.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. The court stated that this "approach thus protects the defendant from vindic-
tive prosecution, interposing the jury between the government and the defendant in all
cases where there is a risk of serious punishment and a consequent possibility of
prosecutorial abuse." Id.
246. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
247. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).




subject to a maximum penalty in the trial de novo of only 180-days im-
prisonment, the Tenth Circuit found that he was not entitled to a jury
trial.
250
IV. DISMISSAL OF INDICTMENT WITHOUT PREJUDICE: PROSECUTION'S
REQUIREMENT TO SHOW CAUSE
United States v. Derr25 1 determined the circumstances under which
an indictment may be dismissed without prejudice at the government's
request prior to trial. In May 1980, Derr was indicted on six counts of
bank embezzlement and six counts of making false entries in bank ac-
counts. 252 On the day of trial, the government moved to dismiss the
indictment without prejudice. Derr objected, stating that she was ready
for trial and arguing that the government had not stated any legitimate
or compelling reasons for dismissing the indictment without prejudice
at that late date. The district court summarily dismissed the indictment
over Derr's objections.
25 3
In November 1982, Derr was reindicted on the same charges. Derr
moved to dismiss the second indictment, arguing that the trial court
erred in dismissing the original indictment without prejudice because it
had not first determined the government's reasons for dismissal. The
trial court agreed that it had abused its discretion and then dismissed
the second indictment with prejudice.
25 4
In determining whether the trial court had properly dismissed the
second indictment, the Tenth Circuit discussed the purposes behind
Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2 5 5 which allows
a prosecutor to dismiss an indictment at anytime, except during trial, if
he or she obtains "leave of court." The court determined that the pri-
mary purpose of the "leave of court" requirement is to prevent harass-
ment of a defendant by charging, dismissing, and recharging the
defendant with a crime. In order to avoid this harassment and to create
a reviewable record, the trial court must at least know the prosecutor's
reasons for seeking to dismiss the indictment and the facts underlying
the prosecutor's decision.
2 56
The court then determined that the trial court's remedy of dismissal
with prejudice was proper because it is the only remedy that would effec-
tuate Rule 48(a). The government's reason for dismissing the first in-
dictment, which was to allow itself more time to investigate, was not
sufficient, because the request came on the day of trial and Derr ob-
250. Id. at 1553-54.
251. 726 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1984).
252. Id. at 618.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) provides: "By attorney for government. The Attorney
General or the United States attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indict-
ment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a
dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the consent of the defendant."
256. Derr, 726 F.2d at 619.
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jected to the request. If the trial court had properly denied the govern-
ment's request, the prosecutor's only alternatives would have been to go
ahead with trial or to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.
25 7
V. APPLICATION OF STATE WIRETAP STATUTES IN FEDERAL COURTS
United States v. McNulty25 8 determined the circumstances under
which evidence obtained pursuant to a state authorized and conducted
wiretap may be admissible into evidence in a federal prosecution.
The federal wiretap statute 259 permits the principal prosecuting at-
torney of any state to apply for and use a state wiretap, provided the
wiretap conforms with the federal statute and the applicable state stat-
ute.260 The Tenth Circuit, en banc, interpreted this requirement as per-
mitting receipt of state authorized wiretap evidence in federal
prosecutions only if the state wiretap complied with both the federal and
state statutes.2 6 1 As a result, the court determined that state statutory
wiretap requirements which are stricter than their federal counterparts
must be complied with in order for the evidence to be used in federal
court, 2 62 even though the evidence would have been admissible had it
been obtained with a federal wiretap.
2 63
The court went on to distinguish two types of cases which imply a
different conclusion. The first type 26 4 involves the distinction between
interception and preservation. The court reasoned that because the
purpose of a wiretap statute is to protect an individual's privacy, only
those requirements of a state statute pertaining to interception must be
complied with in order to allow the evidence into federal court. Preser-
vation of evidence obtained by wiretap does not affect an individual's
privacy and, thus, less stringent federal requirements are acceptable. 26 5
The second type of distinguishable case 26 6 involves the use of warrant-
less wiretaps with one participant's consent. Citing its own case, United
257. Id.
258. 729 F.2d 1243, 1264 (1984) (reh'g en banc).
259. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title Il, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-20 (1982).
260. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1982). The pertinent part of the statute states:
The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting at-
torney of any political subdivision thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a stat-
ute of that State to make application to a State court judge of competent
jurisdiction for an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral
communications, may apply to such judge for, and such judge may grant in con-
formity with section 2518 of this chapter and with the applicable State statute an
order authorizing, or approving the interception of wire or oral communications.
261. 729 F.2d at 1264.
262. Id. (quoting United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697, 702 (2d Cir. 1976)).
263. 729 F.2d at 1264.
264. United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981
(1979), 444 U.S. 1019 (1980); United States v. Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (1979).
265. 729 F.2d at 1265 (quoting Sotomayor, 592 F.2d at 1225-26).
266. United States v. Horton, 601 F.2d 319 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979);
United States v. Nelligan, 573 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d
1369 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976); United States v. Neville, 516 F.2d
1302 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975).
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States v. Hall,2 6 7 the court determined that the federal wiretap statute 268
specifically permits the warrantless use of a wiretap if one participant
consents and, thus, the federal statute controls over any conflicting state
statutes.
2 69
Having decided that a more stringent state wiretap statute must be
complied with in order to allow evidence obtained by a state wiretap into
federal court, the court determined that, in this case, Colorado's wiretap
statute 270 had not been complied with 2 7 1 and, thus, the evidence could
not be used in federal court. Judge Logan, joined by Judges Barrett and
Doyle, dissented from the majority's interpretation of the Colorado
wiretap statute, but agreed that any stricter state requirements must be
complied with in order to allow state wiretap evidence into federal
court.
2 7 2
VI. PAROLE EXTENSION: "THE FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS STANDARD"
United States v. Ortiz273 involved extension of probation based on a
defendant's failure to pay a fine imposed as part of a sentence. Ortiz
pled guilty to offering to sell and selling parts of the bodies of golden
eagles. Ortiz was sentenced to two years probation and fined $650, to
be paid in installments. 2 74 At the end of Ortiz' probation period, the
Federal Probation Office petitioned for an extension because Ortiz had
paid only $75. The petition was granted and Ortiz' probation was ex-
tended two years.
2 75
On appeal, Ortiz argued that the extension of his probation violated
equal protection because, in effect, it punished him for being poor.
2 7 6
The court found that Ortiz had made efforts to pay the fine but his finan-
cial responsibilities and his chronic lack of employment prevented him
267. 536 F.2d 313, 327 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976).
268. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c).
269. 729 F.2d at 1266. The Tenth Circuit also distinguished United States v. Hall, 543
F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977) which it felt did not fit within
either of the other two categories. The court stated:
In United States v. Hall. . . a properly authorizedfederal wiretap produced infor-
mation about transportation of heroin. State officials were notified and they
made a warrantless search of the defendant and seized the heroin. The Ninth
Circuit refused to apply the California provision forbidding the use of the fruits of
wiretap information by state police. In that case, however, the issue was solely
one of admissibility of evidence obtained subsequent to a validly authorized wiretap.
The court there recognized that state standards would have been applicable had
the evidence been obtained by state officers for state prosecution in violation of a
state statute.
McNulty, 729 F.2d at 1266.
270. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-15-102 (1978).
271. 729 F.2d at 1267-68. The court interpreted the Colorado wiretap statute as al-
lowing authorization of a wiretap only for investigation of certain enumerated crimes.
Three of the offenses listed in the affidavit to obtain the wiretap were not included among
these enumerated crimes. Therefore, the court found the wiretap invalid under the Colo-
rado statute. Id.
272. Id. at 1269-70 (Logan, J., dissenting).
273. 733 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1984).
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from paying in full. 27 7
The court then determined, based on the fundamental fairness
standard enunciated in Bearden v. Georgia,278 that the extension of proba-
tion based on Ortiz' failure to pay his fine was not unconstitutional.
2 79
In Bearden, the Supreme Court held that the revocation of a person's
probation for failure to pay a fine violates the fundamental fairness re-
quired by the fourteenth amendment unless the person has not made
bona fide attempts to pay the fine and adequate alternative types of pun-
ishment do not exist. 280 The Tenth Circuit felt that extension of proba-
tion for failure to pay a fine is far different from imprisonment for failure
to pay a fine, as there is a much milder loss of liberty involved in proba-
tion extension. 28 ' A district court has wide latitude to extend probation
based on what is in the "best interest of society."'2 8 2 The court also
found the extension of probation acceptable because Bearden seemed to
contemplate this type of solution in requiring alternative forms of pun-
ishment, other than imprisonment, for failure to pay a fine.2 83
VII. TIME CREDITED ON SENTENCE
In United States v. Baez, 284 the Tenth Circuit determined whether a
district court has the power to deny a defendant credit for time spent in
custody under charges other than those to which the defendant pled
guilty. In February 1982, Baez was found guilty of various violations of
the Controlled Substance Act.2 8 5 On appeal these convictions were re-
versed.2 8 6 Upon remand, Baez agreed to plead guilty to misprison of
felony in return for dismissal of the indictment.287 At this point Baez
had been in custody for 19 months in connection with the drug
charges. 28 8 Baez was sentenced to three years imprisonment and was
fined $500, the maximum penalty for misprison of felony. The district
court refused to credit Baez with his time spent in custody, but directed
him to appeal that ruling.
2 8 9
The Tenth Circuit found that the controlling statute 290 delegated to
277. Id.
278. 103 S. Ct. 2064 (1983).
279. 733 F.2d at 1418.
280. Bearden, 103 S. Ct. at 2070-71.
281. Ortiz, 733 F.2d at 1417-18.
282. Id. at 1418 (quoting United States v. Chancey, 695 F.2d 1275, 1277 (11th Cir.
1982)).
283. Ortiz, 733 F.2d at 1418.
284. 732 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1984).
285. Id. at 781. Baez was convicted of conspiracy to possess PCP with intent to dis-
tribute and use of a communication facility to distribute PCP. Id.
286. United States v. Baez, 703 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1983).
287. Baez, 732 F.2d at 781.
288. Id.
289. Id. The Tenth Circuit noted that ordinarily there is no right of appeal from a
guilty plea. In this instance, though, the court took jurisdiction in order to correct an
illegal sentence. Id.
290. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1983). The pertinent part of the statute states:
The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense shall com-
mence to run from the date on which such person is received at the penitentiary,
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the Attorney General the initial discretion to determine the credit to be
given a defendant for time spent in custody prior to sentencing. As a
result, the district court's order refusing to grant Baez credit for the 19
months he spent in custody was beyond its jurisdiction. 2 9 1 The Tenth
Circuit also found that Baez should not be denied credit for his time
spent in custody solely because misprison of felony is not a lesser in-
cluded offense of his drug charges. Under the statute, the Attorney
General is to give credit on a sentence to a prisoner for time spent in
custody in connection with the offense or acts for which the sentence
was imposed.2 9 2 Baez' guilty plea to misprison of felony was based on
acts committed within the greater drug offense;2 9 3 thus, the court im-
plied that Baez should be granted credit for the 19 months he spent in
custody.
VIII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON RECANTED TESTIMONY
In United States v. Ramsey, 2 94 Ramsey was convicted of conspiring to
damage and destroy a building by use of explosives. 29 5 At Ramsey's
trial, the government's key witness, Jackson, testified that Ramsey had
hired him and two others to break into and destroy the building. 29 6 Af-
ter Ramsey had been convicted, Jackson executed an affidavit recanting
his trial testimony and stating that he had burned down the building
because Ramsey owed him money. Jackson's affidavit was corroborated
by an affidavit executed by his wife. 2 9 7 Ramsey requested a new trial
based on the newly discovered evidence of perjured testimony. The
trial court denied his motion for a new trial without a hearing and with-
out any findings of fact.
2 9 8
In an opinion written by Judge Logan, the Tenth Circuit remanded
the case for a hearing on the credibility of Jackson's repudiation of his
trial testimony. 2 99 The court listed the requirements necessary to ob-
tain a new trial based on recanted testimony30 0 and stated that three of
reformatory, orjail for service of such sentence. The Attorney General shall give
any such person credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in cus-
tody in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed.
291. Baez, 732 F.2d at 782-83.
292. Id. at 782.
293. Id. The court explained that misprison of felony contains four elements: (1) com-
mission of the felony alleged; (2) the accused had full knowledge of the fact; (3) the ac-
cused failed to notify authorities; and (4) the accused took an affirmative step to conceal
the crime. By pleading guilty, Baez admitted all of these elements. Id.
294. 726 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1984).
295. Id. at 602.
296. Id. at 603.
297. Id. at 604.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 605.
300. Id. at 604. The court quoted United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 403 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977) for these requirements:
The newly discovered evidence must be more than impeaching or cumulative; it
must be material to the issues involved; it must be such as would probably pro-
duce an acquittal; and a new trial is not warranted by evidence which, with rea-
sonable diligence, could have been discovered and produced at trial.
Allen, 554 F.2d at 403.
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the four requirements were undisputably satisfied in this case.3 0 ' First,
the recantation was not merely cumulative because presumably Jackson
would testify to the new version at trial. Second, the court stated that
the materiality of the recantation could not seriously be disputed; Jack-
son was the government's chief witness, was the only conspirator who
spoke with Ramsey, and was the only conspirator who received money
from Ramsey. Third, the court noted that it was unrealistic to assume
that Ramsey's attorneys could have elicited the recantation during cross-
examination. The only requirement open to dispute, according to the
court, was whether the recantation would probably produce an acquittal.
The court felt this requirement hinged on the credibility of Jackson's
recantation. 30 2 The Tenth Circuit determined that the case should be
remanded to the district court for a determination of the credibility of
Jackson's recantation; if the district court were to find that the recanta-
tion was credible, it should grant a new trial. The court cautioned,
though, that a recantation is properly viewed with suspicion.3 03 Never-
theless, the court determined that the district court's denial of Ramsey's
motion for a new trial without a hearing or written findings was an abuse
of discretion.
30 4
Judge McKay both concurred with and dissented from the majority
opinion.30 5 McKay agreed with the majority's finding that the trial court
must at least set forth reasons for denying a new trial based on the re-
cantation of a critical witness's trial testimony. He dissented, however,
from the majority's treatment of the recanted testimony. McKay was
particularly troubled by the majority's failure to give the trial court any
directions for the exercise of its discretion in granting a new trial based
on recanted testimony.
30 6
McKay felt that where the testimony recanted is that of a critical
witness, great danger lies in allowing the verdict to stand even when the
recantation is subsequently recanted.3 0 7 In this case, there was particu-
lar reason to be suspicious of the witness's testimony; Jackson was ad-
mittedly guilty of the crime, and he had great motivation to lie because
his attorney had told him he could get the "needle" or spend a long
time in the pen unless he went along with the government. 30 8 Under
these circumstances, McKay felt it was not appropriate to treat the re-
canted testimony with suspicion.
30 9
301. Ramsey, 726 F.2d at 604.
302. Id. at 605.
303. Id. (citing United States v. Ahern, 612 F.2d 507, 509 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1093 (1981). The court also noted that the government's brief alleged that Jack-
son had withdrawn his recantation. 726 F.2d at 605.
304. 726 F.2d at 605.
305. Id. (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
306. Id.





IX. FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
In Fitzgerald v. United States,3 10 Fitzgerald was convicted of posses-
sion of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.3 1 1 The Tenth
Circuit refused to reverse the conviction despite Fitzgerald's contention
that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser in-
cluded offense of simple possession of narcotics.3 12 The court acknowl-
edged that Sansone v. United States3 13 held that if there is a lesser
included offense, the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction if the
evidence warrants it. 3 14 The court determined, though, that because
there was a "surprising lack of evidence supporting a mere possession
charge" 3 15 and because the evidence did support the possession with
intent to distribute charges, it would not remand for a new trial.
3 16
At trial, the evidence showed that Fitzgerald possessed weighing
scales and $18,400 worth of drugs,3 17 that Fitzgerald moved freely in
and out of the rooms of his co-defendants Peterson and Mason, that
there was a considerable amount of public traffic to and from the motel
rooms of all three,3 18 and that $11,000 worth of drugs were seized from
Mason's room.
3 19
In Sansone, the Supreme Court stated that a lesser included offense
instruction is only proper if the charged greater offense requires the jury
to find a disputed factual element which is not required for conviction of
the lesser included offense. 3 20 The Tenth Circuit's approval of the trial
court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of sim-
ple possession indicates that it felt Fitzgerald's intent to distribute was
not in dispute or that the jury could not rationally have convicted Fitz-
gerald of simple possession as opposed to possession with intent to
distribute.
Interestingly, in a somewhat similar case, the Fourth Circuit re-
versed a conviction for failure to grant a lesser included offense instruc-
tion. 32 1 In United States v. Levy, despite the fact that Levy was arrested
with a convicted drug trafficker and 4.75 ounces of 95% pure cocaine
with a potential street value of $35,000 in his car, the Fourth Circuit felt
310. 719 F.2d 1069 (10th Cir. 1983).
311. Id. at 1070.
312. Id. at 1071-72.
313. 380 U.S. 343 (1965).
314. 7!9 F.2d at 1071 (citing Sansone, 380 U.S. at 349).
315. 719 F.2d at 1072.
316. Id. at 1071-72.
317. Id. at 1070. Approximately 25 grams of 47% pure cocaine and 33 grams of 70%
pure amphetamine were seized by the police from Fitzgerald's motel room. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Sansone, 380 U.S. at 350. The Tenth Circuit listed four requirements as necessary
for an instruction on a lesser included offense: "(1) a proper request; (2) the lesser in-
cluded offense consists of some, but not all, of the elements of the offense charged; (3) the
element differentiating the two offenses is a matter in dispute; (4) a jury could rationally
convict the defendant of the lesser offense and acquit of the greater offense." Fitzgerald,
719 F.2d at 1071.
321. United States v. Levy, 703 F.2d 791, 793 (4th Cir. 1983).
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there was a reasonable possibility the jury might infer the cocaine was
for Levy's personal use.3 2 2 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the
value and potential doses (1,300) of the cocaine were substantial,3 23 but
felt that they might merely reflect the costly nature of the habit and that
4.75 ounces of cocaine were not necessarily an amount that would ex-
ceed what one would stockpile for personal use.
Levy and Fitzgerald demonstrate that whether or not a lesser in-
cluded offense instruction on simple possession will be required in trials
involving large quantities of drugs may depend on the court and the
facts of the individual case. In Fitzgerald, the Tenth Circuit placed great
emphasis on the surrounding circumstances-particularly the fact that
there was substantial public traffic to and from Fitzgerald's motel room.
Fitzgerald also shows that if a defendant wants an instruction on a lesser
included offense of simple possession, he or she must introduce evi-
dence showing that the drugs in evidence were for personal use.
3 24
Leigh Bickelhaupt
322. Id. at 792.
323. Id. The court also noted that Levy was unemployed at the time of the arrest and
was presumably without access to legitimate sources of money necessary to purchase 4.75
ounces of nearly pure cocaine. Id.
324. In Levy, the Fourth Circuit felt Levy's ownership of four pipes used for consuming
cocaine was evidence that might infer the 4.75 ounces of cocaine were for Levy's personal
consumption. Id. at 792.
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"TWENTY QUESTIONS" DOESN'T YIELD DUE PROCESS:
CHANEY V. BROWN AND THE CONTINUED NEED TO
OPEN PROSECUTOR'S FILES IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
"A murder trial-indeed any criminal proceeding-is not a sporting
event."' In order to avoid such an atmosphere and to assure the crimi-
nal defendant the fair trial which it has held she is entitled to under the
Constitution, 2 the Supreme Court has greatly expanded the defendant's
right of access to evidence held by the prosecutor which may either lead
to acquittal or mitigate the severity of punishment. 3 This is especially
true in capital offense proceedings. 4 The Court, however, in two sepa-
rate lines of cases, has inconsistently defined the amount of access to
which the defendant is entitled.
The Brady v. Maryland 5 and United States v. Agurs 6 line of cases holds
that the defendant's right to exculpatory evidence depends on (1) the
degree to which the evidence is exculpatory, 7 and (2) how actively the
defense has sought its disclosure. 8 The Lockett v. Ohio9 line of cases
holds that a criminal defendant must be allowed to present any exculpa-
tory evidence or mitigating circumstance during the sentencing phase of
her trial. 10
In Chaney v. Brown,' a recent Tenth Circuit case, these standards
were considered concurrently for the first time. 12 The court implicitly
concluded that the Brady-Agurs evidentiary disclosure standard does not
assure fair trials.13 Consequently, the court applied the Lockett standard
1. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 102 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
2. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963). See also Scurr v. Niccum, 620 F.2d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Beasley, 576 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979); United States
v. Miller, 529 F.2d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976); United States ex
rel Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 819 (3d Cir. 1952). See infra note 166.
3. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
5. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
6. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
7. Id. at 110-11.
S. id. at 104-07.
9. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
10. Id. at 604. For a general discussion of Lockett v. Ohio and subsequent cases, see
notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
11. 730 F.2d 1334 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 601 (1984).
12. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1336. In Chaney, the Tenth Circuit discussed the interplay
among three doctrines: Brady-Agurs; Lockett; and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
Although only briefly addressed in this paper, the Enmund doctrine sets forth the require-
ment that a defendant must kill, attempt or intend to kill, or contemplate that a life will be
taken before a death sentence will be imposed. Id. at 788.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 158-62.
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and reversed the lower court's decision.' 4 While the Tenth Circuit's de-
cision soundly applied Lockett, the court, of course, could not overrule
the Supreme Court and dispense with the inadequacies of the Brady-
Agurs standard. It remains the Supreme Court's task to adopt Lockett as
the standard controlling prosecutorial disclosure at all stages of criminal
trials. The only certain means of accomplishing this, and of assuring fair
criminal trials, is to end the current game of "Twenty Questions"' 15
played in criminal discovery by opening prosecutorial files to unfettered
defense inspection. 16
The Supreme Court recently declined to hear Chaney on appeal.
17
By denying Oklahoma's petition for a writ of certiorari, the Court has
allowed the Tenth Circuit's holding that Lockett controls the
prosecutorial duty to disclose to stand. Unfortunately, the denial also
signals the court's unwillingness or inability to end the confusion sur-
rounding the prosecutor's duty to disclose by taking the necessary fur-
ther step to assuring criminal defendants fair trials and sentencing
hearings: opening prosecutor's files to defense inspection.
Moreover, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Rehnquist and
White, dissented from the denial of certiorari, expressing a desire actu-
ally to decrease the prosecutor's duty to disclose. The dissent not only
ignores Lockett but also suggests significant limitations on the standard
of Agurs.18 Overall, it implies that if the faction of the Court which has
sought to limit criminal defendant's rights becomes dominant through
future appointments to the Court, the criminal defendant's opportunity
to receive a fair trial may be thwarted to an even greater extent than at
present.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Brady-Agurs Case Line
The prosecutorial duty to reveal exculpatory evidence first emerged
in the area of perjured testimony. The Supreme Court held in Mooney v.
Holohan19 that a verdict of guilty could not stand where the prosecution
knowingly used false, contrived testimony to obtain a conviction. 20 The
Court here suggested for the first time that the acts of a prosecuting
14. Id.
15. See Beatty, The Ability to Suppress Exculpatory Evidence: Let's Cut Off the Prosecutor's
Hands, 17 IDAHO L. REV. 237, 242 (1981). "Twenty Questions" is a children's game. One
child secretly picks the name of a person, place or thing for another child to identify. The
other child may ask the first up to twenty questions in attempting to identify this secretly
chosen noun. As Beatty points out, the Agurs "specific request" standard closely resem-
bles this game, but the consequences of losing are far more grave for criminal defendants.
16. See infra notes 163-75 and accompanying text.
17. See supra note 11.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 176-93.
19. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
20. Mooney, a known radical labor leader, was convicted at trial for a murder result-
ing from a parade bombing. It later became clear that he was in no way involved with the
bombing; the prosecution had framed him with false testimony. Id. at 110.
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attorney, by themselves, could amount to a denial of due process. 21
In Pyle v. Kansas,22 the Court held that the prosecution's deliberate
suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant could be as much a
denial of due process as the employment of false testimony.
2 3
Following the Supreme Court's lead in Mooney and Pyle, the Third
Circuit held in United States ex rel Almeida v. Baldi 2 4 that both the suppres-
sion of physical evidence and the suppression of evidence relevant to
punishment deprived a criminal defendant of due process. 25 Almeida
was convicted of felony first degree murder for a policeman's death dur-
ing a robbery.2 6 Suppressed physical evidence strongly indicated that a
fellow officer had accidentally killed the policeman. 27 Although the
court held that the jury could have found Almeida guilty of felony mur-
der despite this evidence under Pennsylvania's felony murder statute,
the evidence certainly mitigated in favor of a lighter sentence. 28 Be-
cause Almeida had exhausted all state remedies, the court affirmed the
lower court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 29 Since the prosecutor
deliberately suppressed evidence in Baldi,3 0 the holding was a logical
extension of the rule in Pyle to all phases of the criminal trial.
In 1959, the Supreme Court further extended the reasoning of
Mooney in Napue v. Illinois.3 1 The prosecution's primary witness falsely
testified that the prosecution had not promised to reduce his sentence if
he cooperated. While the prosecutor had not elicited this testimony, he
knew it was false and failed to correct it. 32 The Court held that even if
the prosecutor's omission was not in bad faith it prejudiced the defend-
ant's trial for felony murder.33 The Court therefor reversed the lower
21. The Supreme Court denied leave to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari because
state remedies had not been exhausted, id. at 115, but stated that "the acts or omissions of
a prosecuting attorney can . .. in and by themselves, amount either to due process of law or
to a denial of due process of law." Id. at 111-12 (emphasis in the original).
22. 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
23. Id. at 215-16.
24. 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952).
25. Id. at 820. Pennsylvania's felony murder statute, 18 P.S. PA. § 4701 (1939), pro-
vided that accomplices to a felony resulting in death could be found guilty of first degree
murder. The court found that "[wlho killed [the policeman shot in the affray, however,]
was a relevant issue, as to penalty to be imposed by the jury at the trial, perhaps the most
relevant one." Id. at 819.
26. Id. at 816.
27. Following the gun battle during which the policeman was killed, investigators at
the scene found a .45 caliber bullet indicating that Almeida was armed with a .45 caliber
gun. They also found a bloody .38 caliber bullet behind where the dead policeman's body
had lain, indicating that the policeman had been shot by a fellow officer carrying a stan-
dard issue police revolver. The prosecution did not enter either bullet in evidence. Id. at
817.
28. See supra note 25.
29. Id. at 821-25.
30. Id. at 818.
31. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
32. Id. at 267-68.
33. "That the district attorney's silence was not the result of guile or a desire to preju-
dice matters little, for its impact was the same, preventing, as it did, a trial that could in any
real sense be termed fair." Id. at 270 (quoting People v. Savvides, I N.Y.2d 554, 557, 136
N.E.2d 853, 854-55, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1956)).
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court's denial of the defendant's motion for a writ of coram nobis. 3 4
The Napue holding marked a dramatic shift away from the focus in
prior cases on prosecutorial culpability. The prosecutor had neither in-
tentionally elicited nor intentionally failed to correct the testimony. The
defendant had nevertheless been denied a fair trial and the court's con-
cern was this denial. Its gaze shifted further away from consideration of
prosecutorial conduct, now focusing almost exclusively on what impact
the supression of evidence had on the defendant's opportunity to re-
ceive a fair trial.
Two Second Circuit decisions decided soon after Napue reveal the
form this shift of attention took in lower federal courts. United States v.
Consolidated Laundries Corp. 3 5 and Kyle v. United States 3 6 both concerned
the mysterious disappearance of documents critical to the defense from
prosecutor's files.3 7 In Consolidated Laundries, the court concluded that
the suppression was negligent, not deliberate.3 8 In Kyle, the court re-
manded for determination of this issue.3 9 In both cases, however, the
court's reasoning centered on due process and fairness; regardless of
the context in which the documents disappeared, the defendants' inabil-
ity to take advantage of whatever exculpatory value the documents had
deprived them of fair trials. 40 Fundamental fairness alone demanded
that the outcome in both cases be reconsidered in light of the
nondisclosures.
In the landmark case Brady v. Maryland,4 ' the Supreme Court held
that suppression of exculpatory evidence after the defendant had re-
quested its disclosure violated due process when the evidence was mate-
rial to the defendant's guilt or innocence irrespective of the
prosecution's good or bad faith in suppressing it. Brady and his accom-
plice Boblit were found guilty of felony first degree murder and sen-
tenced to death. 42 Police had obtained several written confessions from
both men shortly after their arrests, each defendant claiming that the
other had actually strangled the victim and that the killing was separate
and distinct from the robbery.43 However, in one such confession which
34. Napue, 360 U.S. at 266-67, 272.
35. 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961) (the misplacement of files containing evidence impor-
tant for the defense warranted a new trial).
36. 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961) (the inference of misplacement of files important for
the defense warranted a hearing on defendant's motion for an order vacating sentence and
an inquiry into the facts).
37. Consolidated Laundries, 291 F.2d at 568; Kyle, 297 F.2d at 509-11.
38. 291 F.2d at 570.
39. 297 F.2d at 514-15.
40. In Consolidated Laundries, the court based its decision on the need for "the correct
administration of criminal justice in the Federal courts" rather than determining whether a
negligent suppression violated due process. The decision rests on fairness, however, since
rendering criminal justice inevitably requires fairness in the conduct of proceedings. 291
F.2d at 591. In Kyle, decided three months after Consolidated Laundries, the court bases its
opinion entirely upon "the basic principles of fair play embodied in the due process clause
. . 297 F.2d at 513.
41. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
42. Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961).
43. 226 Md. at 426, 174 A.2d at 169.
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he did not sign, Boblit admitted that he killed the victim. 4 4 Believing
this confession inadmissible for lack of Boblit's signature, the prosecu-
tor did not produce it, though Brady's counsel had requested copies of
all such statements.
4 5
The Maryland Court of Appeals held that, under Maryland law, the
jury could convict Brady of felony first degree murder despite Boblit's
confession because the homicide occurred during an armed robbery.
4 6
Therefore, the undisclosed statements were not admissible on the issue
of guilt and a new trial on this issue was not required. 4 7 Disclosure of
the statement might, however, have affected imposition of the death
penalty. 4 8 Consequently, the court remanded for a trial de novo on the
issue of punishment only.4 9 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
evidence favorable to the accused and material to either his guilt or pun-
ishment must be disclosed if requested. 50 Thus, the Brady decision fol-
lowed the lower federal decisions emphasizing the need for fair trials
rather than the punishment of prosecutorial misconduct. The Brady
Court, however, significantly changed the fairness standard applied in
the lower federal courts. The Court based its evaluation of whether the
defendant's trial was fair absent undisclosed evidence, in large part, on
whether the defense had actively sought disclosure of that evidence.
5 1
Criticism of this significant change in the fairness standard soon
emerged-from within the Supreme Court. Giles v. Maryland 5 2 involved
the nondisclosure of evidence that indicated the falsity of rape charges
brought against several youths. 53 The majority declined to rule on the
nondisclosure because there were enough other questions present to
warrant remand without considering this issue. It concluded that there
was no violation of the rule in Napue even though one witness' factually
accurate statements were misleading.
54
In a pointed concurrence, Justice Fortas stated that, though he
would defer to the decision of his brethren to remand, he found the
circumstances of the nondisclosure sufficient to vacate the conviction
and order a retrial. 55 In reaching this conclusion, he reasoned that the
state had a constitutional duty to disclose evidence tending to exonerate
44. Id.
45. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
46. Brady, 226 Md. at 430, 174 A.2d at 171. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 410 (1957).
47. Brady, 226 Md. at 430, 174 A.2d at 171.
48. Id.
49. Id. 226 Md. at 431, 174 A.2d at 172.
50. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ("We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the pros-
ecution" (emphasis added)).
51. Id. Prior cases focused solely on prosecutorial conduct and fairness, not on de-
fense requests. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
52. 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
53. The undisclosed evidence tended to show that the prosecutrix (1) had consented
to the intercourse; (2) had formerly brought false rape charges; (3) was promiscuous;
(4) was mentally unstable; and (5) had perjured herself at trial. Id. at 70-75.
54. Id. at 81.
55. Id. at 99.
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or otherwise aid a defendant. 56 Therefore, the defense-request aspect
of the rule in Brady should be viewed as nothing more than an "in-
clude[d]. . . reference," not a factor upon which the fairness evaluation
should turn.
5 7
In the cases that followed Giles, confusion mounted as to the signifi-
cance of a defense request for disclosure. For example, the Second Cir-
cuit held in United States v. Keogh 58 that, where the prosecutor had not
deliberately suppressed evidence, the absence of a defense request for
disclosure was relevant in determining whether the nondisclosure con-
stituted error.59 This ruling represented a retreat to the standards of
Mooney and Pyle ;60 once again, a federal court was determining fairness
by evaluating prosecutorial conduct.
Two subsequent Supreme Court cases further clouded the meaning
and application of the Brady rule. In Giglio v. United States,6 1 it was un-
clear whether the prosecution had intentionally or negligently sup-
pressed evidence tending to impeach the credibility of its chief witness
in a forgery case. 6 2 The Court held that where such evidence was mate-
rial, a defense request for the evidence was not a necessary prerequisite
to finding that the suppression constituted error.63 This holding indi-
cated that the Court was relegating the Brady request standard to a posi-
tion of secondary importance, but the opinion did not distinguish or
overrule Koegh.
The implication of Giglio proved false. Only four months later, the
Supreme Court revitalized the Brady request standard in Moore v. Illi-
nois,64 holding that a key factor in determining fairness was whether the
prosecution had suppressed evidence following a defense request for its
56. "[The state has a] constitutional duty, as I see it, voluntarily to disclose material in
its exclusive possession which is exonerative or helpful to the defense-which the State
will not affirmatively use to prove guilt-and which it should not conceal." Id. at 10 1-02
(Fortas, J., concurring).
57. Although this Court included in its statement of the controlling principle [in
Brady] a reference to counsel's request .. .I see no reason to make the result
turn on the adventitious circumstance of a request. If the defense does not know
of the existence of the evidence, it may not be able to request its production. A
murder trial-indeed any criminal proceeding-is not a sporting event.
Id. at 102 (Fortas, J., concurring).
58. 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968).
59. "We cannot agree with petitioner that where there has not been a deliberate sup-
pression [of evidence] . ..the absence of a [defense] request is irrelevant." Id. at 147.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
61. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
62. The United States government prosecuted the case. One assistant attorney inter-
viewed the witness, Taliento, and promised him immunity from prosecution for conspiracy
if he testified against Giglio. Another assistant attorney conducted the prosecution and
was unaware of this promise. Thus, when Taliento testified at trial that he had not been
promised immunity, the latter attorney did not correct him. Id. at 251-53.
63. In fact, the Giglio Court stated the Brady rule inaccurately, completely evading the
defense request issue: "Brady v. Maryland... held that suppression of material evidence
justifies a new trial 'irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' " d. at
153.
64. 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
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disclosure.65 Moore's counsel had argued, probably after reading Giles
and Keogh, that a defense request was not an "indispensable prerequi-
site" to a finding of unfairness. 6 6 The Court disagreed.
Uncertainty surrounding the Brady rule peaked in Davis v. Heyd,6 7 a
1973 Fifth Circuit case in which the court reached the same conclusion
Justice Fortas had reached six years earlier in Giles. In Davis, the defend-
ant did not request production of certain highly exculpatory statements,
which would have supported a plea of self-defense at his manslaughter
trial, because he did not know they existed. 6 8 The court held that re-
quiring a request for unknown evidence so material in nature served no
useful purpose and could not be a prerequisite to enforcement of the
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.
69
The Brady decision thus left many questions unanswered for lower
courts, and subsequent Supreme Court cases failed to provide any addi-
tional guidance. A precise definition of materiality was lacking, 70 as
were any firm criteria for the necessity of a defense request. Despite this
confusion, the Supreme Court unwaiveringly held that the defendant
was not entitled to an open inspection of prosecutorial files. 7'
In United States v. Agurs,7 2 the Court sought to remove the ambigui-
ties surrounding the duty to disclose. Agurs was convicted of second
degree murder.7 3 She filed a motion for a new trial, pleading that the
prosecutor's failure to divulge her victim's prior criminal convictions for
assault and carrying a deadly weapon deprived her of evidence to sup-
port her defense that she killed him in self-defense. 74 She had not, how-
ever, requested production of this evidence. 7 5 The Court reversed the
appellate court's grant of her motion, 76 holding the evidence not suffi-
ciently material to merit a new trial. 7 7 It did, however, restate the rule in
Giglio7 8 as a caveat: where evidence is undeniably exculpatory, the pros-
ecution must disclose it even absent a request. 79 It also reaffirmed its
prior rule that trial findings must be overturned where the prosecution
65. Id. at 794-95. (Other key factors included whether the undisclosed evidence was
favorable and material.)
66. Id. at 794.
67. 479 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1973).
68. Id. at 454.
69. Id.
70. It was unclear after these cases whether "material" went only to the exculpatory
nature of the evidence itself or went to both the exculpatory nature of. and the defense's
diligence in seeking out, the evidence.
71. Moore, 408 U.S. at 795 ("We know of no constitutional requirement that the pros-
ecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory
work on a case"); Miller, 529 F.2d at 1129 ("Contrary to his argument, Miller is not enti-
tled to an open inspection of the government files"). See supra note 2.
72. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
73. Id. at 98.
74. Id. at 100.
75. Id. at 101.
76. Id. at 102.
77. Id. at 113-14.
78. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
79. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110-11.
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knowingly employs perjured testimony.
80
The new law promulgated in Agurs concerned evidence of less-than-
certain exculpatory value. The Court adopted a bifurcated standard for
the disclosure of evidence. 8 1 If the defense had "specifically" requested
evidence or information, such a request would place the prosecution on
notice of precisely what the defense wanted and obligate it to respond
virtually without exception. 8 2 In such cases, the Court held that Brady,
fairly interpreted, required that if the defense could later show that the
undisclosed evidence "might have affected the outcome of the trial," a new
trial would be appropriate. 83 Where the request was merely "general,"
however, consisting of boilerplate language requesting only the disclo-
sure of "anything exculpatory," the prosecution would have no firm in-
dication of what the defense was seeking. 8 4 In this instance, the
undisclosed evidence would have to be so significant that it "create[s] a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist" before a new trial would
be merited.
8 5
The import of the Agurs opinion is revealed in Scurr v. Niccum, 86 an
Eighth Circuit case holding that the materiality of nondisclosed evidence
must initially be determined based on whether the defense's request was
"specific" or "general." '8 7 Thus, the court did not determine materiality
of evidence based upon whether that evidence tended to prove inno-
cence or guilt. Rather, it based materiality upon whether defense coun-
sel had requested the evidence. Other lower federal cases have since
held that the materiality of nondisclosed evidence must be determined
based on an evaluation of its significance in light of all of the evidence
actually admitted at trial 88 and that, where more than one piece of evi-
dence is not disclosed, the court must consider the materiality of each
piece not only individually but also in the context of all pieces. 8 9
B. The Lockett Case Line
The second line of cases meriting close examination in evaluating
the Chaney decision concerns the admissibility of mitigating evidence in
the sentencing phase of capital offense trials. In a 197 non-capital
case, 90 the Supreme Court held that the defendant's right to a just sen-
tence required the sentencer to consider both the circumstances of the
crime and the character of the defendant when imposing punishment. 9 1
80. Id. at 103. See supra notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text.
81. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104-07.
82. Id. at 106 ("When the prosecution receives a specific and relevant request, the
failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.").
83. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 106-07.
85. Id. at 112.
86. 620 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1980).
87. Id. at 189.
88. See, e.g., United States ex rel Marzeno v. Gengler, 574 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1978).
89. Id. at 736-37.
90. Pennsylvania ex reL Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937).
91. Id. at 55.
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In Gregg v. Georgia,9 2 the Court upheld Georgia's capital sentencing
procedure because the procedure provided criteria for considering the
character of the criminal defendant and the circumstances of the crime
committed. 9 3 The Court restated its holding in the landmark case of
Furman v. Georgia 94 that the death penalty could not be imposed arbi-
trarily.9 5 The potential for capriciousness could be eliminated if the
sentencer considered mitigating circumstances in assessing the presence
of aggravating circumstances, thus creating a system that "require[s] as
a prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty, specific . . .find-
ings as to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the defend-
ant."'9 6 In Roberts v. Louisiana,9 7 the Court again stated that capital
sentencers must consider those mitigating circumstances relevant to
both the offender and the offense and that a Louisiana statute which did
not permit this was unconstitutional.
9 8
The most significant recent case is Lockett v. Ohio.9 9 Sandra Lockett
was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death for a killing
which occurred during a robbery she conspired to commit. ' 0 0 She was
convicted under an Ohio statute that required imposition of the death
penalty for aggravated murder unless a very limited range of mitigating
circumstances was present.10 ' Evidence which the statute prevented the
sentencing court from considering, however, strongly indicated that the
death penalty was inappropriate for Lockett. 10 2 The Court held that,
given the serious and final nature of the death penalty,' 0 3 the sentencer
must consider any mitigating evidence presented by the defendant in as-
sessing the appropriateness of the death penalty.
10 4
92. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
93. Id. at 197-98. See also Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976).
94. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). (Furman was a per curiam opinion with separate opinions
from each justice).
95. 428 U.S. at 188-89.
96. Id. at 198.
97. 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (Mandatory death penalty statute found unconstitutional); see
also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). See generally Chaney, 730 F.2d at
1351-52 (citing Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937) for same rule).
98. Roberts, 431 U.S. at 637.
99. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
100. Id. at 589-93. Lockett was also convicted of aggravated robbery.
101. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03, 2929.04(B) (1975) require the judge to impose
the death penalty for aggravated murder unless, upon "considering the nature and cir-
cumstances of the offense" and the "history, character, and condition" of the defendant he
finds "by a preponderance of evidence that (1) the victim . .. induced or facilitated the
offense, (2) it was unlikely that [the defendant] would have committed the offense but for
the fact that she 'was under duress, coercion, of strong provocation,' or (3) the offense was
primarily the product of [the defendant's] psychosis or mental deficiency." Lockett, 438
U.S. at 593-94.
102. Lockett was not present at the actual robbery, had no prior felony record, and was
determined by psychological evaluators to be a good candidate for rehabilitation. Id. at
590, 594.
103. Id. at 605.
104. [W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from consid-
ering, as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any
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The Supreme Court has affirmed the importance of the Lockett rule
and the stringency with which it must be applied. First, in Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 10 5 the Court held that a defendant's family background and
psychological profile were admissible at the sentencing hearing to miti-
gate punishment, reversing the lower court's refusal to consider this evi-
dence. 10 6 Second, in Enmund v. Florida,10 7 the Court held that, because
Enmund only drove the getaway car during the course of an armed rob-
bery in which two codefendants killed the victims, the death penalty was
impermissible.' 0 8 Where there was mitigating evidence indicating that
Enmund did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend that killing occur, the
sentencing court must eliminate the death penalty as a sentence
option.10 9
II. CHANEY V. BROWN: THE CLASH OF BRADY-AGURS
AND LOCKET REVEALED
A. Factual Background
The petitioner, Larry Chaney, was convicted of felony first degree
murder for the death of Mrs. Kendal Ashmore. The jury recommended
the death penalty after finding the existence of aggravating circum-
stances, a prerequisite to the death penalty under Oklahoma law."10
The trial judge followed this recommendation. I '
Mrs. Ashmore and her husband Phillip raised Morgan horses on
their farm in Jenks, Oklahoma. For almost a month, a man identifying
himself as Richard Elliot repeatedly called Mrs. Ashmore to discuss hor-
ses. He arranged to meet her in Tulsa, Oklahoma on March 17, 1977,
for further discussion. 1 2 On that date, Mrs. Ashmore and an employee,
Kathy Brown, drove to Tulsa, exchanged their car for the Ashmore's
pickup truck at Mr. Ashmore's office, purchased hay, and went to meet
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.
Id. at 604 (emphasis in the original) (footnotes omitted). See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95
(1979) (hearsay statements merit consideration in mitigation of punishment if they appear
to be reliable).
105. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
106. Eddings, a sixteen-year old juvenile tried and convicted for murder as an adult,
had a very turbulent childhood and was diagnosed to be highly emotionally disturbed.
The Court, holding it appropriate and necessary to consider these circumstances in deter-
mining his sentence, overturned his death penalty. Id. at 107-08.
107. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
108. Id. at 788.
109. Id. at 797.
110. Chanv. 730 F.2d at 1352 n.24. These circumstances are:
I) diw dlci'ndimi knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one
pl) rson:
2) lw dc lnd l committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of
3) lic miuder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel; and
4) th le murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arIe'INI or prosecution.
See Om|.,\. Siuvr. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(2), (3), (4), (5) (West 1983).
1Il. riiawy, 730 F.2d at 1335.
112. Id. a|t 1336.
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Mr. Elliot. 1 13 The women were never seen alive again. 14
That evening, Mr. Ashmore received the first of several calls de-
manding ransom to save the women's lives."l 5 He called the F.B.I., who
monitored and traced all subsequent extortion calls. Evidence impli-
cated Chaney as the caller."16 Authorities found the Ashmore truck in
Tulsa on March 18. Chaney was arrested on March 19. A search of his
trailer home produced evidence which also implicated him to be "Mr.
Elliot." 117  Police found the bodies of Kendal Ashmore and Kathy
Brown four days later, buried on property Chaney leased near Sallisaw,
Oklahoma, some one hundred miles southeast of Tulsa." 8
The prosecution's reconstruction of Chaney's actions between
March 17 and March 18, 1977 eventually brought this case before the
Tenth Circuit. Its interpretation of the facts and subsequent theory
were questionable in light of statements made to the F.B.I. by three wit-
nesses shortly after the murders. 19
The prosecution's theory was essentially this: Chaney acted alone
in kidnapping and murdering Mrs. Ashmore and Ms. Brown. Its recon-
struction of the facts was that at 1:00 p.m. on March 17, Chaney met and
kidnapped Mrs. Ashmore and Ms. Brown in Tulsa.' 20 By 4:30 p.m. he
had taken the women to his Sallisaw property, killed them, and buried
them. 12 1 At 4:39 p.m. Chaney made a long distance telephone call from
a convenience store in nearby Sequoyah, Oklahoma. 12 2 He then re-
turned to Tulsa, abandoned the Ashmore truck, and made the first ex-
tortion call to Phillip Ashmore at about 6:00 p.m.
12 3
Chaney based his applications for Post Conviction Relief and a Writ
of Habeas Corpus' 24 on the contradictions between this theory and the
undisclosed witness statements.' 2 5 One witness, Poppy Weaver, stated
113. Chaney v. Brown, No. 83-C-519-BT, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Okla. June 30, 1983).
114. Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269, 274 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (for subsequent his-
tory, see infra note 131).
115. The caller demanded that $500,000 be left at a local fairgrounds. 730 F.2d at
1337.
116. Id. One call was traced to Chaney's trailer-home and another to a phone booth
from which authorities later lifted his palm print.
117. Id. The evidence consisted of scraps of paper containing the words "Richard El-
oit," [sic] "1 p.m. Thursday," and the Ashmore's phone and street numbers. Id.
118. Id. Both women had been bound and strangled.
119. Id. at 1347. See infra text accompanying notes 125-28.
120. Though the prosecution never explicitly stated this, it strongly inferred this chain
of events during its closing argument. Record at 1173-75; Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1337-38.
121. Again, this is not explicitly stated but clearly represents the prosecution's theory
of events. Record at 1173-75; Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1337-38.
122. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1338, 1348.
123. Once again, this is not explicitly stated but rather inferred by the prosecution. Id.
at 1337; Record at 1174-76; see also Chaney v. State, No. CRF-77-756, slip op. at 6 (D.C.
Tulsa 1981).
124. Chaney v. Brown, No. 83-C-519-B, slip op. (N.D. Okla. 1983). See also Brief in
Support of Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody filed in
Chaney v. Brown, No. 83-C-519-B (N.D. Okla. 1983).
125. Chaney's counsel, Allen Smallwood, learned of these statements when they were
released to a Tulsa newspaper following a Freedom of Information Act request. Chaney,
730 F.2d at 1346. Smallwood had previously requested production of all such statements
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that on March 17 at 4:10 p.m. she saw Mrs. Ashmore in Jenks,
Oklahoma, in the Ashmore pickup, with a man and another woman.1
2 6
Jenks is approximately one hundred miles from Sequoyah, where Cha-
ney made a telephone call at 4:39 p.m. after allegedly killing and burying
Ashmore and Brown. 12 7 Clearly, if Mrs. Ashmore and Ms. Brown were
alive in Jenks at 4:10 p.m., they were not dead in Sallisaw at 4:39 p.m.
The second and third witnesses' statements contradicted the prosecu-
tion's theory that Chaney had returned the Ashmore truck to Tulsa and
abandoned it on the evening of March 17 before making the first extor-
tion call. 1
28
Combined, these statements rendered questionable the prosecu-
tion's assertion that Chaney had acted alone.' 29 They indicated that
someone else, an accomplice, had taken Mrs. Ashmore and Ms. Brown
to Chaney's property and killed them, then returned the Ashmore truck
to Tulsa. Meanwhile, Chaney had already left his property, returned to
Tulsa, and begun making extortion calls.1
3 0
B. The Opinion
The Chaney case reached the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals after a
series of unsuccessful appeals in both Oklahoma and the federal
courts.'31 The court first considered Chaney's claim that his request for
in a very detailed Motion to Produce dated April 1, 1977. See Chaney, Petitioner's Opening
Brief, Appendix B. For exerpts from this motion see infra note 136.
126. Ms. Weaver recognized both Mrs. Ashmore and the Ashmore's truck because she
and the Ashmores were long-time neighbors. 730 F.2d at 1347.
127. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
128. Kyle West, a Tulsa high school student, rode in a school bus past the spot where
the Ashmore truck was abandoned after the time the prosecution alleged Chaney aban-
doned it. He saw only a red pickup truck. J. C. Hamilton saw someone get out of a blue
and white pickup at 8:15 a.m. on March 18 and leave in a second car, presumably driven by
a second person. The F.B.I. did not recover the Ashmore truck until 9:00 a.m. that morn-
ing. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1347-48.
129. Record at 1285; Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1352-53.
130. With regard to those calls, Mr. Ashmore provided further evidence that Chaney
did not act alone. He told the F.B.I. that during the first, unrecorded call the caller told
him, "There are four of us. We're not kidding." 730 F.2d at 1347-48 (emphasis in the
original).
131. Chaney appealed the decision of the trial court to the Oklahoma Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals, which affirmed. Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980). He
then applied unsuccessfully to the United States Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari.
Chaney v. Oklahoma, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981). He applied twice for post-conviction relief,
which was twice denied. Chaney v. State, No. CRF-77-756 (D.C. Tulsa July 27, 1981),
Chaney v. State, No. PC-81-345 (Okla. Crim. App. Nov. 12, 1981). He then reapplied for
and was again denied a Writ of Certiorari from the Supreme Court. Chaney v. Oklahoma,
456 U.S. 919 (1982).
Subsequently, Chaney petitioned for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, which was denied for
failure to exhaust state remedies. Chaney v. Oklahoma, No. 82-C-625-B (N.D. Okla. June
25, 1982). He then reapplied for and was denied post-conviction relief. Chaney v. State,
No. CRF-77-756 (D.C. Tulsa Aug. 9, 1982). The ruling was affirmed. Chaney v. State, No.
PC-82-487 (Okla. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 1983).
A third petition for Writ of Certiorari and a Motion for Stay of Execution were denied
four months later. Chaney v. Oklahoma, 51 U.S.L.W 3872 (U.S. June 7, 1983). On June
15, 1983, Chaney petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and an evidentiary hearing. In a 92 page opinion,
both claims were denied. Chaney v. Brown, No. 83-C-519-BT (N.D. Okla. June 30, 1983).
[Vol. 62:1
DISCLOSURE OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE
exculpatory evidence was specific under the standards of Agurs,13 2 and
that the prosecution's failure to disclose the F.B.I. statements' 33 entitled
him to a Writ of Habeas Corpus.' 3 4 Upon examining and extensively
quoting Chaney's Motion to Produce, 13 5 the court concluded that the
request placed the prosecution on notice of the exact information Cha-
ney sought, thus conforming to the Agurs definition of a specific re-
quest. 136 The court also followed earlier rulings and held that the
specificity of the written motion for production must be evaluated in
light of the hearings held on the motion and the trial court's subsequent
production orders. 1
3 7
Second, the court held that the Oklahoma court committed error by
failing to consider whether the requested undisclosed evidence might
have affected the outcome of Chaney's sentencing hearing.' 3 8 Even if
the lower court had considered this evidence, any decision it reached,
contrary to the state's argument, would not have been entitled to a pre-
sumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 13 9 The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that such a decision presented a mixed question of fact and
Chaney appealed this ruling to the Tenth Circuit, which accepted the case and issued a
Stay of Execution pending appeal. Chaney v. Brown, 712 F.2d 441 (10th Cir. 1983). See
Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1338-39; Petitioners' Opening Brief at 1-3; Brief of Appellee at 1-3.
132. For discussion of the Agurs specific request standard, see supra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text.
133. See supra note 125-28 and accompanying text.
134. See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 10-26.
135. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1340-42. See Motion to Produce filed April 1, 1977,
Oklahoma v. Chaney, No. CRF-77-704, CRF-77-705 (D.C. Tulsa 1977).
136. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1341-44. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106-07. The following exerpts
from the Motion to Produce provide excellent guidance as to what constituted a specific
request:
1. Statements of all persons who were interviewed by an agent of the State of
Oklahoma, an investigator or member of the Tulsa Police Department or the
Tulsa County Sheriff's Office or any other governmental agency in connec-
tion with the subject matter or this case, whether or not the state intends to
call them to testify at trial or not.
2. Stenographic recordings or transcriptions of any oral statement made by
any person to an agent of the State, an investigator or police officer at the
Tulsa Police Department, a member of the Tulsa County Sheriff's Office or a
member of any other governmental agency in connection with the subject
matter of the case, whether or not (a) the stenographic recordings or tran-
scriptions are a substantially verbatim recital of the statement, or (b) the
statement was recorded contemporaneously with its making, or (c) the state-
ment relates to the proposed subject matter of the testimony of the witness
to be used at trial.
4. The names and addresses of all persons who may have some knowledge of
the facts involved in the instant case.
13. Any and all oral statements made to any member of the Tulsa Police Depart-
ment or District Attorney's staff or any other law enforcement official.
Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1340.
137. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1344. See United States v. Gaston, 608 F.2d 607 (5th Cir.
1979).
138. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1344-45.
139. Id. at 1345-46. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 states, in relevant part, that in federal habeas
corpus proceedings the factual findings of a state court shall be presumed correct until or
unless it is established that the facts were inadequately developed or that the petitioner
was deprived of a "full, fair, and adequate hearing," or denied due process. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a), (d)(3),(6),(7). See also Brief of Appellee at 13-2 1; Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2-4.
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law, and was therefore open to federal review. 140
Third, the court held that the undisclosed F.B.I. statements would
not have affected Chaney's conviction for first degree murder. 14 1 The
statements indicated that Chaney was guilty of kidnapping which re-
sulted in death. 142 Like most states' felony murder statutes, Oklahoma's
statute permits conviction of first degree murder when death occurs
during the commission of certain enumerated felonies, including kid-
napping, regardless of whether death was intended. 143 It also permits
one who is merely an accomplice to these felonies to be convicted of first
degree murder for a death which occurs during their commission. 144
Fourth, and most important, the court found that the F.B.I. state-
ments the prosecution withheld on the good-faith supposition that they
were not exculpatory' 4 5 were in fact exculpatory. 14 6 They might have
affected the jury's recommendation that the death penalty be imposed
because they implicated at least one other person in the kidnapping and
murder of Ashmore and Brown. 14 7 The jury had based its conclusions
regarding the existence of aggravating circumstances upon the supposi-
tion-and the prosecution's insistence14 8 -that Chaney had acted
alone. 14
9
The court also held that the prosecution's failure to provide the
F.B.I. statements denied Chaney his Lockett right to present any mitigat-
ing evidence at sentencing. 150 First, the undisclosed statements met the
Green v. Georgia15 ' standard allowing courts to consider reliable hearsay
statements in mitigation of punishment. 1 52 Second, examined for their
140. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1345-46. An in-depth evaluation of this aspect of the court's
decision is beyond the scope of this comment.
141. Id. at 1349-51.
142. Id. at 1350.
143. Id. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701B (West 1983).
144. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1350. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 172 (West 1983).
145. 730 F.2d at 1348.
146. Id. at 1357.
147. Id. at 1352. Because the court found that Chaney's request for evidence was spe-
cific, the standard of materiality for the evidence which the prosecutor did not disclose
following this request was whether that undisclosed evidence might have affected the jury's
decision. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106.
148. Record at 1285. See Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1352, 1357.
149. Id. at 1352. See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 27-36; Petitioner's Reply Brief at 12-
13 and Exhibit A.
150. Id. at 1351.
151. 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
152. After making her statement to the F.B.I. and before Chaney's trial, Poppy Weaver
changed part of her statement, saying she could not identify the woman she saw as Kendal
Ashmore. However, Ms. Weaver made her statement within five days of seeing Mrs. Ash-
more, indicating that her recollections were fresh and accurate. Also, she precisely identi-
fied the time she saw Mrs. Ashmore based on hearing police cars and fire trucks passing
(which were stipulated to have passed her location at the time she said they did), a further
indication of accurate recall on her part. Id. at 1354. Relying on Green, the court held that,
since the statements went to the critical issue of punishment and appeared reliable, they
were admissible under the recorded recollection exception to the hearsay rule despite Ms.
Weaver's failure to confirm them. Id.
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cumulative effect as required by United States ex rel Marzeno v. Gengler, 1
53
the statements indicated that Chaney was only an accomplice to the kill-
ings. The court held that since they created doubt that Chaney had
killed, attempted to kill, or intended that killing occur, his death sen-
tence could not stand in light of Enmund.154 Consequently, the court
affirmed Chaney's conviction, reversed and enjoined his death sentence,
and remanded for either imposition of a life sentence or, if the prosecu-
tion still desired to pursue the death penalty, for a new sentencing hear-
ing or a retrial on all issues, as the Oklahoma courts saw fit to
require. 155
III. CHANEY V. BROWN: ANALYSIS
A. The Tenth Circuit Chose the Lockett Standard of Disclosure
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Chaney v. Brown is a sound decision
given the complete lack of precedent to guide it in integrating the Brady-
Agurs and Lockett lines of decisions.1 56 Nevertheless, the court was con-
fronted with an impossible task; the standards of these lines are irrecon-
cilable and reveal the Supreme Court's inconsistent handling of
discovery in criminal proceedings. If the Supreme Court continues to
adhere to its own espoused goal of assuring criminal defendants fair tri-
als, 157 it should remove the barrier it has placed before this goal: its
failure to open prosecutors' files to unrestrained defense inspection.
Chaney was entitled, based on Lockett, to present any mitigating cir-
cumstances in an attempt to avoid the death penalty.' 58 His ability to
exercise this right depended on the obligation imposed on prosecutors
by Brady and Agurs to reveal exculpatory evidence. The Agurs specific
request standard requires the prosecution to disclose all requested evi-
dence which might affect the outcome of the trial as to either verdict or
punishment. 159
At first glance, "any" and "might affect" appear synonymous, or so
alike that any difference is negligible. A closer evaluation based on the
facts of Chaney shows the illusory nature of this apparent harmony. The
prosecutor in Chaney, when called by Chaney's counsel to testify at a
153. 574 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1978). See supra notes 88 & 89 and accompanying text.
Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1356.
154. 730 F.2d at 1356-57. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
155. 730 F.2d at 1359. The court concluded that it was unnecessary to grant Chaney's
request for a federal evidentiary hearing because his death sentence could not stand, ren-
dering such a hearing moot. Id. at 1358. See also Petitioner's Opening Brief at 36-40; Brief
of Appellee at 30-33; Petitioner's Reply Brief at 13. However, the court held that the
death penalty might be reinstated after further proceedings if the mitigating factors were
determined not to eliminate one or more of the aggravating circumstances required by
Oklahoma law. See supra note 110.
156. The Tenth Circuit noted that, where integration of the Brady-Agurs and Lockett
lines was concerned, Chaney v. Brown was a case of first impression. Chaney 730 F.2d at
1336.
157. See supra note 2.
158. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
159. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
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post-conviction relief hearing, stated that he did not disclose the F.B.I.
statements in question because he believed they were not exculpa-
tory. 160 Rephrased to comply with the language of Agurs, he did not
believe they might affect the outcome of the trial. The flaw in the Agurs
standard is laid bare: it does not eliminate continued exercise of
prosecutorial subjectivity in determining what evidence should be or
must be disclosed. A standard truly requiring the disclosure of any ex-
culpatory evidence would have eliminated this subjectivity.
The Tenth Circuit implicitly found the Agurs standard inferior to the
Lockett standard. It determined that even if the withheld F.B.I. state-
ments were hearsay contradicted by live testimony, they were admissible
for their potential mitigating effect.' 6l In reaching this conclusion, the
court adhered to the Supreme Court's stringent application of the Lock-
ett holding in subsequent cases such as Enmund. 162 It acted to condemn
and eliminate prosecutorial discretion and subjectivity of any kind in
criminal discovery. "Any" indeed means all in Chaney, just as it did in
Lockett. Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Lockett standard of
disclosure is (1) higher than the Agurs standard and (2) controls the de-
fendant's right to know what favorable evidence is in the prosecutor's
possession.
B. The Supreme Court Should Open Prosecutors' Files
One commentator has pointed out that prosecutors' possessiveness
of evidence in their possession is the central barrier to open discovery in
criminal cases. 163 Evidence in criminal cases is unique; physical evi-
dence in particular cannot be duplicated. 64 Given the state's role as
investigator of crimes and its resultant superior fact-gathering appara-
tus, 165 it usually discovers and acts as custodian of the evidence in crimi-
nal cases. This superiority and the Constitution's orientation towards
protecting the criminal defendant from intimidation and improper pun-
ishment 16 6 demand that the defendant be given every opportunity to
160. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1348.
161. Id. at 1354.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 99-109.
163. See Beatty, supra note 15, at 242.
164. Beatty notes:
It has been suggested that "[s]uppressed evidence would not be a major
problem if the defendant had facilities adequate to gather his own evidence
before the trial." But that is not really correct. Assume both parties have ade-
quate investigatory staffs, but there is only one used bullet to find in a case.
Should the party who finds the bullet be able to withhold that item of evidence
from the trial process because it belongs to them or because the other party failed
to request it?
Id. (quoting Note, The Prosecutors' Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74
YALE L.J. 136, 142-43 (1964)).
165. For an excellent discussion of the relative advantage of the state over the defend-
ant in criminal discovery, see Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1180-92 (1960). See also Application of Kapatos, 208
F. Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
166. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (the state cannot convict the accused of crime based on
improperly seized evidence); amend. V (the state cannot try the accused for the same of-
fense twice, the accused is protected from self-incrimination, the state may not deprive the
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assess all the evidence against him and either mount a defense or con-
front the likelihood of his conviction and attempt to plea bargain.'
6 7
One critic of only partially opened prosecutors' files suggests that any
system designed to settle disputes between parties will produce proper
and desirable resolutions only when the facts giving rise to the dispute
are available to both parties.' 6 8 At least one nation, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, is in agreement. It has completely opened prosecutors'
files to defense inspection in an effort not only to produce desirable res-
olutions in criminal proceedings but also to streamline the criminal pro-
cess. Its decision to do so has brought positive results in both areas. 169
The most significant drawback of the Agurs disclosure standard is
precisely the problem the Tenth Circuit recognized and sought to cor-
rect: it is frequently impossible for a prosecutor to assess correctly the
mitigating potential of a given piece of evidence. 170 In fact, one com-
mentator has suggested that most prosecutors lack even threshold
knowledge of the nature and purpose of exculpatory evidence or of their
responsibility to identify and reveal it.' 7 1 If this is a realistic assessment,
and it appears to be, what are the defendant's chances of receiving evi-
dence which is unknown to her? Justice Fortas was quick to point out in
Giles v. Maryland that her chances are slim if not eliminated entirely.1
7 2
He concluded, as the Tenth Circuit concluded implicitly in Chaney, that
it is improper to judge the fairness of the criminal defendant's trial by
the type of request the defense has submitted' 73-by the ability of de-
fense counsel to play "Twenty Questions."'
174
Chaney and the decisions underlying it lead to the conclusion that
accused of life, liberty or property without due process of law); amend. VI (the accused has
the right to a speedy, public, jury trial, to be informed of the charges against him, to be
represented by counsel, and to subpoena witnesses); amend. VIII (no excessive bail or
fines, no cruel and unusual punishments); amend. XIV (making the above amendments
applicable to and binding upon the states). For a discussion of this "selective incorpora-
tion" and extensive citation to relevant cases, seeJ. NOWAK, K. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 452-60 (1983)).
167. One commentator has even said that, in the pretrial phase, plea bargaining cannot
be realistically explored by the defendant if she cannot examine the complete case against
her, including all evidence. Absent such disclosure, an informed plea is not possible.
Comment, Disclosure to the Guilty Pleading Defendant: Brady v. Maryland and the Brady Trilogy,
72J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 165 (1981).
168. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56 (1961).
169. In fact, the defense can "motion the prosecution to investigate (at public expense)
any defensive claims and evidence that might have been overlooked" (footnote omitted).
Langbein, Lard Without Plea Bargaining How the Germans Do It, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 204, 207-
08 (1979).
170. See Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74
YALE L.J. 136, 147 (1964).
171. See Beatty, supra note 15, at 243, n.35 (A U.S. Attorney had addressed a group of
New York prosecutors and presented to them a fact pattern involving a bank robbery
where only one of six witnesses said the defendant was not the robber. He then asked for
a show of hands by those who thought they would be obligated under Brady to disclose
that witness and her opinion to defense counsel. Only two in a large group raised their
hands, leading the U.S. attorney to the understated conclusion that "the obligation to
disclose favorable evidence is not one fully appreciated by all prosecutors.")
172. See supra note 57.
173. Id.
174. See Beatty, supra note 15, at 242.
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fairness in criminal cases will be assured only when the Supreme Court
properly and fully imposes the Lockett disclosure standard on the entire
criminal process by opening prosecutors' files to unfettered defense in-
spection. This is the standard applicable in civil discovery virtually with-
out exception, yet the penalties faced by "convicted" civil litigants are
distinctly less onerous than those faced by convicted criminals.175 It is
time the Court grants to criminal defendants the fair trials it has said are
their constitutional right.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DENIAL OF CERTIORARI IN CHANEY V.
BROWN: THE MAJORITY DECLINES TO OPEN PROSECUTORS'
FILES WHILE THE MINORITY FORESHADOWS
POSSIBLE DIMINISHMENT OF THE
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
Six members of the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in
Chaney v. Brown. 176 This decision has two ramifications which ultimately
raise more questions than they answer. First, the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion, favoring the Lockett standard over the Brady-Agurs standard, con-
trols the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in the Tenth
Circuit. This holding clarifies the definition of a specific request, en-
hancing the defendant's opportunity to receive both a fair trial and a fair
sentencing hearing. There is not, however, a uniform standard binding
on all courts. Second, and more important, the denial of certiorari sug-
gests that there currently is not a majority of justices who believe that
fair trials can only be assured by opening prosecutors' files to unfettered
defense inspection. It is possible that the Court's denial of certiorari
represents a compromise between one contingent ofJustices who would
have opened prosecutors' files and a second who would not entertain so
significant a change in prior law, but equally would not be party to the
further constriction of due process advocated by the minority in Chief
Justice Burger's dissent.
That dissent suggests a disturbing possibility: any change in the
composition of the court adding to ChiefJustice Burger's activist contin-
gent could lead not only to the overruling of Lockett but also could result
in a drastic diminishment of the Brady-Agurs standard.
The dissent argues that certiorari should be granted to resolve two
issues: what distinguishes a specific from a general request and what
criteria determine whether undisclosed evidence is material in the sen-
tencing phase of trial.17 7 After a brief review of the facts, the Chief Jus-
tice concludes that, while the F.B.I. statements "arguably should have
been disclosed," they would not overturn either Chaney's guilt or sen-
tence because "none are relevant to rebut an inference that [Chaney]
175. Civil penalties are nearly always economic. Though they may be burdensome,
they do not jeopardize one's life or physical liberty.
176. Brown v. Chaney, 53 U.S.L.W. 3433 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1984). This decision will here-
after be cited as Brown to distinguish it from the decision of the Tenth Circuit.
177. Id. at 3433.
[Vol. 62:1
DISCLOSURE OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE
intended that the victims be killed."' 178 He states that the Tenth Circuit
failed to address Chaney's intent as revealed by the threatening nature
of Chaney's extortion calls to Mr. Ashmore.' 79 This overlooks the fact
that neither the Tenth Circuit nor the trial court addressed the possibil-
ity that Chaney was bluffing to assure delivery of the ransom money,
never intending that an accomplice would kill Ashmore and Brown. The
Chief Justice thus ignores the holding of Enmund.18
0
In discussing the first issue, the dissent acknowledges the dilemma
created by the Agurs standard because "not all requests fall into obvious
,specific' or 'general' categories."' 8 1 It continues, however, to state that
the Tenth Circuit improperly held Chaney's request for production of
all F.B.I. statements was specific because the request failed to give notice
"of the defendant['s] interest in a particular piece of evidence." 182 In the
same discussion, the dissent acknowledges that the defense may be una-
ware of the prosecutor's possession of exculpatory evidence. 18 3 The
Chief Justice argues, though, that Agurs adequately "addressed this di-
lemma by requiring some information to be released where there was only
a general request or no request at all."' 18 4 The dissent's conclusion,
then, is that Chaney's request was general because he failed to request
particular evidence. The fact that his request was general because he
was unaware of what the prosecution possessed was unimportant; how-
ever, if the withheld statements were truly relevant and material the
prosecution would have disclosed them anyway under the general re-
quest standard of Agurs.
The danger inherent in the dissent's argument is self-evident; it re-
vives the precise problem the Tenth Circuit sought to eliminate by
adopting the Lockett standard: prosecutorial subjectivity in evaluating
the importance to the defense of evidence in the prosecution's exclusive
possession. What is "some information"? Does it include the implica-
tion arising from four separate F.B.I. witness statements that a defend-
ant may not be a murderer, as in Chaney? According to Chief Justice
Burger's dissent, it does not.
In considering the second issue, the Chief Justice implies that a
Court dominated by those sharing his views would hold the Brady-Agurs
standard inapplicable to the nondisclosure of mitigating evidence in the
sentencing phase of trial.' 85 He suggests that reconsideration of a de-
fendant's sentence when a nondisclosure affects the severity of that sen-
tence could in the future depend not on whether a violation occurred
178. Id. at 3433, 3434 n.9.
179. The caller, presumed to be Chaney based on circumstantial evidence, told Ash-
more that "Mrs. Ashmore would be 'dead' or pieces of her body returned in a box if the
ransom request was not complied with. ... Id. at 3434 n.9. See supra note 116.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
181. Brown, 53 U.S.L.W. at 3434.
182. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Jackson, 388 Mass. 98, 110, 445 N.E.2d 1033, 1040
(1983)) (emphasis added by the ChiefJustice).
183. Brown, 53 U.S.L.W. at 3434 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106).
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Id.
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but on the appropriateness of the sentence imposed "in light of all the
evidence."' 18 6 Again, the diminishment of the defendant's due process
rights which would result from such a standard is readily apparent. This
rule, if promulgated by the Court at a later date, will eliminate the rule
of Lockett that reconsideration of sentencing is merited whenever any
mitigating evidence is not disclosed.' 8 7 The dissent implies that it
would require the defendant to show that undisclosed mitigating evi-
dence was "material" before it would reconsider any sentence, even a
capital sentence.18 8 If such were the case, a court rather than a jury
would determine the materiality of the undisclosed evidence. The dis-
senters in Agurs cogently argued that allowing a judge to determine what
mitigating evidence would have affected a jury's recommendation to im-
pose capital punishment would be fundamentally unfair. 1
89
In his concluding paragraph, the Chief Justice states that the prose-
cutor has an "interest in avoiding premature or excessive discovery of
his files."190 He apparently concludes that this interest mandates a nar-
rower interpretation of Agurs than the Tenth Circuit's interpretation. 19
It is difficult to imagine what this interest is, however, since the court
stated in Agurs that the prosecutor's "overriding interest [is] that 'justice
shall be done,' ",192 and, further, that "the prudent prosecutor will re-
solve doubtful questions [concerning whether to disclose evidence] in
favor of disclosure."' 19 3 Chief Justice Burger's interpretation of what
constitutes due process in terms of evidentiary disclosure perpetuates
the specter of courts erroneously meting out capital sentences without
first providing defendants every opportunity to demonstrate that such
sentences are inappropriate. The only sure means of exorcising this
specter from criminal jurisprudence is to open prosecutor's files to un-
fettered defense inspection.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants are constitu-
tionally entitled to fair trials. In order to assure fair trials, it has re-
quired, in certain circumstances, that prosecutors disclose exculpatory
186. Id.
187. See supra text accompanying note 104.
188. Brown, 53 U.S.L.W. at 3434.
189. Under today's ruling, if the prosecution has not made knowing use of perjury,
and if the defense has not made a specific request for an item of information, the
defendant is entitled to a new trial only if the withheld evidence actually creates a
reasonable doubt as to guilt in the judge's mind. With all respect, this rule is com-
pletely at odds with the overriding interest in assuring that evidence tending to
show innocence is brought to the jury's attention. The rule creates little, if any,
incentive for the prosecutor conscientiously to determine whether his files con-
tain evidence helpful to the defense.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 117 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See generally id. at 117-
120.
190. Brown, 53 U.S.L.W. at 3435.
191. Id.
192. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110-11 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935)) (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 108.
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evidence. The Court has failed to assure fair trials, however, because it
has promulgated two ineffective standards to determine the amount of
disclosure to which the defendant is entitled. The Brady-Agurs standard
detracts from assuring fair trials by basing the defendant's right to evi-
dence in the prosecutor's possession upon the specificity of his request
for that evidence. The Lockett standard endeavors to assure fair trials by
requiring that the defense be allowed to present any mitigating circum-
stances to aid the defendant, but that standard has heretofore applied
only to the sentencing phase of capital offense proceedings. Further-
more, the amount of prosecutorial evidence which the defense will have
even at the sentencing stage of the defendant's trial depends upon the
disclosure requirements imposed on the prosecution at the beginning of
the proceedings by the Brady-Agurs discovery standard. Thus, given the
Court's history of placing a high premium on fair trials, neither standard
adequately protects the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial.
Chaney v. Brown brought these standards together for the first time.
The facts of the case demonstrate that the Brady-Agurs standard contin-
ues to permit prosecutors to exercise discretion in disclosing evidence.
This leads to the nondisclosure of evidence which the defense must re-
ceive if the defendant is to exercise effectively his Lockett rights. The
Tenth Circuit attempted to integrate the Brady-Agurs and Lockett stan-
dards, but implicitly found this impossible and concluded that the Lockett
standard should control prosecutorial disclosure throughout the crimi-
nal process. In order to enforce this proper conclusion, the Supreme
Court should guarantee the application of the Lockett standard by open-
ing prosecutors' files to unconditional defense inspection.
Unfortunately, by denying certiorari, the Court implicitly declined
to open prosecutors' files or to promulgate a uniform standard of disclo-
sure. Moreover, ChiefJustice Burger's dissent from the denial of certio-
rari suggests that the imminent realignment of the Court may further
dim the prospects for full disclosure and truly fair criminal trials. The
dissenters apparently would not only eliminate the rule in Lockett but
also greatly narrow the Bradv-Agurs line. To the extent the Court limits
the defendant's right to such disclosure, it diminishes her prospects of




FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit has announced several decisions of note in the
area of federal practice and procedure which either expand the scope of
procedural issues, chart new courses in the field, or crystallize previously
settled doctrines. Although none of the Tenth Circuit's decisions
presents radical departures or adamant affirmations of settled doctrines,
the practicing attorney should apprise himself of the subtle changes
which have occurred during this survey period. The topics which this
survey addresses include: attorney's fees, in personam jurisdiction, pre-
trial motions, notice under the Fair Labor Standards Act, trial and post-
trial motions, the final judgment rule, and cross-appeals.
I. ATrORNEY'S FEES UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
Under the prevailing "American Rule" of attorney's fees, a success-
ful litigant may not collect attorneys' fees from the losing party.' In
United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef,2 the Tenth Circuit faced the
difficult task of interpreting the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).
3
This was Congress' attempt to legislate an exception to the American
Rule in situations where the United States government assumes the po-
sition of losing party.
In Boned Beef, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
seized 273 beef carcasses and offal belonging to Jarboe-Lakey Feedlots,
Inc. The USDA charged the carcasses contained diethystilbestrol (DES),
a prohibited chemical shown to leave potentially carcinogenic residue in
meat when used in feed and implants. 4 The United States later filed a
seizure action against the meat alleging violations of the Federal Meat
Inspection Act.
5
I. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975). In
the United States, a successful litigant may not ordinarily collect attorney's fees from the
loser. The rule in England, and in other parts of the world, is that attorney's fees may be
awarded to the prevailing party. Aleyska, 421 U.S. at 247 & n.18; Spencer v. NLRB, 712
F.2d 539, 543 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984). The rule has
only two narrow exceptions:
when a "loser has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive rea-
sons," he may be obliged to reimburse the winner for his attorneys' fees, and,
when an individual litigant, by successfully maintaining a suit, has conferred a
benelit on a group of persons the court may allow him to recover his attorneys'
fees from the beneficiaries. [citations omitted]
712 F.2d at 543. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES 194-200
(1973).
2. 726 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 105 (1984).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982).
4. Boned Beef, 726 F.2d at 1484.
5. 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1982). Specifically, the United States charged the meal
had been adulterated within the meaning of § 601(m). This statute provides, in pertinent
part, that meat is adulterated:
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After trial, the district judge dismissed the action finding that
although the United States demonstrated the feedlot owner implanted
the animals with DES and that DES was harmful within the meaning of
the Meat Inspection Act, the government failed to prove the amount of
DES found in the meat was harmful. 6 The court declined to consider
Jarboe-Lackey's attorney's fees request under the EAJA and both parties
appealed.7 The Tenth Circuit dismissed both appeals for finality. The
trial court, on remand, considered and denied the defendants petition
for attorney's fees under the EAJA.8
Judge Arraj, 9 writing for the Tenth Circuit, quickly disposed of an
initial jurisdictional argument'0 and proceeded to discuss the EAJA.
The court noted that Congress designed the EAJA to "relieve victims of
abusive governmental conduct and to expose more governmental action
to adversarial testing by encouraging private parties to challenge U.S.
behavior.""II The stated purpose of the EAJA is to encourage members
of the private sector to bring suit to seek review of, or defend against,
unreasonable governmental action. 12 The EAJA allows attorney's fees to
be awarded to a prevailing party in two instances. First, attorney's fees
may be collected from the United States to the extent any other party
would be liable under statute or common law. 13 Second, courts must
award attorney's fees unless they find "the position of the United States
substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust."14
Jarboe-Lackey appealed, citing both provisions.15
The court first considered section 2412(d)(l)(A),16 the second situ-
"(1) If it bears or contains any poisionous or deleterious substance which may
render it injurious to health...
(2)(A) if it bears or contains . . . any added poisionous or deleterious
substance which may . . . make such article unfit for human food
6. Boned Beef, 726 F.2d at 1484.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. United States District Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
10. Jarboe-Lackey asserted that because the Meat Inspection Act limited the govern-
ment's right to detain seized meat for not more than twenty days, 21 U.S.C. § 672 (1982),
it followed that the complaint in any libel action must also be filed within twenty days, and
the government's failure to do so was a jurisdictional defect. The court rejected this argu-
ment, finding the express language of the act allowed a judicial proceeding to be instituted
"at any time against an adulterated meat food product." Boned Beef, 726 F.2d at 1485
(quoting United States v. 2623 Pounds, More or Less, of Veal & Beef, 336 F. Supp. 140,
144 (N.D. Cal. 1971)).
11. 726 F.2d at 1485 (citing Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
12. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1980), repnnted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4984.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982). This provision codifies the "bad faith" and "common
benefit" exceptions to the American Rule, making them applicable to the government.
Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984).
See supra note 1.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1982). This is an experimental provision of the act
which will be automatically repealed by its "sunset provision" if not reenacted before Oc-
tober 1, 1984. Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204(c), 94 Stat. 2321, 2329 (1980) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2412 (1982).
15. Boned Beef, 726 F.2d at 1485.
16. 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(l)(A) (1982).
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ation described above. This simple provision, that courts shall award
attorney's fees "unless the position of the United States is substantially
justified," has thrown the circuits into bitter disagreement over its
meaning.1 7 Noting that other courts seemed in general agreement that
the meaning of "substantially justified" was essentially one of reasona-
bleness, 18 the Tenth Circuit outlined the controversy:
While there is little debate about the meaning of "substantial
justification," there is considerable disagreement about which
government position must be justified. Some courts have con-
cluded that the government position referred to in section
2412(d)(1)(A) is the litigation position. Other courts have held
that it refers to the agency action which made it necessary for a
party to file suit. 1 9
The "litigation position" means arguments presented to the court at
trial, as opposed to government action precipitating the lawsuit. 20 The
court reasoned that it did not make any difference which construction of
the clause was chosen as the litigation position of the United States will
almost always be that its underlying action was legally justified.
2 1
Without further discussion, the court adopted the interpretation of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Spencer v. NLRB. 22 In Spen-
cer, the District of Columbia Circuit, after considering the identical issue
presented in Boned Beef, concluded that although legislative history sup-
ported both interpretations, the underlying purpose of the act would be
most effectively served by adopting the "litigation position" interpreta-
tion.23 Applying this new rule to the facts, the court in Boned Beef found
no error in the district court's holding that the posture assumed by the
government at trial had been substantially justified.
2 4
17. Compare Rawlings v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1984) ("underlying action"
interpretation); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1983);
Boudin v. Thomas, 554 F. Supp. 703, 705-06 & n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Watt, 554 F. Supp. 36, 40-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) aff'd 722 F.2d 1081 (2d
Cir. 1983); MacDonald v. Schweiker, 553 F. Supp. 536, 540-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Cornella
v. Schweiker, 553 F. Supp. 240, 242 & n.3 (D.S.D. 1982) rev'don other grounds, 728 F.2d 978
(8th Cir. 1984) (dicta); Moholland v. Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D.N.H. 1982);
Citizens Coalition for Block Grant Compliance v. City of Euclid, 537 F. Supp. 422, 426
(N.D. Ohio 1982) afd 717 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1983); with Kay Mfg. Co. v. United States,
669 F.2d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (litigation position); Gava v. United States, 699 F.2d
1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Tyler Business Servs. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir.
1982); Broad Avenue Laundry & Tailoring v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed.
Cir. 1982); Grand Boulevard Improvement Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 553 F. Supp. 1154.
1162-63 (N.D. Il. 1982); Alspach v. District Director of Internal Revenue, 527 F. Supp.
225, 228 (D. Md. 1981).
18. Boned Beef, 726 F.2d at 1486-87.
19. Id. at 1487 (citations omitted). "These two interpretations have come to be
known, respectively, as the 'underlying action' and the 'litigation position' theories."
Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984).
20. Spencer, 712 F.2d at 546.
21. Boned Beef, 726 F.2d at 1487 (Citing Foley Constr. Co. v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers, 716 F.2d 1202, 1204 (8th Cir. 1983)).
22. 712 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. 0'. 1908 (1984).
23. Id. at 556. For a differing view, see Natural Resources Ih'liNc Council v. EPA,
703 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1983).
24. Boned Beef, 726 F.2d at 1487-88.
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The court next turned to section 2142(b), a provision which would
allow recovery of attorney's fees where a party shows the government
has acted in bad faith in filing or prosecuting the case.2 5 Noting the
section is punitive in nature and would only be imposed in exceptional
cases for dominating reasons ofjustice, the court held the district judge
did not abuse his discretion in finding the provision inapplicable. 2 6 Af-
ter considering additional arguments unrelated to this discussion of the
EAJA, 2 7 the court affirmed the trial court's decision.
Spencer's interpretation of the EAJA, adopted by the court in Boned
Beef, cannot be faulted because it is a persuasive and well-reasoned opin-
ion. It should be noted though, that the court in Boned Beef might have
followed equally persuasive opinions of other courts, such as the Third
Circuit in National Resources Defense Council v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency. 28 In that case, the Third Circuit interpreted the "sub-
stantial justification" provision much differently: "Thus plainly, 'posi-
tion of the United States' means position taken by 'any agency and any
official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity.' Only
hostility to the underlying legislative purpose, we suggest, wodld permit
[such] a reading .... 29 In speaking of the competing interpretation
enunciated in cases such as Spencer, the Court stated that the interpreta-
tion adopted by these courts:
means that no matter how outrageously improper the agency
action has been, and no matter how intransigently a wrong po-
sition has been maintained prior to the litigation, and no mat-
ter how often the same agency repeats the offending conduct,
the statute [EAJA] has no application, so long as employees of
the Justice Department act reasonably when they appear before
the court.
30
In Boned Beef the Tenth Circuit adopted one of two interpretations
of the EAJA, both of which have basis in the only interpretational tool
the courts had at their disposal-legislative history. 3 1 Since the Boned
25. Id. See supra note 12.
26. 726 F.2d at 1488.
27. Jarboe-Lackey argued the District Court was required to allow an evidentiary
hearing on the issues of substantial justification and bad faith. The court held that
although an evidentiary hearing would have been permissible, the parties had ample op-
portunity to brief and argue the EAJA issue and were consequently not prejudiced by the
denial. Id. at 1489.
Next, Jarboe-Lackey contested the finding of the court that the steers had been ille-
gally implanted. The court held the finding was supported by evidence and would not be
overturned. Id. at 1489-90. Finally, Jarboe-Lackey argued that the trial court erred in
denying their motion and counterclaim for recoupment. The court held that since the
government had not sought money damages, it would be impossible to reduce or dis-
charge the claim by recoupment or setoff. Id. at 1490. As to the counterclaim, the court
held because the government had not consented to the claim, it was properly barred under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. However, Jarboe-Lackey might validly assert a claim
against the government under the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. § 1491 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(2) (1982)). Id. at 1491.
28. 703 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1983).
29. Id. at 707.
30. Id. at 706-07.
31. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
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Beef decision, attorney's fees may be recovered under the EAJA only
where it is shown that the government, as the losing party, acted in bad
faith in filing or prosecuting the action, or when the government's posi-
tion adopted at trial is not substantially justified.
II. IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
Manley v. Fong 32 required the Tenth Circuit to determine the reach
of Oklahoma's long arm statute.3 3 Specifically, the court had to deter-
mine whether a contract to purchase a fractional share of an oil and gas
lease, located in Oklahoma, conferred upon the Oklahoma court in per-
sonam jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.
3 4
The plaintiff, an Oklahoma resident, entered an agreement with the
defendant, a Vancouver resident, whereby the plaintiff was to sell a
seven/twenty-fourths interest in his oil and gas lease in exchange for the
defendant's deposit of ten percent of the purchase price in trust with a
designated attorney and the payment of the balance on a specified date.
Upon defendant's failure to pay the balance due, the plaintiff filed the
subject breach of contract action in Oklahoma. The defendant's motion
to dismiss, initially denied, was granted upon the defendant's motion to
reconsider. The trial court then entered an order dismissing the com-
plaint for lack of in personamjurisdiction. Subsequently, the Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed the order of dismissal.
3 5
Under the Oklahoma long arm statute,36 the court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a person having an interest in, using, or pos-
sessing real property within the state. Two questions then arise:
(1) whether an oil and gas lease is an interest in real property, and
(2) whether the execution of a contract to purchase an interest in real
estate vests equitable title in the purchaser.
In response to the first question, the Tenth Circuit relied upon its
earlier decision in Jones v. Tower Production Co.,37 where it held that "an
oil and gas lease is an interest in real property."138 Answering the sec-
ond question proved to be less straightforward because the court was
presented with conflicting authority.3 9 The Tenth Circuit ultimately
adopted the holding of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Alfrey v. Rich-
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984. See generally Note, The Award of Attorney's Fees Under the Equal Access
to Justice Act, II HOFSTRA L. REV. 307 (1982).
32. 734 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1984).
33. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a) (West 1980). The pertinent section states:
"A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an
agent, as to a cause of action or claim for relief arising from the person's: ...(5) having
an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state." Id.
34. Manley, 734 F.2d at 1417.
35. Id. at 1417-18.
36. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(5) (West 1980). See supra note 33 and ac-
companying text.
37. 120 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1941).
38. Id. at 782.
39. The following cases support the proposition that a contract to convey land, in the
future, and contingent upon performance of certain acts, does not create equitable title in
the vendee: Sutton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 95 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir.
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ardson40 which elucidated the contours of the doctrine of equitable con-
version. 41 Essentially, the doctrine states that execution of a contract
for the sale of land, for valuable consideration, vests equitable title in
the vendee from the time of execution of the contract.
4 2
Finally, the Tenth Circuit addressed the considerations set forth in
the United States Supreme Court decisions of Hanson v. Denckla43 and
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.44 The pertinent section of Hanson v.
Denckla revolves around whether an individual has availed himself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state such that the
benefits and protections of its laws were invoked.4 5 International Shoe ad-
dressed the question of whether the "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" would be offended by exercising in personam juris-
diction. 46 Relying upon these considerations, the Tenth Circuit found
that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over an international de-
fendant who entered a contract to purchase an interest in an oil and gas
lease did indeed comport with the due process principles announced in
these Supreme Court cases. Thus, a plaintiff may obtain in personam
jurisdiction over a resident of a foreign country based upon an applica-
ble long-arm statute and presumably Rule 4(i) 4 7 which provides for ser-
vice of process in a foreign country.
III. PRETRIAL MOTIONS
A. John Doe Pleading and the Statute of Limitations
The practice of identifying an unknown or protected party in the
pleadings with a fictitious name, commonly termed "John Doe" plead-
ings, 48 raises procedural problems when a statute of limitations issue
arises. The question presented in Watson v. Unipress, Inc.49 was whether,
upon discovery of a party's true identity, insertion of the party's name in
the pleadings after the running of the statute of limitations will relate
back or whether it is technically the addition of a new party.
1938); Blakely v. McCrory, 274 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Okla. 1954); Parks v. Classen Co., 156
Okla. 43, 9 P.2d 432, 433-34 (1932).
The following cases support the proposition that this type of contract creates equita-
ble title in the vendee: Alfrey v. Richardson, 204 Okla. 473, 231 P.2d 363, 368 (1951);
Whale v. Pearson, 201 Okla. 619, 208 P.2d 552, 556 (1949); Scott-Baldwin Co. v. McAd-
ams, 43 Okla. 161, 141 P. 770, 771 (1914); Adams v. White, 40 Okla. 535, 139 P. 514, 515
(1914).
40. 204 Okla. 473, 231 P.2d 363 (1951). This is the case the trial court originally
relied upon in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss.
41. Id. at 368.
42. Id.
43. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
44. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
45. Henson, 357 U.S. at 253.
46. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
47. The court did not discuss the manner in which service of process was effected.
Rule 4(i) provides for such service and takes into consideration the procedures of the law
of the foreign country.
48. Presently, no federal statute or rule specifically authorizes this practice. Watson v.
Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d 1386, 1388 (10th Cir. 1984).
49. Watson, 733 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1984).
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In Watson, plaintiff filed a products liability action two days before
the applicable statute of limitations expired. The complaint named
'John Doe" as one of the defendants. 50 Five months later, plaintiff
learned the identity of John Doe and sought to amend the complaint to
name the new defendant, Unipress, Inc., in the caption. 5' Unipress filed
a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, arguing the statute of
limitations barred its inclusion in the case. 5 2 Agreeing the addition of
Unipress was outside the statute of limitations, the trial court granted
the motion.
53
I On appeal, Watson asserted two arguments. First, Watson argued
that under Colorado law the place of injury determines whether John
Doe pleading tolls the statute of limitations. 54 Watson cited Colorado
Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) 55 as authority for the proposition that
John Doe pleading allows substitution of the real party, after the statute
has run, if the original claim is timely filed.5 6 The Tenth Circuit rejected
this argument. The court stated neither the rule itself nor the recent
Colorado case of Marriot v. Goldstein57 could be read as allowing substitu-
tion of Unipress. 58 The court decided it did not need to determine
whether Colorado or federal law controlled on the tolling issue since
plaintiff's cause of action against defendant would fail in either
situation.
59
Second, Watson contended that her amended complaint naming
Unipress as defendant, filed after the statute had run, should relate back
to the date of original filing under Federal Rule 15(c). 60 In considering
this argument, the court stressed the difference between addition of a
50. Id. at 1387. The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure allow John Doe pleading. See
CoLo. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
51. Watson, 733 F.2d at 1387. At the time of injury the company was named Unipress,
Inc. As the result of a merger, the company's name became BMM Weston, Inc. Through-




55. COLO. R. Civ. P. 10(a). The rule states in pertinent part: "In the complaint the
title of the action shall include the names of all parties."
56. Vatson, 733 F.2d at 1388.
57. 662 P.2d 496 (Colo. App. 1983). The court in Marriot held that a party replacing a
"John Doe" caption with the true party amounted to "changing a party" within the mean-
ing of Colorado Rule 15(c). The court stated that the amendment would only relate back
when the record shows that the requirements of the rule have been met. 662 P.2d at 498.
Rule 15(c) states in pertinent part:
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back
if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for
commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment
1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be
prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and 2) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the
action would have been brought against him.
COLO. R. Civ. P. 15(c). The Watson court stated that in Marriot, the Colorado Court of
Appeals impliedly held that John Doe pleading did not operate to toll the statute of limita-
tions. Watson, 733 F.2d at 1388.
58. Watson, 733 F.2d at 1388.
59. Id. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
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new party and a mere misnomer. 6 ' The court restated its holding in
Archuleta v. Duffy's, Inc. ,62 that in order for an amendment which substi-
tutes a new party to relate back, the requirements of rule 15(c) must be
met:6 3 (1) the suit involves the very same transaction or occurrence;
(2) the new party had prior notice of action before expiration of the
statute of limitations; and (3) the added party knew, or should have
known, that but for a mistake in identity he would have been included in
the original complaint. 64
Applying these requirements to the facts, the court found Unipress,
Inc. had no knowledge, nor should it have known, of the controversy
until several months after the statute ran. 6 5 The court affirmed the or-
der of the district court dismissing Unipress from the action.
66
In Watson, The Tenth Circuit strictly adhered to the relation back
provisions of Rule 15 and refused to accept the softer approach taken by
some other courts. 6 7 This interpretation, however, is the majority posi-
tion on the issue of John Doe Pleading.
68
B. Conversion of Motion to Dismiss into Motion for Summary Judgment
If a party moving to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 1269 also presents new evidence which is
not excluded by the judge, the motion must be treated as a motion for
summary judgement under Rule 56.70 Ordinarily, when a motion to
dismiss is treated as a motion for summary judgment, the hearing and
notice requirements of Rule 56 must be strictly followed. 7 1 The Tenth
Circuit, however, has long held that a party may waive the hearing and
61. Watson, 733 F.2d at 1389.
62. 471 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1973).
63. 733 F.2d at 1389.
64. Id. at 1390.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Cf Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
940 (1979). In Ingram, the defendant, as in Watson, had no notice of the action prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations. The court nevertheless held the amendment re-
lated back pursuant to Rule 15.
68. See, e.g., Royal Indem. Co. v. Petrozzino, 598 F.2d 816, 820 (3d Cir. 1979); Varlack
v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1977); Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F.2d
133, 136 (7th Cir. 1973). See generally 3J. MOORE &J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
115.15 [4.-2] (2d ed. 1984).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 12. Subsection (c) of the rule states in pertinent part:
If on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
Summary Judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall
be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such
motion by Rule 56.
70. Adams v. Campbell County School District, 483 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir. 1973).
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides in pertinent part:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56
71. Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 480 F.2d 607 (10th Cir.
1973). Rule 56(c) provides, in relevant part, that the motion "shall be served at least 10
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notice requirements. 72  In Prospero Associates v. Burroughs Corp.,7 3 the
Tenth Circuit decided for the first time that a party waived the notice
requirements of Rule 56 as a result of certain pretrial conduct.
7 4
In Prospero, plaintiffs filed a successful breach of contract action in
state court. 7 5 Thereafter, plaintiff Prospero Associates (Prospero), filed
another state court action seeking additional damages. 76 After defend-
ant Burroughs Corporation (Burroughs) removed the action to federal
district court, it filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of resjudicata,
and alternatively moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 77 In its
motion, Burroughs included evidence of the state court action.7 8 The
district court treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judg-
ment and dismissed the complaint on resjudicata grounds.
79
On appeal, Prospero argued the district court had converted the
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment without the req-
uisite notice. 80 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, holding Pros-
pero waived the notice requirements. 8 1 The Tenth Circuit principally
relied on Prospero's pretrial pleadings as the basis for its conclusion.
8 2
In its opposition brief to Burroughs' motion to dismiss, Prospero
argued that Burroughs failed to affirmatively plead resjudicata, and if this
argument were to "be considered at all, the motion would have to be
treated as one for summary judgment."'8 3 Burroughs responded that it
agreed-its motion should be considered as one for summary judgment,
and moved the court accordingly. 84 The trial court thereafter granted
Burroughs' motion for summary judgment.8 5 Based on these events,
the court held Prospero waived its right to formal notice.
8 6
This holding prompted Judge McKay to file a strong dissent.
Although in agreement that there are occasions where a party might
waive the requirements of Rule 56, Judge McKay argued that this was
not one of them.8 7 The dissent recounted the pretrial activities between
the parties. Initially Prospero asserted that the motion to dismiss was
days before the time fixed for the hearing." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also Annot., 1 A.L.R.
FED. 295 (1969 & Supp. 1984).
72. Id. at 608.
73. 714 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1983).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1023.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1023-24.
78. Id. Burroughs incorporated by reference the findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and judgment in the state court case.
79. Id. at 1024.
80. Id. Prospero also contested the trial court's summary judgment ruling on the
merits. This aspect of the court's opinion will not be reviewed.
81. Id. at 1024-25. Under proper circumstances the notice requirements of Rule 56
may be waived. Mustang, 480 F.2d at 608.
82. 714 F.2d at 1024-25.
83. Id. at 1024.
84. Id. at 1024-25.
85. Id. at 1025.
86. Id. The court also addressed and decided the resjudicata issue. This aspect of the
opinion is not discussed. See id. at 1025-28.
87. Id. at 1028 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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hypothetically improper and it might be a motion for summary judg-
ment. Burroughs mischaracterized Prospero's statement regarding
summary judgment and the summary judgment ruling was entered.
88
Judge McKay could not understand why the court sanctioned violations
of Rule 56 when its requirements were so easily satisfied. 89
In past Tenth Circuit cases on this issue,90 the court has maintained
that Rule 56 notice and hearing requirements may be waived by a party.
The court has never before indicated what might constitute waiver, but
has only conclusorily stated what does not constitute waiver without any
discussion of particular facts. 9 1 In Prospero, the Tenth Circuit has for the
first time held thaf a party's actions amount to waiver, but again, the
court has failed to articulate the criteria on which it relied. The court
seems intent on deciding such waiver of notice issues on a case-by-case
basis. Because a party might never know if its action constitutes waiver,
it would seem to be in the interest of justice to simply follow Judge Mc-
Kay's suggestion and demand compliance with Rule 56 notice
requirements.
IV. NOTICE PROVISION UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 193892 (FLSA) provides employ-
ees with a means of redress against employers to recover unpaid wages
and penalizes employers found to be in violation of provisions of the
FLSA.93 Specifically, section 216(b) of the FLSA states that a legal ac-
tion may be maintained by an employee on his own behalf and collec-
tively on behalf of other employees similarly situated. 94 The procedural
mechanism of a section 216(b) action creates confusion for the parties,
attorneys, and the courts. The Tenth Circuit, in Dolan v. Project Construc-
tion Corp.,95 attempted to reduce this confusion by announcing the pro-
cedural mechanism which would govern section 216(b) actions.
Dolan involved an employee's suit to recover wages and overtime
pay pursuant to sections six and seven of the FLSA.9 6 In the district
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Dolese v. United States, 541 F.2d 853, 855 (10th Cir. 1976); Adams v. Campbell
County School District, 483 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir. 1973); Mustang Fuel Corp. v.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 480 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1973).
91. See Dolese v. United States, 541 F.2d 853, 855 (rejecting an argument of waiver,
noting that objecting party's continuing protests hardly amounted to waiver); Mustang
Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 480 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that
the facts presented, which the court did not discuss, did not constitute waiver).
92. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-262 (1982).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1982).
94. Section 216(b) provides, inter alia: "An action to recover the liability prescribed in
[this act] . . .may be maintained . . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf of
himself or themselves and others employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a
party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a
party and such consent is filed in the court in which the action is brought." 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1982).
95. 725 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1984).
96. Dolan, 725 F.2d at 1265.
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court, 97 the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to give notice to other
similarly situated employees. This motion was referred to a magistrate,
denied by the magistrate, and then subsequently affirmed by the district
court. Thereupon the plaintiffs brought this interlocutory appeal to the
Tenth Circuit to review the district court order. Essentially, the appeal
asked the Tenth Circuit to determine whether either a court or the
plaintiffs could provide other similarly situated employees, potential
plaintiffs, with notice of the pending lawsuit. 98
In deciding this issue, the Tenth Circuit initially distinguished a sec-
tion 216(b) collective action from a class action brought pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.99 In a class action, all members of
the established class will be bound by the resulting judgment unless a
member of the established class specifically "opts-out" of the class.' 0 0
Given the effect of resjudicata, due process requires that all class mem-
bers be given notice and the opportunity to opt-out of the class so that
their substantive rights will not be adversely affected by a binding judg-
ment resulting from a lawsuit of which they had no knowledge.'
0 '
A section 216(b) collective action provides that a similarly situated
employee must take an affirmative step and "opt-in" to a pending FLSA
action in order to be bound by the resulting judgment. 10 2 Conse-
quently, a potential litigant who does not receive notice and is unaware
of a pending action will not have his substantive rights adversely affected
by the outcome of that action.'
0 3
It is the notice aspect, born of the "opt-out/opt-in" distinction be-
tween Rule 23 class actions and section 216(b) collective actions which
was the focus of Dolan.10 4 Although section 216(b) provides remedies
against spurious collective actions, it is mute with respect to the proce-
dural mechanism by which such actions are brought and the extent, if
any, to which a court or a litigant may become involved with providing
97. See supra note 93.
98. Dolan v. Project Construction Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Colo. 1983).
99. 725 F.2d at 1256. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims of de-
fenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides in pertinent part:
"The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from
the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable
or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any mem-
ber who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance
through his counsel."
Id.
101. Dolan, 725 F.2d at 1266.
102. Id.
103. See Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977); LaChapelle v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding trial court rulings that po-
tential class members in a suit brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, were required to "opt into" the action).
104. Dolan, 725 F.2d at 1265.
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notification of a pending section 216(b) action to other employees who
would be eligible to join therein. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
attempted to articulate this procedure in the wake of conflicting deci-
sions by the Second, 10 5 Seventh, 10 6 and Ninth Circuits. 10 7 The Tenth
Circuit reached its decision by gleaning what guidance it could from the
legislative history. 108
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Dolan allows plaintiffs or counsel to
notify other potential plaintiffs of a pending FLSA action but prohibits
judicial involvement in either discovery or notification thereof.10 9 This
holding followed the court's discussion of the history of the FLSA, judi-
cial expansion of the FLSA, and subsequent congressional action to pull
in the reins on that judicial expansion." 10
The court bolstered its rationale, which drew heavily from the legis-
lative history, by contrasting certain section 216(b) aspects with diamet-
rically opposed provisions of a class action suit.'"I The Tenth Circuit
concluded that the class action "opt-out" provision encourages litiga-
tion and requires active judicial participation to protect substantive
rights. Conversely, the section 216(b) "opt-in" provision discourages
litigation and relegates the court to passive duties and limited
jurisdiction.
The court's holding was also motivated to accommodate Congress's
desire not to unduly burden the defendant. 1 2 In the district court ac-
tion, plaintiff propounded interrogatories which requested the names of
all similarly situated employees and numerous specifics regarding the
terms of each employee's employment. The Tenth Circuit noted that
allowing such discovery would be a substantial drain on the defendant's
time and money.
The Tenth Circuit specifically rejected the Seventh Circuit's inter-
pretation of the same legislative history 1 3 and, consequently, rejected
the Seventh Circuit's holding' 14 except that portion which prohibits no-
tice to potential plaintiffs from being sent out on district court letter-
head over the signature of the court clerk. This restrictive measure was
imposed to prevent a possible misunderstanding by potential plaintiffs
105. Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 660 F.2d 335 (2d Cir.
1979) (allowing court sponsored notice).
106. Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that
plaintiff could communicate with other members of the class under terms and conditions
prescribed by the court, but notice should not go out on court letterhead over the signa-
ture of a court official).
107. Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1977) (prohibiting notice
from plaintiff, counsel, and court).
108. Portal to Portal Act of 1947 § 5, Pub. L. No. 49, 61 Stat. 84. H.R. REP. No. 71,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947); reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1032.
109. Dolan, 725 F.2d at 1268.
110. Id. at 1266-67.
111. Id. at 1267.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1267 n.3.
114. Id. at 1268; see supra note 106.
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that the judicial imprimatur represented that the suit had merit,' 15
Dolan provides the procedural limitations upon the notice which can
be given to similarly situated potential plaintiffs in an FLSA action.' 16
Thus, the Tenth Circuit allows parties to notify similarly situated em-
ployees, but prohibits judicial involvement with both notification and
discovery in accordance with its interpretation that a FLSA section




A. Joinder of Immune Parties for Discovery of Proportional Fault
In Hefley v. Textron, Inc.,' 18 the Tenth Circuit considered the possi-
bility ofjoining immune governmental parties for the purpose of discov-
ery and assessment of proportionate fault. After consideration, the
court concluded that no such procedural mechanism exists.
1 1 9
The underlying action resulted from a helicopter crash which in-
jured three members of the Kansas Air National Guard (KANG). The
helicopter was manufactured by Textron, owned by the United States,
and operated by KANG.' 20 The three injured guardsmen brought suit
against Textron, whereupon Textron filed a third-party complaint
against the United States, Major General Fry (Fry), the State of Kansas,
and KANG. Textron sought indemnity, contribution, discovery, and as-
sessment of proportionate fault.'
2 1
The district court granted the third-party defendants' motion for
summary judgment, concluding that the United States and Fry were im-
mune from suit based on the Feres12 2 and Stencel123 doctrines. The dis-
trict court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Textron's claim
that it had an implied contract of indemnity with the United States. Pro-
visions of the eleventh amendment were the basis for ruling that Kansas
and KANG were immune from suit. 12 4 Ultimately, the district court
115. Id. at 1268. The court also reasoned: "To actively involve the trial court in the
sending of notice would necessarily involve engrafting certain additional class action pro-
cedures to protect the administration of the case from improper certification and issuance
of notice. We refuse to begin this involved process without clear congressional guidance."
Id.
116. Id.
117. It remains to be seen whether this rule announced by the Tenth Circuit will con-
serve resources, both judicial and the defendant's, or whether subsequent suits brought by
those employees who could have been initially joined as plaintiffs will ultimately burden
the resources sought to be conserved.
118. 713 F.2d 1487 (10th Cir. 1983).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1489.
121. Id.
122. Derived from Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
123. Derived from Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666
(1977).
124. "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XI.
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ruled that no procedural mechanism existed which would allow Textron
to join the immune entities solely for discovery purposes and assessment
of proportionate fault.1
25
Textron's appeal presented the following issues:
1) Can Major General Fry be held liable for his own negli-
gence in performing non-discretionary duties?
2) Can the third-party defendants be kept in the case to deter-
mine whether they are liable to Textron under a theory of an
implied contract of indemnity?
3) Can the third-part defendants be kept in the case, despite
immunity, for purposes of discovery and assessment of propor-
tionate fault under the Kansas comparative negligence
statute?1
26
Although Textron presented a battery of possible theories in support of
each issue, only those issues which the Tenth Circuit considered note-
worthy are addressed here.
B. Immunity of Government Officials
The Feres doctrine creates an exception to the United States' liability
for "injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service,"' 12 7 for which no provisions were
made in the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). 12 8 This doctrine was
extended in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States. 129 In Stencel, the
Feres doctrine was held to absolve the United States from liability "when
a member of the Armed Services brings a tort action against a private
defendant and the latter seeks indemnity from the United States under
the Tort Claims Act, claiming the Government officials were primarily
responsible for the injuries."s Further, numerous cases have held that
the Feres doctrine is applicable to officers and other servicemen in addi-
tion to the United States.'
3 '
In Hefley, the Tenth Circuit carefully considered the ramifications of
the Feres and Stencil doctrines, and concluded that the Feres doctrine is a
separate judicial exception to the FTCA. i32 The Tenth Circuit found
Fry was immune from suit despite the fact that his actions may have been
ministerial 133 and notwithstanding the express discretionary function
exception to the FTCA. 134 The Court stressed that this decision was
125. Hefley, 713 F.2d at 1490.
126. Id.
127. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
128. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
129. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
130. Id. at 670.
131. See, e.g., Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981);
Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975); Mattos v. United States, 412 F.2d
793 (9th Cir. 1969); Bailey v. DeQuevedo, 375 F.2d 72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923
(1967).
132. Hefley, 713 F.2d at 1492.
133. Id.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976), in pertinent part provides:
[Vol. 62:1
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
not based upon blind adherence to the Feres or Stencel doctrines, nor to
sovereign immunity in general,' 3 5 but instead was an attempt to pro-
mote efficient administration of justice.1
36
C. Implied Contract of Indemnity
Despite Textron's contention that there was an implied contract for
indemnity, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's conclusion that it
lacked jurisdiction over this claim. This affirmation recognized that the
United States waived sovereign immunity for actions based on express
or implied contracts. 137 In cases involving actions on express or implied
contracts, however, the federal district courts are limited to claims not
exceeding $10,000; the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over
claims in excess of $10,000.138 Because Textron did not limit its claim
to $10,000 or less, the district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction. 139
After affirming the district court on the issue of jurisdiction, the
Tenth Circuit proceeded to extend the Feres doctrine. The court stated:
As an alternative basis for affirming the decision of the trial
court, therefore, we hold that where the injured party is a ser-
viceman injured incident to military service, Feres and Stencel bar
a private party from recovering from the United States on a
claim of implied contract of indemnity.
140
As the basis for extending the Feres doctrine, the Tenth Circuit discussed
the liability of the United States as affected by the situs of the contract,
their attempt to avoid circumventing the limitations on liability con-
tained in federal military compensation schemes, and their goal of
avoiding a decision which would adversely affect military discipline.
14 1
D. Comparative Negligence and Discovery
After conceding that the third-party defendants were immune from
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title. .. shall not apply
to ... [a]ny claim ... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion in--
volved be abused.
Id.
135. Hefley, 713 F.2d 1492.
136. Id.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978), in pertinent part,, provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent -with the Court of
Claims, of ... [alny other civil action or claim against the United States, not
exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution .... or
upon any express or implied contract with the United States .... For the pur-
pose of this paragraph, an express or implied contract with the Army and Air
Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchanges, Marine Corps Exchanges, Coast Guard
Exchanges, or Exchange Councils of the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-




139. Hefley, 713 F.2d at 1492.
140. Id. at 1493.
141. Id. at 1492-93.
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a suit seeking money damages, Textron argued that the third-party de-
fendants nevertheless could be joined for purposes of discovery and as-
sessment of comparative fault. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction over the federal defendants. 14 2 Regarding the state defend-
ants, the Tenth Circuit relied upon the eleventh amendment to conclude
that Textron's claim was barred.143 Finally, with respect to both federal
and state defendants, the Tenth Circuit asserted that there is no proce-
dural mechanism by which to join any of the third-party defendants for
purposes of discovery or assessing proportionate fault.1
4 4
Hefley v. Textron is essentially a case which resolves many issues by
application of law to fact. It is notable for the extension of the Feres
doctrine and the court's assertion that no procedural device exists by
which defendants may be joined for the purpose of discovery and assess-
ment of comparative fault. In regard to the joinder issue, the Tenth
Circuit relied on the outcome determinative test outlined in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York 14 5 and found:
to any extent that inclusion of the United States as a party
would allow more extensive discovery, which presumably
would provide evidence that would persuade the jury to assign
a lesser degree of fault to Textron, we conclude that the effect
on the outcome of the case would be trivial.
14 6
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit held that the Kansas Tort Claims Act
14 7
is procedural, not outcome determinative, and is therefore not binding
on the federal courts.
148
VI. TRIAL AND POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
A. Motion for Directed Verdict
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Peterson v. Hager149 illustrates the
harsh consequence which may result from application of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 50(a), Motion for a Directed Verdict. Upon denial of a
motion for directed verdict made at the close of an adversary's case, a
party has two options: first, a party may stand on his original motion
and have the denial reviewed on appeal; or second, he may proceed with
his case and introduce evidence. 150 By choosing the second option a
party waives the right to appeal the denied motion for directed
142. Id. at 1495.
143. Id. at 1499.
144. Id. at 1496, 1499.
145. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
146. Hefley, 713 F.2d at 1497.
147. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(c) (1976).
148. Hefley, 713 F.2d at 1497.
149. 724 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1984).
150. Id. at 854, citing with approval, 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MI..ER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2531 (1971); 5A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDE.RAI. PRACTICE 50.05[ I]
(2d ed. 1984).
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verdict. 151
In Peterson, the plaintiff brought suit for damages for injuries to his
pecan trees allegedly caused by defendant's negligent application of an
herbicide. 15 2 To recover damages for injury to crops, Oklahoma law
requires evidence of: (1) market value, (2) finishing costs, and (3) trans-
portation CoStS. 1 5 3 The plaintiff, however, only presented evidence of
market value, whereupon the defendant moved for a directed verdict on
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence as to
causation and the amount of damages. 154 After his motion was denied,
the defendant presented evidence showing plaintiff's reasonable costs
for finishing and transportation in an effort to reduce the amount of
damages. However, by so doing he provided the essential elements of
the plaintiff's case.'
55
At the close of all the evidence, the defendant renewed his motion
for directed verdict, which was again denied, and the defendant ap-
pealed. Notwithstanding the Tenth Circuit's conviction that the trial
court erred in denying the defendant's first motion for directed verdict,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed, reiterating what it termed the "well estab-
lished rule":
The renewed motion will be judged in the light of the case as it
stands at that time. Even though the court may have erred in
denying the initial motion, this error is cured if subsequent tes-
timony on behalf of the moving party repairs the defect of his
opponent's case. 
15 6
The Tenth Circuit in Peterson I, had originally reversed the district
court then, on rehearing, the district court's ruling was affirmed. 157 Pe-
terson l's sympathetic tack was apparently based upon a notion of just-
ness. The court recognized the dilemma in which defendant found
himself but did not cite the "well established rule" on which it relied on
rehearing. Instead, Peterson I recognized that the defendant's presenta-
tion of evidence remedied the plaintiffs case and viewed this as an ac-
tion by the defendant to reduce the amount for which he might
ultimately be liable. The court in Peterson I concluded that the trial court
should have directed a verdict for the defendant at the close of the plain-
tiffs evidence. 1
58
This case illustrates that trial courts, on occasion, commit grievous
151. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2531
(1971); 5A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 50.05[1] (2d ed. 1984).
152. Peterson, 724 F.2d at 853.
153. Garrett v. Haworth, 183 Okla. 569, 83 P.2d 822 (1938).
154. Peterson, 724 F.2d at 853.
155. Peterson v. Hager, 714 F.2d 1035 (10th Cir. 1983). On the initial hearing of this
case, this view was first expressed.
156. Peterson, 724 F.2d at 854 (emphasis deleted), (quoting 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2531 (1971)). Accord Newman v. Brengle, 250
F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 951 (1958); Auto Transport v. Potter, 197
F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1952).
157. Peterson v. Hager, 714 F.2d 1035 (10th Cir. 1983).
158. Id.
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errors and in the face of such errors, a party has difficult tactical deci-
sions to make. The outcome of this case demonstrates that Rule 50(a) is
not always construed so as to "secure the just . . . determination of
[the] action," as all rules must be construed.
15 9
B. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and New Trial
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), Motion for a Directed Ver-
dict and for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, in part, provides:
A motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion [for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict], or a new trial may be
prayed for in the alternative. If a verdict was returned the court
may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment
and either order a new trial or direct the entry ofjudgment as if
the requested verdict had been directed.
Although this provision has been restrictively interpreted by a large
majority of courts, it has been interpreted flexibly by a well-reasoned
minority. 160 The majority and minority views are in agreement in rec-
ognizing that where a motion for judgment n.o.v. may properly be
granted by the trial court, the trial court need not necessarily grant it. 16 1
Rather, the trial court has the discretion to grant, in the alternative, a
new trial ifjustice dictates.16 2 The conflict of opinion arises in the situ-
ation where the court determines that the moving party is not entitled to
judgment n.o.v. The Tenth Circuit addressed this controversy in Kain v.
Winslow Manufacturing Inc. 163
In this case the United States District Court for the District of Kan-
sas sua sponte granted the defendant a new trial. Judgment was originally
entered in October of 1980, and the defendant filed a timely motion for
judgment n.o.v. but did not join therewith a request for a new trial. In
November of 1981, some thirteen months afterjudgment, the trial court
ordered the new trial.164
The plaintiff's notice appealing the district court's action was spe-
cifically addressed to the order of new trial. Upon consideration of this
matter, the Tenth Circuit reversed after discussing the controversy sur-
rounding the discretionary provision of rule 50(b). The court con-
cluded by reiterating the fact dhat the district court was powerless to
order a new trial and that the order exceeded its jurisdiction.' 6 5
When a cout deterinics tiat the moving party is not entitled to a
judgment ii.o.v.. and the movant has not joined a request for a new trial,
the majority view requires that the verdict stand and the court is without
jurisdiction to grnt a ne'w trial.' 6 6 According to the minority view, a
159. FED. R. Cir. P. 1.
160. See, e.g., Kain v. Winslow Nitg., Inc., 736 F.2d 606, 215 (10th Cir. 1984) (minority).
161. Cone v. West Virginia I"'lp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 215 (1947) (dictum).
162. Id.
163. 736 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Peterman v. Chicago. Rock Island & Pac. R.R., Co., 493 F.2d 88 (8th Cir.), cert.
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motion for judgment n.o.v. implicitly encompasses a motion for a new
trial. 16 7 Conversely, the majority finds support in the wording of Rule
50(b), the provisions of Rule 59, and policy considerations.
16 8
The majority position is that the portion of Rule 50(b) which states
that "[a] motion for a new trial may be joined . . . or a new trial may be
prayed for in the alternative" is essentially a limitation on the trial
court's discretion to grant a new trial. 169 If, as the minority contends, a
motion for judgment n.o.v. encompasses a motion for a new trial, then
the above quoted language of Rule 50(b) would be superfluous. 170 In
Jackson v. Wilson Trucking Corp. 171 the court noted that the purpose of
Rule 59, sections (b) and (d), which provides for new trials,172 would be
largely nullified by the minority interpretation.
173
The policy considerations behind Rule 59, expressed in Kanatser v.
Chrysler Corp.,174 and cited with approval in Kain,175 were found to be
equally appropriate considerations for limiting a court's jurisdiction
with regard to a Rule 50(b) grant of a new trial. 17 6 According to the
Kanatser court:
There is good reason for thus confining the trial court within
the narrow limits of its discretionary powers, for it is important
in the administration of justice that there shall be an end to
litigation, and that issues tried and decided by a jury shall not
be lightly set aside. If a case is to be retried, it should be done
with dispatch, lest the error of delay outweigh the error of
trial. '
77
As previously noted, the minority of jurisdictions allow the district
court to exercise its discretion and order a new trial in the situation
where the motion for judgment n.o.v. must be denied. Support for this
denied, 417 U.S. 947 (1974);Jackson v. Wilson Trucking Corp., 243 F.2d 212, 215 (D.C.
Cir. 1957). However, a trial court which acts "no later than 10 days after entry ofjudg-
ment. . . may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial
on motion of a party." FED. R. Civ. P. 59(d).
167. SeeJackson v. Wilson Trucking Corp., 243 F.2d 212, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Burger,
J., dissenting); 5AJ. MOORE &J. LuCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 50.11 (2d ed. 1984).
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b), see supra text preceeding note 160; FED. R. Civ. P. 59:
(a) A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of
the issues (1) in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the
reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the
courts of the United States; and (2) in an action tied without ajury, for any of the
reasons for which rehearings have heretofore been granted in suits in equity in
the courts of the United States. On a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
169. Jackson, 243 F.2d at 216-17.
170. Id.
171. 243 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
172. These subsections provide a strict 10 day period in which a litigant or the court,
respectively, may motion or order a new trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(b), (d).
173. Jackson, 243 F.2d at 216.
174. 199 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 921 (1953).
175. 736 F.2d at 608.
176. Id.
177. Kanatser, 199 F.2d at 615.
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view is embodied in Judge (now ChiefJustice) Burger's dissenting opin-
ion in Jackson v. Wilson Trucking Corp. 178 Judge Burger characterized the
majority position as an artificial limitation upon a court's choice of reme-
dies which is contrary to the liberal spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 179 He reads the language of Rule 50(b), stating that a party
may join a motion for a new trial with a motion for judgment n.o.v., as a
"signpost" offering guidance rather than as a limitation.i80 More re-
cently, a noted commentator 8 offered the pragmatic view that where a
motion for judgment n.o.v. has been made, the adversary is on adequate
notice of the challenge to the sufficiency of evidence. Accordingly, it
would not be improper to deem a motion for new trial, on the ground
that the verdict was contrary to the great weight of evidence, to be in-
cluded within a motion for judgment n.o.v.
18 2
VII. FINAL JUDGMENT RULE
A. Subpoena Orders and the Perlman Exception
As prescribed by statute, United States circuit courts may only hear
appeals from final decisions of federal district courts. 183 An order to
appear before a grand jury pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum is an inter-
locutory order and consequently not appealable by the witness. 184 In
the case of In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Vargas,18 5 the Tenth Circuit ad-
dressed the application of an established exception to this rule to allow
appeal from a trial court's order directing a witness to produce
documents.
In Vargas, an attorney received a subpoena duces tecum directing him
to appear and deliver client billing records for a community health
center and another nonprofit corporation. I86 After complying with the
subpoena, the attorney received another subpoena directing him to pro-
178. Jackson, 243 F.2d at 217 (Burger, J., dissenting); See also 5A J. MOORE, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 50.11 (2nd ed. 1982); Note, Federal Court Procedure: Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 50(b): Authority of Trial Court to Grant New Trial on Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict, 5 UCLA L. REV. 154 (1958).
179. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Id.
180. Jackson, 243 F.2d at 222 (Burger, J., dissenting).
181. James W. Moore, author of MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE.
182. 5AJ. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 50.11 (2d ed. 1982).
183. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). This statute embodies the policy against piecemeal liti-
gation. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1945) (dictum) (the policy
against appeals other than from final decisions conserves judicial energy and prevents de-
lays caused by interlocutory appeals).
184. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1972) (subpoena duces tecum requir-
ing production before federal grand jury of records of respondent's overseas business not
appealable); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327-28 (1940) (just as important
to prevent delay of grand jury proceedings as of trial, thus no appeal proper from sub-
poena duces tecum); cf. Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121-22 (1966) (subpoena
duces tecum requiring production of records before a special examiner not appealable). 28
U.S.C. § 1292 (1982) lists interlocutory orders from which appeals may be taken.
185. 723 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 90 (1984).
186. Id. at 1463.
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duce client files to substantiate the billings. 18 7 The attorney appeared
but refused to produce the records, claiming a fifth amendment privi-
lege regarding the records. 188 The presiding judge ordered the attor-
ney to produce the records and informed the attorney contempt
proceedings would result if he refused. 18 9 The community health
center filed an appeal and received a stay of the order.190 The attorney
later filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and, or in the alternative, a
Writ of Prohibition.191
In an opinion written by Judge McKay, the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered the health center's argument that although an order to appear at a
hearing pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum is ordinarily not appealable,
this case fell within the purview of the exception established in Perlman v.
United States. 192 The court noted that Perlman involved a situation where
a witness objected to release by the Clerk of the Court of constitution-
ally privileged documents to adverse parties. In Perlman, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the witness was unable to resist the order himself
and suffer contempt, and the clerk could hardly be expected to risk con-
tempt to protect the witness. Based on these facts, the Supreme Court
allowed the appeal, holding that if it ruled otherwise, Perlman would be
"powerless to avert the mischief of the order."' 93
Within circuit courts, one faction, led by the Second Circuit, 194 in-
terprets the Perlman exception narrowly, "emphasizing the policies be-
hind the final judgment rule and the nature of the relationship between
the party subpoenaed and the party possessing the privilege."195 Cases
from these circuits subscribe to the rationale that where an individual
objects to a subpoena duces tecum issued to a third party custodian of the
documents, the nature of the relationship between the third party and
witness should be considered. 196 Where the witness might be expected
to risk a contempt citation to protect the third party's privilege or inter-
187. Id. At issue in the investigation were charges of a scheme to use public money for
private gain.
188. Id. In a previously filed motion to quash the attorney asserted attorney-client and
work product privileges. Id.
189. Id. at 1464.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
193. Id. at 13.
194. See, e.g., National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 591 F.2d 174
(2d Cir. 1979) and cases cited therein.
195. Vargas, 723 F.2d at 1465.
196. See, e.g., In re Sealed case, 655 F.2d 1298, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (corporation may
not appeal denial of a motion to quash subpoena duces tecum requiring production by the
corporation's outside counsel of work product materials); In re Obe-Koetter, 612 F.2d 15,
18 (1st Cir. 1980) (client may not immediately appeal order directing attorney to testify
before grand jury); National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 591 F.2d
174, 177-79 (2d Cir. 1979) (government agency may not appeal, prior to contempt cita-
tion, order directing employees to answer questions of defendant in private class action).
See generally 9J. MOORE & J. LuCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRAC-riCE 110.13[2] (2d ed. 1984)
(discussing appealability prior to contempt citation, of orders requiring non-party disclo-
sure of information).
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est, appeal will not lie. 19 7
The other view interprets the Perlman exception broadly. Whenever
the subpoena is issued to the custodian of a third party's documents, the
third party may immediately appeal the denial of a motion to quash. An
immediate appeal is justified because the appellant himself cannot diso-
bey the order and appeal after being found in contempt.'
9 8
In Vargas, the Tenth Circuit adopted the narrow view. 199 The court
held that the third party is entitled to immediate appeal only when to
deny the appeal would eliminate any review whatsoever of his claim.
200
The court reasoned that an attorney might ordinarily be expected to
expose himself to contempt to protect the client's interest and demon-
strate his tenacity as an advocate. 20 ' Additionally, if the attorney asserts
a work-product privilege along with the attorney-client privilege, as in
Vargas, the attorney would be motivated to risk contempt to protect his
own interests. 20 2 The court concluded that the health center would have
to wait for a contempt citation to be issued against its attorney, or show
the attorney would produce the records when threatened with con-
tempt, in order to appeal.
20 3
As an alternate to appeal from a contempt citation, the court sug-
gested that application for a Writ of Mandamus could be used where
there has been a clear abuse of discretion by the trial judge.20 4 Consid-
ering the attorney's petition for Writ of Mandamus, or in the alternative,
Prohibition, the court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial judge and denied the petition.
Although in Vargas the court has clearly articulated its stance on the
Perlman exception to the nonappealability of subpoena duces tecum or-
ders, the court's opinion is strangely quiet about its previous holdings in
this area. The court failed to mention its 1965 case of Covey Oil Co. v.
Continental Oil Co.,205 wherein it held that non-party witnesses served
with subpoenaes duces tecum "should not be required to expose them-
selves to the hazard of punishment in order to obtain a determination of
197. See supra note 196.
198. See, e.g., In re Berkley & Co. Inc., 629 F.2d 548, 551-52 (8th Cir. 1980) (corpora-
tion permitted to appeal district court's order to government which had custody of corpo-
ration's documents, to disclose documents); In re Matter of Grand Jury Applicants, C.
Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 619 F.2d 1022, 1024-26 (3d Cir. 1980) (corporation permitted to
appeal denial of motion to quash subpoenas directed to its employees); In re Grand Jury
Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 673-74 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915
(1979) (corporation permitted to appeal denial of motion to return records held by gov-
ernment, as to which records the corporation's employee had been ordered to testify);
Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Parsons, 561 F.2d 671, 673-74 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 942 (1978) (corporation permitted to appeal denial of a motion to quash subpoenas
requiring attorney from corporation's outside counsel to testify and produce documents
relating to representation of the corporation).
199. See supra note 196.
200. Vargas, 723 F.2d at 1465.
201. Id. at 1465-66.
202. Id. at 1466.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1467.
205. 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965).
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their claimed rights."'20 6 The court in Covey made this statement in re-
sponse to Continental's argument that the subpoenaed witnesses should
obtain review by disobeying the order and then appeal from a resultant
adjudication of contempt, instead of direct appeal.
20 7
Although the Tenth Circuit might have distinguished Covey on the
basis that Vargas involved a party witness, 20 8 several courts have applied
the non-appealability rules to non-party, as well as party witnesses. 20 9
Additionally, in the Tenth Circuit case of Sanders v. Great Western Sugar
Co.,210 non-party local officials of the Small Business Administration
were allowed to appeal an order requiring them to respond to a sub-
poena duces tecum on the authority of Covey.2 1' The officials in that case
claimed a governmental privilege of nondisclosure. 2 12 Sanders is re-
markably similar to Branch v. Phillips Petroleum,2 13 a case quoted in Vargas
and expressly disapproved.
2 14
In Vargas, the court should have delineated the scope of Covey
before adopting what appears to be a totally contrary view. If the court
perceived Covey to be distinguishable, it should have said so; if not, the
case should have been overruled. The Vargas court's failure to address
these previous inconsistent decisions 2 15 has considerably muddied the
clear policy and rule of law laid down in Vargas.
B. Orders Involving Injunctions
One statutory exception to the Final Judgment Rule 2 16 allows ap-
peals of right from district court orders "granting, continuing, modify-
ing, refusing, or dissolving injunctions. ' 2 17 The issue of whether
206. Id. at 996-97.
207. Id. at 996.
208. See American Express Warehousing Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 277,
282 (2d Cir. 1967) (dictum) (Covey distinguished where allowing appeal was justifiable be-
cause the appellant was not a party, and therefore, could not obtain review on appeal from
a judgment in the main action).
209. See Gialde v. Time, Inc., 480 F.2d 1295, 1298-1301 (8th Cir. 1973) (no appeal
permitted of discovery order directing non-party employee of defendant to disclose source
of his information); United States v. Anderson, 464 F.2d 1390, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (no
appeal permitted of discovery order directing non-party witnesses to answer deposition
questions); United States v. Fried, 386 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1967) (no appeal permitted
of denial of a motion to quash information subpoena served on non-party witness who was
defendant's son). See also National Super Spuds v. New York Mercantile Exch., 591 F.2d
174, 176-81 (2d Cir. 1979) (no appeal permitted of order directing non-party government
employee to respond to deposition questions).
210. 396 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1968).
211. Id. at 794.
212. Id. at 794-95.
213. 638 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1981).
214. Vargas, 723 F.2d at 1465.
215. Compare Centurion Inds., Inc. v. Warren Steurer & Assoc., 665 F.2d 323, 324 n.l
(10th Cir. 1981) (appeal permitted from order requiring non-party witness to disclose
trade secrets) with United States v. Feeney, 641 F.2d 821, 823-25 (10th Cir. 1981) (no
appeal permitted from denial of party intervenor's motion to quash subpoena duces lecum
requiring production of documents in connection with post-conviction proceedings).
216. "The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final deci-
sions of the district courts of the United States . 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
217. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982).
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dismissal of a party seeking injunctive relief qualifies that party to appeal
under the statutory exception arose in B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Grand River
Dam Authority.
2 18
In Goodrich, B. F. Goodrich Company sued Grand River Dam Au-
thority (Grand River) in United States District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma alleging 4 causes of action, the most significant of
which sought reformation of a settlement agreement between Grand
River and Goodrich. 2 19 Grand River, in turn, filed a third-party com-
plaint against Northeast Oklahoma Cooperative (Northeast) requesting
declaratory judgment. Northeast responded with a counterclaim seek-
ing injunctive relief.220 The District Court dismissed Northeast, the
third party defendant, on its own motion after determining no justicia-
ble controversy existed between Northeast and defendant Grand
River. 22 1 Northeast subsequently appealed the dismissal.
In considering whether Northeast might properly maintain its ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals quickly dismissed the contention that the dis-
trict court's order was a final judgment. The court noted that resolution
of at least three claims in the main suit between Goodrich and Grand
River still remained. 22 2 The court then summarily rejected Northeast's
final argument that since its counterclaim prayed for injunctive relief,
the order dismissing the counterclaim was tantamount to denial of an
injunction and therefore appealable.2 23 The court stated it could not
subscribe to such a strained interpretation of the statute-the district
court had not denied the injunction on the merits, but had simply dis-
missed Northeast from the entire proceeding. 2 24 The court dismissed
the appeal.
2 25
In judge Holloway's dissent, he argued that dismissal of Northeast's
counterclaim had the "effect" of refusing an injunction and Northeast
was therefore entitled to appeal. 2 26 Based on Carson v. American Brands,
Inc.,227 the dissent would allow an appeal where, as here, the party
showed both that the order had the practical effect of denying an injunc-
tion and that the order had serious or irreparable consequences which
could only be effectively challenged through immediate appeal.
22 8
In Carson, the parties negotiated a settlement permanently en-
joining defendant employers from discriminating against black employ-
ees.2 29 The district court refused to enter a consent decree to this
218. 712 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1983).




223. Id. at 455. Northeast claimed the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear the
appeal based on 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982). (see supra note 217 and accompanying
text).
224. Id. at 455.
225. Id.
226. Id. (Holloway, J., dissenting).
227. 450 U.S. 79 (1981).
228. Goodrich, 712 F.2d at 455.
229. Carson, 450 U.S. at 81 (respondent employers and unions agreed to give hiring
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effect. 2 30 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the
appeal saying the court's refusal did not amount to denial of injunc-
tion 2 3 ' under section 1292.232 The Supreme Court reversed, stating
that although the district court's refusal to enter the consent decree did
not technically deny an injunction, it nevertheless had the "practical ef-
fect of doing so." 2 3 3 The Court held that in order for appeal to lie, the
party must show not only that the order had the practical effect of refus-
ing an injunction, but that "an interlocutory order of the court might
have a 'serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,' and that the order
can be 'effectually challenged' only by immediate appeal .... 234
Judge Holloway would have held that Northeast met this burden.
23 5
Although there is some support for the Tenth Circuit's holding in Good-
rich,23 6 perhaps the court should have considered Northeast's argument
more closely.
VIII. CROSS-APPEALS
Savage v. Cache Valley Dairy Assoc.23 7 takes up the issue of whether
filing a cross-appeal within the fourteen-day period, provided by Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(3),238 is a jurisdictional prerequisite
for the appellate court. In Savage, the plaintiff-appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal. The two defendant-cross-appellants filed their cross-
appeals one day and five days late, respectively.
The Tenth Circuit's consideration of this issue notes that several of
the circuits are in disagreement as to whether timely filing of a cross-
appeal is or is not jurisdictional. Both the Seventh Circuit 23 9 and the
Sixth Circuit 2 40 hold that the timely filing of a cross-appeal is a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite. Conversely, the Ninth Circuit 24 1 and Third Cir-
cuit 2 4 2 hold that the cross-appeal rule is not a jurisdictional mandate.
and seniority preferences to black employees and to fill one-third of certain supervisory
positions with qualified blacks).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 82.
232. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982).
233. Carson, 450 U.S. at 83-84.
234. Id. at 84 (quoting Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181
(1955)).
235. Goodrich, 712 F.2d at 456.
236. See, e.g., Shirey v. Bensalem Township. 663 F.2d 472, 475-78 (3d Cir. 1981) (dis-
missal of plaintiffs' prayer for injunctive relief not appealable because plaintiffs neither
sought a preliminary injunction, nor alleged continuing harm, and because the district
court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for reasons unrelated to plaintiffs' entitlement to in-
junctive relief).
237. 737 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1984).
238. In pertinent part, the rule provides: "If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party,
any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first
notice of appeal was filed .... " FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(3).
239. Martin v. Hamil, 608 F.2d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 1979).
240. Richland Knox Mutual Ins. Co. v. Kallen, 376 F.2d 360, 364 (6th Cir. 1967).
241. Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981).
242. Scott v. University of Delaware, 601 F.2d 76, 83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931
(1979).
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Previously, in two unpublished opinions, 243 the Tenth Circuit has
held that the filing of a timely cross-appeal is both mandatory and juris-
dictional. In Savage, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the unpublished deci-
sions are binding precedent. Accordingly, in the Tenth Circuit,
compliance with the provision of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure





243. Herndon v. Piper Aircraft Corp., No. 81-1916 (10th Cir. October 5, 1981);Jenkins
v. Peet, No. 82-1705 (10th Cir. July 29, 1982).




Due to the large number of habeas corpus petitions which eventu-
ally find their way to the Tenth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit Survey, for the
first time, devotes a separate article to coverage of the more significant
habeas corpus cases. In past issues, habeas questions have been ad-
dressed in the criminal law and procedure articles.
During the past survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided several
noteworthy habeas cases involving the contemporaneous objection
rule-a state rule of procedure requiring timely objection at trial in or-
der for the objectionable issue to be heard on appeal. The article also
considers a few cases in which the Tenth Circuit qualified the exhaustion
of state remedies principle. Finally, this survey covers an appeal of a
denial of a habeas petition based on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, one of the few cases in which a habeas petitioner encountered
success at the Tenth Circuit.
I. THE CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION RULE
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently heard three significant
cases involving the contemporaneous objection rule. Two of the cases,
Runnels v. Hess,' and Hux v. Murphy,2 limited the principles set forth by
the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Sykes. 3 The third, Al-
mond v. Angelone,4 refused to apply the Sykes cause and prejudice test and
reviewed the case, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner presented
claims in his petition for federal habeas corpus relief that he failed to
present in his initial state post-conviction petition.
A. Background
One of the leading Supreme Court cases addressing a habeas peti-
tioner's failure to comply with the contemporaneous objection rule is
Wainwright v. Sykes. 5 In Sykes, respondent Sykes sought federal habeas
corpus review, claiming that his state court conviction had resulted from
inculpatory statements made by him and wrongly admitted into evi-
dence. Sykes did not object to the evidence when it was presented at
trial, nor later on appeal. He objected to the evidence unsuccessfully in
a motion to vacate his conviction and in two state habeas corpus peti-
1. 713 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1983).
2. 733 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1984).
3. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
4. No. 83-1550 (10th Cir. Oct. 18, 1983).
5. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Sykes involved the Flordia contemporaneous objection rule.
Under the Florida rule, a criminal defendant must move to suppress inculpatory state-
ments before trial. The trial judge may, at his discretion, hear a motion or an appropriate
objection at trial. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(i).
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tions. 6 The United States Supreme Court, relying heavily on its earlier
decisions in Davis v. United States7 and Francis v. Henderson,8 held that
Sykes was barred from federal habeas corpus review because he failed to
contemporaneously object to the admission of his inculpatory state-
ments and did not show both cause for the noncompliance and actual
prejudice from the noncompliance. 9 The Sykes Court concluded its deci-
sion by underscoring the advantage of adopting the cause and prejudice
test of Francis over the more lenient deliberate bypass test of Fay v.
Noia. 10
The Fay v. Noia deliberate bypass test, announced by the Court in
1976, per Justice Brennan, allows a federal judge to deny habeas corpus
review only if the petitioner "deliberately by-passed the orderly proce-
dure of the state courts."' I The Sykes cause and prejudice standard,
however, severely restricted Fay's broad grant of review, leaving peti-
tioners only with the dubious assurance that the cause and prejudice test
adequately guarantees that a federal habeas corpus court will not be
barred "from adjudicating for the first time the federal constitutional
claim of a defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be
the victim of a miscarriage of justice."'
12
The cause and prejudice test has several advantages over the delib-
erate bypass test. It allows the court to avoid the difficult task of prying
into the state of mind of the petitioner, or his counsel, for purposes of
determining whether the "bypass" was deliberate. The test also equita-
bly affords petitioners an opportunity to explain their failure to object
and goes to the core of the issue: whether the petitioner has suffered
actual harm or prejudice as a result of the error. Furthermore, the cause
and prejudice standard places greater emphasis on the state court pro-
ceeding than does Fay v. Noia. Justice Rehnquist reasoned in Sykes:
The accused is in the courtroom, the jury is in the box, the
judge is on the bench, and the witnesses, having been subpoe-
naed and duly sworn, await their turn to testify. Society's re-
sources have been concentrated at that time and place in order
to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the question of
6. Sykes alleged that he did not understand his Miranda rights due to his intoxicated
condition at the time of his arrest. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 74-75.
7. 411 U.S. 233 (1973). The Davis Court held that under rule 12(b) the petitioner
waived his objection, reasoning: "no reason has been suggested why petitioner or his
attorney could not have ascertained all of the facts necessary to present the objection to
the court prior to the trial . . . . Petitioner has shown no cause why the court should
grant him relief from his waiver of the objection . Id. at 244-45 (quoting the district
court opinion).
8. 425 U.S. 536 (1976). In Francis, the Court upheld a felony murder conviction
where the petitioner was seeking collateral relief from the state court, claiming that blacks
had been excluded from the grand jury that indicted him. The Court held that the rule
that the petitioner must show not only cause for his failure to challenge but also actual
prejudice, applied with equal force when a federal court is asked in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding to overturn a state court conviction.
9. 433 U.S. at 86-87.
10. 372 U.S. at 391.
11. Id. at 438.
12. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91.
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guilt or innocence of one of its citizens.'
3
Hence, finality, comity and economy are all clear results of the cause and
prejudice test. It is unknown, however, whether this stricter standard in
fact provides relief to petitioners who have suffered an actual miscar-
riage of justice.
B. Runnels v. Hess
The Tenth Circuit first received Runnels v. Hess 14 in 1981 on an ap-
peal from the district court's grant of Runnels's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Runnels had petitioned for federal habeas relief in the
district court, after exhausting his state remedies. Runnels attacked his
conviction on the ground that during trial the prosecutor violated his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination by improperly empha-
sizing Runnels's failure to testify. 15 The district court agreed and
granted the writ.
The Tenth Circuit vacated and remanded the original district court
decision with instructions that the lower court proceed consistent with
the cause prong of the Sykes decision. 16 The district court complied,
denying the writ. However, while the appeal of this district court opin-
ion was pending, the Supreme Court decided Engle v. Isaac17 and United
States v. Frady,' 8 leading the Tenth Circuit again to remand the case for
findings regarding the effect of Frady and Isaac on the cause and actual
prejudice prongs of Sykes.' 9
Not surprisingly, in its "Findings on Partial Remand," the district
court stated that under Isaac and Frady, Runnels failed to make a suffi-
cient showing of cause and actual prejudice required for habeas corpus
13. Id. at 90. For a discussion of the contributions the contemporaneous objection
rule makes to criminal litigation, see id. at 88-91.
14. 653 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1981) (An Oklahoma state circuit convicted Runnels of
rape and sentenced him to 63 years imprisonment); See also Runnels, 713 F.2d 596 (10th
Cir. 1983) (Order on Remand).
15. See Runnels v. State, 562 P.2d 932, 937 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
893 (1977).
16. 653 F.2d at 1364. "We, however, are unable to find any facts in the record bear-
ing on defense counsel's reasons or cause for noncompliance with the Oklahoma contem-
poraneous objection rule. . . . Proof of cause for noncompliance is essential; mere
speculation that it existed is not enough." Id.
17. 456 U.S. 107 (1982). Isaac presented the question whether a convicted respon-
dent, who failed to comply with OHIo R. CRIM. P. 30 requiring contemporaneous objec-
tions to jury instructions. may challenge the constitutionality of those instructions in
federal habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Applying the cause and preju-
dice standard in Sykes, the Court held that respondent was barred from asserting his consti-
tutional claim in the federal habeas corpus proceeding due to his failure to comply with
Ohio's contemporaneous objection rule at the trial. Id. at 108.
18. 456 U.S. 152 (1982). Frady, originally sentenced to death by electrocution by a
jury in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia for first-degree murder and
robbery, was resentenced to a life term by the court of appeals. The issue before the
United States Supreme Court, however, was whether Frady's failure to object to a jury
instruction at trial may prevent him from challenging the instruction fifteen years later
under FED. R. CRIM. P. 30. Applying the cause and prejudice test of Sykes, the Court con-
cluded that Frady fell short of meeting his burden of showing actual prejudice and thus
habeas corpus relief could not be granted. Id. at 153.
19. 713 F.2d at 597.
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relief. The district court concluded that it erred in granting Runnels's
writ of habeas corpus. 20 The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district
court's finding and quashed the writ.
2 '
The essence of the cause requirement of Sykes was clearly articu-
lated in the district court's "Additional Findings on Partial Remand."
'22
The district court found that under the current law, Runnels may not
have satisfied the cause requirement. 2 3 Emphasizing principles of com-
ity and finality of state court criminal judgments,2 4 and noting that cause
based wholly upon circumstantial and speculative factors would not be
accepted by the Supreme Court,2 5 the district court determined that
Runnels's showing would not satisfy the "cause" element. The court
found that Runnels did not show adequate cause even though his inabil-
ity to present testimony on the cause issue was solely due to the inter-
vening death of his trial counsel.
26
The Tenth Circuit approved the district court's heavy emphasis on
the "clear distinction drawn in Frady between standards of proof appli-
cable upon direct appeal and upon subsequent collateral attack."' 27 To
obtain collateral relief, a prisoner must clear a significantly higher hur-
dle than would exist on direct appeal. This is due to society's legitimate
interest in the finality of state criminal judgments and in encouraging
parties to seek a fair trial in the original criminal actions.
28
The Tenth Circuit similarly rejected Runnels's showing of preju-
dice. Citing Isaac and Frady, the court determined that the actual preju-
dice standard in a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus challenge
requires a greater showing of prejudice than is necessary to show plain
error on direct appeal. 29 Federal courts, in consideration of comity and
finality of state decisions, set a higher standard for habeas review of state
convictions than for direct review of federal convictions. 30 The circuit
court thus set a standard of prejudice that required Runnels to demon-
20. Id.
21. Id. at 600.
22. See id. at 597-98.
23. Id. at 598.
24. Id. at 598. The idea of comity and finality of criminal judgments is a recurrent
theme running through many habeas cases. See, e.g., Sykes, 433 U.S. at 74 (1977); Engle,
456 U.S. at 135.
25. 713 F.2d at 598 (citing Isaac and Frady).
26. 713 F.2d at 598.
27. See id. at 598-99.
28. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 162-66.
29. See id. at 599. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). The "plain error" rule gives the
courts of appeals the power to correct particularly excessive errors on appeal notwith-
standing a defendant's trial default. The rule provides: "Plain errors or default affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). By its terms, aid may be given under the rule only on
appeal from a trial that was attended by error so "plain" that the trial judge and prosecu-
tor were negligent in approving it, even absent the defendant's timely objection. The rule
was intended for use on direct appeal. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 163.
30. 713 F.2d at 599 (quoting Isaac, 456 U.S. at 134-35). See also Frady, 456 U.S. at 166
(1982); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). The Court in Isaac also noted that
the "plain error" standard is too vague to correct the miscarriages ofjustice that might be
at stake in federal habeas petitions. 456 U.S. at 134-35.
244 [Vol. 62:1
HABEAS CORPUS
strate that the prosecutor's remarks at trial worked to his "actual and
substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitu-
tional dimensions."'' 3 The court concluded that Runnels failed to meet
the cause and prejudice criteria as explained in Isaac and Frady.3 2 Be-
cause Runnels was unable to show cause for his counsel's noncompli-
ance with the contemporaneous objection rule, and because he was
unable to show he was actually prejudiced by the prosecutor's remarks,
the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of Runnels's writ of
habeas corpus and quashed the writ.
s"
Judge Logan, dissenting, found that the majority applied the actual
prejudice criterion of Sykes too strictly. He emphasized the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals' finding that actual prejudice had been
demonstrated since the prosecutor's statements amounted to reversible
error.3 4 According to Judge Logan, short of showing actual innocence,
a state court's determination that a defendant suffered actual prejudice
is "the most conclusive demonstration of prejudice possible."3 5 Judge
Logan argued that had defense counsel timely objected, a new trial
would have been ordered for the petitioner; "instead he is serving a
long prison term."
3 6
Judge Logan then admonished the majority's rigid application of
the cause criterion. His argument was based on the reasonable premise
that in some cases it will be "impossible to conclusively prove there was
or was not cause." 3 7 Asserting that the defense counsel was 74 years
old, of poor health, hard of hearing, and died before the habeas pro-
ceeding, 3 8 Judge Logan maintained that the cause test was unreasonable
here. Defense counsel's poor health and hearing problems constituted
circumstantial evidence that he never heard the prosecution's prejudicial
comments.39 Because counsel's intervening death prevented the court
from discovering why counsel failed to object, and because Runnels had
suffered actual prejudice, Judge Logan argued that the cause and preju-
dice requirements had been met.
40
Judge Logan concluded his dissent by recalling the majority state-
ment in Isaac: "The terms 'cause' and 'actual prejudice' are not rigid
concepts . . . . In appropriate cases, those principles must yield to the
imperative of a fundamentally unjust incarceration . . . . [W]e are con-
fident that victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the
cause-and-prejudice standard."' 4 1 According to Judge Logan, Isaac
31. 713 F.2d at 599 (citing Frady, 456 U.S. at 170).
32. 713 F.2d at 600.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 600-01 (Logan, J., dissenting).






41. Id. at 601 (quoting Isaac, 456 U.S. at 135). See also Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91; id. at 94-97
(Stevens, J., concurring).
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stands for the proposition that if a petitioner shows a "fundamental mis-
carriage ofjustice," relief should follow, notwithstanding petitioner's in-
ability to conclusively show cause for any failure by his attorney.
4 2
Thus, Judge Logan reproved the majority's strict application of the Sykes
cause and prejudice standard. Accordingly, he would have upheld the
writ of habeas corpus.
C. Hux v. Murphy
The question presented to the Tenth Circuit in Hux v. Murphy4 3 was
whether a habeas petitioner must satisfy the "cause and prejudice" test
when he has failed to comply with the state contemporaneous objection
rule, but where the state courts have nevertheless proceeded to consider
the claim on its merits on direct appeal. 4 4 In Hux, the petitioner sought
habeas relief alleging that the Oklahoma trial court issued an erroneous
jury instruction. 4 5 The instruction stated that there is a "legal presump-
tion that one intends the obvious and natural consequences of his acts,
unless the contrary is shown."' 46 Hux did not object to the constitution-
ality of the instruction at the trial but did challenge it on direct appeal.
4 7
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Hux's convic-
tion by applying the "fundamental error" exception to the contempora-
neous objection rule. 48 The court stated that as the instruction did not
raise itself to the level of fundamental error, Hux could not obtain a
reversal on direct appeal.4 9 Later, in response to Hux's petition for fed-
eral habeas corpus, the district court repeated the two-prong test in
Sykes, stating that since Hux had not objected to the instruction at trial,
he could now challenge it only by satisfying the cause and prejudice
standard.50 The district court then dismissed the petitioner's claim for
his failure to adequately demonstrate cause and actual prejudice. 5 1
In overturning the district court's decision to dismiss the petition,
the Tenth Circuit limited the cause and prejudice standard according to
Ulster County Court v. Allen. 5 2 The circuit court held that the lower court
had improperly applied the Sykes cause and prejudice test when it should
42. 713 F.2d at 601.
43. 733 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1984). Ruel Hux was convicted by ajury in an Oklahoma
state court of second degree burglary, and sentenced to twenty-eight years imprisonment.
44. Id. at 738-39.
45. Id. at 738.
46. Id. See also Record on Appeal to Okla. Crim. App., vol. 1, at 10. After deciding to
hear the petition on its merits, the Tenth Circuit discussed at length the issue of whether
this instruction amounted to a violation of Hux's right to due process. This right was in
jeopardy of being violated since the state can obtain a conviction only upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of all elements of a crime. 733 F.2d at 739.





52. 442 U.S. 140 (1979) (holding that absent a showing by the state legislature or
state courts that a federal constitutional claim is barred by some state procedural rule, a
federal court may entertain the claim).
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have adopted the law declared in the more recent Ulster decision. In
Ulster the Court found that a habeas petitioner need not satisfy the cause
and prejudice standard for failing to comply with a state procedural rule
if the state courts consider the claim on its merits on direct appeal.
53
The Tenth Circuit emphasized that under Ulster the cause and prejudice
standard is only applicable when "state courts invoke state law to dis-
miss a defendant's federal claims on procedural grounds." '54 In HUX, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed Hux's claim on the mer-
its under its "fundamental error" rule, notwithstanding his procedural
default at trial. 55 Therefore, the Sykes standard was inappropriately ap-
plied by the district court, and the Tenth Circuit was able to hear the
petitioner's claim on the merits. The Tenth Circuit thus confined the
expansion of the Sykes cause and prejudice standard. The cause and
prejudice test now must yield when a petitioner fails to timely object at
trial but the state appellate court nevertheless proceeds to consider the
petitioner's claim on its merits on direct appeal.
In his concurring opinion, Judge Barrett agreed with the majority's
decision to hear the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, but disagreed
with its failure to apply the cause and prejudice standard. 56 Relying on
the strict interpretations of the cause and prejudice standard in Runnels
v. Hess,5 7 Judge Barrett asserted that all federal habeas corpus chal-
lenges require a showing of cause and prejudice when petitioners do not
lodge contemporaneous objections.5" Judge Barrett noted that "the
'cause' and 'prejudice' standard is a difficult one to hurdle in terms of
proof," and concluded that Hess could not meet the standard.
5 9
D. Almond v. Angelone
Hux illustrated the Tenth Circuit's willingness to maintain the Sykes
standard within its reasonable limitations. Similarly, in Almond v.
Angelone,60 the circuit court limited the expansion of the Sykes cause and
prejudice standard by articulating a distinction between the failure to
comply with the contemporaneous objection rule as in Sykes, and the
failure to raise an issue on direct appeal that is later raised in the federal
habeas petition.
In Almond, issues not raised in the petitioner's first state post-convic-
tion petition were raised in his federal habeas petition.6 1 Thus, the
question before the Tenth Circuit was whether the petitioner's failure to
present these claims in his first post-conviction petition prevented the
53. Id. at 141.
54. 733 F.2d at 739 (citing Ulster, 442 U.S. at 147-54).
55. 733 F.2d at 739.
56. 733 F.2d at 740 (Barrett, J., concurring).
57. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text (explaining cause and prejudice test).
58. 733 F.2d at 740 (Barrett, J., concurring) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107
(1982); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982)).
59. 733 F.2d at 740 (Barrett, J., concurring).
60. No. 83-1550, (10th Cir. Oct. 18, 1983).
61. Id. at 3.
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circuit court from reaching the merits of the claims. The district court
found that the petitioner's claims were precluded from habeas consider-
ation since he failed to successfully demonstrate cause and prejudice as
required by Sykes.
62
The Tenth Circuit, in finding that the claims could be reached and
were in fact properly before the court, stated that "to apply Sykes to the
facts here, where the procedural default consists of a failure to raise an
issue in the first state post-conviction proceeding, would be an extension
of Sykes which we chose not to undertake here." 63 The Tenth Circuit
turned instead to the 1972 Supreme Court decision of Murch v. Mot-
tram64 which, relying on Fay v. Noia,6 5 applied the deliberate bypass
standard.
66
The Tenth Circuit first considered the deliberate bypass standard in
Holcomb v. Murphy.6 7 Under Holcomb, when a federal habeas petitioner
fails to raise an issue in his direct criminal appeal, the deliberate bypass
test of Fay v. Noia applies, not the cause and prejudice test of Sykes. 68 In
its decision, the court in Holcomb stated that "Fay v. Noia is still the law
and enunciates a broad enough rule to permit federal habeas considera-
tion of issues not raised in the direct state appeal."'6 9 This illustrates the
Tenth Circuit's willingness to apply the deliberate bypass test absent a
Supreme Court decision specifically requiring the cause and prejudice
standard. The Tenth Circuit's use of the deliberate bypass standard also
illustrates its inclination to hear a prisoner's claim unless the law clearly
shows that the petitioner has waived his rights.
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit in Almond, after finding no showing
of a deliberate bypass 70 on the petitioner's part, heard the claims on
their merits. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the district court's finding
that the petitioner's claims were without merit.
7'
II. EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court decided Rose v. Lundy,
72
62. Id. at 4. The petitioner was claiming ineffective assistance of counsel as counsel
did not investigate the post-arrest confession and counsel never got a psychiatrist's report.
See id. at 3-4.
63. Id. at 5.
64. 409 U.S. 41 (1972). Murch v. Mottram was a pre-Sykes case in which an issue not
raised by the petitioner in his first state post-conviction proceeding was raised in his fed-
eral habeas petition. The Court held that the petitioner deliberately chose to bypass or-
derly state procedures. The Court in Sykes did not discuss Murch.
65. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
67. 701 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3546 (1983).
68. Almond, slip op. at 5.
69. Id. (quoting Holcomb, 701 F.2d at 1312). See also Guzzardo v. Bengston, 643 F.2d
1300 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981).
70. Almond, slip op. at 6.
71. Id. at 7.
72. 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (where respondent Noah Lundy, following a jury trial, was
convicted on charges of rape and crimes against nature. He was sentenced to the state
penitentiary to serve consecutive terms of 120 years on the rape charge and from 5-15
years on the crimes against nature charge).
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adopting a "total exhaustion" policy. Under this policy, a habeas corpus
petitioner must exhaust all of his claims at the state level before he may
petition a federal district court for habeas relief.73 The Court in Lundy
held that a district court cannot consider habeas petitions which contain
both unexhausted and exhausted claims.
74
In response to Lundy, the Tenth Circuit heard Smith v. Atkins, 7 5 ad-
dressing a federal habeas petition containing both exhausted and
unexhausted claims. The district court considered two of the issues and
found them to be frivolous, then dismissed the remaining issues on the
ground that the petitioner had failed to exhaust his state remedies as
required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 76 In reversing and remanding the
case to the district court the Tenth Circuit discussed a nuance of the
"total exhaustion" requirement. 77 The Tenth Circuit first noted that
"[a]s a preliminary matter. . . the district court must 'review the record
in a § 2254 proceeding at least summarily in order to determine whether
all claims have been exhausted.' "78
The Smith court then attempted to clarify some of the existing con-
fusion as to exactly what is precluded by the exhaustion doctrine. Citing
Brown v. Allen, 79 the court explained that the exhaustion doctrine does
not automatically preclude federal habeas relief any time there remains a
state remedy.80 The court stated that "[w]hen a petitioner presents the
exact constitutional issue to the state courts on direct appeal, sufficient
exhaustion for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) will be presumed."
8 1
Then, under the exhaustion doctrine, a petitioner may resort to the fed-
eral courts to determine whether the state courts gave the issue "full and
fair consideration."
'8 2
The Smith v. Atkins decision was handed down after the district court
73. Id. at 510.
74. Id. at 522.
75. 678 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1982) (Smith challenged his state conviction of three
counts of kidnapping, one count of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of robbery).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2554(c) (1982) states: "An applicant shall not be deemed to have
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this
section, if he has the right under the law of the state to raise, by any available procedure,
the question presented."
77. See 678 F.2d at 884.
78. Id. (quoting Lundy, 455 U.S. at 527 (Blackman, J., concurring)).
79. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (holding that when a state prisoner's claim has been decided
adversely to him by the state supreme court on direct review of his conviction, he has
complied with 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which requires him to exhaust state remedies before a
federal court may entertain his application for habeas corpus). See id. at 446-50. The
Court added two points to this finding. First, under such circumstances, the prisoner need
not pursue a collateral remedy in the state courts based on the same evidence and issues.
Id. at 447-50. Second, § 2254 should not be interpreted as requiring prisoners to make
repetitious applications to state courts for relief. Id. at 448 n.3.
80. See 678 F.2d at 884-85 (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 524 n.l).
81. 678 F.2d at 885. The Tenth Circuit directed the district courts to Sandoval v.
Rodriguez, 461 F.2d 1097 (10th Cir. 1972), and the "legal versus factual" dichotomy con-
tained therein for guidance when determining whether the "exact" legal issue has been
presented. Smith v. Atkins, 678 F.2d at 885.
82. 678 F.2d at 885.
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decided Wilson v. Rayl.8 3 Due to the continued confusion in the trial
court, the Tenth Circuit heard Wilson v. Rayl on December 10, 1983.84
In Wilson v. Rayl a Kansas court convicted the petitioner, Wilson, of
robbery, burglary, and felony theft. 8 5 The Kansas Court of Appeals af-
firmed, 86 and the Kansas Supreme Court denied a petition for review.
87
In Wilson's petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, he set forth the
same grounds for relief as were presented to the Kansas appellate
courts. 8 8 Before filing this action in federal court, however, Wilson did
not avail himself of his state post-conviction remedies. 8 9 The district
court dismissed the action because Wilson failed to exhaust state reme-
dies before filing for relief in federal court.90 The Tenth Circuit, citing
its holding in Smith v. Atkins, reversed and remanded the case, holding
that the district court erred in dismissing Wilson's petition for failure to
exhaust state remedies. 9 1 Wilson's direct appeals were denied by the
state supreme court, so the Tenth Circuit found that Wilson's petition
for habeas corpus was properly before the federal district court,
notwithstanding his failure to exhaust state post-conviction remedies.
Both Smith v. Atkins and Wilson v. Rayl illustrate the Tenth Circuit's will-
ingness to hear state prisoners' habeas corpus petitions even though all
state remedies are not in fact totally exhausted.
Wilson v. Rayl is notable for the concurring opinion of Judge Bar-
rett.9 2 In his concurrence, Judge Barrett addressed the argument ad-
vanced by the prison warden, that the rule in Smith v. Atkins is too
"cumbersome."-93 Counsel for the warden maintained that the Smith de-
cision should be overruled because petitioners, rather than trial judges,
should bear the burden of proving exhaustion of state remedies.
94
Judge Barrett, however, reduced the confusion over who has the
burden of showing exhaustion. Stating that the initial burden of persua-
sion remains on the petitioner, the judge explained:
If it appears from the papers and records before the federal
83. No. 82-1242 (10th Cir. Dec. 10, 1983).
84. On the issue of exhaustion of state remedies, the Tenth Circuit also heard Marti-
nez v. Romero, No. 82-1726 (10th Cir. June 29, 1983). The record did not clearly show
that petitioner had exhausted his state remedies, so the Tenth Circuit remanded the case
to the district court for the purpose of determining whether petitioner had exhausted his
state remedies. The Tenth Circuit ruled that state prosecutors cannot waive the exhaus-
tion requirement. Id. at 4 (citing Naranjo v. Ricketts, 696 F.2d 83, 87 (10th Cir. 1982)).






91. Id. at 3.
92. Id. at 4 (Barrett, J., concurring).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 3. The circuit court dismissed this claim by asserting that a circuit court
should not overrule a prior decision of the same court made up of different judges. The
court added that "[t]o do so puts the law [of the Circuiti into a state of flux, and no one
can tell what the law will be until the composition of the court is determined." Id. at 3




district court that the identical factual or legal issue was
presented and decided by the highest state court, then the issue
has in fact been exhausted. Where, however, it is not apparent
to the federal district court from the papers and records filed
by the petitioner that available state remedies have been fully
exhausted, the burden of proof on the exhaustion issue does
not shift either to the state or to the federal district court to
show such exhaustion.
95
Hence, Judge Barrett's concurring opinion in Wilson v. Rayl provides au-
thority for the proposition that the burden of proof remains on the peti-
tioner to show that the exact issue has been decided by the highest state
court and is therefore exhausted.
III. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Although the Tenth Circuit dealt with the issue of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel in many of the petitions for habeas corpus relief during
the period covered by this survey, 96 only one case actually discussed the
matter at length. That case, Maldonado v. Winans,9 7 did not present the
Tenth Circuit with an unfamiliar fact pattern.
In Maldonado,98 petitioner, under the direction of his counsel pled
guilty to a charge of escape from the New Mexico State Penitentiary. 99
Maldonado, the petitioner, offered the guilty plea in exchange for the
prosecution's promise not to use a prior conviction to upgrade the sen-
tence.10 0 Maldonado, however, believed the prior conviction was inva-
lid and informed his counsel of this, but his counsel still advised him to
plead guilty. 1 1 Later, Maldonado, with different counsel, proved the
prior conviction to be invalid. ' 0 2 Thus, petitioner argued that his guilty
plea was uninformed and involuntary due to his counsel's poor
advice. '
0 3
For reasons unknown, defense counsel waived any claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, and the district court focused its decision
95. No. 82-1242, slip op. at 2-3 (Barrett, J. concurring).
96. See Almond v. Angelone, No. 83-1550 (10th Cir. Oct. 18, 1983) (petitioner alleged
he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his trial and appeal; the Tenth Circuit
found petitioner's counsel met the constitutional standard pronounced in Dyer v. Crisp,
613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980)); Franklin v. Manfin, No. 82-2287
(10th Cir. Aug. 31, 1983) (holding that a petitioner has a right to counsel at reopening of
parole revocation hearings); Maldonado v. Winans, 728 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1984) (see infra
notes 107-119 and accompanying text); Martinez v. Romero. No. 82-1726 (10th Cir. June
29, 1983) (petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel but the Tenth Circuit Court
vacated and remanded the case to the district court to determine the issue of exhaustion,
and the circuit court never addressed the question of effective assistance of counsel); Run-
nels v. Hess, 713 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1983) (prisoner's counsel was hard of hearing, sick
during the prisoner's trial, and failed to make a timely objection that, if made, would have
allowed a finding of reversible error); see also supra notes 14-42 and accompanying text.
97. 728 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1983).
98. Id.
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solely on the voluntariness of petitioner's guilty plea.' 0 4 The Tenth Cir-
cuit, however, rejected the lower court's holding, and declared that "ef-
fective assistance of counsel . . .is indispensable to a voluntary guilty
plea."' 10 5 The circuit court added that "the standard of legal represen-
tation required by the sixth amendment ' 0 6 is indistinguishable from that
required by the fifth amendment10 7 for purposes of guaranteeing a vol-
untary guilty plea in this case." 1 08 Thus, the Tenth Circuit vacated and
remanded the district court decision for further consideration of the re-





106. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
U.S. CONST. amend. 6.
107. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person .. .shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. 5. Under
the fifth amendment, all guilty pleas must be voluntary. See, e.g., Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970).
108. 728 F.2d at 439 (citing Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1975)).




The Tenth Circuit handed down four labor opinions during this
survey which merit review. Two additional cases are mentioned in brief.
In Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1261,1 the
Tenth Circuit applied only agency theory in determining that a local
union was not liable for damages due to an unauthorized strike. In so
holding, the court extended to local unions the Supreme Court's test for
determining parent union liability. In Artra Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 2 the
court enforced a Gissel bargaining order and applied the Wright Line
"mixed motive" analysis to uphold the National Labor Relations
Board's (NLRB or Board) rejection of the employer's economic neces-
sity defense in the face of alleged anti-union animus. In Southwest Com-
munity Health Services v. NLRB, 3 the Tenth Circuit held that the Board
failed to apply the correct standard in certifying a bargaining unit com-
posed of medical technicians and paramedics. The case was remanded
to the Board to determine the correct bargaining unit under the "dispar-
ity of interests" standard. In Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc.,4 the Tenth
Circuit reversed a district court ruling as to the applicable statute of lim-
itations in a "hybrid contract" suit which sought vacation of an arbitra-
tion award under the Railway Labor Act (RLA). The court applied the
six-month statute of limitations under section 10(b) of the National La-
bor Relations Act (NLRA) rather than the two year limitation under the
RLA. Donovan v. United Video, Inc.,5 and Jefferson County Community Center
for Developmental Disabilities, Inc. ,6 are discussed briefly.
I. UNION LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY UNAUTHORIZED STRIKES
In Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1261,7
the court held that a union local was not liable for damages caused by an
unauthorized strike where local officials played no part in instigating or
condoning the walkout. In affirming the district court's summary judg-
ment decree, the circuit applied only agency theory to the facts of the
case. The court determined that the "best efforts" and "mass action"
theories were no longer valid in view of the Supreme Court's decision in
Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers of America.8 Consolidation extends to
1. 725 F.2d 1258 (10th Cir. 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 7-47.
2. 730 F.2d 586 (10th Cir. 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 48-88.
3. 726 F.2d 611 (10th Cir. 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 89-131.
4. 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 594 (1984). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 132-52.
5. 725 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 153-62.
6. 732 F.2d 122 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 591 (1984). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 163-71.
7. 725 F.2d 1258 (10th Cir. 1984), afg 500 F. Supp. 72 (D. Utah 1980).
8. 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
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local unions the Court's most recent pronouncements on parent union
liability.9
A. Facts of Consolidation
The employer, operator of a coal mine in Emery County, Utah,
brought suit against the local union seeking injunctive relief and dam-
ages following an unauthorized walkout at the mine. The walkout took
place pursuant to worker dissatisfaction with the handling of a grievance
filed by a fellow union member. Local officials met immediately after
the walkout with the mine superintendent, but were unable to persuade
the membership to return to work. One local official remained on the
job until threats convinced him to leave work. The union threatened
internal disciplinary action and broadcasted radio announcements in an
effort to end the walkout, but work did not resume until 72 hours after
the strike commenced.' 0 The district court denied injunctive relief and
found the local union not liable under any theory of liability."I
B. Theories of Liability for Damages Pursuant to Unauthorized Walkouts
Courts have defined three theories of liability for employer dam-
ages pursuant to unauthorized walkouts where a no-strike obligation ex-
ists in the collective bargaining agreement.
1. Agency Theory
Under Section 301(b) 12 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA), any labor organization, be it a union or employer, "shall be
bound by the acts of its agents." Section 301(e)13 further defines the
role of an agent and follows the principles of apparent authority by stat-
ing that "the question of whether the specific acts performed were actu-
ally authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling." Thus,
an agent's actions may bind a union under the common law rules of
agency regardless of whether those actions were specifically authorized
or ratified. Under agency theory, courts examine the actions of stew-
ards, committeemen, and union officers for indications of ratification of
a strike in breach of a no-strike obligation. 14 The Third Circuit has
noted that failure of local union officials to repudiate a purported
agent's ordering of a strike may constitute ratification of the agent's ac-
tions whether or not he had authority.'
5
9. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981) (individual union
members not liable regardless of whether union found liable); Carbon Fuel Co. v. United
Mine Workers of America, 444 U.S. 212 (1979) (parent unions not liable under "mass
action" or "best efforts" theories); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962)
(individual members not liable where union found liable for strike damages).
10. 725 F.2d at 1259-60.
11. Id. at 1260.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1982).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1982).
14. Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 963 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976).
15. Id. at 964.
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It is clear, however, that union officials and rank-and-file members
are not individually liable for wildcat strikes. In Atkinson v. Sinclair Refin-
ing Co.,16 the Supreme Court held that when a union is found liable for
damages due to breach of a no-strike clause, its officers and members
are not individually liable. 17 Likewise, in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical
&Atomic Workers International Union,' 8 the Court announced that when a
union is not liable for breach of a no-strike agreement, no remedy for
damages attends against members individually. 19
2. Mass Action
A second theory of liability has been used where large groups of
workers walk off the job en masse. Mass action is thought to have
originated in 1948 when a district court ventured that "the idea ... that
• ..350,000 to 450,000 men would all get the same idea at once, inde-
pendently of leadership, and walk out of the mines, is of course simply
ridiculous."
20
The Third Circuit clarified mass action in Eazor Express Inc. v. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters,2 1 concluding "large groups of men do
not act collectively without leadership . . . a functioning union must be
held responsible for the mass action of its members."' 22 Mass action dif-
fers from pure agency theory in that authority and ratification are in-
ferred from the concerted action of a large labor organization. In Carbon
Fuel, the Supreme Court undertook the question of whether mass action
could be applied to find liability on behalf of an international or district
union even though the parent unions had no involvement with the lo-
cal's unauthorized walkout. The Court disavowed Eazor Express 23 and
cited the Fourth Circuit's decision in United Construction Workers v. Haislip
Baking Co.24 for the proposition that "there is [no] responsibility on the
16. 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
17. Id. at 247-48 (discussing section 301 (b) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1982)).
18. 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971).
19. Id. at 52 (citing Atkins v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962)).
20. United States v. United Mine Workers, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C. 1948), afd,
177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949).
21. 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975).
22. Id. at 963 (citations omitted).
23. 444 U.S. at 215. Eazor Express involved a strike over questionable discharges at a
loading dock in northeastern Ohio and an immediately subsequent sympathy strike by a
second local union at Pittsburgh, thereby implicating responsibility to the Teamster Inter-
national. Both strikes were in breach of no-strike obligations and neither was submitted to
the grievance machinery for resolution. The court found that neither local union insti-
gated or ratified the walkouts, but that the International as party to the collective bargain-
ing agreement nonetheless became liable to the employers 24 hours after the second
walkout began. The parent union's failure to use "all reasonable means to end the unau-
thorized strike" in violation of the no-strike obligation was deemed the proximate cause of
employer's damages. Eazor Express, 520 F.2d at 965-66.
24. Carbon Fuel, 444 U.S. at 215 (citing Haislip Baking, 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955)).
In Haislip Baking, the Fourth Circuit reversed a jury verdict against defendant national
unions. Haislip Baking arose over the dismissal of two employees and a subsequent walkout
by the entire bargaining unit. The circuit stated that employees involved in unauthorized
walkouts may lose some federal protections, but there is no responsibility on behalf of the
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part of a union for a strike with which it has had nothing to do."'2 5 Fun-
damental to the court's refusal to recognize mass action was Congress'
clear intention under section 30126 to limit liability to situations where
agency could be found.
2 7
3. Best Efforts
Closely related to the mass action theory is the best efforts theory,
which the Third Circuit also championed in Eazor Express.2 8 Best efforts
is based solely on the obligation of a union to use all reasonable means
to end a walkout where the union is party to a no-strike clause and the
accompanying arbitration process. The Third Circuit said that in the
case of a suit for damages incurred during an unauthorized walkout, a
union is estopped to disclaim responsibility unless it has used all reason-
able means to end the walkout. 29 Thus, best efforts can be distin-
guished from the two theories set forth above as being based on
contractual other than agency principles. It should be noted though,
that in the case of an unauthorized walkout, neither of the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement realistically could be held to the obliga-
tion if the walkout was not conceived, advocated, or ratified by union
officials. Rather, the walkout is the responsibility of individual workers
who are not party to the agreement. In Carbon Fuel, the Supreme Court
doused "best efforts" by finding that a union which repeatedly dis-
avowed wildcat strikes could not be found liable for failure to use all
reasonable means to end a wildcat walkout simply because Congres-
sional policy favors arbitrating industrial disputes. 30 Furthermore, the
Court clarified its position on the contractual foundation of best efforts
liability, stating that unless full responsibility for wildcat walkouts ap-
pears as a bargained-for provision in a collective bargaining agreement
such responsibility could not be read into the parties' contract. 3 1
C. The Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of Carbon Fuel in Consolidation
In Consolidation the Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court ruling, re-
fusing to find the local liable under mass action or best efforts theo-
ries. 3 2 The Court applied agency theory to the facts but found no
evidence to suggest the local "instigated, supported, ratified, or en-
couraged the actions" of the mine workers in their decision to walk
union for a strike in which it took no part. The litigants in Haislip Baking were parties to a
no-strike pledge similar to that in Eazor Express, supra note 23.
25. 223 F.2d at 877.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982) provides a cause of action in contract by or against labor
organizations.
27. See, e.g., Carbon Fuel, 444 U.S. at 217.
28. 520 F.2d 959. "Best efforts" is also known as the "all reasonable means" test. See
id. at 959-60.
29. Id.
30. 444 U.S. at 218.
31. Id. at 221-22.
32. 725 F.2d at 1260.
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out. 33 Significantly, the court held that the Supreme Court's decision in
Carbon Fuel applied to local unions, even though the Court in Carbon Fuel
considered only the obligations of parent unions.3 4 The circuit court
was careful not to preclude best efforts or mass action theories of liabil-
ity where the parties have specifically bargained for an "all reasonable
means" obligation in their agreement.
3 5
D. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Consolidation is firmly in line with Car-
bon Fuel in holding that neither mass action nor best efforts survived the
Supreme Court's decision. The fact that mass action and best efforts
theories are usually applied to local unions coupled with the reminder
that Carbon Fuel pertained solely to parent unions, indicates a conceptual
leap by the Tenth Circuit in Consolidation. By extending the Court's
holding in Carbon Fuel to local unions, the court of appeals has clarified
the boundaries of agency liability. That the Court in Carbon Fuel failed to
find union liability based only upon an arbitration clause where the par-
ties have not bargained for an explicit obligation to use all reasonable
means to end a wildcat strike3 6 is broad enough to discredit the best
efforts theory at all levels of union hierarchy.
Likewise, the Court's indictment of Eazor and endorsement of Hais-
lip on the issue of a union's lack of responsibility for strikes in which it is
not involved3 7 is sufficiently broad to discredit the mass action theory at
all levels. In reviewing the legislative history of section 301, the Court
seems to have convinced itself that Congress took great care to con-
struct a shield of immunity around unions which could only be broken
by proof of agency.3 8 Mass action liability infers authority and ratifica-
tion from the circumstances, but it does not require proof of these ele-
ments of agency theory.
The other circuits have not interpreted Carbon Fuel as applicable to
locals. The Fourth Circuit, champion of "mass action," stated in Consoli-
dation Coal Co. v. Local 1702, United Mine Workers of America3 9 that the
mass action theory remains "a sensible and pragmatic approach to this
difficult problem in the area of labor relations."'40 The circuit applied
mass action to a local union, distinguishing Carbon Fuel based upon the
33. Id. at 1263. In a footnote the court of appeals pointed out that the district court
had found no ratification of the wildcat strike by the failure of union officials, in the face of
threats, to work their preassigned shifts in the three-days walkout. Id. n. 12. But see Con-
solidated Coal Co. v. Local 1702 United Mine Workers, 709 F.2d 882, 884, 886 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 487 (1983).
34. 444 U.S. at 215 n.3; 725 F.2d at 1261 n.7.
35. Id. at 1263 n.1 1; accord Carbon Fuel 444 U.S. at 721-22.
36. 444 U.S. at 218.
37. Id. at 215.
38. Id. at 218.
39. 709 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1983).
40. Id. at 885 (quoting Carbon Fuel, 582 F.2d 1346, 1349-50 (4th Cir. 1978), afd, 444
U.S. 212 (1979)).
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Court having only the district and international unions before it.4 1 The
Fourth Circuit had affirmed a finding of liability against the local unions
in Carbon Fuel4 2 based on the mass action theory of liability, and appears
reluctant to retreat from its holding.
In North River Energy Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America,43 the
Eleventh Circuit, without mentioning Carbon Fuel, affirmed the validity of
the mass action theory but declined to apply it to an Alabama wildcat
strike. In explaining its view of mass action the court sought a "correla-
tion" between the actions of the union as an entity speaking and acting
through its officers, and the actions of its membership. 44 This language
suggests a test more strict than that of Eazor Express which looks only to
large concert of unlawful action regardless of what union leaders might
have said or done in instigating a walkout; thus, the Eazor Express criteria
is similar to a strict liability test.
The Tenth Circuit in Consolidation follows a parade of cases which
make recovery of damages for wildcat walkouts increasingly difficult.
4 5
Because individual union members can not be found liable for damages,
and union entities are shielded from liability unless their leadership has
taken an active role, employers can only look to the bargaining agree-
ment 4 6 or Boys Markets injunctions 4 7 for relief.
II. BARGAINING ORDERS AND BURDEN OF PROOF
A. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,48 the Supreme Court upheld the
Board's practice of compelling employers to bargain with a designated
union where the employer has engaged in unfair labor practices suffi-
cient to render a certification election biased. 4 9 The Court found the
Board issuance of a bargaining order to be a valid alternative remedy to
41. The Fourth Circuit also found the local union liable under agency theory. By
taking only actions which were "foresecably ineffective," the local union had ratified and
tacitly encouraged the strike. Consolidation Coal, 709 F.2d at 885-86.
42. Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 582 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir.
1978), affid 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
43. 664 F.2d 1184 (11 th Cir. 1981).
44. Id. at 1194 (citing Consolidation Coal Co., 500 F. Supp. at 77).
45. See supra, note 9.
46. The controlling principle after Carbon Fuel is that such a contract term must be
bargained-for and specific as to each party's duties, and not ambiguously stated, e.g., when
the parties "agree and affirm that they will maintain the integrity of this contract." See
Carbon Fuel, 444 U.S. at 216.
47. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). Boys
Markets provides an exception to the no injunction rule of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Spe-
cifically, an action in equity to enjoin a strike can only be had where the strike is over a
grievance which both parties have agreed to arbitrate, and the employer should be com-
pelled to arbitrate such a grievance. Id. at 254 (citing Sinclar Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370
U.S. 195, 228 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). All other principles of equity attendant to
an injunction order must be met.
48. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
49. Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 600. The National Labor Relations Act enumerates un-




an election where the employer abrogates his duty to bargain in good
faith under the NLRA. 50 Under Gissel, the Board may determine
whether an employer's anti-union campaign constitutes unfair labor
practices to the extent a cease and desist order is inadequate, or where
an employer's activities have been so egregious that a bargaining order
is the only fair remedy. 5 1 The Court's decision in Gissel precludes em-
ployers' from delaying elections while the Board considers whether evi-
dence warrants a cease and desist order. 52 The Court in Gissel was quick
to point out, and the Tenth Circuit has repeated, however, that a bar-
gaining order is not a permanent remedy. 53 Employees may always
decertify a union after the Board orders bargaining.
54
B. NLRB v. Wright Line
In NLRB v. Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc. ,55 the First Cir-
cuit affirmed the Board's procedural analysis in "mixed motive cases"
where an employee alleges his discharge or discipline resulted from
anti-union animus and the employer asserts valid motives from such ac-
tion. 56 Anti-union animus can be defined broadly as prejudicial hiring,
firing, or administration of work rules based upon employees' exercise
of activities protected under sections seven 5 7 and eight 58 of the NLRA.
Under the "partial motivation test" 5 9 used prior to Wright Line, the
Board could order reinstatement of an employee accused of bad con-
duct whenever the General Counsel could prove dismissal was based
partially on union activism. Hence, the rule left union proponents insu-
lated from discharge or appropriate discipline regardless of their em-
ployment activity.
60
Under the Wright Line analysis, a "but for" test is applied to deter-
mine whether a discharge would have occurred regardless of the em-
ployee's pro-union actions.6 1 Once the general counsel establishes the
prima facie existence of an unfair labor practice, i.e., "discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment,"'6 2 the burden of production
shifts to the employer to show that no unfair labor practice occurred and
that the employee would have been discharged regardless of his union
50. The duty of bargaining in good faith arises under section 8(a)(5) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
51. Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 610-14.
52. Id. at 610-11.
53. Id. at 613 (citing Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1944)); NLRB
v. Groendyke Transport, Inc., 417 F.2d 33, 35 (10th Cir. 1969) (citing Franks Bros., 321
U.S. 702), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970).
54. See, e.g., Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 613.
55. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
56. Id. at 907.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 7 protects workers' right to form and join a
union, bargain collectively, and engage in concerted activities.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). See supra note 49.
59. Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 902.
60. Id. (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 903.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
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activity. 6 3 The General Counsel still has the burden of showing by a
preponderance that an unfair labor practice transpired, i.e., but for the
employee's union related activities he would not have been dismissed.
64
Thus, section 10(c) of the NLRA, 65 requiring the Board to prove all ele-
ments of an unfair labor practice, was not violated because the company
was not presented with a greater burden of persuasion than that which
the Board could properly shift to it.
6 6
The Supreme Court altered Wright Line to a small degree in NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp. ,67 which held that it was fair to shift the
burden of persuasion to the employer to prove that no anti-union ani-
mus was involved in the treatment of a union-sympathyzing employee.
68
The Court held that the First Circuit erred in interpreting section 10(c),
stating that nothing "forbids placing the burden on the employer to
prove that absent improper motivation" it would have discharged the
employee for legitimate reasons. 69 Thus, the employer may proffer an
affirmative defense to this effect, to which it bears the burden of proof.
70
C. Artra Group v. NLRB
In the Artra Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 7 1 the Board brought unfair labor
practice charges under sections 772 and 8(a)(1), 73 against a small
Oklahoma electronics manufacturer. The Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) found fifteen separate violations of the Act, including interroga-
tion of and threats to employees, surveillance of union activities, and
two substantial layoffs designed to remove union leaders from the bar-
gaining unit,7 4 concluding that the company used these coercive tactics
to impede the organization of a union. Accordingly, the ALJ enjoined
the employer's anti-union activity and ordered reimbursement with back
pay for laid off employees. Additionally, without providing a rationale,
the ALJ issued a bargaining order based upon the discriminatory impo-
sition of rules and coercive threats, including closure.
7 5
The employer appealed the ALJ's adjudication to the NLRB. The
Board upheld the ALJ's efforts in general, with slight but unsubstantial
modifications. 76 The Board did, however, make two significant determi-
63. Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 906-07. The firing of a union employee, even a union
activist, is not an unfair labor practice if his employer took the action for business reasons.
The issue goes to motive of the employer.
64. Id. at 906, n. 12.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
66. Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 903-04, 904 n.8.
67. 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
68. Id. at 2475.
69. Id. at 2474.
70. Id. at 2473.
71. 730 F.2d 586 (10th Cir. 1984).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
74. Artra Group, 730 F.2d at 589.
75. Id. at 593. Presumably, the Act determined that a fair election was unlikely due to
bias invoked by the employer's threats and prejudice.
76. Id. at 589.
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nations. First, it rejected the company's contention that it was unaware
of the union's organizational activities which would have precluded a
finding of anti-union animus. 7 7 Second, the Board provided its own ra-
tionale for the extraordinary bargaining order issued by the ALJ.
7 8
The employer challenged the Board's affirmance on several
grounds. First, the employer claimed that evidence of economic neces-
sity was inadequately considered by both the ALJ and the Board. The
Tenth Circuit pointed out, however, that while the Board "could have
written a more detailed opinion," it could properly rely on the ALJ's
conclusions regarding the economic evidence. 79 Moreover, the court
noted, the ALJ's conclusion did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
80
Second, the employer asserted that the Wright Line analysis had not been
applied in considering its economic evidence, however sufficient. In re-
sponse, the court noted that the ALJ had clearly applied Wright Line
8 '
and, more importantly, the company's evidence of economic necessity
was simply insufficient as an affirmative defense. 82 Third, the employer
challenged the Board's conclusion that it had knowledge of the union
organization activities. On this point, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the factual determinations of the ALJ provided evidence in the record
from which the Board could infer the employer's knowledge. 83 Finally,
the court affirmed the bargaining order, reasoning that the Board's de-
termination of a proper "remedy is entitled to special respect."'8 4 On
each point the Tenth Circuit stated specifically, or clearly inferred, that
the conclusion of the ALJ and determination by the Board were sup-
ported by substantial evidence.
8 5
D. Conclusion
In Artra Group, the Tenth Circuit has indicated it will not question
detailed procedural analysis of the NLRB where the evidence clearly
demonstrates an unfair labor practice. 8 6 Unfortunately, however, the
court accepts the Board's meager analysis for enforcing compelled bar-
gaining. The issuance of a Gissel bargaining order is an extraordinary
remedy, rarely levied by the Board. It defeats the purposes of elective
bargaining between the parties, and should only be issued where the
facts clearly warrant bypassing the traditional secret ballot election pro-
77. Id. at 592.
78. Id. at 589-90 (quoting Dutch Boy. Inc., Glowlite Division and International Union
and Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, 262 N.L.R.B. 1 (1982)).
79. 730 F.2d 590.
80. Id. at 591. The ALJ simply concluded that the company had altered its financial
records and, therefore, its defense was not credible. Id. at 592.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., id. at 591-92.
83. Id. at 592-93.
84. Id. at 593.
85. See, e.g., id. at 590 (citing Ann Lee Sportswear, Inc. v. NLRB, 543 F.2d 739 (10th
Cir. 1976)).
86. The Board made 15 separate findings of fact which lent support to the opinion
that the employer had committed numerous unfair labor practices. See supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
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cess. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit requires the NLRB to give a de-
tailed analysis of its justifications for bypassing this process as an aid to
judicial review. 87 The Tenth Circuit, however, holds that the Board's
choice of remedy, regardless of its extraordinary nature, is entitled to
the same narrow review afforded most administrative actions by the
board.8 8
III. BARGAINING UNIT DETERMINATION IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
A. Non-Proliferation of Bargaining Units in the Medical Industry
1. Legislative History
In 1974 Congress amended section 2(2) of the National Labor Rela-
tion Act 8 9 to include employees in non-profit hospitals under federal
protection and coverage. 90 Legislators in both the House and Senate
discussed the issue of labor interruptions in the health care field and
warned against the proliferation of bargaining units at health care facili-
ties. 91 Congress was concerned that labor conflicts would cause inter-
ruptions or slowdowns in the delivery of health care, and that wage
"whipsawing,,"9 2 striking in succession the several employers of a bar-
gaining unit, would increase health care costs. 93 Additionally, Congress
noted that unlike goods and materials, medical care is not "storable,"
and that a hospital strike could be extremely detrimental to patient
care. 94 Moreover, organizational efforts themselves adversely affect pa-
tient care.
9 5
The Senate rejected efforts to restrict the number of bargaining
units in non-profit hospitals to four: professional employees, technical
employees, clerical workers, and service and maintenance employees.
96
87. Red Oaks Nursing Home, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 503, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1980).
The court points out that "even a cursory examination of the decisions apply Gissel in this
circuit and other circuits reveals that the Board has declined repeatedly to assist the Courts
with this expertise by revealing reasons for issuing Gissel bargaining orders." Id. at 508.
88. Artra Group, 730 F.2d at 593 (citing Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613 n.32).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982).
90. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, § 2(2), 88 Stat. 295. See NLRB v. St.
Francis Hospital of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404, 411-13 (9th Cir. 1979), for a discussion of
legislative history behind this change.
91. NLRB v. St. Francis Hospital of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1979)
(citations to Congressional debate omitted).
92. Id.
93. NLRB v. Anchorage Businessmen's Ass'n, 289 F.2d 619, 621 n.3 (9th Cir. 1961)
(citing NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union, 353 U.S. 87, 90 n.7 (1957)).
94. S. REP. No. 766, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1974), reprinted in 2 [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3946, 3953 (views of Sen. Dominick), cited in St. Francis Hospital of
Lynwood, 601 F.2d at 411. Mr. Dominick of Colorado expressed opposition to the compro-
mise bill which eventually passed, warning that it would open health care institutions to
organizational drives and similar disruptions, thereby impeding the administering of vital
services. He predicted that even in large cities where there is no alternative to hospitals
which provide specialized services, labor interruptions common to other industries could
be problematic. Id. at 40.
95. Presyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 723 F.2d 1468, 1473 (10th Cir.
1983). Union solicitation does not enjoy the presumption of protected concerted activity
in patient care areas.
96. See St. Francis Hospital, 601 F.2d at 411 (citations omitted).
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Congress did, however, admonish the Board to prevent proliferation of
such units in the health care industry. 9 7 Specifically, it warned that hos-
pitals, given their critical community service, should not suffer the same
administrative and labor-management problems as the construction
industry.
9 8
2. The Community of Interests Standard
The NLRA gives the Board few specific instructions of how to deter-
mine appropriate bargaining units. 99 The Board has established the
"community of interests" standards when determining the makeup of
units, based upon parameters found in sections 7100 and 9(b)10 1 of the
Act. Section 9(b) instructs the board to "assure ... employees the ful-
lest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by" the Act, and section
7 allows employees to engage in concerted activities such as forming,
joining, and bargaining as, a union. In order to allow employees to ef-
fectively communicate their vocational or professional interests, the
Board groups employees, according to job classification, into units
based upon similarity of terms and conditions of employment, duties,
qualifications, earnings, and proximity as well as their stated desires.'
0 2
Unit determination has a significant impact on the nature of collective
bargaining. For instance, a larger unit may fragment as different groups
of employees promote separate interests.
10 3
3. The Disparity of Interests Standard
Until August of 1984 the NLRB and the circuit courts of appeals
battled over unit determination in non-profit hospitals. 10 4 The majority
of the pre-Reagan Board invoked consistantly its specialized experience
and authority to determine appropriate units regardless of Congress'
admonition against unit proliferation.' 0 5 The circuit courts of appeals
often rejected the Board's determinations and, on occasion, repri-
manded the Board's hypocritical approach. 10 6 In Allegheny General Hospi-
tal v. NLRB, 10 7 the board reconsidered but refused to reverse its
97. S. REP. No. 766, 93D CONG., 2D SESS. 5 (1974), repinted in 2 [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3946, 3950.
98. 120 CONG. REC. 12945 (1974) (statement of co-sponsor Sen. Taft).
99. A. Cox, D. BOK, and W. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW, 274 (9th
ed. 1981).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982).
102. A. Cox, supra note 99, at 275.
103. See, e.g., Mallinkrodt Chemical Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966) (where the Board
announced a new standard for determining whether a group of craftsmen should consti-
tute a separate unit).
104. See Mary Thompson Hosp. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980), Alle-
ghany Gen'l Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 966, 970 (3d Cir. 1979), and St. Vincent's
Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588, 592-93 (3d Cir. 1977), for some of the more outstanding
clashes between the Board and the Circuits.
105. J. ABODEELY, R. HAMMER, and A.L. SANDLER, THE NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE
BARGAINING UNIT, 265-66 (rev. ed. 1981).
106. See, e.g., Allegheny Gent7 Hosp. 608 F.2d at 966.
107. Id. at 965.
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determination of a maintenance employees' unit after the Third Circuit
had remanded to the Board a nearly identical case' 0 8 for reconsidera-
tion in light of Congressional sentiment. The circuit denied enforce-
ment of the Board's order which sought to carve out an operating
engineers unit from the existing maintenance employees unit, citing
stare decisis. 10 9 Despite reprimands such as this, the Board applied the
community of interests standard of American Cyanimid Co. 110 throughout
the 1970s and early 1980s.
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits pioneered the "disparity of interests"
standard in refusing to enforce Board unit determination orders in
NLRB v. St. Francis Hospital"I I and Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v.
NLRB. l" 2 In St. Francis Hospital, the Ninth Circuit borrowed the term
"disparity of interests" from Senator Williams' statement in the legisla-
tive history of the 1974 amendments."13 The court distinguished "com-
munity of interests," which groups employees into smaller units based
on traditional factors, from "disparity of interests," which focuses upon
those differences between groups that inhibit larger bargaining units.' "4
The term is an unfortunate one. "Disparity of differences" better de-
scribes the applicable standard. The Tenth Circuit shed a great deal
more light on the terminology in Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center,' 15
where it stated:
It is . . . the dissimilarity of interests relevant to the collective
bargaining process that determines which employees are not to
be included in a proposed unit. The proper approach is to be-
gin with a broad proposed unit and then exclude employees
with disparate interests. One should not start with a narrow
unit, such as registered nurses, and then add professionals with
similar interests.' 16
The Second and Eighth Circuits have criticized the "disparity of in-
terests" standard applied by the two western circuits as too restrictive of
the employees' right to choose a bargaining representative""1 7 and as
requiring unnecessarily large, unmanageable units." 18
108. See St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977).
109. Allegheny Genl Hosp., 608 F.2d at 970 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803)). "For the Board to predicate an order on its disagreement with this
court's interpretation of a statute is for it to operate outside the law. Such an order will
not be enforced." Atlegheny, 608 F.2d at 970.
110. 131 N.L.R.B. 909, 910 (1961).
111. 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).
112. 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981).
113. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d at 419 (citing Mercy Hospital of Sacramento, Inc., 217
N.L.R.B. 765, 766-67 (1975) (citation to Sen. Williams' remarks omitted)).
114. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d at 419.
115. 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981).
116. Id. at 457-58 n.6.
117. Trustees of Masonic Hall and Asylum Fund v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 642 (2d Cir.
1983).
118. Cf. Watonwan Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1983).
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B. Southwest Community Health Services v. NLRB
In Southwest Community Health Services, 1 9 the Board certified a group
of 54 ambulance service employees intricately connected with the opera-
tor's eleven facilities, but the operator alleged the unit's impropriety and
refused to bargain with it. Unfair labor practice charges were filed
against the operator on which the Board granted General Counsel's mo-
tion for summary judgment.120 The Board petitioned the Tenth Circuit
for enforcement of its summary judgment order.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit first noted that its standard of review
was not the usual "arbitrary and without substantial support" test,' 2 '
but rather the desparity of interests standard.' 2 2 The court noted that
although the justifications considered by the regional director for certifi-
cation could support the presumption that the ambulance service em-
ployees performed significantly different work than that performed by
potentially included groups, the correct presumption in the health care
industry is that employees in other classifications might have a disparity
of differences such that their inclusion would be appropriate.123 The
circuit did not hold the unit inappropriate per se, but remanded to the
Board for reconsideration under the appropriate standard.
12 4
C. St. Francis Hospital and International Brotherhood of Electric
Workers Local 474
In August, 1984, the Board announced it would no longer apply the
community of interests standard to non-profit hospital unit determina-
tions.1 2 5 It declined, however, to adopt the strict interpretation of "dis-
parity of interests," and, instead, formulated a balancing test which
considers the congressional instructions along with differences between
employee groups.' 26 The Board emphasized that "no unit is per se ap-
propriate," and, henceforth, separate representation would be based
upon the facts of each case in light of the "disparity of interests" stan-
dard;' 2 7 yet, it cautioned that strict division of employees into profes-
sional and non-professional units is unwarranted.
12 8
D. Conclusion
The Board, reconstituted in the image of the Reagan administra-
tion, has reduced tension with the courts of appeals on the health units
119. Southwest Community Health Services, 726 F.2d 611 (10th Cir. 1984).
120. Id. at 613.
121. 726 F.2d at 613 (citing Beth Israel Hosp. and Geriatic Cen. v. NLRB, 688 F.2d
697 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1025 (1982)).
122. 726 F.2d at 613 (citing Presbytarian/St. Lukes Medical Cen., 653 F.2d at 457; St. Fran-
cis Hosp., 601 F.2d at 419).
123. Southwest Community Health Services, 726 F.2d at 613-14.
124. Id. at 614.
125. St. Francis Hospital, 271 N.L.R.B. No. 160, 1984-85, NI.RB Dec. (CCH) 16,590.
126. Id. at 15-16.
127. Id. at 17.
128. Id. at 16-17.
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issue, indicating that cases like Southwest Community Health Services will be
fewer in the future. Given the persistant, often sharp remonstrances by
the courts, the Board had little choice but to move toward what the cir-
cuit courts consider to be a strong congressional mandate.
In labor law, volatile issues must be examined from at least two per-
spectives. Labor groups feel justifiably more comfortable in smaller
units, especially at the bargaining table, where their unique needs in the
mandatory bargaining areas of wages, hours, and terms of employ-
ment 129 are considered more carefully. Additionally, hospitals, with
their diverse array of services, lend themselves to proliferation of bar-
gaining units. Coupled together, these two factors explain why it took
the Board a decade to implement Congress' non-proliferation compro-
mise, and even then not without a hint of mitigation.
The disparity of differences standard will reduce the number of bar-
gaining units certified by the Board. In theory, this will promote peace-
ful labor relations. Yet the real result may be a displacement of tensions
into the arena of unit fragmentation. Congress defeated a bill which
would have mandated four reasonably well-defined units 130 in the final
legislation, presumably because its categorizations were unduly restric-
tive. It would hardly reflect true congressional intent for the Board to
adopt more a restrictive standard of unit determination than that re-
jected by Congress. Due to the patent vagueness of the legislative his-
tory, '3 ' the Tenth Circuit and its sister courts should now watch for unit
determinations in the health care field which are too rigid to effect the
rights conferred in section 7 and the duty of the Board found in section
9(b) of the Act.
IV. LIMITATIONS OF HYBRID ACTIONS UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
A. Barnett v. United Air Lines'
3 2
Frank Barnett, an employee of United Air lines and a member of the
Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), filed a grievance concerning his
seniority status under a collective bargaining agreement between United
and the union. The Railway Labor Act (RLA)' 3 3 mandates an adjust-
ment board, established by each airline and railway carrier, which has
jurisdiction over minor labor grievances which do not merit attention of
the National Mediation Board. 13 4 The system adjustment board, which
129. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
130. S. 2292, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); see, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR
OF THE SENATE COMMITrEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., Legisla-
tive History of the Coverage of Nonprofit Hospitals Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 1974 (Comm. Print 1974) (S. 2292, reprinted at 449-61).
131. J. ABODEELY, supra note 105 at 276.
132. 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 594 (1984).
133. 45 U.S.C. § 151 to 188 (1982).
134. 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1982) outlines procedures for the establishment of system,
group, or regional boards of adjustment. The system adjustment board utilized by United
and the AFA is not unlike an arbitration panel established by many industries and unions.
Under 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982) the National Mediation Board can enpanel a National Air
Transport Adjustment Board to handle major disputes. See gernerally De La Rosa Sanchez
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included representatives of both the airline and the AFA, denied Bar-
nett's grievance. He subsequently filed a "hybrid contract" action
against the airline for breach of contract and against the union for
breach of the implied duty of fair representation.
13 5
The drafters of the RLA failed to anticipate hybrid actions such as
Barnett, consequently no directly applicable statute of limitations ap-
pears in the Act. The court reviewed Barnett twice. In its initial opinion
in March, 1984, it overruled the district court's use of the state statute
and substituted the RLA's two-year limit.' 3 6 The court determined that
Congress intended to provide the airline industry with a statutory
scheme similar to the rail industry; thus, the two year limitation of Na-
tional Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) actions was applicable.
13 7
The court did not consider the similarity between Barnett's action and
hybrid contract suits under the NLRA.
In June, 1984, the Tenth Circuit withdrew its March decision and
substituted the present ruling. 138 Citing DelCostello v. International Broth-
erhood of Teasters,139 the Supreme Court decision which applied the
NLRA six-month limit to hybrid claims, the circuit ruled the NLRA stat-
ute applies to hybrid RLA suits as well.
B. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Hybrid labor actions involve two suits. The first is a breach of con-
tract suit brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act (LMRA). 14 0 The second is a breach of duty of fair
representation claim brought against the union. The latter is implied
from the NLRA and recognized by the Court as a necessary remedy due
to the union's obligation to represent all of its members in an honest
and aggressive fashion. 14 1 Most hybrid actions arise from arbitration
decisions where the union member feels he was inadequately repre-
v. Eastern Airlines, 574 F.2d 29, 31, 32 (lst Cir. 1978) (jurisdiction on each board
detailed).
135. "Hybrid" actions are cognizable in federal courts and, thus, are an exception to
the pre-emption doctrine enunciated in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959). The cause of action known as "breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion" was first recognized in Steele v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192
(1944), where a minority employee sued both his employer and a union under the RLA.
Though the action sounds in unfair labor practice, the Board did not recognize it until
1962. and the courts until 1966. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), the Court ex-
tended federal court jurisdiction to hybrid suits, based in part on the courts' power to
review arbitration decisions and in part on an employee's right to a remedy where neither
the employer nor the union will afford her one. See id. at 184-86.
136. Barnett v. United Air LInes, Inc., 729 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.), vacated, 738 F.2d 358,
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 594 (1984).
137. Barnett, 729 F.2d at 696.
138. 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 594 (1984).
139. 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982) provides for suits by and against unions and employers
sounding in contract.
141. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), the Court held a union's duty of representa-
tion "includes" a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostil-
ity or discrimination toward any." Id. at 177.
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sented or not represented at all and, subsequently, brings a claim
against both the employer and the union. In DelCostello, the employee
refused to drive a truck he felt was unsafe and, as a result, was dismissed.
He filed a grievance and lost at arbitration.' 42 Ordinarily, system ad-
justment board decisions are subject to very limited review by the
courts, 14 3 but hybrid actions receive full review by the federal courts if
the plaintiff shows that the union breached its implied duty to handle the
worker's grievance fairly.
14 4
In DelCostello, the lower courts applied different statutes of limita-
tion to the workers' hybrid claims. The Court overruled the decisions in
both companion cases, holding that federal courts should not borrow a
state statute where a federal statute provides guidance more reflective of
the practicalities of the specific litigation.' 4 5 The Court reasoned that
section 10(b) of the NLRA, governing the handling of unfair labor prac-
tice cases, was more analogous to hybrid actions than state remedies'
46
and lended itself to uniformity in section 301 actions.' 4 7 Thus, DelCos-
tello implemented the six-month limit of section 10(b).
C. Discussion
In Barnett, the court's application of DelCostello to hybrid RLA suits
stretches the Supreme Court's holding. While the state statutory limit is
less appropriate than a federal limit, the proper issue is which federal
statute of limitations is appropriate for hybrid RLA actions. The court
found "identical competing interests" between DelCostello and Barnett, in
rejecting the RLA two-year limitation.' 4 8 The comparison is deceiving.
The interests in DelCostello were those of the state and federal statutes of
limitations, where the federal limitation appears in the Act under which
the cause of action arose, and the state limitation rule applied to ordi-
nary contract or malpractice actions which have nothing to do with fed-
eral law. The competing interests in Barnett appear as tension between a
federal limitation designed specifically for the rail and air industries and
a limitation which governs unfair labor practices under a separate fed-
eral act.
The Tenth Circuit based its decision to apply the section 10(b) stat-
utory limit rather than the RLA limit, on a similarity between the RLA
hybrid action and the classic NLRA hybrid action. It appears, though it
is not clear, that there are two reasons for this arrival. First, both stat-
utes apply the same threshold test for full review of a hybrid claim, re-
142. DelCostello, 103 S. Ct. at 2286.
143. Exclusive jurisdiction to interpret a collective bargaining agreement is vested in
the adjustment boards pursuant to 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1982). See Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Firemen & Enginemen v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 199 F.2d 384, 385 (5th Cir.
1952) (citations omitted).
144. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 185.
145. DelCostello, 103 S. Ct. at 2294.
146. Id. at 2293.
147. See, e.g., id. at 2292-93 n.18, 19 (citations omitted).
148. Barnett, 738 F.2d at 363.
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quiring that the plaintiff show breach of the implied duty of fair
representation. Second, application of the two-year RLA limitation is
vague and no other limitation directly governs hybrid suits. The two
year statutory limit appears in a section setting forth practice of the Na-
tional Railroad Adjustment Board,14 9 which does not control grievances
such as that of Barnett. This same statute, however, is incorporated in
the section creating the National Air Transport Adjustment Board' 50
which had enough relevance to this case to have been said to fit "hand in
glove" with the Barnett case on first hearing at the circuit.'
5 '
D. Conclusion
Very little evidence of Congressional intent appears in the final de-
cision of Barnett. Instead the decision seems to hinge on Congress' in-
tent to provide uniform limitations periods for similar suits. The Tenth
Circuit applied DelCostello blindly, and giving little, if any, rationale for
withdrawing its first decision which applied the RLA statute of limita-
tions. It is an ironic decision, given that the case arose under the RLA,
and that the cause of action of breach of fair duty of representation
arose originally under the RLA.1
52
V. OTHER TENTH CIRCUIT LABOR DECISIONS
A. Donovan v. United Video, Inc.
In Donovan v. United Video, Inc., 13 the Tenth Circuit upheld a district
court ruling which found that microwave system engineers were not
"administrative employees" for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA). 154 The court also upheld the lower court's determination
of back wages due the engineers despite the fact neither party kept accu-
rate records.
Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA 155 exempts "bona fide executive, ad-
ministrative, or professional" employees from overtime compensation
regulations found in section 7(a)(1) 15 6 of the Act. The Department of
Labor and the courts use two tests to determine whether work per-
formed by employees designated by their employers as "administrative"
is, in fact, exempt from overtime provisions. 15 7 The "short test' 158
used in United Video applies to persons earning more than $250 per
149. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (r) (1982).
150. 45 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
151. Barnett, 729 F.2d at 696 (quoting United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S.
56, 64 (1981)). United Parcel is a somewhat moot decision which should be utilized with
great care based upon its irregular procedural context. See United Parcel, 451 U.S. at 65-71
(Stewart, J., concurring).
152. See supra note 128.
153. 725 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1984).
154. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219 (1982).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1982).
156. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1982).
157. 29 C.F.R. § 541.2 (1984).
158. Id. § 541.2(e)(2).
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week, while the "long test,"' 159 more precise in nature, applies to per-
sons earning less than $250 per week.
The Secretary of Labor brought suit against the employer to en-
force the overtime and record keeping requirements of the Act. The
district court found the engineer's primary duty was to maintain the mi-
crowave systems, a responsibility which, for the most part, involved
truck driving and equipment inspection. The district court concluded
that the employer had violated the Act and determined the amount of
back wages due. The court of appeals affirmed.
160
The employer objected to the court's ruling on back wages on the
grounds that the number of overtime hours worked by the complaining
engineers was not settled. The circuit applied Anderson v. Mount Clemens
Pottery Co.,161 wherein the Supreme Court stated that the grieving
party's burden in a FLSA case is to show that he has performed work for
inadequate compensation, given that the court can reasonably infer the
amount of that work from the evidence. The burden then shifts to the
employer to negate the allegation as to amount and, should he fail, the
court may award damages to the employee, albeit based upon a approxi-
mation drawn from the evidence.' 62 As the employer could not come
forward with precise records as to hours worked, the district court's de-
termination of back wages, based on the Secretary of Labor's calcula-
tions from depositions and payroll records, was affirmed.
B. Jefferson County Community Center for Development Disabilities
Inc., v. NLRB
In Jefferson County Community Center for Developmental Disabilities, Inc. v.
NLRB, 16 3 the Tenth Circuit enforced board orders directing a commu-
nity health care facility to bargain with and supply information to an
employee's union despite the facility's insistence that it was a political
subdivision of state government and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction
of the NLRB under section 2(2)164 of the Act. Section 2(2) of the
NLRA, which gives the board jurisdiction over labor-management rela-
tions, exempts states and their political subdivisions from its
provisions.1
65
The circuit outlined a two part test for qualification as a political
subdivision: that the entity be either created by the state as an arm of
government, or administered by those responsible directly to public offi-
cials or the electorate. 16 6 The court found that while the health care
159. Id. § 541.2(a) to (e).
160. United Video, 725 F.2d at 583-84.
161. 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
162. United Video, 725 F.2d at 583-84 (citing Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co.,
328 U.S. at 687-88; Donovan v. Simmons Petroleum Corp., 725 F.2d 83, 85-86 (10th Cir.
1983)) (other citations omitted).
163. 732 F.2d 122 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 591 (1984).
164. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982).
165. For purposes of the Act, the term "employer" does not include "any state or
political subdivision thereof." Id.
166. Jefferson County, 732 F.2d at 124 (citing NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S.
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center contracts with the state on a regular basis, the state did not create
the center, nor did the facility fall within the heirarchy of an arm of gov-
ernment. 16 7 There was no evidence to conclude that the administration
of the center answered to public officials or the public; 16 8 moreover, the
method for removing Board members was self-contained, with no room
for involvement by the state. Additionally, the facility's lack of power to
issue tax-exempt bonds, issue subpoenas, or exercise eminent domain
further distinguished it from political entities.
16 9
The facility offered another reason for its exemption. It claimed
that because its business primarily involved contracts with and grants
from governmental agencies it lacked "sufficient control over the em-
ployment relationship" to bargain effectively. 170 The court of appeals
recognized that the facility's ability to bargain might be restricted but
held that it controlled bargaining over "wages, benefits, hiring, firing,




600, 604-05 (1971); Board of Trustees of Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 177, 184
(10th Cir. 1980)).
167. Jefferson County, 732 F.2d at 125.
168. Id. at 126.
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing Board of Trustees of Memorial Hosp., 624 F.2d at 185).
171. Jefferson County, 732 F.2d at 127.
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OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit has historically played a major role in the devel-
opment of Indian law. The cases decided during this survey period were
certainly no exception. Among the court's numerous decisions affecting
Indians were those involving the standard of proof in cases seeking to
disestablish Indian reservations, the duty owed by the Secretary of the
Interior to the Indians in the administration of oil and gas leasing on
Indian lands, the effect of state gas price control acts on Indian royalties,
the necessary standard of compliance with acts allowing non-Indians to
obtain interests in Indian real property, the conflict between Indian sov-
ereign immunity and the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure requiring join-
der of all necessary parties to an action, and the Indians' power to tax
non-Indians who develop the Indians' natural resources. Additionally,
this article discusses the enforcement power of Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission under the Natural Gas Act; the construction of oil and
gas operating agreements as to deep geologic horizons; and finally, the
consequences of conveyancing real property when a predecessor in in-
terest has suffered due process violations in the form of defective tax
sales or condemnation proceedings.
I. INDIAN LAW
A. Disestablishment of Indian Lands: Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah
1. Introduction
Since the mid-nineteenth century, numerous acts of Congress have
reflected the constantly changing attitude of the United States towards
Indians. These congressional acts have far-reaching and potentially
devastating effects on the rights of Indians today.' During this survey
period the Tenth Circuit, in Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah,2 disestablished a
substantial portion of the Ute's reservation.3 Through such decisions,
1. This discussion is limited to "disestablishment" cases involving lands which at
some point were part of an Indian reservation. See infra note 3.
2. 716 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Utes v. Utah].
3. Disestablishment refers to the process whereby Indian lands are withdrawn from
the Indians' control. Disestablishment often resulted from a general allotment act of Con-
gress, which, in an attempt to assimilate the Indians into the agrarian lifestyle of their
neighbors, allotted "homesteads" to individual Indians in order to curtail their nomadic
lifestyle. The surplus unalloted lands were then "opened" to non-Indian settlement. The
typical issue in disestablishment cases is whether the land was disestablished by the mere
language of the general allotment act which opened it, or whether additional evidence is
necessary to conclusively divest the Indians of title and interest in their lands. The answer
to this question, and hence the status of such "opened" lands depends upon the language
of the Act and the circumstances underlying its passage. Compare Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S.
481 (1983); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); and Solem v. Bartlett, 104 S.
Ct. 1161 (1984) (all holding that the opened lands retained their reservation status) with
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) and DeCoteau v. District County
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the Indians are threatened with the cummulative disestablishment of
their lands. 4 Once a court finds that Congress, at any point in history,
intended to disestablish part or all of an Indian reservation, such land is
no longer Indian land. In order to prevent the widespread disestablish-
ment of Indian lands, courts generally strictly construe those acts which
open Indian lands.
Subsequent to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Utes v. Utah, the
Supreme Court, in Solem v. Bartlett,5 reviewed a case very similar to Utes
v. Utah and found the evidence insufficient to support disestablishment.
The result in Utes v. Utah appears inconsistent with Solem because the
Tenth Circuit viewed a record that the district court found devoid of the
"hard evidence necessary to overcome the construction of ambiguities
in favor of the Indians."'6 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit disestablished
a substantial portion of the Ute Indian Reservation known as the Uintah
Reservation.
7
The district court in Utes v. Utah8 found, inter alia, that the Ute Res-
ervation remained "Indian country," 9 except to the extent it was specifi-
cally altered by Congress.' 0 The district court found that the tract
Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975) (both holding that the opened lands lost their reservation
status). 716 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983).
4. Congressional acts opening Indian lands are often referred to as "surplus land
acts" because they were enacted to appropriate the Indians' surplus lands. These acts
sometimes reveal that Congress believed that the Indians' best interests would be served
by eliminating the reservation system. Although Congress has since discarded this belief,
Indians today nevertheless find themselves bound by these archaic acts, which, though no
longer approved by Congress, still constrain courts. See Solem v. Bartlett, 140 S. Ct. 1161,
1165 (1984).
5. 104 S. Ct. 1161 (1984).
6. Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1155 (D. Utah 1981) (citing
United States v. Long Elk, 565 F.2d 1032, 1040 (8th Cir. 1977)), affid in part, rev 'd in part,
715 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983).
7. It is the Tenth Circuit's disestablishment of the Uintah portion of the Ute Reserva-
tion which appears to contradict the Supreme Court's holding in Soem. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's ruling as to the Uintah portion also sparked the dissent ofJudge Doyle. See Utes v.
Utah, 716 F.2d at 1315-22.
8. Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Utah 1981).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982) (defines "Indian country" for purposes of criminal juris-
diction). The Utes brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to estab-
lish the exterior boundaries of their reservation and to enjoin Utah from asserting criminal
jurisdiction. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (D. Utah 1981).
10. Although the Utes appealed the district court's disestablishment of the following
four tracts, the Tenth Circuit found the applicable acts and presidential proclamation ef-
fected disestablishment. First, by the Act of May 24, 1888, ch. 310, 25 Stat. 157 (1889),
Congress removed a 7,040 acre tract known as the Gilsonite Strip from the Uintah Reser-
vation. See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. at 1099. Second, Congress extin-
guished the Uncompahgre Reservation under the Act ofJune 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 87
(1899). See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. at 1104. Third, by the authority vested
in him by the Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048, 1070 (1905), President
Roosevelt withdrew 1,010,000 acres from the Uintah Reservation, which lands were made
a part of the Uintah Forest Reserve. See Proclamation of July 14, 1905, 34 Stat. 3116,
(1907); 716 F.2d at 1313. Fourth, by the Act of April 4, 1910, ch. 140, 36 Stat. 269, 285
(1911), Congress extinguished the Utes' interest in 56,000 acres known as the Strawberry
River Reclamation. See Utes v. Utah, 716 F.2d at 1314. By the Act of March 11, 1948, ch.
108, 62 Stat. 72 (1949), Congress added the Hill Creek Extension to the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation. See Utes v. Utah, 716 F.2d at 1301. This discussion is therefore limited to the
disestablishment of the portion of the Utes' land known as the Uintah Reservation.
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known as the Uintah Reservation had not been disestablished. The
Tenth Circuit reversed, and found that the Acts of 1902, 1903, 1904 and
1905 "opening" the Uintah Reservation changed its status to "public
domain." 11
2. The Legislative Basis for Disestablishment
As the basis for its disestablishment holding, the Tenth Circuit re-
lied primarily on the Indian Appropriations Act of 1902.12 This Act
states in relevant part, that "all the unallotted lands within said reserva-
tion shall be restored to the public domain."' 13 Congress, however, be-
lieved that it needed the consent of the Utes in order to open their
lands, 14 and the disestablishment sought under the 1902 Act was condi-
tioned upon the consent of a majority of the adult male Utes. 15 The
Utes vehemently opposed ceding major portions of their reservation to
the government, so the 1902 Act was never effectuated. 16 The Tenth
Circuit held that the subsequent Acts carried forward the intent of the
1902 Act, although they did not expressly contain the language restor-
ing the reservation lands to the "public domain." 17 In other words, the
majority felt that the 1902 Act established a "baseline purpose of dises-
tablishment" which was consumated by the subsequent acts.18
In his dissent, Judge Doyle agreed with the holding of the district
court that the 1902 Act did not establish a baseline purpose of disestab-
lishment that was carried out by the Acts of 1903, 1904 and 1905. Nor
did he feel that the 1905 Act demonstrated that Congress intended to
extinguish all of the Ute's interest in the Uintah Reservation. 19 Judge
Doyle argued that Congress intended the opening under the 1902 Act to
take effect only after the Ute's consented. Therefore, congressional in-
tent cannot be retroactively inferred where Congress later learned that
Indian consent was unnecessary.
20
In the Indian Appropriations Acts of 190321 and 1904,22 Congress
11. Utes v. Utah, 716 F.2d at 1307-15.
12. Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245, 263-264 (1903). See Utes v. Utah, 716
F.2d at 1308-13.
13. Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245, 263-64 (1903).
14. It was not until 1903 that the Supreme Court announced that Congress could
unilaterally diminish Indian reservations. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
15. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. at 1118.
16. In addition to the Ute's resistance there were delays in the funding necessary to
execute the Act. 521 F. Supp. at 1116.
17. 716 F.2d at 1310-12.
18. Id. (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)). Commen-
tators have criticized the reliance in Rosebud on an unratified agreement by the Indians as
establishing a "baseline purpose of disestablishment." Rules of strict construction militate
against the Court's method of tacking documents together to establish congressional in-
tent. See Note, Indian Law-Boundary Disestablishment Through The Operation Of Surplus Land
Acts, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 1305, 1322-23; see also Case Developments, Indian Land Claims-A
Question of Congress' Right to Unilaterally Abrogate Indian Treaty Provisions: Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.
Richard Kneip, 21 How. L.J. 625, 642 (1978).
19. 716 F.2d at 1315-22 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
20. Id.
21. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat. 982 (1903).
22. Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 189, 207 (1904).
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reinacted altered provisions of the 1902 Act to dispose of those Uintah
lands not already claimed by the Utes. 23 The Indian Appropriations Act
of 1905 also intended to open the surplus Indian lands to non-Indian
settlement. 24 In drafting the 1905 Act, Congress was concerned that the
opened lands would be quickly seized by land speculators rather than
homesteaders; 25 therefore, Congress used language which limited the
opening to disposition "under the general provisions of the homestead
and town-site laws" rather than using the "public domain" language of
the 1902 Act.2 6 Congress was not concerned with whether the Utes
would retain any interest in the opened lands because it assumed the
lands would be purchased and settled by homesteaders. 27 Indeed, the
distinction between the "public domain" language of the 1902 Act and
the restrictive language of the 1905 Act was intended for the benefit of
homesteaders, not the Utes.
28
3. Analysis
In light of Solen v. Bartlett,2 9 the Tenth Circuit's reliance on the
"public domain" language of the 1902 Act is questionable. In Solem, the
party seeking disestablishment argued that the Cheyenne River Act ef-
fected disestablishment.3 0 That Act referred to the opened lands as
"the. public domain" and "the reservation thus diminished." t3 ' The
Supreme Court stated that, while those phrases lended support to the
disestablishment argument, when balanced against the rest of the Act's
stated goals, those phrases did not "carry the burden of establishing an
express congressional purpose to diminish."
'3 2
Solem, moreover, reaffirmed the doctrine that ambiguous acts of
Congress are to be construed in favor of the Indians by requiring clear
proof of congressional intent to disestablish. In Utes v. Utah, the only
evidence adduced to carry this burden was the similarity between the
1902 Act, which contained explicit disestablishment language, and the
1905 Act.3 3 Commentators have criticized this method of proving in-
tent because it requires an unproveable assumption of congressional in-
tent, which is contrary to principles of strict construction mandated by
23. The 1903 Act deleted the requirement in the 1902 Act which necessitated the
Indians' approval of the disestablishment, based on the Supreme Court's holding in Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit
found that neither the 1903 Act nor the 1904 Act changed the operative terms of the 1902
Act. Utes v. Utah, 716 F.2d at 1310.
24. See Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048 (1905).
25. See Indian Appropriation Bill, 1906: Hearings before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. of
Ind. Aff., 58th Cong., 3d Sess. (1905); Utes v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. at 1128-32.
26. Utes v. Utah, 716 F.2dat 1310-11.
27. Utes v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. at 1127-32.
28. Id.
29. 104 S. Ct. 1161 (1984).
30. Cheyenne River Act, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460 (1908).
31. Solem, 104 S. Ct. at 1168.
32. Id. at 1169.
33. 716 F.2d at 1308-11.
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the courts when construing acts affecting Indians.
34
In an ineffective attempt to explain the relationship between the
1902 and 1905 Acts,3 5 the Utes v. Utah court cited its earlier decision in
Hanson v. United States.3 6 In Utes v. Utah, the court found that Hanson was
decided under the 1902 Act, and that the 1905 Act merely extended the
date of opening the Uintah lands. 3 7 Yet, the result reached in Hanson is
incongruous with the result in Utes v. Utah. In Hanson, the Tenth Circuit
found that the Utes retained the beneficial title to the lands opened
under the 1902 Act.3 8 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit in Utes v. Utah
cited Hanson's analysis of the 1902 and 1905 Acts to support its holding
that the 1902 Act extinguished the Ute's interest in the opened lands of
the Uintah Reservation.
39
Utes v. Utah is inconsistent with Hanson in a second way. The Tenth
Circuit in Utes v. Utah, based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the legislation involved in DeCoteau v. District County Court,40 found that
the term "public domain" in the 1902 Act demonstrated that Congress
intended to disestablish the Uintah Reservation. 4 1 In Hanson, however,
the Tenth Circuit did not rely on the "public domain" language, but in
fact held that the Utes held a beneficial interest in the "public domain,"
which consisted of opened Ute Reservation. 4 2 Thus, Hanson did not
view the term "public domain" as inconsistent with the Ute's interest in
the Uintah Reservation. Solem has since pointed out that, while isolated
phrases are indicative of congressional intent, an act must be read as a
whole.
4 3
In addition to the language of an act, another factor courts use to
determine the intent behind an early surplus land act is the method by
which the Indians were paid for the lands opened. For example, in Rose-
bud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip,4 4 the Rosebud Sioux agreed to cede unallotted
portions of their reservation in return for a lump-sum payment. The
Supreme Court found this strongly indicative of congressional intent to
extinguish the Sioux's interest in the land. The method of payment pro-
34. See supra note 18. In both Rosebud and Utes v. Utah it was not possible to prove that
congressional intent carried through to the subsequent acts. Nevertheless, put in the diffi-
cult position of trying to discern congressional intent, both courts found a "baseline pur-
pose of disestablishment" in the acts.
35. 716 F.2d at 1310-11.
36. 153 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1946).
37. 716 F.2d at 1310-11.
38. 153 F.2d at 163.
'39. 716 F.2d at 1310-11.
40. 420 U.S. 425,446 (1975) (the Court implied that "returned to the public domain"
is synonymous with "stripped of reservation status").
41. 716 F.2d at 1302.
42. "Thus, Congress has recognized the beneficial title of such Indians to lands of
such area restored to the public domain by the Act of May 27, 1902." Hanson, 153 F.2d at
163 (emphasis added).
43. Solem, 104 S. Ct. at 1169 ("[R]ead as a whole [the Act] does not present an explicit
expression of congressional intent to diminish the . . .Reservation.").
44. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
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vided by the legislation at issue in Solem v. Bartlett4 5 was perhaps the
strongest factor underlying the Court's decision to uphold the reserva-
tion status of the opened portions of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reserva-
tion. 46 Rather than a sum-certain payment as in Rosebud, the Act in Solem
provided for payment to the Indians only as the lands were subsequently
sold. 4 7 Based on this evidence, the Supreme Court found that the
United States served as a guardian and trustee for the Indians, and that
the opened, but unsold, lands retained their reservation status.
48
Utes v. Utah involved the title to several tracts of land4 9 and both
forms of payment. 50 The majority opinion noted those tracts for which
the Utes received sum-certain payments to support its disestablishment
holding. 5 ' The court made no attempt, however, to reconcile the uncer-
tain form of payment provided by the Act opening the portion known as
the Uintah Reservation with its disestablishment holding. Judge Doyle,
dissenting, found the uncertain form of payment for the Uintah Reserva-
tion another indication that the Uintah Reservation was not
disestablished.
52
Courts also consider the subsequent administrative treatment of
opened lands to determine the land's status. But, as was the case in
Solem, such evidence is often "so rife with contradictions and inconsis-
tencies as to be of no help to either side."'53 In Utes v. Utah, Congress'
subsequent treatment of the opened lands revealed "no consistent, clear
and uniform identification of the reservation's status."
5 4
In Utes v. Utah, the Tenth Circuit's statutory construction appears
flawed 55 in ruling that the Uintah Reservation had been disestablished.
Both the reasoning of the district court, and Judge Doyle's dissent, illus-
trate the lack of conclusive evidence to support disestablishment. In
light of the doctrine of constructing ambiguous acts in favor of the Indi-
ans, and in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Solem v. Bart-
lett, the Tenth Circuit's holding is highly questionable.
45. 104 S. Ct. 1161 (1984). The legislation was the Cheyenne River Act, ch. 218, 35
Stat. 460 (1908).
46. 104 S. Ct. at 1167-68.
47. Section 6 of the Cheyenne River Act, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460 (1908) provides, in
part: "From the proceeds arising from the sale. . . of the lands . . . there shall be depos-
ited in the Treasury of the United States, to the credit of the Indians . . . the sums to
which the respective tribes may be entitled."
48. 104 S. Ct. at 1168 (citing Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962)).
49. See supra note 10.
50. 716 F.2d at 1314.
51. Id. The Utes were compensated for the 1,010,000 acres added to the Uintah For-
est Reserve by presidential proclamation pursuant to the Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479,
33 Stat. 1048, 1070 (1905). See Uintah and White River Bands of the Ute Indians v. United
States, 152 F. Supp. 953 (1957). The Utes were also compensated for 56,000 acres known
as the Strawberry River Reclamation. 716 F.2d at 1314.
52. 761 F.2d at 1318 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
53. Solem, 104 S. Ct. at 1170.
54. 716 F.2d at 1313.
55. See supra notes 12-34 and accompanying text.
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B. Oil and Gas Leasing on Indian Lands
The Tenth Circuit, in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp. ,56
sidestepped the issue of the fiduciary duty owed by the Secretary of the
Interior to the Jicarilla in administering oil and gas leasing on their
lands. 5 7 In so doing, the Tenth Circuit has approved a passive role for
the federal government in protecting the Indian's rights when oil and
gas leasing is involved. InJicarilla v. Supron, theJicarilla Indians brought
suit against Supron, 58 an oil and gas lessee under leases executed in the
early 1950's. The Jicarilla disputed the amount of royalties they re-
ceived from the defendant oil and gas companies. The Tribe also
named the Secretary of the Interior as a defendant for an alleged breach
of his fiduciary duty. 59
1. Fiduciary Duty of the Secretary of the Interior
The most significant aspect officarilla v. Supron was the Tenth Cir-
cuit's ruling that the Secretary did not breach any fiduciary duty he may
have owed the Jicarilla in the administration of oil and gas leasing on
their lands. 60 The district court found that the Secretary had breached
his fiduciary duty to the Indians on several counts. 6 1 The district court
found that the Secretary failed to interpret the leases and Interior regu-
lations in the Jicarilla's best interests. 6 2 The district court also found
that the Secretary failed to adequately monitor development of the
leases. 63 The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding it unnecessary to decide
the fiduciary duty issue. Although purportedly abstaining from deciding
the fiduciary duty issue, the court implicitly decided that the Secretary
owes no such duty. The result of this decision is contrary to decisions of
both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit. 64 Only by avoiding the
fiduciary issue was the Tenth Circuit able to reverse the district court.
Instead of holding the Secretary to a fiduciary standard, the court based
56. 728 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1984), reh'g granted, Mar. 30, 1984 [hereinafter cited as
Jicarilla v. Supron].
57. A fiduciary duty, owed to Indians by the federal government, has been recognized
in many areas. The litigants inJicarilla v. Supron briefed extensively the applicability of a
fiduciary duty to the government's administration of the Indian oil and gas leasing
program.
58. Also named as defendants were Southland Royalty Co., Gas Co. of New Mexico
and Exxon Corp. The State of New Mexico intervened on the issue of the applicability of
New Mexico's price ceiling on natural gas. See infra notes 93-109 and accompanying text.
59. See 728 F.2d at 1558-59.
60. The breach of fiduciary duty was one of three issues in which Judge Seymour
dissented. 728 F.2d 1563-73 (Seymour, J. dissenting). Judge Seymour agreed only with
the majority's affirmation of the district court's dismissal of the tribe's anti-trust claims. Id.
at 1563.
61. 479 F. Supp. at 547-51 (citing Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286
(1942)).
62. 479 F. Supp. at 549-51.
63. Id. at 547-48. The Jicarilla alleged a lack of diligent development and failure to
drill offset wells to protect against drainage. Although the district court found that the
lessees had not failed to develop the leases diligently, District Court Judge Mechem found
that the Secretary breached his fiduciary duty by failing to ensure that the lessees diligently
develop the leases.
64. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
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its review on the less exacting administrative law standard of "abuse of
discretion."
6 5
The substantive issue which served as the basis of the fiduciary duty
question involved the method used to calculate the value of natural gas
produced. 66 The Interior regulations set forth the methods used to de-
termine royalties which accrue on Indian lands.6 7 The Jicarilla lands
produced a natural gas referred to as "wet gas," 68 for which the regula-
tions give two methods to determine royalties.
69
On the basis of the Interior's regulations, 70 the district court or-
dered a "dual accounting" to calculate the amount of royalty due the
Jicarilla. 7 1 Dual accounting requires that both "gross proceeds ' 72 and
"aggregate value ... of all commodities" 73 be determined. The royalty
due is based upon the greater of the two values.74 Supron argued, and
the Tenth Circuit held, that a production company should not be ac-
countable for the aggregate value of all commodities when the gas is
sold at the wellhead to a refinery over which the production company
has no control. In her dissent, Judge Seymour argued that such a con-
struction of the regulation would be conducive to "sweetheart deals"
between the producer and the refiner, and that the regulation makes no
such exception.
75
The Tenth Circuit based its holding on three factors. First, it found
dual accounting to be inconsistent with the interpretation given the reg-
ulation by the Interior for many years. 7 6  Second, when the
lessee/producer does not own the refinery, it has no control over the
aggregate value of the commodities obtained from the unprocessed wet
65. 728 F.2d at 1560.
66. This value is in turn used to determine the royalty due.
67. (a) Royalty accrues on the dry gas, whether produced as such or as residue
gas after the extraction of gasoline.
(b) If the lessee derives revenue on gas from two or more products, a royalty
normally will be collected on all such products.
(c) For the purpose of computing royalty, the value of wet gas shall be either the
gross proceeds accruing to the lessee from the sale thereof or the aggregate value
determined by the Secretary of all commodities, including residue gas, obtained
therefrom, whichever is greater.
30 C.F.R. § 221.50 (1982) (recodified at 30 C.F.R. 206.105 (1984)). To avoid confusion,
this comment will cite the 1982 regulations.
68. Wet gas is defined as "Natural gas containing liquid hydrocarbons in solution,
which may be removed by a reduction of temperature and pressure or by a relatively sim-
ple extraction process." 8 H. WILLIAMS AND C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAw 831 (1982); see
also 728 F.2d at 1567 n.4 (concerning methods of marketing wet gas and how royalty calcu-
lations are made).
69. See 30 C.F.R. § 221.50(c) (1982). See supra note 67.
70. See 30 C.F.R. § 221.50(c) (1982).
71. 479 F. Supp. at 551.
72. That is, the amount paid to the lessee for products sold at the wellhead.
73. This amount includes those products obtained from the gas after it has been
refined.
74. 30 C.F.R. § 221.50(c) (1982). See supra note 67.
75. 728 F.2d at 1568-69 (Seymour, J., dissenting) (explaining how "sweetheart deals"
will be encouraged in the absence of dual accounting).
76. Id. at 1559-60.
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gas it sells to the refinery. 7 7 Third, a provision in the leases involved in
ficarilla v. Supron vested discretion in the secretary to conclusively deter-
mine the royalties due.
7 8
In her dissent, Judge Seymour found these three factors unpersua-
sive. Although the Secretary's construction of Interior regulations is
normally given substantial deference, Judge Seymour stated that neither
the Interior's former nor present practices can lower the Secretary's fi-
duciary duty to administer the royalty regulations in the best interests of
the Jicarilla.
79
In response to the majority's exception to dual accounting when the
lessee/producer has no control over the aggregate value of products
eventually produced, Judge Seymour noted that the regulations do not
distinguish or make exception for those situations. 80 She also stated
that the majority's interpretation of the regulation made subsections (b)
and (c) redundant. 8 1 Judge Seymour found further support for her po-
sition in the Indian Mineral Leasing Act.8 2 She noted that "the purpose
of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act is to ensure that Indian tribes receive
the maximum benefit from mineral deposits on their lands."
'8 3
Prior to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Jicarilla v. Supron, both the
Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of whether
the Secretary owes a fiduciary duty to the Indians. Contrary to the result
reached inJicarilla v. Supron, both courts found that such a duty exists.
In United States v. Mitchell,84 (Mitchell II) the Supreme Court recently
addressed the Secretary's fiduciary duty to the Indians. That opinion
gave three factors which determine the extent of the Secretary's duty:
(1) the pervasiveness of the Secretary's role in the area in question,
(2) the extent of the regulations involved, and (3) the intent of Con-
gress. 8 5 These three factors mandated the imposition of a fiduciary duty
upon the Secretary in administering timber sales on Indian lands. In the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act, Congress delegated to the Secretary the ad-
ministration of oil and gas leasing on Indian lands. 86 The oil and gas
leasing regulations inJicarilla v. Supron were as comprehensive and per-
vasive as the timber management regulations in Mitchell 11.87
The Court in Mitchell II distinguished United States v. Mitchell,8 8
(Mitchell I) which held that the Secretary owes a duty of only limited trust
to the Indians. The Court stated:
77. Id. at 1559.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1566 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1568.
81. Id.
82. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of May 11, 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 348 (1938).
83. 728 F.2d at 1568 (Seymour. j., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
84. 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983).
85. Id. at 2969-72.
86. See 25 U.S.C. § 392 (1982).
87. Compare 25 C.F.R. § 163 (1984) (general forest regulations of the BIA) with 25
C.F.R. § 211 (1984) (leasing ol tribal lands for mining).
88. 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
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In contrast to the bare trust created by the General Allotment
Act, the statutes and regulations now before us clearly give the
Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian re-
sources and land for the benefit of the Indians. They thereby
establish a fiduciary relationship and define the contours of the
United States' fiduciary responsibilities.8 9
Given the three Mitchell II factors, the similarity between the timber
sales regulations and the oil and gas leasing regulations should require
the Tenth Circuit to impose a fiduciary duty upon the Secretary in his
administration of oil and gas leasing equal to the duty imposed upon
him in his sales of Indian timber.
In 1982, the Tenth Circuit considered the nature of the obligation
placed on the Secretary by Congress in administering oil and gas leasing
on Indian lands. In Kenai Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Department of Interior,90 the
Tenth Circuit stated that the Secretary has a fiduciary duty as trustee of
Indian lands. Reviewing the same statute and regulations that were in-
volved inJicarilla v. Supron, the Tenth Circuit in Kenai stated that "[a]s a
fiduciary for the Indians, the Secretary is responsible for overseeing the
economic interests of Indian lessors, and has a duty to maximize lease
revenues." 9 1 Although Kenai invoked the fiduciary standard to justify
the Secretary's discretionary action, the fiduciary doctrine should apply
to compel the Secretary to act in the best interests of Indians. The
Tenth Circuit inJicarilla v. Supron made no attempt to distinguish its ear-
lier decision in Kenai because the court found it unnecessary to deter-
mine the fiduciary issue. Given the clear language of Kenai, however, the
court's holding inJicarilla v. Supron is untenable.
Another factor militates strongly in favor of the court reversing it-
self on rehearing. The majority quoted a provision in the lease which
purported to allow the Secretary discretion to determine royalties.
9 2
The court's reliance upon the lease was unwarranted, given the plain
language of the regulations and the Secretary's fiduciary duty.
On rehearing, the Tenth Circuit should follow both Mitchell II and
Kenai and impose a fiduciary duty on the Secretary in administration of
oil and gas leasing on Indian lands. After finding such a duty, the Tenth
Circuit should require dual accounting, not only in those circumstances
where the production company owns the refinery, but also in those cir-
cumstances where the production company sells at the wellhead. Only
in this way can the court give full effect to the Indian Mineral Leasing
Act.
2. Effect of State Gas Price Control Acts on Indian Royalties
In Jicarilla v. Supron, the Tenth Circuit also reversed the district
89. 103 S. Ct. at 2972.
90. 671 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1982).
91. Id. at 386 (citing Gray v. Johnson, 395 F.2d 533, 536 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 906 (1968)).
92. 728 F.2d at 1559.
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court's finding that the New Mexico Natural Gas Pricing Act 93
(NMNGPA) did not place a ceiling on the value of natural gas produced
on Indian lands for the purpose of determining the Indians' royalties.
9 4
The Tenth Circuit held that the NMNGPA does apply to gas produced
on Indian lands and can therefore limit Indian royalties. 9 5 Judge Sey-
mour dissented, and found that federal law preempts the NMNGPA to
the extent the NMNGPA attempts to limit Indian royalties.
9 6
The resolution of conflicts among federal, state and Indian govern-
ments depends on the specific interests at stake of each party. 9 7 The
Tenth Circuit found Moe v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes9 8 and Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation9 9 determinative of the pre-
emption issue in Jicarilla v. Supron. In both of these cases the Indians
operated retail cigarette stores which they claimed were exempt from
state taxes because of their sovereign immunity. The resulting lower
prices induced non-Indians to travel to the reservations to make their
purchases, to the detriment of state tax revenues. In both cases, the
Supreme Court found that the states' interest in uniform taxation out-
weighed the Indians' interest in encouraging business on their reserva-
tions at state expense.100
The court's reliance on Moe and Confederated Tribes, however, was
misplaced. The direct frustration of the state's interests in these two
cases was not present in Jicarilla v. Supron. In Jicarilla v. Supron, New
Mexico admitted that the royalty received by the Indians would not af-
fect its consumers' cost for natural gas.101 New Mexico therefore lacked
a significant interest in the Indian royalty issue, and the Moe and Confed-
erated Tribes balancing test should have weighed in favor of the Indians.
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 10 2 the Supreme Court was
faced with circumstances very similar to the circumstances inJicarilla v.
Supron. In White Mountain, the Indians contracted with non-Indians to
cut and transport timber within the Indian reservation. The Indians de-
rived substantial revenues from the timber harvest. Arizona attempted
to assess the non-Indian enterprise with a motor carrier license tax. '
0 3
The Indians argued that the taxes unlawfully infringed upon tribal self-
government. The Supreme Court found three reasons why federal law
preempted the state tax.
First, comprehensive federal regulations governed Indian timber
93. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-7-1 to 10 (1978) (repealed 1984).
94. 728 F.2d at 1561.
95. Id. at 1561-62.
96. Id. at 1569-72 (Seymour,J, dissenting) (citing White Mountain Apache v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136 (1980)).
97. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).
98. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
99. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
100. See Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. at 1670-67; Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. at
481-83.
101. 728 F.2d at 1569 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
102. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
103. Id. at 138-41.
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harvesting. The Court found the regulatory scheme "so pervasive as to
preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed."' 10 4 The regula-
tion of oil and gas leasing on Indian lands, at issue inficarilla v. Supron,
was similarly comprehensive. 10 5 Second, the White Mountain Court dis-
cussed the general federal policy of encouraging tribes to achieve eco-
nomic self-sufficiency. The taxes diminished tribal revenues and
thereby thwarted this policy.' 0 6 In the same manner, the price ceiling of
the NMNGPA diminished the Jicarilla's royalty revenues.' 0 7 Third, the
Court found further support for preemption in finding that the Indians
received no benefit from the state tax.' 0 8 InJicarilla v. Supron, there was
no evidence that the Indians received any benefit from the NMNGPA.
The Tenth Circuit, on rehearing, should follow the principles in
White Mountain and find the the NMNGPA does not limit the value of
natural gas for the purpose of determining Indian royalties. This result
is not without practical implications. Production might become unprof-
itable by limiting the price at which gas can be sold under state price
control acts, while simultaneously allowing royalties to be calculated
without the restraints of state price control acts. This effect could con-
ceivably reduce oil and gas leasing operations on Indian lands and re-
duce total royalties to the Indians, thereby effectively thwarting the
congressional objective of promoting Indian self-sufficiency. 10 9 Never-
theless, given the absence of legislative directives to the contrary, the
Supreme Court's reasoning in White Mountain should compel a finding
that state gas price control acts are preempted by federal law to the ex-
tent they purport to limit Indian royalties.
C. Strict Statutory Compliance
In Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. ,' 10
the Tenth Circuit held that Mountain Bell did not acquire a right-of-way
from the Pueblo Indians in 1928 for telephone and telegraph lines. The
Tenth Circuit so ruled despite the following facts: (1) in 1928, the
Pueblo granted Mountain Bell a right-of-way; (2) the Secretary of the
Interior approved the grant; and (3) Mountain Bell was dismissed from a
pending quiet title action by a court relying on these very facts. I"'
For many years Congress has considered itself guardian of the In-
dian tribes of this country."t 2 As early as 1834, Congress expressed this
view in the Nonintercourse Act' 13 which prevented alienation of Indian
104. Id. at 149.
105. See 30 C.F.R. Part 221 (1982).
106. 448 U.S. at 148-50.
107. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress' intent
to maximize the Indians' income from mineral deposits.
108. 448 U.S. at 150-51.
109. 728 F.2d at 1569 (Seymour J., dissenting).
110. 734 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 242 (1984).
111. Id. at 1403-04.
112. See generatty Solem v. Bartlett, 104 S. Ct. 1161 (1984).
113. Nonintercourse Act of 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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lands without Congress' express approval. Parts of this Act were un-
clear, however, and it was held not to apply to the Pueblo by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Joseph.
1 14
In the New Mexico Enabling Act, 1 5 Congress, in 1910, retained
jurisdiction and control over the Pueblo's lands."16 In order to clarify
the status of Pueblo lands, Congress passed the Pueblo Lands Act in
1924.117 In 1927, the United States filed a quiet title action pursuant to
the Pueblo Lands Act' 18 to determine the status of the lands claimed by
the Pueblos, including the right-of-way involved in the present case." 19
Mountain Bell was named a defendant in that suit.
In an attempt to obtain an easement to construct, maintain, and op-
erate a telephone and telegraph line, Mountain Bell entered into a right-
of-way agreement with the Pueblos. Although the Secretary of the Inte-
rior approved this agreement, it was not approved by Congress as re-
quired by section 17 of the Pueblo Lands Act. 120 Nevertheless, on the
basis of the right-of-way agreement, Mountain Bell was dismissed from
the 1928 quiet title action.
12 1
In 1980, the Pueblo filed an action seeking damages for the alleged
trespass of Mountain Bell's telephone and telegraph lines. Relying on
the 1928 right-of-way agreement, Mountain Bell sought partial summary
judgment on the issue of the alleged trespass occurring since 1928.122
The district court denied this motion and entered partial summary judg-
ment against Mountain Bell on the basis of the failure to comply with the
Pueblo Lands Act.'
23
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that section 17
of the Pueblo Lands Act clearly required the approval of both Congress
and the Secretary of the Interior to alienate Pueblo lands.' 24 The 1928
right-of-way agreement was not ratified by Congress and therefore did
114. 94 U.S. 614 (1876). The Supreme Court in 1876 found that the Pueblos were a
civilized, Christian, agrarian society, wholly unlike the nomadic "savages" sought to be
protected by the 1834 Act.
115. New Mexico Enabling Act of 1910, ch. 310 § 2, 36 Star. 557, 558-59.
116. This provision withstood a constitutional attack in United States v. Sandoval, 231
U.S. 28 (1913), which distinguished Joseph.
117. Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, ch. 331 § 2, 43 Stat. 636.
118. Id.
119. The quiet title action, filed in the Federal District Court for the District of New
Mexico, was entitled United States and Guardian of the Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Brown, No.
1814, Equity (D.N.M. 1928).
120. The Pueblo Lands Act provides:
No right, title, or interest in or to the lands of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico
to which their title has not been extinguished as hereinbefore determined shall
hereafter be acquired or initiated by virtue of the laws of the State of New Mexico,
or in any other manner except as may hereafter be provided by Congress, and no sale, grant,
lease of any character, or other conveyance of lands, or any title or claim thereto,
made by any Pueblo as a community, or any Pueblo Indian living in a community
of Pueblo Indians, in the State of New Mexico, shall be of any validity in law or in
equity unless the same be first approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, ch. 331 § 17, 43 Star. 636, 641-42 (emphasis added).
121. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 734 F.2d at 1404.
122. Id.
123. Id. See also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
124. 734 F.2d at 1406.
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not result in a valid right-of-way. 125
Mountain Bell also asserted that because of its dismissal from the
1928 quiet title action, the present action was barred by the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel. The Tenth Circuit dismissed this
argument because it found that the 1928 dismissal was not a final judg-
ment as required by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estop-
pel. 12 6 The court gave several reasons for this finding. First, the 1928
order dismissing Mountain Bell did not specify whether the dismissal
was with or without prejudice. As a matter of law, the court found the
dismissal to be without prejudice. 12 7 Second, in dismissing Mountain
Bell, the court in 1928 did not pass on the merits of the agreement.
Quoting National Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Parkinson,128 the court
stated that "[c]ourts do not validate that which is invalid by merely con-
senting to a dismissal of the controversy over which its jurisdiction has
been invoked."' 129 In Pueblo of Santa Ana, the Tenth Circuit found that
the failure of Mountain Bell to comply with section 17 of the Pueblo
Lands Act was not before the court in 1928 and, therefore, did not result
in a final judgment for purposes of applying res judicata.130
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Pueblo of Santa Ana comports with
the Supreme Court's decisions regarding alienation of Indian lands.131
Purported alienation of property interests, like the right-of-way in this
case, must strictly comply with the procedures set forth by statute.
D. Indian Sovereign Immunity Circumscribed by F.R. C.P. 19-Indispensable
Parties
In Lear Petroleum Corp. v. Wilson, 13 2 the Tenth Circuit considered
whether Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which re-
quires dismissal of any action in which all indispensable parties are not
joined, precluded consideration of an interpleader action when some
potential parties in interest are Indians. 13 3
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1407.
127. Id. See also Ex Parte Skinner and Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86 (1923).
128. 136 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1943).
129. 734 F.2d at 1407 (quoting Parkinson, 136 F.2d at 509).
130. 734 F.2d at 1407.
131. See Solem v. Bartlett, 104 S. Ct. 1161 (1984).
132. 730 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1984).
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 19 states:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and
whosejoinder will not deprive the court ofjurisdiction over the subject matter of
action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest re-
lating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obliga-
tions by reason of his claimed interest.
(emphasis added).
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a person as de-
scribed in subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall
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The Lear Corporation held oil and gas leases on lands bordering
the Arkansas River in LeFlore County, Oklahoma. Lessors of these
lands included the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw Indian nations,
as well as Wilson and the non-Indian defendants named in the com-
plaint.' 3 4 Due to the movement of the bed of the Arkansas River
through erosion and accretion, Lear was uncertain as to who was enti-
tled to the royalties accrued from oil and gas production. To resolve the
uncertainty, Lear brought an interpleader action. 135 At trial, no evi-
dence was presented of any attempt to join the Indians, yet it was admit-
ted that the Indians had received royalties prior to the suit.' 36 The
District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma dismissed the action
sua sponte, for non-joinder, finding that the Indian nations were indis-
pensable parties. 
13 7
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the lower
court erred in dismissing the action.1 38 The court reasoned that the dis-
trict court did not sufficiently consider whether the parties would be left
without any remedy, and it concluded that "[a] judgment can be entered
which will be adequate under rule 19(b)."'
3 9
Judge Doyle, dissenting, would have affirmed the district court.
Judge Doyle reasoned that since the Indians gave Lear a lease for the
land, the Indians obviously believe they have a right to it. 140 Further-
more, Judge Doyle found it "impossible" to understand how the lower
court could determine royalty rights without first determining owner-
ship.141 Although he perceived the need to weigh Lear's need for a rem-
edy against the Indian's sovereign immunity, Judge Doyle refused to tip
the scale in favor of Lear. He concluded that the implicit result of the
majority opinion is to give Lear full and complete title to the land. 14 2
While Rule 19(b) has often been applied to bar suits involving In-
dian sovereign immunity, 14 3 the holding in Lear reaffirms the exception
determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed
among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus
regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include:
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be preju-
dicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective
provision in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the preju-
dice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the per-
son's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate
remedy if the action is dismissed for non-joinder.
134. 730 F.2d at 1364.
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982).
136. 730 F.2d at 1364.
137. Id. See also McShon v. Sherrill, 283 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1960), which ordered the
dismissal of a quiet title action where there was evidence that possible claimants were not
joined.
138. 730 F.2d at 1364-65.
139. Id. at 1365 (distinguishing Tewa Tesuque v. Morton, 498 F.2d 240 (10th Cir.
1974), in which the court approved a dismissal for non-joinder of an indispensable party,
finding, inter alia, that there were alternative remedies available to the plaintiff).
140. 730 F.2d at 1365.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Lomayaktwea v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1975).
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to this rule, which was first applied by the Tenth Circuit in Manygoats v.
Kleppe. 14 4 In Manygoats, the Tenth Circuit stated that "[d]ismissal of the
action for nonjoinder of the Tribe would produce an anamolous result"
because the Indians had nothing to gain by consenting to the suit, and
that by asserting their immunity they could not be adversely affected.1
4 5
The Manygoats court found the controlling test under Rule 19(b) to be
"whether in equity and good conscience the case can proceed in the
absence of the Tribe."' 14 6 Thus, the equities of a particular case may
allow a court to proceed despite the failure to join an indispensable In-
dian party, so long as an appropriate remedy can be fashioned to protect
the Indians' interests. 1
47
The Lear decision allows several desirable results. First, federal
courts can quiet title as between all non-Indian parties before them. 1
48
Second, Lear prevents Indians from using their sovereign immunity as a
shield to avoid the merits of a controversy. 149 Third, due to thejurisdic-
tional nature of the holding in Lear, Indians are not compelled to forgo
their sovereign immunity and join a suit because they will not be barred
by the doctrine of res judicata from contesting the result at a later date.
If the Indians feel injured by such a decision, they can challenge it if and
when they see fit.
E. Indian Taxation of Natural Resources
In Southland Royalty Co. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians,15 0 the Navajo had
enacted a tax on oil and gas production. The affected oil and gas produ-
cers brought suit, claiming that the taxes were invalid because the Nav-
ajo failed to obtain the required approval of the Secretary of the
Interior. The Navajo tax, unlike the Apache tax involved in Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe,' 5 ' is not expressly subject to approval by the Secre-
tary because the Navajo have chosen not to reorganize under the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934152 (IRA). Nevertheless, Judge Jenkins of
the United States District Court for the District of Utah agreed with the
144. 558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1977). The court used an equitable standard by balancing
the parties' interests.
145. Id. at 559.
146. Id. (citing Wright v. First Nat'l Bank of Altus Okla., 483 F.2d 73, 75 (10th Cir.
1973)).
147. 730 F.2d at 1364.
148. See id.
149. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
150. 715 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Southland]. Other plaintiffs
included Phillips Petroleum Company, Shell Oil Company, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Superior
Oil Company, The Union Oil Company of California, Willshire Oil Company of Texas,
Anadarko Production Company and Texaco, Inc. The State of Utah, San Juan County,
and various state and local individuals and organizations intervened to protect their inter-
ests. Several tribal organizations and individuals were named as defendants. The United
States and several entities within the Department of the Interior were also named as
defendants.
151. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). The Supreme Court in Aerrion suggested that secretarial
approval of Indian taxes would minimize the abuse of the power to tax. Id. at 141. South-
land held that this safeguard may not be available.
152. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1982). See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 134.
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producers and found that the Secretary's approval was a necessary con-
dition to the validity of the Navajo taxes.
153
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Seth, re-
versed the district court, refusing to impute a requirement of secretarial
approval where none is explicitly required by law.' 54 In so doing, the
Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Merrion15 5 that Indian sover-
eignty affords Indians substantial authority in the area of taxation of nat-
ural resources. Also consistent with Merrion, the Southland decision
indicates that the Tenth Circuit will defer to Congress when it comes to
limiting Indian taxing authority.
15 6
The district court's holding would have forced the Secretary to de-
termine appropriate levels of Indian taxation without any statutory gui-
dance. Apart from the legal problems, the practical problems posed by
such a requirement would also justify its invalidation. 157 The Tenth Cir-
cuit therefore correctly found Merrion's implied requirement of secre-
tarial approval repugnant to the federal policy of encouraging tribal
independence. 158 Merrion indicates the Supreme Court's unwillingness
to repress the Indians' ability to tax. This unwillingness is exemplified
by the Tenth Circuit's holding in Southland. In situations such as the one
addressed in Southland, guidelines, safeguards, or limitations on the In-
dians' power to tax must come from Congress, not from the courts.
II. OIL AND GAS LAW
A. The Enforcement Power of FERC under the Natural Gas Act
The Natural Gas Act1 59 (NGA) delegates authority to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to fix rates and schedules, and
to order refunds when it finds that unjust or unreasonable rates have
been charged.160 Courts have consistently held that this power to order
refunds is purely remedial and does not authorize FERC to impose pen-
alties. 16 1 In Southern Union Gas Co. v. FERC,162 the Tenth Circuit re-
versed an order by the FERC which sought to impose a penalty on
153. 715 F.2d at 488-89.
154. Id. at 489.
155. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980), afd, 455 U.S.
130 (1982).
156. See Southland, 715 F.2d at 489.
157. It is unclear what sanctions the Secretary could impose, what tribes and lands
would be subject to the Secretary's powers, or what standards the Secretary must use to
determine appropriate levels of taxation. While these arguments might be applied to Mer-
rion and other situations where Indian constitutions mandate secretarial review and ap-
proval, the point is that, in the absence of legislative guidelines, rate setting by the
Secretary would be neither appropriate nor effective.
158. Id. at 490 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-
44 (1980)), to wit: "Ambiguities in federal law have been construed generously in order to
comport with. . . traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of encour-
aging tribal independence."
159. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1982). FERC's predecessor was the Federal Power Commission.
160. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1982).
161. See, e.g., FPC v. Hope Nat'l Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 618 (1944).
162. 725 F.2d 99 (10th Cir. 1984).
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Southern Union Gas Company (SUG). In the process, the court pro-
vided some guidelines for determining whether FERC action is a proper
administrative remedy or whether it serves as a penalty.
In 1973, SUG was unable to provide sufficient quantities of natural
gas to its customers in Beaver, Oklahoma. To compensate for this
shortage, SUG diverted gas it had available under irrigation contracts to
meet the primarily residential needs of Beaver.' 6 3 These diversions
technically violated the NGA because SUG failed to file notices of the
changes with the FERC as required by statute.' 64 However, due to the
small amounts of gas actually diverted, no shortages were created, nor
were any damages suffered by the gas suppliers' other customers.
16 5
FERC referred the NGA violations to the Department of Justice which
decided not to institute criminal proceedings. 166 FERC then attempted
to impose quasi-punitive sanctions by ordering SUG to pay its suppliers
for the diverted gas under "emergency rate" schedules rather than at
the lower rates under the original irrigation contracts. 16 7 FERC as-
serted that its order was a proper administrative action, authorized by
section 16 of the NGA. 168 The court disagreed, finding that the Com-
mission's order was actually a penalty and thus beyond its authority.169
The court in SUG v. FERC indicated two useful factors for deter-
mining when an assessment is within the scope of the Commission's
powers. The first factor is the purpose and justification for making the
assessment. The second and less definitive factor is the evidence ad-
duced to correlate the Commission's reparative order to actual injury
suffered by gas customers. The first factor relied on in SUG v. FERC was
also considered in Mesa Petroleum Co. v. FPC.170 In Mesa, the Fifth Circuit
reviewed the purposes and goals of the NGA and offered several guide-
lines concerning reparative orders under the NGA. In Mesa, a gas pro-
ducer violated the NGA by terminating its gas sales to a pipeline
company without the approval of the Federal Power Commission (FPC).
The FPC assessed the producer for the difference between the pre-ter-
mination contract price and the average replacement cost. The Fifth
Circuit held that this assessment was not a penalty, but that it was within
the broad regulatory powers of the FPC. 17 l Citing Niagra Mohawk Power
Corp. v. FPC, ' 72 the court in Mesa held that the Commission's powers are
163. Id. at 100.
164. See 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1982).
165. 725 F.2d at 101.
166. Id. The court noted that referral to the Dept. ofJustice of the FERC complaint was
the only remedy contemplated under the Act. Id.
167. Id. at 101-02.
168. Section 16 provides in pertinent part:
The Commission shall have power to perform any and all acts, and to prescribe,
issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
52 Stat. 830 (1938); 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1982).
169. 725 F.2d at 102-03.
170. 441 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971).
171. Id. at 186-89.
172. 379 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (quoted at 441 F.2d at 187-88).
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broadest in its role of effectuating the congressional objectives of the
NGA and narrower when ascertaining statutory violations.1 73 In other
words, federal courts afford the Commission much greater deference
upon review of remedial action than upon review of action involving de-
terrent sanctions. Because these two functions often merge or overlap,
careful characterization is crucial. In disallowing the assessment in SUG
v. FERC, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Commission's brief character-
ized the assessment as a penalty.'
7 4
The second factor stressed by the Tenth Circuit in SUG v. FERC was
the complete absence of evidence indicating that any injury was caused
by SUG's violation of the NGA. The lack of evidence led the court to
conclude that the order could only have been punitive. 175 Although the
Commission was not required to prove that violations of the NGA re-
sulted in actual injury before it could take remedial action, 17 6 SUG used
the absence of injury to help prove the punitive nature of the Commis-
sion's assessment.
177
In sum, although section 16 of the NGA vests broad powers in
FERC, these powers do not include the imposition of civil penalties.1
7 8
While the distinction between remedies and penalties remains some-
what ambiguous, the Tenth Circuit's decision in SUG v. FERC indicates
that the purpose and justification for the assessment as well as the actual
injury sought to be remedied are both important factors.
B. Unit Operating Agreements-How Deep Do They Go?
In Morgan v. Mobil Oil Corp. ,179 the Tenth Circuit held that a unit
operating agreement' 8° is not limited to certain geological formations
unless the agreement expressly provides otherwise. Under the Tenth
Circuit's ruling, production from any geological horizon will hold unit-
173. 379 F.2d at 159 (quoted at 441 F.2d at 187-88).
174. 725 F.2d at 102-03.
175. SUG offered testimony that the illegal diversions averaged only one-tenth of one
percent of each supplier's daily volumes. There was no evidence of any resultant shortage
or damage of any type. 725 F.2d at 101.
176. In Mesa Petroleum, 441 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971), the court upheld a remedial as-
sessment and noted that it would not require the Commission to prove an actual injury.
There was "ample support" in the record that gas customers had to pay a higher price as a
result of Mesa's violation. The court therefore deferred to the agency's conclusion that
the remedial assessment was appropriate-
177. 725 F.2d at 101.
178. See 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1982).
179. 726 F.2d 1474 (10th Cir. 1984).
180. A unit operating agreement, also known as a unit agreement is "an agreement or
plan of development and operation for the recovery of oil and gas made subject thereto as
a single consolidated unit without regard to separate ownerships and for the allocation of
costs and benefits on a basis as defined in the agreement or plan." 8 H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAw 798-99 (1982). Unit operating agreements are written for two
interrelated reasons. First, many states have oil and gas commissions (such as the Kansas
Corporation Commission) which require unitization before the state will grant a well drill-
ing permit. Second, unitization eliminates the necessity of drilling unnecessary and un-
economical wells, which would rcsult in physical and economic waste. See 6 H. WILLIAMS
AND C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS Iw § 901 (1983).
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ized leases past their primary terms.1 8 '
In Morgan, the court decided two cases which were consolidated for
purposes of appeal.' 8 2 Both cases resulted from unit operating agree-
ments which were written in response to orders of the Kansas Corpora-
tion Commission (KCC) around 1940 regarding unitization of specific
geological formations.' 8 3 Although the operating agreements were
written in response to the Commission's orders, they lacked any specific
language limiting their scope to that of the Commission's orders.'
8 4
In Anadarko Production Co. v. Taylor,18 5 one of the two cases consoli-
dated for appeal, the district court found that the parties intended' 8 6 to
unitize the leases only to the horizons where the KCC required unitiza-
tion.18 7 Production from other horizons therefore did not hold the
leases to all depths but only to the depths where production had been
obtained.' 8 8 In Morgan v. Mobil Oil Corp.,189 the same district court
found that the intent behind the unit operating agreements was to hold
the leases as to all horizons. 190 In reconciling these two opinions, the
Tenth Circuit found the leases and subsequent agreements unambigu-
ous and imited its investigation to the four corners of the documents.
The court found no indication in either case of an intent to limit the
lessees' rights to any horizon, and held that the unitized areas were held
under lease to all depths by production from any geological horizon
within the units. 19 1
The underlying problem in Morgan was the age-old difficulty of tai-
loring a legal document to fit the needs, desires and intent of the parties.
The primary purpose of a unitization agreement is to facilitate produc-
181. Oil and gas leases usually contain two terms, a primary term, consisting of a fixed
time period in which the lessee must try to find oil and gas, and a secondary term of an
indefinite period. To propel the lease from the primary term into the secondary term
requires production of oil and gas or certain legal substitutes. See HEMINGWAY, THE LAW
OF OIL AND GAS §§ 6.1-6.9 (2d ed. 1983).
182. Morgan v. Mobil Oil Corp. 556 F. Supp. 108 (D. Kan. 1983); Anadarko Prod. Co.
v. Taylor, 535 F. Supp. 103 (D. Kan 1982).
183. See Anadarko Prod. Co. v. Taylor, 535 F. Supp. 103, 105 (D. Kan. 1982) (order of
the KCC dated March 21, 1944). The KCC sought to regulate only certain shallow geolog-
ical formations. The unit operating agreements were written to comply with the regula-
tions and made reference to the specific formations regulated by the KCC. The
lessor/plaintiffs contended that the intent behind the unit operating agreements was to
unitize only the specified formations, and that the deep horizons were not held under lease
by production from the unitized shallow formations. See 726 F.2d at 1476.
184. 726 F.2d at 1476-77.
185. 535 F. Supp. 103 (D. Kan. 1982), rev'd, 726 F.2d 1474 (10th Cir. 1984).
186. Both Morgan and Anadarko quoted Jackson v. Farmer, 225 Kan. 732, 594 P.2d 177
(1979), for that case's statement of the law of Kansas regarding oil and gas lease
interpretation.
187. 535 F. Supp. at 109-11.
188. Production from "pooled" or "unitized" acreage inures to the benefit of all inter-
est holders in the acreage. Production in one part of the unitized acreage, therefore, le-
gally constitutes production for all interest holders regardless of the lease from which
production results. See generally HEMINGWAY, supra note 181 at § 7.13.
189. 556 F. Supp. 108 (D. Kan. 1983), afd, 726 F.2d 1474 (10th Cir. 1984).
190. Id. at 114.
191. 726 F.2d at 1478, 1480.
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tion from an underground oil or gas reservoir. 19 2 Implicit in this pur-
pose is the idea that only one particular underground reservoir is to be
unitized. Otherwise, where several reservoirs overlap vertically but at
different horizons, unitization might become unfeasible as to all overlap-
ping reservoirs. Ideally, a unit agreement should be limited to a particu-
lar reservoir. 1
93
Unitization agreements, however, are often not limited to a particu-
lar reservoir or geological horizon. 19 4 Where the agreement is not so
limited, as in Morgan, the court's proper duty is not to rewrite the par-
ties' agreement but to enforce what the parties have expressed in their
agreement. Because favorable economics have increased interest in
deep geological horizons, practitioners need to consider oil and gas
rights vertically as well as horizontally when drafting documents con-
cerning oil and gas rights to ensure that such documents truly reflect the
intent of the parties.
III. REAL PROPERTY LAW
In Kemmerer Coal Co. v. Brigham Young University,195 the Tenth Circuit
considered whether a person has standing to assert alleged due process
violations suffered by a predecessor in interest to real property. The
court held that a successor does not have standing because such due
process rights are personal and can only be asserted by the person alleg-
edly suffering the deprivation.
1 9 6
Kemmerer brought this quiet title action after being deprived of
subsurface coal rights by a procedurally defective tax sale in 1936. Kem-
merer's predecessor in interest and record-owner of the coal rights re-
ceived no notice of the tax assessment or sale. 19 7 Instead, notice was
mistakenly sent to the surface owner. In 1975, a tax sale purchaser who
had been issued a tax deed in 1954 to the disputed underground rights
gifted one half of the rights to BYU. 19 8
The District Court for the District of Utah found that no notice of
the tax proceedings was given to anyone in Kemmerer's chain of title to
the coal rights. 19 9 The court held that this failure violated the title-
holder's due process rights and that therefore Utah's statute of limita-
tions had not run.200
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Saranac Land & Timber Co. v.
192. See HEMINGWAY, supra note 181 at 395.
193. See generally Rogers v. Westhoma Oil Co., 291 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1961).
194. But see the Model Form of Unit Agreement, as propounded by the American Petro-
leum Institute, which provides: "Describe by geologic name, depth interval or otherwise."
WILLIAMS & MYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 920.1 at 1.2 (1981).
195. 723 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1983).
196. Id. at 57.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 54-55.
199. Id. at 55.
200. Id. Kemmerer asserted the due process challenge to get around the short statute
of limitations imposed by Utah to limit tax title challenges.
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Roberts,20 1 the Tenth Circuit noted that "a reasonable statute of limita-
tions can constitutionally bar claims based on alleged violations of fed-
eral due process rights."2 0 2 But the Tenth Circuit declined to base its
holding on Saranac, and instead decided the case on the basis of stand-
ing. The alleged due process violations were not suffered by Kemmerer
but by its predecessors in interest. The court found that due process
rights are personal, and held that Kemmerer lacked standing to assert
the deficiencies of the tax sale.
20 3
Although there is substantial case law which notes the personal na-
ture of constitutional rights in general, 20 4 Kemmerer has considerably ex-
tended this doctrine as it applies to a chain of title for real property.
The Kemmerer court cited numerous cases supporting the proposition
that constitutional rights are personal and cannot be asserted vicari-
ously. United States v. Haddon20 5 involved a chain of title to real property.
There, the First Circuit considered a condemnation proceeding in which
the record owner was allegedly denied due process for lack of notice.
One significant difference between Haddon and Kemmerer is that the First
Circuit expressly limited its holding in Haddon to those situations where
the party asserting due process violations was not in privity with the
party who actually suffered the violations. 20 6 In Haddon, the plaintiffs
claimed an interest in the land by way of a tax sale, which occurred sub-
sequent to the earlier condemnation proceeding. 20 7 Because they ac-
quired their interest through the tax sale, the plaintiffs were not in
privity with the persons who owned the land at the time of the condem-
nation proceeding. The court refused the plaintiffs' due process argu-
ment because the plaintiffs were not the owners at the time of the
condemnation. Noting the lack of privity between the plaintiff and the
owners who allegedly suffered the due process violation, the Haddon
court qualified its holding by stating "it is questionable to what degree
private claims based on defects in notice would pass to a successor in
interest." °2 0 8 Kemmerer has answered this question within the Tenth Cir-
cuit. By the court's holding, no successor in interest, bona fide pur-
chaser, or any other person in chain of title has standing to assert due
process violations suffered by a predecessor in a chain of title.
Andrew K. Sorensen
201. 177 U.S. 318 (1900).
202. 723 F.2d at 57.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
205. 550 F.2d 677 (1st Cir. 1977). The Kemmerer court also cited Hewitt v. Glaser Land
& Livestock Co., 626 P.2d 268 (Utah 1981).
206. 550 F.2d at 681.
207. Id. at 678.




During the past survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
issued two opinions in the securities area involving controversial theo-
ries of recovery which have divided the circuits.' In Christy v. Cambron,
2
the court relaxed the criteria of the sale of business doctrine to encom-
pass a transfer of less than a 100% interest in a business to four purchas-
ers in varying proportions. The court found that the stock shares issued
were only indicia of ownership and not "securities" subject to the regu-
lations of the 1933 Act s and the 1934 Act 4 and its corresponding rules.
5
In T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Authority,
6
the Tenth Circuit recognized the fraud on the market theory of liability
for the first time, adopting perhaps the most expansive view of any cir-
cuit. This theory allows plaintiffs to rely on the integrity of the trading
market and does not require them to prove actual reliance on a specific
fraudulent act to establish causation in a lOb-5 action.
This article compares the positions of the Tenth Circuit to other
jurisdictions on both the sale of business doctrine and the fraud on the
market theory of liability. First, the article explores the early cases and
their supporting rationales. Second, it analyzes and compares the con-
flicting lines of cases in both areas. Third, it discusses the application of
precedent by the Tenth Circuit in Christy and Raney. Finally, it suggests
possible ramifications of these decisions.
1. In an unpublished opinion, SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., No. 82-1954 (10th
Cir. Sept. 19, 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 783 (1985), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
Federal District Court of Colorado's granting of an injunction against the defendants for
violations of securities regulations. The defendant, the best efforts underwriter on an all
or nothing offering of shares and warrants of a start-up corporation, engaged in several
large transactions for its own account when it appeared that the entire offering would not
be sold by the deadline. Since these transactions did not qualify as bona fide purchases,
the continuation of distribution by the defendant from its own account subsequent to the
closing date was a violation of Rule lOb-6(c)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 6240.10b-6(c)(3) (1984). Be-
cause the all or nothing offering failed to close, the defendant was obligated to make re-
funds. This was not done and Rule lOb-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-9 (1984), was violated.
Also, the escrow account was improperly managed because funds were disbursed prior to
the closing of the offering. This was a violation of Rule 15c-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-4
(1984). The appellate court also found the defendants' argument that aider and abettor
liability was not a component of securities regulation unpersuasive. Finally, the evidence
of manipulations and non-disclosures supported the trial court's determination that the
defendant had violated the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 Act, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (1982), the 1934 Act, section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), and Rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
2. 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1983).
3. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
4. The Securities Exchange Commission Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
5. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.0-1 to .31-1 (1983).
6. 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1285 (1984).
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I. EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE SALE OF BUSINESS DOCTRINE
A. Christy v. Cambron
In Christy v. Cambron,7 plaintiffs Kelly Christy, Hunt Klein, Richard
Loose, and Pearse Nolan each made capital contributions to a new cor-
poration, Mark Cambron, Inc., which was formed by the defendant,
Mark Cambron, to build and own a discotheque in Vail, Colorado. Each
plaintiff became a director and officer of the corporation 8 and received
shares reflecting his or her contribution to the start-up capital fund.
The plaintiffs' capital contributions totalled $97,160, but the prepara-
tion costs for opening the disco were only approximately $50,000. Pur-
suant to the pre-incorporation agreements signed by plaintiffs,
Cambron received the balance remaining in the start-up fund after prep-
aration expenditures, about $40,000, as compensation. 9
Due to insufficient financing and poor economic conditions in
Vail, 10 the disco operated for less than three months. Shortly after it
closed, it was sold to a third party who eventually defaulted on the pay-
ments. Cambron and plaintiffs repossessed the property and listed it
with a realtor, Trevor T. Bradway Company. Defendant Ernest Crates
purchased the disco through a Bradway agent with the intention of im-
mediately reselling it for a profit. Because of the poor economic condi-
tions in Vail, Crates was unable to resell and sustained a loss.
Plaintiffs filed suit in the Federal District Court of Colorado alleging
that Cambron violated rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission I I and Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.12 They fur-
ther contended that Cambron breached his fiduciary duty as an
incorporator under Colorado law. Crates counterclaimed against plain-
tiffs and cross-claimed against Cambron alleging fraud in the sale of
Mark Cambron, Inc. stock to him and violation of securities laws and
regulations. Crates also cross-claimed against Cambron for breach of
fiduciary duty. A third party claim by Crates against Trevor T. Bradway
Company settled prior to trial.
The jury returned verdicts for plaintiffs against Cambron on their
three claims for relief and awarded compensatory and punitive damages.
Crates received verdicts against all plaintiffs and Cambron. Plaintiffs
and Cambron filed motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. Crates moved for a new trial on the issue of damages only.
The court granted Cambron's motion for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and dismissed the case in its entirety. 13 Plaintiffs appealed to
7. 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1983).
8. The court noted that "[pilaintiffs were involved in running the disco . Id. at
671. See infra text accompanying notes 46-47.
9. 710 F.2d at 671.
10. During the winter ski season of 1975-76, the Vail area experienced inadequate
snowfall and a fatal gondola mishap, causing adverse national publicity.
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
13. "Reasons given by the trial court ... were that . . .(1) the dispute did not in-
volve a "security" ...; (2) there was no causal relationship between the plaintiffs' losses
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the Tenth Circuit contending that the trial court erred in granting that
motion. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to dis-
miss the case.
1 4
B. Defining a "Security"
The circuits are divided on whether shares of corporate stock trans-
ferred as part of a sale of a business qualify as "securities" within the
meaning of the Securities Acts.1 5 Some jurisdictions evaluate all stock
according to its character and do not distinguish among the various con-
texts in which shares of stock can be transferred. 16 Other jurisdictions
follow a transactional approach and classify stock transferred in the sale
of a business as merely the medium of exchange through which the busi-
ness assets are purchased. 1 7 In these circuits, these shares of stock are
and any misrepresentations or omissions by Cambron; and (3) Crates' claims were not
supported by the evidence." 710 F.2d at 672.
14. In considering a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, trial courts
analyze evidence "in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. at 671. Specifically, the
court stated that the motion could "not be granted unless the evidence is susceptible of no
reasonable inferences that sustain the position of the party against whom the motion is
made with respect to one or more of the necessary elements of each claim . (cita-
tions omitted). Id. at 672.
15. Section 2 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982) states:
[Ulnless the context otherwise requires-The term "security" means any note,
stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certifi-
cate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional un-
divided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option,
or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index or securities
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof) or any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relat-
ing to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to sub-
scribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Section 3 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982) states:
[U]nless the context otherwise requires-The term "security" means any note,
stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease,
any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, trans-
ferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit,
for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certifi-
cate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or
based in the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered
into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general,
any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include cur-
rency or any note, draft, bill or exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a
maturity date at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
While the definitions in the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act are not identical, they were
intended to reflect substantially the same meaning and have been so construed by the
courts. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934), cited in Villeneuve v. Advanced
Business Concepts Corp., 698 F.2d 1121, 1124 (1 Ith Cir. 1983), affirmedon reh'g, 730 F.2d
1403 (11 th Cir. 1984) (en bane); see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837, 847 n.12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336, 342 (1967).
16. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
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not "securities," they are only indicia of ownership of the business as-
sets, and, consequently, the transfer of stock does not receive the pro-
tection of securities regulations.' 8 These opposing philosophies are
supported by conflicting interpretations of the same Supreme Court
case, United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman. 9
The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits focus on the
character of the instrument transferred and disregard the nature of the
underlying transaction. 20 They interpret part II.A. of the Forman opin-
ion as providing securities regulation coverage to any instruments which
have the characteristics of stock. These attributes include recognition as
stock for the purposes of corporate, commercial, and tax law; the oppor-
tunity of holders to receive dividends, to vote, and to realize apprecia-
tion in value upon sale; and the capacity to transfer to others or to
pledge. 2 ' This approach adopts a literal application of the definition of
"securities." Only if the instruments lack the traditional characteristics
of stock will these courts apply the "economic realities" analysis from
part II.B. of the Forman opinion.
The Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits follow the "eco-
nomic realities" approach, set forth in part II.B. of Forman, which advo-
cates a flexible interpretation of the security definition.
2 2 Under this
18. Id.
19. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
20. Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320 (3d Cir.) (plaintiff purchased 50% of cor-
poration's outstanding stock from defendant, the sole shareholder, and as consideration
promised to pay a specified sum and devote certain efforts to the business.), cert. granted,
105 S. Ct. 428 (1984); Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1983) (three plaintiffs
purchased all the outstanding shares of a corporation from the two defendants and as-
sumed managerial control of the business.); Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 696
F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1982) (Seagrave Corp., a closely-held family corporation, purchased
from Vista Resources, Inc. all the assets of 29 of its subsidiary corporations including real
property, machinery, equipment, and stock which was listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change.), revg 534 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2341, cert. dis-
missed, 105 S. Ct. 23 (1984); Cole v. PPG Indus., Inc., 680 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1982)
(rejecting the sale of business doctrine on a claim filed under the Arkansas Securities Stat-
utes relying on Forman.); Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs
purchased 100% of the outstanding stock of an existing corporation from defendant, its
sole shareholder.); Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff sold his entire
50% interest of a corporation to defendant, who owned the other 50% interest.); Coffin v.
Polishing Mach., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979) (discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 43-44).
21. Seagrave Corp., 696 F.2d at 229.
22. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.) (plaintiffs purchased
100% of corporation's outstanding stock and retained seller as an advisory consultant for
one year.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 427 (1984); Chandler v. KEW, Inc., 691 F.2d 443 (10th
Cir. 1977) (discussed in the text accompanying note 42); Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197
(7th Cir. 1982) (created the rebuttable presumption that if the purchaser already has, or by
the purchase in question acquires, more than 50% of the common stock of the corpora-
tion, his purpose in purchasing the stock will be presumed to have been entrepreneurship
rather than investment; thus, the sale of business doctrine is recognized.); King v. Winkler,
673 F.2d 342 (11 th Cir. 1982) (discussed in the text accompanying notes 38-41); Frederik-
sen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.) (discussed in the text accompanying note 40), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); see Seldin, When Stock Is Not a Security: The "Sale of Business"
Doctrine under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 637 (1982); Thompson, The Shrinking
Definition of a Security: Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock Is NAot a Federal Security Transac-
tion, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225 (1982).
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approach, a transaction evidenced by the sale of "stock" is not necessar-
ily a security transaction even though the statutory definition of security
includes the words "any. . .stock."'2 3 This analysis focuses on the sub-
stance and purpose of the transaction and de-emphasizes its form and
label.24 The circuits following this analysis do not regard fulfillment of
the part II.A. stock attribute requirements of Forman as conclusive. They
also apply the three-part Howey-Forman "economic realities" test 25 to de-
termine if the transaction evidenced by a transfer of stock is governed by
the federal securities regulations. The elements of this analysis are:
(1) an investment, (2) in a common venture, (3) with a reasonable expec-
tation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of others. 26 These courts interpret Forman to require satisfaction
of the part II.B. requirements in order to classify an exchange or trans-
fer as a securities transaction.
The first element, presence of an investment, is fulfilled if the inves-
tor commits "his assets to an enterprise or venture in such a manner as
to subject himself to a financial lOSS." ' 2 7 To qualify as an investment, the
investor must give up a tangible and definable consideration. In return,
he receives a separate financial interest that has, substantially, the char-
acteristics of a security.
28
The second element, a common enterprise, has been defined as
"one in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and de-
pendant upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investments
of third parties."
29
Some courts analyze the third element in two parts: (1) was there a
reasonable expectation of profit? and (2) was this profit to be derived
from the managerial and entrepreneurial efforts of others? It is the sec-
ond part of this element that was determinative in most cases. 30 This
second component previously required profits to be derived "solely"
from the efforts of others.3 1 The courts no longer construe the term
"solely" literally; instead, they examine the quality and quantity of the
23. United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. at 848; 45 SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946); see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. at 336.
24. Forman, 421 U.S. at 848 (citing Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336).
25. Howey extended coverage of the federal securities laws by creating a three-part
analysis to define an "investment contract." Thirty years later, Forman, in limiting protec-
tion of the federal laws, adopted a modified version of the Howey test and labelled it the
'economic realities" approach.
26. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852; Howey, 328 U.S: at 301; Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties,
Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 1980).
27. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976); Wooldridge Homes, Inc. v.
Bronze Tree, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1085, 1086 (D. Colo. 1983); SEC v. International Mining
Exch., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1062, 1067 (D. Colo. 1981).
28. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559 (1979) (the court
found that employees' contributions to a noncontributory, compulsory pension fund did
not constitute an investment.)
29. SEC v. Glenn Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.) (citing Los Angeles
Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
919 (1961)), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
30. See Thompson, supra note 22, at 238-39.
31. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
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efforts performed by both parties. 3 2 The Tenth Circuit has adopted the
following interpretive test: "whether the efforts made by those other
than the investor are undeniably significant ones, those essential efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." 3 3 Contribution of
time and effort are not the only factors examined. The focus is on the
degree of ultimate control over the operations of the business. 34 There-
fore, the reliance of the investor on the promoter or third parties does
not have to be complete, as long as the duties performed by the investor
are nominal or limited and have an inconsequential impact in the suc-
cess of the enterprise.
3 5
C. Rationalizing the Facts with the Law
Typically, the sale of business doctrine has been applied to transac-
tions where the investor acquired 100% of the outstanding stock and
assumed control of the corporation.3 6 This transaction is classified as
the sale of a business through the sale of stock. The substance of the
transaction is the purchase of a business and the stock is regarded as the
medium of exchange and merely an indicia of ownership. In Christy,
plaintiffs collectively acquired an eighty-one percent interest in Mark
Cambron, Inc., each holding various numbers of shares proportionate
to their investment, and defendant Cambron continued to serve as the
organizer and promoter of the corporation. The court chose to extend
the sale of business doctrine to this situation, finding that plaintiffs did
not expect profits based on Cambron's efforts. 37 The court, however,
failed to adequately address the issue of control, raising the question of
the extent to which an investor or purchaser can be involved in manage-
ment without invoking the doctrine.
In a footnote, the court cited King v. Winkler,3 8 an Eleventh Circuit
opinion, for the proposition that "[a] sale of less than 100% of the stock
32. Turner, 474 F.2d at 482.
33. Aldrich, 627 F.2d at 1040 n.3 (quoting Turner, 474 F.2d at 482).
34. Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 877, 880 (10th Cir. 1978).
35. Commander's Palace Park Ass'n v. Girard & Pastel Corp., 572 F.2d 1084, 1086
(5th Cir. 1978); Schultz v. Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1978); Fargo Partners v.
Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 1976); McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211
(10th Cir. 1975); Lino v. City Inv. Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1973) (quoting SEC Act
Release No. 5211 (November 30, 1971), reported in [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 78446 at page 80,973).
36. Until the decision in Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982), all circuit
court cases applying the sale of business doctrine involved a transfer of 100% of the cor-
poration's outstanding stock. In Sutter, the Seventh Circuit created an investor-entrepre-
neur distinction and established a rebuttable presumption that one holding 50% or more
of a corporation's stock is an entrepreneur and the sale of the business doctrine applies to
a transfer of this interest. The Tenth Circuit has joined this minority view but failed to
discuss Sutter, possibly because none of the interests transferred equalled a 50% share by
itself.
37. After examining the evidence, the court concluded that while the venture included
potentially fraudulent elements, these elements failed to develop into a legally actionable
claim. Thus, the court could have denied recovery for the plaintiffs because no fraud ex-
isted without expanding the sale of business doctrine to include the unique factual ele-
ments of Christy.
38. 673 F.2d 342 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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might not be covered by the [Securities] Acts. A sale of 100% of the
stock can be covered by the Acts."' 39 King involved the transfer of an
existing business through the private sale of the sole shareholder's en-
tire interest in the corporate stock to two purchasers who intended to
manage and operate the business. The passage quoted from King con-
tinues, stating that "[t]he number of sellers and purchasers will not nec-
essarily control the outcome."'40 While the King court stated that the
approach used to resolve the case was not a "function of numbers,"' 4'
the facts in King resemble the classic sale of business doctrine case. The
purpose of the transaction in King was to sell all of the business assets.
There were no numbers with which the court had to struggle. The sole
shareholder sold his entire interest and completely relinquished control
over the business assets and the purchasers assumed complete control
of the business and its success or failure depended on their efforts alone.
The statement quoted in the Christy opinion does not reflect the true
precedential value of King.
The Christy court cited Chandler v. KEW, Inc. 4 2 as the authority for
classifying Christy as a sale of business doctrine case. Chandler, although
published five years after it was decided, was the first post-Forman appel-
late court recognition of the sale of business doctrine. It involved the
sale of a liquor store where the purchaser received 100% of the stock in
the transfer and assumed control of the business. Chandler is the prece-
dent for the sale of business doctrine in the Tenth Circuit, but unlike
Christy, it represents the typical, classic sale of business doctrine case.
The Christy court failed to distinguish a more analogous Fourth Circuit
case, Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc.
43
Polishing Machines, Inc. was interested in obtaining financing to ex-
pand its business. This objective was accomplished by selling fifty per-
cent of its outstanding stock to Coffin, who became its executive vice-
president. The Fourth Circuit characterized the transaction as "the very
sort of transfer with which the federal securities laws are most con-
cerned, 'the sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making pur-
poses.' ",44 The Fourth Circuit declined to apply the economic realities
test and, instead, held that because the shares purchased by Coffin were
ordinary corporate stock, the transaction was subject to the federal se-
curities laws.
By way of contrast, in Frederiksen v. Poloway,4 5 the Seventh Circuit
applied the sale of business doctrine to the transfer of an existing busi-
ness through the purchase of 100% of its outstanding stock. The court
distinguished the Coffin decision on two grounds. First, Coffin did not
39. Id. at 346.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977) (initially published at [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. LAw REP. (CCH) $ 96,966 (10th Cir. 1977) at page 96,053).
43. 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1979).
44. Id. at 1204; see also Forman, 421 U.S. at 849.
45. 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1981).
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involve the transfer of 100% of the stock. Second, the Frederiksen court
determined that the purpose of the Coffin transaction had not been to
vest ownership of the business in the purchaser despite the fact that the
investor assumed the duties of executive vice-president. It found that
the economic reality of the Coffin transaction was the sale of stock to
raise capital to finance corporate expansion. It is not apparent from the
Frederiksen opinion how the Seventh Circuit would resolve cases similar
to Coffin, but its analysis demonstrates an awareness for distinguishing
facts and a concern for establishing possible parameters of the doctrine.
The analysis in Christy is not nearly as revealing. Given the mechan-
ical application of the Howey-Forinan test, the outcome of this case is pre-
dictable. The court conclusively stated that "[t]he economic realities
• . . show that plaintiffs were buying a discotheque, and there is no
question about that.' '46 The economic realities approach, however, pro-
motes substance over form, and requires careful application of the test's
three elements to the facts. Unfortunately, the court's rationale in
Christy does not include a discussion of the purpose of the transaction or
the extent of control retained by the plaintiffs over their investment and
its relation to their respective shares.
Cambron was seeking financial backing to build a discotheque. He
offered interests in his corporation, denominated in shares of stock, in
exchange for capital contributions needed to finance the discotheque. It
appears Cambron's motive for selling interests in his corporation was to
raise capital to build a discotheque and generate profits for himself and
the investors. When the plaintiffs made their investment in Mark Cam-
bron, Inc., the disco was only in the organizational stages and not yet
operational. It does not appear as obvious and conclusive as the court
indicated that plaintiffs were purchasing the discotheque. Indeed, the
opposite appears to be the more reasonable conclusion.
The court determined that the controlling issue was "not a matter
of numbers, but, rather, whether the purchaser of securities expects to
profit from the efforts of others."' 4 7 This interpretation indicates that in
the Tenth Circuit, the determinative factor in a sale of business transac-
tion is whether the investor exercises control over the interest acquired,
and not the medium through which the transaction was accomplished or
the underlying purpose of the transfer. In electing to focus on the con-
trol component, the Tenth Circuit has created a distinction between pas-
sive investors and those who choose to assume even a nominally active
role in controlling their newly acquired interest.
In reaching its holding, the court implies that the control exercised
by the four investors was more than nominal or limited and their efforts
were determinative to the success or failure of the enterprise. The
plaintiffs' only actions involved acquiescing to leasing rather than
purchasing the disco equipment and the firing of a group of employees
by plaintiff Klein. No executive responsibilities or actions were offered
46. Christy, 710 F.2d at 672.
47. Id. at n.1.
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to support the control factor. Moreover, the opinion indicates that the
minimal involvement of plaintiffs came in response to their after-the-fact
realization that the enterprise was undercapitalized. At the time Cam-
bron sold plaintiffs their interests, they had no intention of providing
anything other than capital.
The "efforts of others" requirement is an integral part of the eco-
nomic realities analysis and frequently operates to distinguish sale of
business transfers from securities transactions. It should not, however,
be considered determinative in every instance. The Christy court regards
the "efforts of others" element as conclusive and narrowly construes it
to require complete passivity on the part of the investor and exclusive
reliance on the efforts of third parties, even when financial demise be-
comes probable. This interpretation expands the sale of business doc-
trine beyond its original purpose and denies securities law coverage to
generally passive investors in enterprises managed primarily by
promoters.
II. THE FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY OF LIABILITY
IN lOb-5 ACTIONS
A. T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel
Authority
In T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Author-
ity, 48 the Tenth Circuit considered the propriety of plaintiffs' claim as a
class action in an interlocutory appeal. 49 The complaint filed by the
plaintiff, TJ. Raney & Sons, Inc., a distributor of the Series C Bonds of
the Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Authority, alleged securities
fraud under Rule lOb-5 50 based on a form of the fraud on the market
theory. Raney claimed that the defendant bond counsel recklessly af-
firmed the validity of the bonds and concealed the wrongful divergence
of the proceeds. It contended that the bond proceeds were commingled
with other funds and never used for their intended purpose. Raney also
claimed that the bonds were unlawfully issued under Oklahoma law.
The Series C Bonds went into default and this class action ensued.
Raney sought to represent all Series C bondholders. There were
approximately sixty Series C bondholders with different degrees of in-
vestment experience. All the purchasers did not receive the same infor-
48. 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983).
49. In West v. Capital Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 558 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1977), the
court explained the basis for the "Death Knell" exception of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)
which grants the court of appeals jurisdiction over the final decisions of the district courts.
To appeal a decertification order, plaintiffs must prove that the suit will not continue as a
private action if the class action is decertified.
In Bowe v. First of Denver Mortgage Investors, 562 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1977), the
court discussed the preferable means for review of class action orders under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1982) or through an extraordinary writ of mandamus. To qualify under
§ 1292(b), the order must involve a controlling question of law which "may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." Id. at 644 n.l. The jurisdiction of the
court of appeals in this situation is discretionary.
50. 19 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983); see infra note 85 (text of Rule lOb-5).
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mation. Some received an allegedly fraudulent offering circular and
bond opinion before purchasing while others did not.
Defendants contended in their motion to decertify the class action
that this case was inappropriate as a class action because not all the class
members relied on the offering circular and the bond opinion. They
asserted that because causation could not be established with respect to
each class member, the claim as a class action must fail. They also
claimed that Raney was not a suitable class representative. It was a case
of first impression in the Tenth Circuit. 5 1
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to
decertify and recognized the plaintiffs' cause of action under a variation
of the fraud on the market theory of liability created in Shores v. Sklar 52
which allowed investors to assume that any securities offered for sale
were "entitled to be marketed.'' 5 3 The court noted that three other cir-
cuits, the Second, Fifth, and Ninth, had adopted various forms of the
fraud on the market theory of liability for lOb-5 actions and elected to
join this trend with the Raney case.
5 4
B. The Reliance Requirement in 1Ob-5 Actions
The traditional measure for causation in a private action under SEC
Rule lOb-5 is the plaintiff's actual reliance on the defendant's misrepre-
sentations. 5 5 In a misrepresentation case, the plaintiff must affirmatively
allege and prove that he relied on false representations made by the
defendant. The reliance requirement is fulfilled if "the misrepresenta-
tion is a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which
results in [the investors'] loss.''56 In nondisclosure or omission cases,
this standard requires the plaintiff to show he relied to his detriment on
factors which were not revealed to him. Because this burden of proof
was difficult to sustain, the Supreme Court established a presumption of
reliance in favor of the plaintiff which arises after the plaintiff establishes
the materiality of the undisclosed facts.5 7 Materiality is established by
51. 717 F.2d at 1333.
52. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
53. Id. at 471.
54. 717 F.2d at 1332 (citing Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 71-76); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981)
(discussed infra at text accompanying notes 80-87); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th
Cir. 1975) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 60-68)).
55. The elements of a classic lOb-5 violation are: (1) a false representation made by
defendant; (2) with defendant's scienter; (3) the false representation is material; (4) plain-
tiffjustifiably relied on the false representation; (5) plaintiff purchased or sold securities in
connection with the false representation; and (6) plaintiff was damaged as a result of the
false representation. Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983); Holds-
worth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955
(1977). See generally Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 1Ob-5, 88
HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975).
56. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir.) (bracketed infor-
mation in the original) (quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.)
(quoting Restatement of Torts § 546 (1938)), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965)), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 2004 (1971).
57. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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proving that a reasonable man might have considered the undisclosed
facts important in making his decision. 58 The presumption of causation
is not conclusive; it merely shifts the burden of proof of non-reliance to
the defendant. The defendant meets his burden by showing that the
plaintiff's investment decision would not have been different even if the
defendant had disclosed the omitted facts.
5 9
Proving reliance is equally difficult where the alleged fraud has af-
fected the market and consequently injured the plaintiff. The fraud on
the market theory recognizes that investors make their decisions based
on a variety of factors, some unrelated to specific statements made to
investors about the investment, including the securities' presence in a
reliable market. A literal interpretation of the reliance element would
compel the plaintiff to prove reliance on specific actions or false repre-
sentations of the defrauder rather than the effects of such actions or rep-
resentations on the market. Those circuits which recognize the fraud on
the market theory of liability do not require proof of direct reliance on a
particular false representation to sustain a lOb-5 claim. A presumption
of reliance on the integrity of the market arises when the plaintiff estab-
lishes the materiality of the false representations, and the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant to prove non-reliance by plaintiff upon the
market or non-materiality of the false representations.
C. The Fraud on the Market Theory of Liability
The leading case addressing the fraud on the market theory is
Blackie v. Barrack. 60 In Blachie, the plaintiffs, stock purchasers in the sec-
ondary market, filed a class action suit claiming that the defendant cor-
poration issued false annual and interim reports, press releases, and
SEC filings as to its financial condition which affected the price they paid
for the shares. The Ninth Circuit, in effect, extended the presumption
of reliance created by the Supreme Court, in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah
v. United States,6 1 for nondisclosure actions to cases involving misrepre-
sentations that inflate the price of stock traded on the open market.6 2 It
is not necessary to show direct reliance to establish causation in this con-
text. Causation is established by showing that plaintiffs purchased stock
in the secondary market and that the misrepresentations which distorted
the stock's value were material. 6 3 The burden then shifts to the defend-
ant to disprove causation by disproving materiality; by showing that
even though the false representation was material, a nominal number of
traders relied on it; or by showing that the purchaser acted without
58. Id. at 154.
59. Id. at 153-54.
60. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
61. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
62. 524 F.2d at 906 n.22. The court declined to interpret Affiliated Ute as creating a
presumption of reliance in lOb-5 actions. Instead, it viewed reliance based upon material-
ity as a threshhold of causation.
63. Id. at 906. "[C]ausation is adequately established in the impersonal stock ex-
change context by proof of purchase and of materiality of misrepresentation, without di-
rect proof of reliance." Id
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knowledge of the false character of the representation, or that he would
have acted in the same manner had he known of it. 6 4 The court's ration-
ale was that an investor relies generally on the market to reflect valid
stock prices, and thus indirectly on the truth of the representations un-
derlying the stock price.6 5 The court reasoned that to require proof of
direct reliance would defeat claims where reliance is indirect, even
though the misrepresentations were material and causation was estab-
lished.6 6 The extension of the Affiliated Ule presumption in this case alle-
viated the "unreasonable and irrelevant evidentiary burden" 6 7 of the
traditional reliance requirement. The court believed this holding would
facilitate enforcement of securities laws and encourage complete recov-
eries by plaintiffs with valid claims.
68
The Ninth Circuit expanded the fraud on the market theory beyond
reliance on the integrity of the market to reflect accurate stock values in
Arthur Young & Co. v. United States District Court.69 Here, plaintiffs alleged
that false and misleading registration statements and prospectuses filed
with the SEC were sent or shown to every investor who relied on them
to his detriment in the purchase of limited partnership interests pro-
moted by the defendant. There were 1215 investors represented in this
class action. The court determined that plaintiffs were entitled to rely
on the integrity of the regulatory process to produce truthful filing
statements.
70
In Panzirer v. Wolf,7 1 the Second Circuit found that the plaintiff
stated a cognizable fraud on the market claim based on her reliance on
the integrity of the market in producing the information reported in the
Wall Street Journal. She established a chain of causation by alleging that if
the corporation's annual report had been accurate, the stock analysts
interviewed by the Journal would not have commented positively on the
company, the Journal would not have reported favorably on the com-
pany's prospects, and she would not have relied on the article and
purchased the company's stock.7 2 The court determined that plaintiff
established reliance by showing that she acted in response to informa-
tion based on a material misrepresentation or omission transmitted by
reporters or workers in the securities markets. 73 To prove causation,
64. Id.
65. 524 F.2d at 907.
66. Id. "Requiring direct proof from each purchaser that he relied on a particular
representation when purchasing would defeat recovery by those whose reliance was indi-
rect, despite the fact that the causational chain is broken only if the purchaser would have
purchased the stock even had he known of the misrepresentation." Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
70. Id. at 695. Plaintiff had a right to rely "on the integrity of the regulatory process
and the truth of any representations made to appropriate agencies and the investors at the
time of original issue."
71. 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982).
72. Id. at 367.
73. Id. "Where the plaintiff acts upon information from those working in or reporting
on the securities markets, and where that information is circulated after a material misrep-
[Vol. 62:1
SECURITIES
the plaintiff was required to show that the defendant's fraud was a "sub-
stantial factor" or "significant contributing cause"
74 of her injury. 75
The court analogized to the Blackie opinion, stating that just as a mate-
rial misrepresentation or omission is presumed to affect the price of
stock, so it should be presumed to affect the information "heard on the
street" which leads investors to make purchases in the secondary stock
market.
76
Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., Inc.,77 mentioned in Raney as con-
flicting 78 yet not distinguished, is not based upon the "entitled to be
marketed/fraud on the market theory" alleged in Raney. The plaintiff
did not allege that the bonds were not entitled to be on the market, but
instead that the bonds were distributed with a fraudulently prepared of-
fering statement containing affirmative misrepresentations which dis-
torted their value. Thus, this opinion is not controlling or persuasive to
Raney. Vervaecke sought compensation for the decline in value of the
bonds measured by the difference between their cost and their present
fair market value. He attempted to classify his claims as involving non-
disclosure to benefit from the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance, but
the court determined that the plaintiffs alleged material misrepresenta-
tions and omissions in the nature of misrepresentations under clause (2)
of Rule 1 Ob-5, to which the Affiliated Ute presumption did not apply. The
court also declined to distinguish or discuss Blackie which, arguably, is
persuasive in this context. Vervaecke was unable to sustain his burden
of proof of reliance on the misrepresentations because he did not view
the offering circular until after he committed to purchase the bonds.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's summary judgment
against his claim.
7 9
The most persuasive authority for the holding in Raney is Shores v.
Sklar,80 a class action suit brought by purchasers of industrial revenue
bonds following their default. A distinctly divided en banc Fifth Circuit
panel 8 ' allowed the class to maintain a claim under 10b-5(1) and lOb-
5(3) based on a variation of the fraud on the market theory which allows
the investor to rely on the integrity of the market to the extent that the
securities offered for sale to him must be ones which are entitled to be in
the marketplace. The complaint alleged that the bonds were marketed
under a fraudulent scheme so pervasive, that without it, the bonds
would not have been offered on the market at any price. The Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court's summary judgment against Shores' lOb-
resentation or omission, plaintiff has stated a sufficient claim of reliance on the
mispresentation."
74. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 28, 34 (2d Cir.
1976).
75. Panzirer, 663 F.2d at 367.
76. Id. at 368.
77. 578 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1978).
78. 717 F.2d at 1333.
79. 578 F.2d at 720.
80. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981).
81. 12 in the majority, 10 in the dissent.
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5(2) claim based on an offering circular which was, allegedly, defective
because it contained material misrepresentations and omissions.
Shores' admission that he purchased the bonds based solely on his bro-
ker's oral representations and that he had not read or otherwise relied
on the offering circular operated to disprove reliance, a necessary ele-
ment in his claim under lOb-5(2).
The Shores majority interpreted the plaintiff's complaint as alleging
that "fraud on a broader scale" 8 2 caused the bonds to be offered for sale
on the market. Thus, it was the presence of the bonds in the market-
place that was challenged, not the effect of the offering circular on the
purchasers' decisions to invest. The majority classified the offering cir-
cular as only one element of the overall scheme to defraud and held that
nonreliance on this one component was not fatal to the claim. The court
determined that plaintiff's burden of proof was to establish: (1) that de-
fendant fraudulently marketed securities, (2) that he reasonably relied
on the bonds' presence in the market to represent their legitimacy, and
(3) that he was injured as a result of the fraudulent scheme.
8 3
The dissent's examination of the case law found that clauses (1) and
(3) of Rule 1Ob-5 have been applied in situations where clause (2) is
inappropriate. 84 The language of clause (2) is specific, requiring the
making of an untrue statement of a material fact or the omission of a
material fact necessary to render the statements made not misleading.
The first and third clauses are phrased less restrictively to include "any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," or "any act, practice, or course
of business which operates . . . as a fraud .... 85 The dissent con-
cluded that clauses (1) and (3) were drafted broadly to include fraudu-
lent activities not covered by the particular language of clause (2).
The dissent criticized the majority's position in sustaining the plain-
tiff's claims under lOb-5(l) and lOb-5(3) as permitting allegations of
misconduct in connection with the preparation and distribution of a mis-
leading offering circular covered by lOb-5(2) to be recognized as causes
of action under clauses (1) and (3) because of extensive allegations of
collateral misconduct. The dissent argued that the majority allowed the
plaintiff to circumvent the traditional reliance requirement of clause
(2)86 by acknowledging an "entitled to be marketed/fraud on a broader
82. 647 F.2d at 472.
83. Id. at 469-70.
84. Id. at 473-74 (Randall, J., writing for the dissent).
85. Rule lOb-5 provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, .
(a) to employ any device, scheme, of artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
86. List, 340 F.2d at 462. The traditional reliance requirement is "whether the mis-
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scale" theory of recovery despite the plaintiffs admitted lack of reliance
on the offering circular.
8 7
While the majority interpreted the primary purpose of the securities
laws to be the protection of investors and the promotion of free and
honest securities markets achieved through full disclosure and other
means, the dissent determined that the fundamental purpose of the Acts
was to fully disclose the terms of the transaction to the investor allowing
him to make an informed investment decision. From the dissent's per-
spective, the majority's validation of plaintiffs lOb-5 claim, despite his
admitted nonreliance on the offering circular proffered to promote full
disclosure, contradicted the philosophy of the Acts. The dissent be-
lieved that the majority position would allow plaintiffs to recover in
some instances, even though they did not read or rely on the defend-
ants' public disclosures.
The Raney opinion acknowledges that the Shores' court was almost
equally divided in its decision, but makes only an abbreviated attempt to
address the concerns of the Shores' dissent. The primary concern is that
the presumption of reliance extended in Raney could operate as a
scheme of investor's insurance. When an investor successfully states a
claim under the "entitled to be marketed/fraud on the market" theory,
the issue of whether he took steps to protect his interest, namely by
reading an offering circular or a bond opinion, is irrelevant. The Shores'
dissent speculated that despite the material misrepresentations and
omissions in that offering circular, if the plaintiffs had read it, they would
have been warned by its patent defects. The Raney court does not dis-
cuss the degree of credibility of the bond opinion or offering circular.
The investor need only establish that he "reasonably relied on the avail-
ability of the bonds as indicating their lawful issue" 88 to establish
causation.
Raney cited Arthur Young & Co. to illustrate the expansion of the
fraud on the market theory to "reliance to the integrity of the regulatory
process and the truth of any representation made to appropriate agen-
cies and the investors at the time of original issue,"'8 9 but omitted the
truthfulness clause in its discussion of the case. The Raney court rea-
soned that investors are entitled to rely on federal and state securities
regulations to produce lawfully issued securities. The court, however,
attached a broad disclaimer which significantly eroded its rationale. The
court did not grant investors the right to rely on the truthfulness of the
offering circular. Despite this disclaimer, the court believed its holding
did not create a "scheme of investors' insurance."
90
If the Raney holding does not allow an investor to rely on the truth-
fulness of the statements made in the disclosure documents, then it pro-
representation is a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which results in
. . .loss." See Raney, 717 F.2d at 1332.
87. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 481-87 (Randell,J., writing for the dissent).
88. 717 F.2d at 1333.
89. 549 F.2d at 695.
90. 717 F.2d at 1333 (quoting List, 340 F.2d at 463).
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tects the investor who neglects or declines to read a patently erroneous
offering circular. While Arthur Young & Co. protects investors who actu-
ally read deceptively misleading disclosure statements, Raney extends
protection to investors who may or may not have read disclosure state-
ments which may or may not be patently misleading. Federal securities
regulations require disclosure statements to provide investors with in-
formation on which to base their decisions. It is difficult to rationalize
how the protection offered by Raney to investors who do not read disclo-
sure documents does not establish a scheme of investors' insurance
when the disclosure documents are patently erroneous when read by the
reasonable investor or securities broker.
The Tenth Circuit sustained Raney's lOb-5 claim under the guise of
a "fraud on the market" theory. The label attached to this theory of
liability implies two premises: (1) an actionable fraud, (2) which is per-
petrated on a market. Raney established a sufficient claim under Rule
lOb-5, but the opinion does not reflect any evidence introduced to show
this fraud was practiced on a market. The customary interpretation of
the term "market" in the context of securities transactions is based on
the concept of an organized forum where securities are actively traded.
It is composed of a primary market for original issues and a secondary
market where prices are determined by supply and demand. The securi-
ties in Raney were Irrigation Fuel Authority Bonds purchased by sixty
local investors at their original issue. The bonds did not have a secon-
dary market and their value and selling price were calculated from their
bond rating. There was no market for the bonds in the commonly ac-
cepted sense. The cases prior to Shores applied the fraud on the market
theory to claims involving actively traded securities. 9 1 The "entitled to
be marketed/fraud on the market theory" created in Shores and accepted
in Raney is a misnomer. A fraud was committed, but not on a market.
The fraud was committed on the bond investors themselves.
Lynn Bolinske
91. Blackie and Panzirer involved stock purchases in the secondary market. Arthur





This article discusses eight recent decisions by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, many of which required extensive statutory construc-
tion. After addressing three commercial cases, this survey considers two
estate and trust administration cases. This article then discusses a case
in which the timing of a minister's opposition to social security taxes
prevented him from qualifying for an exemption from social security
taxes. The survey concludes by considering two railway property tax
cases in which the Tenth Circuit construed section 306 of the Internal
Revenue Code.
I. COMMERCIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
A. Unreasonable Rental Expenses under Section 162
In Harmon City, Inc. v. United States,' the Tenth Circuit considered
the deduction of rental expenses incurred by a closely-held corporation
in the absence of arm's length dealing. Harmon City, Inc. (taxpayer)
operated several retail supermarkets throughout Utah including a mar-
ket in Granger, Utah. In 1973, Harmon City, Inc. sold the Granger store
to Harmon City Associates, a limited partnership whose partners con-
sisted largely of Harmon City shareholders. The partnership leased
back the Granger store to the corporation for rental payments which
consisted of a base rate rental payment and a percentage override. The
percentage override was added to the leasing agreement after the par-
ties discovered that the base rate rental would be insufficient to service
the mortgage commitment on the property.
In an opinion by Judge Saffels, 2 the Tenth Circuit upheld the IRS
determination that a portion of the taxpayer's rental expenses were not
reasonable and therefore not ordinary and necessary expenses deducti-
ble under IRC section 162(a)(3). After stating the general rule that it is
ordinarily inappropriate for the Commissioner to inquire into the rea-
sonableness of rental payments, Judge Saffels went on to espouse the
exception to this rule, that the Commissioner should not defer where
there is a close relationship between lessor and lessee.3 In such a case,
the Commissioner may inquire into the reasonableness of the rental
1. 733 F.2d 1381 (10th Cir. 1984).
2. United States District Judge Saffels sitting by designation.
3. 733 F.2d 1381, 1383 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Safway Steel Scaffolds Co. v. United
States, 590 F.2d 1360, 1362 (5th Cir. 1979). "It is ordinarily inappropriate to inquire into
the reasonableness of the rent paid, however, this case presents an exception to the gen-
eral rule. That exception is the case of a close relationship between the lessor and the
lessee." Id. at 1362; Brown Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1958);
Place v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 199 (1951), aFfd, 199 F.2d 373 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 927 (1953).
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amount paid to determine whether this amount exceeds the amount
which the lessee would have been required to pay had he dealt with a
stranger at arm's length.
4
Judge Saffels stated that the reasonableness issue is a question of
fact, and that the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed unless
found to be clearly erroneous. 5 Based on the testimony of the govern-
ment's expert witness, as to the fair rental value of the lease,6 Judge
Saffels upheld the trial court's determination that taxpayer's superior
management capabilities and the strength of its weekly sales averages
placed the taxpayer in an advantageous negotiating position. Such a po-
sition would have resulted in a fair rental value below the agreed upon
rentals if the lease had been negotiated at arm's length. 7 Moreover,
Judge Saffels noted that the record demonstrated that the lease was not
intended to reflect a reasonable rental value but merely to provide funds
necessary to service the mortgage liability on the property.
8
Harmon City places the Tenth Circuit outside the mainstream of cir-
cuits that have reviewed the reasonableness of rental expenses. In South-
eastern Canteen Co. v. Commissioner,9 the Sixth Circuit, on facts very similar
to those in Harmon City, examined the personal objectives of both the
lessor and the lessee in structuring their agreements and upheld the
finding that the sale-leaseback agreements were not ends in themselves
but merely steps in an overall plan.' 0 Thus, in the Sixth Circuit's view,
the Commissioner's inquiry should focus upon not only the instant
transaction but also upon the entire history of the related parties' inter-
actions. Likewise, the Seventh Circuit in Safway Steel Scaffolds Co. v. United
States upheld inquiry into the reasonableness of all transactions made
between the related parties.'I Harmon City more correctly focuses the
inquiry upon the reasonableness of the leasing transaction rather than
upon the reasonableness by which related parties structure their affairs.
B. Federal Withholding, FICA, FUTA: Employee or Independent Contractor?
An employer is generally responsible for withholding federal taxes
4. Place v. Commissioner, 17 TC. 199, 203 (1951), ard, 199 F.2d 273 (6th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 927 (1953).
5. 733 F.2d at 1385 (citing Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. United States, 561 F.2d 190
(10th Cir. 1977)). This power given to the Commissioner is derived from the broader
declaration that the substance of a transaction rather than the form is controlling. Greg-
ory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Southeastern Canteen Co. v. Commissioner, 410
F.2d 615, 619 n.6 (6th Cir. 1969); Smith v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1966).
6. The government's expert gave two methods for determining fair rental value:
(1) by examining leases for similar properties, but between unrelated parties, or (2) by
calculating the amount which constitutes a reasonable rate of return on the owner's invest-
ment in the property at the date of the lease's inception. 733 F.2d at 1383.
7. Harmon City's weekly sales averages in 1973 outperformed the national average
per square foot by more than two to one. The sales averages outperformed local super-
markets. 733 F.2d at 1385.
8. Id. at 1384.
9. 410 F.2d 615 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969).
10. Id. at 620.
11. 590 F.2d 1360, 1362 (7th Cir. 1979).
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and for making FICA and FUTA contributions once the employer-em-
ployee relationship has been established. In Marvel v. United States,
12
(Marvel II) the Tenth Circuit reviewed the factors to be considered in
determining an individual's employment status.
In Marvel II, the taxpayers operated a photography business em-
ploying the services of thirty-one individuals, some of whom worked at
the taxpayer's studio and others who worked primarily out of their
homes. Taxpayers treated all of these individuals as independent con-
tractors and accordingly did not withhold or pay federal employment
taxes.' 3 Upon the district court's judgment that certain individuals were
employees, the taxpayers sought Tenth Circuit review.
14
Under the Internal Revenue Code, common-law distinctions be-
tween an employee and an independent contractor determine a person's
status for federal employment tax purposes. 15 For this reason, Judge
Holloway recognized that the employee status exists when the person
for whom the services are performed has the right to direct and control:
(1) the method and manner in which the work is done, and (2) the result
sought to be achieved.16 By contrast, an independent contractor status
exists "when an individual performs services for another according to
his own method and manner, free from the direction and control of the
employer, in all matters, except as to the product of his work."'
17
12. 719 F.2d 1507 (10th Cir. 1983).
13. Id. at 1510.
14. The taxpayers raised other attacks on the district court opinion including: (1) that
the adjudicatory procedure whereby this cause was referred to a United States Magistrate
was statutorily and constitutionally infirm, (2) that assessment notices delivered to the tax-
payers in the name of Marvel Photo were defective in that they failed to fulfill due process
requirements, and (3) that the penalties imposed on them were punitive and inappropriate
in light of the honest controversy over tax liability. On the first issue, Judge Holloway held
the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 94-577, § 1, 90 Stat.
2729 codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(2) (1982) provided the statutory authoriza-
tion for a consensual reference during the period in question. See Marvel 11, 719 F.2d at
1511. He also found the reference constitutionally permissible under Article III in reli-
ance upon the district court's de novo review of the magistrate's determination. Id. at
1513. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); see also Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 78-79 (1982) (plurality opinion). The tax-
payer's reliance on Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978), was held to be mis-
guided in that the final judgment appealed from was the final decision of a United States
district court rather than a district appeal from magistrate determination. 719 F.2d at
1513.
On the procedural due process issue, Judge Holloway concluded the assessments
were valid and effective in that they listed the correct taxpayer identification number and
were issued in the trade name which the taxpayers had adopted. Id. at 1513. On the
appropriateness of penalties imposed issue, Judge Holloway refused to uphold the tax-
payer's position since the issue was not properly before the court. Id. at 1516.
15. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3121(d), 3306(i), 3401(c) (1982). See also Employment Tax Regula-
tions 26 C.F.R. §§ 31.3121(d)-I, 31.3306(i)-I, 31. 3401(c)-1 (1984).
16. 719 F.2d at 1514.
17. Id. Judge Holloway also listed other factors which could shed light on the distinc-
tion. "Other factors . . . include: (1) the substantiality of the investment of the person
rendering the service with his own tools and equipment, (2) the cost incurred by the al-
leged employee in rendering the service, as by the employment of his own laborers, (3) the
ability of the person rendering the service to profit from his own 'management skill',
(4) whether or not the service involved requires a special skill, (5) the permanency of the
relationship between the parties, and (6) whether the person rendering the service works
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Applying this standard, Judge Holloway found the tasks performed
at the studio dispositive of the employee-independent contractor issue.
In so finding, he referred to the testimony that the delivery boys assisted
in drying pictures daily at the studio. 18 He also referred to the work of
the oil colorist packaging proofs and cutting strips of film at the stu-
dio. 19 Similarly, Judge Holloway enumerated the duties the other em-
ployees performed in the studio. The only evidence relied on by the
court which did not demonstrate control was the testimony of some of
the workers that the Marvels would "take care of their taxes."
'20
Thus, the Tenth Circuit views the performance of tasks at an em-
ployer's place of business as largely dispositive of the employee-in-
dependent contractor issue. The court's rationale is based upon its
assumption that an employer's right to control at the place of business is
greater than its right to control elsewhere.
The Tenth Circuit's view, however, denigrates the "total situation"
standard set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Silk. 2 1 In Silk,
the Court stated "[t]he Social Security Agency and the courts will find
that degrees of control, opportunities for profit or loss, investment in
facilities, permanency of relation and skill required in the claimed in-
dependent operation are important for decision. No one is controlling
nor is the list complete."'2 2 Marvel is misleading to the extent that it
implies that the right to direct and control is dispositive. Silk directs that
all of the above factors should be examined and that no one factor is
controlling.
2 3
C. Assumption Reinsurance Transactions and Accounting for Loading:
Security Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. United States
In Security Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. United States,2 4 the Tenth Circuit
construed complex portions of the Internal Revenue Code concerning
life insurance companies. 2 5 Security Benefit resolved two issues under the
Phase II tax of the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959.26
The first issue concerned whether life insurance companies must report
as compensation an amount equal to the reserve they are required to
establish in an assumption reinsurance transaction. The second issue
was whether life insurance companies must employ the same accounting
method in computing the inclusion in income of the net valuation por-
in the course of the recipient's business rather than in an ancillary capacity." Id. at n. 1
(citing Avis Rent A Car Sys. v. United States, 503 F.2d 423, 429 (2d Cir. 1974)).
18. 719 F.2d at 1515.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 331 U.S. 704, 719 (1947).
22. Id. at 716 (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. 726 F.2d 1491 (10th Cir. 1984).
25. The Tenth Circuit has previously addressed the tax treatment of unpaid insurance
premiums in Commissioner v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 525 F.2d 786 (10th Cir.
1975), rev'd, 433 U.S. 148 (1977).
26. 26 U.S.C. §§ 801-820 (1982).
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tion of deferred and uncollected premiums as when computing the net
valuation portion of the gross premium added to the insurance com-
pany's reserves.
1. Background
In an effort to augment federal tax revenues realized from the oper-
ation of domestic insurance companies, Congress enacted the Life In-
surance Company Income Tax Act of 1959.27 The special treatment
prescribed by the Act was designed to require a clearer reflection of in-
surance company income. 28 Among other issues, the Act sets forth the
tax implications of reinsurance transactions and the tax treatment of de-
ferred and uncollected premiums.
In an assumption reinsurance transaction, one company transfers
policies to another company, the "reinsurer," which receives the insur-
ance premiums, maintains the requisite statutory reserves, 29 and pays
the death benefits. 30 In such a transaction, the company assigning the
policies, "the reinsured," can reduce its required reserves, but must in-
crease its income by the amount of such reduction.3 ' By contrast, the
reinsurer must increase its required reserves, but may take a current de-
duction from income for the increase in reserves.
3 2
The Fifth Circuit in Mutual Savings Life Insurance Co. v. United States
33
was faced with determining the tax consequences of a reinsurance trans-
action. As a result of its assumption of policies of another company,
Mutual Savings was required to increase its insurance reserves by
$1,047,142.3 4 For its assumption of these policies, Mutual Savings re-
ceived only $682,990 in tangible assets.3 5 Thus, the company gained a
deduction of over $1,000,000 and was required to include only
$682,990 in income. The government sought to impute an additional
amount of income so that the recognizable income would equal the al-
lowable deduction.
Section 809(c)(1) provides for the inclusion in income of considera-
27. Id. For a discussion of this Act, see Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co., 57 T.C. 482, 498
(1972). See also Kaufman, Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959-An Appraisal of the
Effects on the Life Insurance Industry, (pts. I & 2) 16 NAT'L TAxJ. 337 (1963).
28. Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co., 57 T.C. 482, 498 (1972).
29. State law prescribes the amount of the premium which must be added to insur-
ance reserves to provide for future death benefits. This amount, referred to as the "net
valuation premium," is determined under mortality and interest assumptions. Commis-
sioner v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 433 U.S. 148 (1977).
30. Mutual Say. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 488 F.2d 1142, 1144 (5th Cir. 1974).
31. Id.
32. 26 U.S.C. § 809(a)(1) (1982). For a discussion of the statutory scheme of sub-
chapter L and its policy implications see Commissioner v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co.,
433 U.S. 148, 152-54 (1977). "Throughout the history of the federal income tax, Con-
gress has taken the view that life insurance companies should not be taxed on the amounts
collected for the purpose of paying death benefits." Id. at 152. This policy is effectuated
by the allowance of current deductions for the required contributions to policy "reserves."
33. 488 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974).
34. Id. at 1145.
35. Id.
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tion received in respect of the assumption of insurance liabilities. 3 6 Sec-
tion 809(d)(2) provides for the deduction from income of the net
increase in reserves. 37 In 1962 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is-
sued a regulation which attempted to clarify the meaning of considera-
tion received in reinsurance transactions.3 8 In Example 1 of this
regulation the reinsurer was not required to impute an additional
amount of income up to the deduction for increased reserves.
39
Pursuant to this regulation, the Fifth Circuit in Mutual Savings held
that the reinsurer was required to include in income only tangible assets
received. 40 In response to this decision, the IRS amended the 1962 reg-
ulation and formulated new rules for determining the consideration re-
ceived in the sale of insurance policies. 4 1 The 1976 amendments
provide that where the reinsurer receives a net amount less than the
increase in the required reserves, the reinsurer shall be treated as having
received consideration equal to the increase in reserves. 4 2
2. Reinsurance Transactions
In Security Benefit Li f, 43 the Tenth Circuit was faced with a reinsur-
ance transaction indistinguishable from the transaction in Mutual Sav-
ings. Security Benefit assumed the life insurance policies of another
insurer. In recognition of this assumption, Security Benefit reported
over $5,900,000 as income. 44 This "consideration received" repre-
sented the fair market value of the cash, real estate, and securities re-
ceived by Security Benefit. The company also deducted over $7,500,000
as the required increase in reserves attributed to the assumption of
these policies.
4 5
In district court, the government contended that the difference be-
tween the reported income and the allowable deduction represented ad-
ditional income which must be imputed to the taxpayer. 4 6 The issue was
whether the 1976 amendments covered the transactions and, therefore,
whether the amendments would require the imputation as income of an
additional amount.4 7 The district court held for the taxpayer, reasoning
that the additional imputation has no application outside the scope of a
"netting transaction." '4 8
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the government again pressed its
36. 26 U.S.C. § 809(c)(1) (1982).
37. 26 U.S.C. § 809(d)(2) (1982).
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-4 (1962).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-4(d)(3) (1962).
40. 488 F.2d at 1145.
41. 40 Fed. Reg. 34128 (1975).
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-4(d)(2)(ii) (1976).
43. 726 F.2d 1491 (10th Cir. 1984).
44. Id. at 1493.
45. Id. The reserve was calculated by arriving at the present value of future benefits of
these policies.
46. 517 F. Supp. 740 (D. Kan. 1980).
47. Id. at 761. DistrictJudge Rogers adopted the taxpayer's labeling of double impu-
tation as arbitrary and mechanical. Id. at 762.
48. Id. A netting transaction occurs when either the reinsurer or the reinsured pays a
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position that the difference between the two figures should be imputed
as additional income. 49 The government argued that the transaction was
covered by the 1976 amendments. The Tenth Circuit denied the addi-
tional imputation of income and held that a company is required to re-
port as income only the fair market value of the tangible assets
received.50 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion
that the transaction was not covered by the 1976 amendments but the
court did not go so far as to state that the application of the 1976
amendments should be restricted to netting transactions. 51 The thrust
of the court's opinion was that the discrepancy between income and de-
duction was created by the use of an unrealistically low interest rate for
determining the reserves. Thus, remedy should lie with a change of the
interest rate and not with an imputation of income.
During consideration of the Life Insurance Company Tax Act of
1959, the Senate Committee on Finance expressed concern over the
ability of insurance companies to reduce their tax burdens by manipulat-
ing the statutory interest rate which establishes the reserves. 5 2 The Sen-
ate Committee specifically expressed its concern with the ability to take
larger deductions, by a large addition to the reserve account, while limit-
ing the income included under Phase I of the Act.
53
The IRS attempt to balance the allowed deduction with the income
realized comports with the plain language of the statute and its legisla-
tive history. Thus, the Treasury Regulation, as amended, should have
been applied on the basis of its implementation of the congressional
intent.
54
Notwithstanding the Tenth Circuit's narrow construction of the
1976 amendments, the application of this regulation should not be de-
nied to transactions which generate a deduction greater than the recog-
nized income. Clearly in such circumstances the reinsurer is willing to
accept a smaller package of assets when that package is accompanied by
net amount to the other instead of both companies exchanging payments. 726 F.2d at
1494 n.1.
49. 726 F.2d at 1493.
50. Id. at 1495.
51. Id. at 1494.
52. S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1575 (1959).
53. S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 14-17, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS !575, 1589-91 (1959).
54. The Commissioner promulgated the amendments to Treas. Reg. § 1.817 under
his authority to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations." 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (1982).
The courts have recognized a lower standard of deference when regulations are issued
under this general authorization. Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981).
In contrast, regulations issued under a specific grant of authority are given greater defer-
ence: "When the Commissioner acts under specific authority, our primary inquiry is
whether the interpretation or method is within the delegation of authority." Id. An even
higher degree of deference is provided for legislative regulations, i.e., those regulations
promulgated by an administrative agency using these regulations to fill gaps either explic-
itly or implicitly left by Congress. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). Legislative
regulations are given controlling weight provided they are neither arbitrary, capricious,
nor manifestly contrary to the statute. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984).
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a sizable tax deduction. The 1962 regulation, as amended, should be
interpreted as providing that when the reinsurer receives a net amount
equal to the value of the assets paid, less the tax benefits, the reinsurer
will recognize consideration equal to the increase in the required
reserves.
55
Courts should not restrict this regulation to those transactions
where the consideration received is expressly reduced by credits owed
to the exchanging party. The regulation, as amended, should have
equal validity where the consideration received is implicitly offset by tax
savings.
3. Tax Treatment of Deferred and Uncollected Premiums
Apart from the tax treatment of reinsurance transactions discussed
above, the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959 sought to
clarify the tax implications of deferred and uncollected premiums. The
Act, as codified in section 809 of the Internal Revenue Code, provides
that premium income must be included in the insurance company's taxa-
ble income.
5 6
To understand how deferred and uncollected premiums are in-
cluded in taxable income, it is necessary to explain the various compo-
nents of insurance premiums. Gross premiums received by the
company consist of a "net valuation premium" portion and a "loading"
portion. The "net valuation premium" is the portion of the premium
that will enable the company, given mortality and interest rate projec-
tions, to pay the death benefits to the policyholder. 57 "Loading" is the
excess of the gross premium over the "net valuation premium."
'5 8
Faced with the question of what portion of unpaid premiums should
be included in gross premium income, and accordingly, what portion
should be added to the company's reserves, the Supreme Court in Com-
missioner v. Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co. 59 held that only the net
valuation premium portion need be included in taxable income. The
Standard Life Court sought to avoid the uncertainty and confusion inher-
ent in segregating unpaid loading into deductible and nondeductible
parts and opted for a "practical rule which should minimize the likeli-
hood of future disputes."
6 0
Following Standard Life, Judge Logan held in Security Benefit that in-
surance companies need not employ the same accounting method used
to compute the net valuation portion of unpaid premiums as they use to
compute the net valuation portion of such premiums added to reserves.
Adopting the district court's reasoning that "the factors that determine
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-4(d) (1976).
56. 26 U.S.C. § 809(c)(1) (1982).
57. Security Benefit Life, 726 F.2d at 1496. State statutes require reserves equal to the
"net valuation premium" to ensure that death benefit funds are maintained.
58. Id. Loading is comprised of the company's expenses and profits. See also Commis-
sioner v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 433 U.S. 148, 150 (1977).
59. 433 U.S. 148 (1977).
60. Id. at 162.
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the amount of the increase in reserves are not the same as the factors
that determine the amount of loading on unpaid premiums," 6 1 Security
Benefit extended the reasoning in Standard Life to hold that perfect sym-
metry between the increase in reserves and the amount of loading in-
cludable in taxable income is not required.
6 2
The method of accounting used by Security Benefit to increase its
reserve deduction was a method approved by the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). 63 Judge Logan emphasized, as
did the Supreme Court in Standard Life, that section 818(a) provides for
rejection of the NAIC approach only if that approach is found to be in-
consistent with the dictates of accrual accounting.64
II. FEDERAL TAx IMPLICATIONS OF ESTATE AND TRUST ADMINISTRATION
A. Federal-State Comity
The bar and the courts have long been burdened by the problem of
deciding what effect should be given to a state trial court decree which is
determinative of federal estate taxes.
6 5 In Estate of Selby v. United States, 66
the Tenth Circuit faced this difficult issue. Selby originated in a Colorado
probate court. The Colorado court permitted a personal representa-
tive's successor to renounce all rights and interests in property passed to
the decedent by the rules of survivorship by reopening a closed estate.
67
The sole purpose of the renunciation was to reduce the estate's federal
tax liability.
When the IRS refused the estate's claim for a refund, the estate
brought a refund suit in federal district court. The district court, in an
effort to maintain "proper federal-state comity," deferred to the state
probate court's interpretation of Colorado law and upheld the
renunciation.
68
On appeal, Judge Barrett recognized the broad federal power to
review state court decisions affecting federal tax liability. Noting several
factors set forth in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,69 Judge Barrett's review
61. 517 F. Supp. 740, 770 (D. Kan. 1980).
62. 726 F.2d at 1498 (emphasis added). Standard Life does require symmetry regard-
ing the net valuation portion of deferred and uncollected premiums includable under
§ 809(c)(1) and deductible under § 809(d)(2). Standard Life implied, and Security Benefit
held, that symmetry is not required between the taxable and deductible portions of
loading.
63. See Rev. Proc. 78-6, 1978-1 C.B. 588 (allowing companies that had adhered to the
treasury regulation prior to Standard Life to elect to change retroactively their method of
accounting).
64. 726 F.2d at 1498. See also Standard Life, 433 U.S. at 162-63.
65. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 462 (1967).
66. 726 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1984).
67. Id. at 646.
68. Id. at 645 (discussion of the district court decision).
69. 387 U.S. 456, 463-64 (1966). The Court listed the following factors: (1) whether
the Tax Commissioner was made a party to the state proceedings, (2) whether the state
proceedings were brought for the purpose of directly affecting federal estate tax liability,
(3) whether the legislative history of the marital deduction indicated that state court deter-
minations be "final," and (4) whether the state determination was made by the highest
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of the state court determination revealed that the probate court pro-
ceeding was ex parte in nature, instituted solely to reduce federal tax lia-
bility, and concerned, at least in part, with the application of the marital
deduction. 70 Most important, Judge Barrett found that the probate
court's determination did not express the law of the state as envisioned
by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins71 because it was the decision of a probate
court rather than the Colorado Supreme Court.
The Tenth Circuit opinion embraced the Bosch rationale, adopting
the Court's conclusion that:
It follows here then, that when the application of a federal stat-
ute is involved, the decision of a state trial court as to an under-
lying issue of state law should a fortiori not be controlling
... . If there be no decision by [the highest state court] then
federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after
giving "proper regard" to relevant rulings of other courts of the
State.
7 2
The problem with the Tenth Circuit's adoption and application of
the proper regard standard is its use outside the arena where it
originated. The proper regard standard is derived from a report of the
Senate Finance Committee recommending enactment of the marital de-
duction. 7 3 Bosch stated that "proper regard," not finality, "should be
given to interpretations of the will," by the state courts.74 By applying
this standard in Selby, the Tenth Circuit opened the door to federal court
review of all state trial court proceedings that might jeopardize the fed-
eral fisc. The decision failed to recognize the specific federal interests
involved in Congress' allowance of the marital deduction under section
2056(a). 7 5 Such specific congressional legislation was used as the vehi-
cle for applying the proper regard only to decisions of the highest state
court. Thus, specific congressional action enabled the federal court to
examine the lower state court determination on state property law. The
Tenth Circuit failed to recognize that the Bosch Court's reliance on the
proper regard standard was necessary to construe the marital deduction
strictly, as Congress intended. 76 Selby lacked such a specific federal in-
state court and thus viewed as the "law of the state" as envisioned by Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
70. 726 F.2d at 646. Although the court characterized the probate court's determina-
tion as impacting the marital deduction, the impact is dubious. Selby merely ascertained
when, under Colorado law, assets are "accepted" by an estate. YetJudge Barrett's charac-
terization enables him to adopt the standards of Bosch which were derived from the legisla-
tive history underlying enactment of the marital deduction.
71. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
72. 726 F.2d at 646 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465).
73. S. REP. No. 1013, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1948).
74. Bosch, 387 U.S. at 464.
75. Id.
76. Id. Outside the arenas of the marital deduction and the administration of estates,
commentators have persuasively argued that the stricter examination of state court deci-
sions prescribed by Bosch needs to be distinguished when assessing deductibility of admin-
istrative expenses under 26 U.S.C. § 2053 (1982). Pursuant to section 2053(a)(2),
administration expenses are deductible if they are "allowable by the laws of the jurisdic-
tion . . . under which the estate is being administered." 26 U.S.C. § 2053(a)(2) (1982).
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terest as estate administration is purely a function of state probate law.
Unlike the federal interest underlying the marital deduction in Bosch, the
administration in Selby involved no specific federal interest. In the ab-
sence of such specific federal interest, federal-state comity necessitates
greater federal deference to state court decisions which construe and
apply state property laws.
The Tenth Circuit opinion, moreover, failed to acknowledge the
criticism leveled at the Bosch decision by focusing upon its parity with the
supporting doctrine of Erie Railroad.7 7 Erie is based largely on the prop-
osition that only the highest state court can make a final determination
of the state's common-law principles. 78 By contrast, any final state court
decision, in the absence of fraud or collusion, settles the property inter-
ests at issue in the case even if it has done so in a way later found to be at
variance with the law of the state. 79 In other words, Bosch failed to rec-
ognize that the Erie doctrine considers the controlling effect of local law,
not local adjudication.8"
In Selby, Judge Barrett reviewed Colorado law, finding that the as-
Thus, in the arena of an estate's administrative expenses, despite the specific federal inter-
est in providing a deduction for these expenses, Congress chose to defer to state court
determination. The critics cite the pronouncement in Bosch that:
We cannot say that the authors [of Section 2056(a)] intended that the decrees of
state trial courts were to be conclusive and binding on the computation of the
federal estate tax as levied by the Congress. If the Congress had intended state trial
court determinations to have that effect on the federal actions, it certainly would have said so--
which it did not do.
387 U.S. at 646 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d
479, 484 n. I (2d Cir.) (Mulligan, J., dissenting) (observing that in Bosch, there "was no act
of Congress. . . citing jurisdiction to the state [courts)"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975);
Comment, Estate of Smith-Deductibility of Administration Expenses Under the Internal Revenue
Code and Under the Treasury Regulations: Resolving the Conflict, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363,
377 (1975) (Bosch should not apply to section 2053(a) because the section "itself specifi-
cally makes its operation dependent upon state law.") Note, Current Problems Facing the
Executor Taking The Section 2053 Estate Tax Deduction, 30 VAND. L. REV. 795, 803, 804 (1977)
("[R]eliance [on Bosch] is misplaced . . . [tihe Court in Bosch was considering the marital
deduction under section 2056. In contrast, section 2053(a) does proclaim that state court
determinations are conclusive .. ") (emphasis in original); R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD
AND S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION 5.03(1), at 5-6 (5th ed. 1983) [herein-
after cited as R. STEPHENS] (all of the items listed in section 2053(a) pass final muster as
estate tax deductions only if they are "allowable" under applicable local law. There is no
federal law that purports to say whether they are allowable in the obvious sense of the
requirement. The question is whether state law permits the amount to be paid by the
executor out of estate assets. This is a classic example of express reference to local law for
a principle to be applied in the implementation of a federal statute.) (emphasis in original).
77. See, e.g., R. STEPHENS, supra note 76, 4.05(2)(b), at 4-93. Under Bosch, the Erie
doctrine is stretched to permit Federal reexamination of a state decision which has settled
the property rights as between the litigating parties.
78. Id. at 4-93 n. 11.
79. See, e.g., Brown and Hinckle, Tax Effects of Non-Tax Litigation-Bosch and Beyond, 27
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1415, 1421-23 (1969); Note, Taxation: The Role of State Trial
Decisions in Federal Tax Litigation, 21 OKLA. L. REV. 227, 229-30 (1968); Note, Bosch and the
Binding Effect of State Court Adjudication Upon Subsequent Federal Tax Litigation, 21 VAND. L.
REV. 825, 840-41 (1968); Note, Binding Effect of State CourtJudgment in Federal Tax Cases, 21
Sw. L.J. 540, 544-45 (1967).
80. R. STEPHENS, supra note 76, 5.03(1) at 5-6, n. 14; see also Estate of Carson v.
Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. 1434 (1974). Thus local adjudication of property interests
should be given effect.
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sets were properly accepted by the estate. He concluded there was no
erroneous distribution of property to the estate. Judge Barrett found no
Colorado authority that would allow reopening a closed estate merely to
reduce the amount of federal estate tax. He also found the probate
court action was neither irregularly made nor procured by fraud or mis-
take.8 1 Later the opinion asserted that "[t]o countenance the reopening
of estates on this basis, or other such self-serving purposes, would di-
minish the finality intended by estate closing procedures and place new
burdens on those responsible for assessing and collecting federal estate
taxes."
82
Facilitation of the assessment and collection of federal taxes, how-
ever, was not among the concerns of the Colorado legislature in enact-
ing its probate code. Assuming the probate court incorrectly applied
Colorado law, correction in the Colorado courts and not in the federal
courts is in keeping with the long-standing policy expressed in the Rules
of Decision Act8 3 and envisioned by Erie.
84
B. General Powers of Appointment
A taxpayer's power to invade the trust corpus generally will cause
the entire trust corpus to be included in the taxpayer's gross estate. 85 In
Estate of Sowell v. Commissioner,86 the Tenth Circuit addressed the ques-
tion of whether the power to invade the trust corpus "in case of emer-
gency or illness" precipitated inclusion of the entire trust corpus in the
taxpayer's estate.
The basic test for determining whether a power to invade a trust
rises to the status of a general power of appointment under section
2041(b) 87 is whether such a power is one that can be exercised by the
decedent for his or her own benefit. 88 In Sowell, Judge Doyle measured
the power of appointment by first questioning whether the standard of
invasion was ascertainable 89 and, second, by questioning whether the
standard was related to, or reasonably measurable in terms of, the dece-
dent's health, support or maintenance.9 0
The extent or terms of a decedent's ability to invade a trust depends
81. 726 F.2d at 648 (citing Williams v. Hankins, 82 Colo. 251, 258, 258 P. 1114, 1116
(1927)).
82. Selby, 726 F.2d at 648.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
84. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Federal interests would still be protected in state court adju-
dications by command of the Supremacy Clause that "the laws of the United States ...
shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S.
CONST., art. VI.
85. See 26 U.S.C. § 2041 (1982).
86. 708 F.2d 1564 (10th Cir. 1983).
87. 26 U.S.C. § 2041(b) (1982).
88. R. STEPHENS, supra note 76, 1 4.13(3) at 4-242.
89. 708 F.2d at 1566. The ascertainable standard requires that a standard be capable
of being interpreted and applied by a court of law. See generally Randall and Schmidt, The
Comforts of the Ascertainable Standard Exception, 59 TAXES 242 (1981).
90. See R. STEPHENS, supra note 76, 4.13(4)(a), 4-243.
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on state statutes and case law. 9 1 Judge Doyle examined state law for
guidelines in measuring whether the trust provision would be capable of
interpretation and application in a court of law, and found that the stan-
dard of invasion was ascertainable.
92
Once the powers the decedent enjoyed under state law have been
ascertained, the question of whether such powers constitute a general
power of appointment for estate tax purposes is a federal question.
9 3
The Internal Revenue Code provides that a power will not be treated as
a general power of appointment if the invasion power is related to the
decedent's health, education, support or maintenance.
94
Judge Doyle scrutinized the trust's appointment clause as it related
to the decedent's health, education and support. He found the tax court
erred in its underlying assumption that the word "emergency" was in-
herently broader in meaning than health, education and support.9 5 He
recognized that the fundamental circumstance of an emergency is need
and that the power to invade the trust only in emergency situations de-
nied the decedent unfettered command of the trust corpus. Satisfied
that the purposes of section 2041 were not being thwarted, Judge Doyle
held that, since such invasion would be tolerated only in times of need,
this power was sufficiently related to invasions on the basis of health,
education and support. 9 6
III. SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX: THE BELATED BELIEF CASE
As part of the Social Security Amendments of 1967, 9 7 Congress
changed the framework for the exemption of ministers from self-em-
ployment taxes. Prior to 1967, ordained ministers were automatically
excluded from Social Security coverage. 98 Since the adoption of the
amendments, ministers may still be exempt provided they meet the stat-
utory requirements of Internal Revenue Code section 1402(e).9 9
Section 1402(e)(l) allows an exemption from self-employment
taxes for compensation earned from services performed as a duly or-
dained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church. The duly or-
dained minister must file an application together with a statement that
he or she is conscientiously or religiously opposed to the acceptance of
91. Id. at 4-243.
92. 708 F.2d at 1567. "Certainly the New Mexico court could readily ascertain the
meaning of the governing words here." Cf. Rev. Rul. 76-502, 1976-2 C.B. 273.
93. R. STEPHENS, supra note 76, 4.13(3) at 4-243. Local characterization of the inva-
sion power is not controlling. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, as amended in denial of
rehg, 309 U.S. 626 (1940).
94. 26 U.S.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A) (1982).
95. 708 F.2d at 1566.
96. See 26 U.S.C. § 2041(b)(1)(B). In deliniating the abilities of the decedent to in-
vade the trust, Judge Doyle concluded "the term 'emergency' is a limiting word and would
not tolerate any excuse. Accordingly, mental depression requiring a trip around the world
would not be a proper occasion for invading the trust." Id. at 1567.
97. Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821 (1967) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
98. Ballinger v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 752, 756 n.2 (1982).
99. 26 U.S.C. § 1402(e) (1982).
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public insurance.1 00 Section 1402(e)(2) provides that the minister must
file the application not later than the due date of the tax return for the
second taxable year for which he or she has net earnings of $400 or
more, any part of which is derived from the performance of services as a
duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the
exercise of his or her ministry.' 0 1
In Ballinger v. Commissioner,10 2 a minister was issued a certificate of
ordination by the First Missionary Baptist Church of St. Louis, Missouri
in 1969. While pursuing his duties as a minister of this church he did not
oppose the acceptance of public insurance and never sought exemption
from self-employment taxes. In September, 1973, he became an
unordained minister of the Maranatha Church in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma. As a result of "evolving beliefs"' 1 3 he became opposed to
the acceptance of public insurance. On May 2, 1978, he was formally
issued a certificate of ordination by the Maranatha Church and in July of
1978, filed an application for exemption. After an initial approval, the
IRS revoked his exemption.
In an opinion by Judge McKay, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the IRS
revocation. Judge McKay found no statutory exemption for a minister
who belatedly acquires a belief which opposes public insurance.' 0 4 The
court found that Ballinger's informal assumption of ministerial duties
satisfied the statutory requirement that the individual seeking the ex-
emption be a duly ordained, commissioned or licensed minister. Judge
McKay found the two-year statutory time period was triggered by the
assumption of ministerial duties and functions. Thus, Ballinger's subse-
quent ordination was irrelevant as the two-year period had already
lapsed. ' 0 5
By this construction the court rewrote the statute. Section
1402(e)(1) establishes the exemption and Section 1402(e)(2) sets forth
the time for filing the exemption application. But the court's analysis
combines the two subsections, leaving a messy melange which fails to
implement fully the directives of each subsection.
Section 1402(e)(1) provides an exemption for individuals duly or-
dained, commissioned or licensed as a minister of a church. Ballinger,
however, indicates that a formal ordination is not required. Merely as-
suming ministerial duties satisfies the congressional prescription. 
1
06
100. Id. § 1402(e)(1).
101. Id. § 1402(e)(2).
102. 728 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir. 1984).
103. Id. at 1289; 78 T.C. at 755.
104. 728 F.2d at 1290.
105. Id.
106. The court's adoption of its quasi-ordination test violates a basic maxim of statu-
tory construction that "in construing a statute, the court is obliged to give effect, if possi-
ble, to every word Congress used." Reiter v. Sontone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).
See also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739-40 (1978) ("Normally, a statute must if
reasonably possible, be construed in a way that will give force and effect to each of its
provisions rather than render some of them meaningless."); Allen Oil Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 614 F.2d 336, 339 (2d Cir. 1980); FTC v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., 515 F.2d
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Hence, Ballinger had two years from the informal assumption of duties
at the second church to file for the exemption. Section 1402(e)(1) also
requires the applicant to include a statement that he or she is either
conscientiously or religiously opposed to the acceptance of public insur-
ance. Ballinger did not acquire his religiously based opposition to pub-
lic insurance until 1977,107 four years after he assumed the functions of
a minister at his new church. Under the court's interpretation, Ballinger
could never qualify for the section 1402 exemption because he lacked a
condition precedent for exemption (opposition, conscientiously or relig-
iously based) which he did not develop until after the statutory period
had lapsed.
As a result of the court's decision, "evolving beliefs" resulting in
opposition to public insurance will be given effect only if the change
occurs within a two-year period after the assumption of ministerial du-
ties, regardless of when formal ordination occurs. 10 8
IV. RAILROAD PROPERTY TAx
In 1976 Congress, in an attempt to restore the economic well-being
of the nation's railroads, passed the Railroad Revitalization and Regula-
tory Reform Act of 1976.109 One of the goals of this Act was "to elimi-
nate the long-standing burden on interstate commerce resulting from
discriminatory state and local taxation of common and contract carrier
transportation property."" 0 Section 306 of the Act prohibits both de
facto and dejure discrimination in the assessment, levying and collection
of taxes on rail property." 'I During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit
heard two cases which presented difficult questions concerning burdens
of proof, the proper role of the federal courts, and the prima facie show-
ing necessary in suits brought under the anti-discriminatory provisions
of section 306.
Under section 306(2)(c) a railroad can obtain relief when the assess-
ment ratio for railroad property exceeds by five percent the assessment
ratio of commercial and industrial property in the same assessment ju-
risdiction.' 12 Pursuant to Kansas law, property subject to tax is assessed
988, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Blasius, 397 F.2d 203, 207 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
granted 393 U.S. 950, cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 1008 (1969).
107. 728 F.2d at 1289.
108. Spiritual growth and change. however, will be griven effect upon assumption of
duties and functions at a new church.
109. Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31, 54 (section 306 of the Act was first codified at 49
U.S.C. § 26c (1982)). Later the language of section 306 was changed and the section was
recodified as part of the Revised Interstate Commerce Act of 1978 (also known as the 4R
Act), Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337 (1978) placing section 306 at 49 U.S.C. § 11503
(1982).
110. S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969). Congress used the commerce
clause to effectuate the policy. Congress found that discriminatory taxing of rail property
"constitute[s] an unreasonable and unjust discrimination against, and an undue burden on
interstate commerce." See Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 527 F. Supp. 784, 785 (E.D.N.C.
1981), ajtd on other grounds, 700 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1983).
11I. See Clinchfield, 527 F. Supp. at 785.
112. 732 F.2d at 1500.
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at thirty percent of its fair market value.' 13 In Atchison, Topeka, and Santa
Fe Railway v. Lennen, 114 the Tenth Circuit determined whether sufficient
evidence had been presented by the railroad to prove the assessment
ratio for commercial and industrial property in the Kansas
jurisdiction. 115
The railroads computed the assessed value of their rail property by
taking thirty percent of its true market value as determined by the Kan-
sas director of property valuation. 1 6 Similarly, the railroads introduced
the Kansas Real Estate Assessment/Sales Ratio for 1980 to prove the
ratio of the assessed value to the true market value for commercial and
industrial properties. Apparently, the railroads took cognizance of sub-
section 306(2)(e) of the Act which tacitly expresses a preference for es-
tablishing this assessment ratio by means of a sales assessment ratio
study."i 7 The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Logan, found that the district
court erroneously permitted the railroads to prove the assessment ratio
for commercial and industrial property by means of a sales assessment
study based upon real estate only."i 8 The court noted the Act's explicit
reference to personal property in its definition of commercial and indus-
trial property on which the sales assessment ratio study would be
based." 9 The railroads offered no evidence as to the assessment ratio
of personal property. Despite the railroad's contention that such could
not be performed, Judge Logan held that the statute mandated at least a
showing that such a study would be prohibitively expensive.'
20
In Burlington Northern Railroad v. Lennen,12 1 the court, again per
Judge Logan, defined the proper role of federal courts in section 306
actions and delineated the showing of overvaluation which is necessary
to maintain a suit under section 306. In Burlington, various railroads
sought an injunction against the Kansas taxing authorities to prohibit
them from applying discriminatory assessments. The railroads alleged a
form of defacto discrimination whereby the state authorities taxed both
113. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-1439 (1977), amended by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-1439 (Cum.
Supp. 1983 Vol. 6A).
114. 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1984).
115. Id. at 1501.
116. Id. at 1499.
117. Subsection 306(2)(e) provides in part: "[Iln the event that the ratio of the as-
sessed value of all other commercial and industrial property in the assessment jurisdiction
to the true market value of all such other commercial and industrial property cannot be
established through the random sampling method known as a sales assessment ratio study
... to the satisfaction of the court .
118. 732 F.2d at 1503.
119. Id. at 1501.
120. Id. at 1504. Upon a showing that a sales assessment ratio study for personal prop-
erty would be prohibitively expensive,Judge Logan indicated that proof by appraisal stud-
ies or expert testimony may be permitted. Id.
121. 715 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2690 (1984). Burlington
Northern was cited in Atchinson for the proposition that, in the absence of a strong showing
of purposeful overvaluation with discriminatory intent, Congress did not intend for fed-
eral courts to become involved in the challenges of a state official's determination of true
market value. Atchinson, 732 F.2d at 1500 n.5.
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rail and commercial property at the same rate but assessed the rail prop-
erty at a value higher than its true market value.
Judge Logan determined that section 306 was not intended to pro-
tect rail carriers from every form of defacto discrimination. In particular,
he found the discrimination alleged, termed valuation discrimination, to
be outside the range of reprehensible discrimination which the federal
courts have the power to remedy.12 2 Additionally, in recognition of the
coercive burdens federal courts place on the states by enjoining their tax
collection process, Judge Logan placed a higher burden on railroads
seeking relief under section 306. A prima facie case therefore will be
recognized only when the plaintiff makes a strong showing of purposeful
overvaluation of rail property with discriminatory intent.
12 3
These cases serve to remove the Tenth Circuit from the orbit of
other circuit and district courts which have considered section 306 dis-
crimination suits. By requiring the assessment ratio study to be derived
from both real and personal property, Atchison diametrically opposes the
Fourth Circuit's Clinchfield Railroad 124 rationale. The district court in
Clinchfield construed section 306(2)(e) as firmly establishing that a prop-
erly conducted sales assessment ratio study serves as a benchmark for
assessing discrimination and federal relief, provided the study is ac-
cepted as satisfactory proof by the adjudicating court. 125 Furthermore,
Atchison rejects legislative history showing that Congress understood
sales assessment ratio surveys to be studies of real property. 126 Instead,
Judge Logan endorsed the statements of an expert who testified before a
Senate subcommittee that sales assessment ratio surveys could be under-
taken for certain kinds of personal property. 127 It was this testimony
that enabled judge Logan to find, in the face of evidence to the contrary,
that Congress intended a sales assessment ratio study for both real and
personal property. 1
2 8
122. 715 F.2d at 497. A form of defacto discrimination which has been recognized as
falling within the anti-discriminatory net is the imposition of the same rate of tax on both
classes of property, but applying that rate to a property value below the true market value
of commercial property while applying the rate to the true market value of rail property.
Defacto discrimination should be distinguished from dejure discrimination. Dejure is
found when taxing authorities impose a higher percentage rate on rail than on commercial
property. See id.
123. Id. at 498.
124. Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 700 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1983).
125. Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 527 F. Supp. 784, 787 (E.D.N.C. 1981), afd on other
grounds, 700 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1983). (The Fourth Circuit did not approve of strict reli-
ance on sales assessment ratio studies of real estate alone, opining that personal property
should be considered. The Fourth Circuit fell far short of endorsing sales assessment ratio
studies for personal property).
126. 732 F.2d at 1502.
127. Id. See State Tax Discrimination Against Interstate Carrier Property: Hearing on S. 2289
Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 63 (1969) (Statement of Rolf Weil, President, Roosevelt Univ.).
128. See National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. CAB, 618 F.2d 819, 828
(D.C. Cir. 1980):
Courts in the past have been able to rely on legislative history for important in-
sights into congressional intent. Without implying that this is no longer the case,
we note that interest groups who fail to persuade a majorily ofCongress to accept
particular statutory language often are able to have inseried, in the legislative
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It is the Burlington Northern opinion that places the Tenth Circuit far
outside the purview of mainstream 306 construction. The Eighth Cir-
cuit, in Ogilvie v. State Board of Equalization,12 9 stated that the purpose of
section 306 is to prevent tax discrimination against railroads "in any
form whatsoever."' 130 Yet, in Burlington Northern, the Tenth Circuit bi-
furcated de facto discrimination into protected and unprotected
classes.' 3 ' By recognizing that the statute fails to prescribe a proper
method for valuing rail property, the Tenth Circuit excuses the discrimi-
natory tactics of overvaluating rail property as unprotected.
Burlington Northern is anomalous in another facet. Despite the ex-
press exception in section 306(2) to the Tax Injunction Act, 132 Judge
Logan found that Congress never intended for the courts to sidestep the
general noninterference rule of the Tax Injunction Act. 133 This view is
directly opposite the Eleventh Circuit's perception of the availability of a
federal forum for section 306 discrimination suits. In Southern Railway v.
State Board of Equalization,134 the Eleventh Circuit recognized a section
306 exception "not only to the Tax Injunction Act, but also to the un-
derlying doctrine of equitable restraint in the narrow area of discrimina-
tory taxation of railroads."' 13 5  Viewing Congress as acting
unconditionally to ensure federal forums, the Eleventh Circuit found
section 306 to go beyond exemption from the Tax Injunction Act and all
its forms and prohibit "Burford abstention" 136 in cases of either dejure or
defacto discrimination against railroads.137 The Eleventh Circuit's posi-
tion was buttressed by the Supreme Court's mandate in Patsy v. Board of
history of the statute, statements favorable to their position, in the hope that they
can persuade a court to construe the statutory language in light of these state-
ments. This development underscores the importance of following unambiguous
statutory language absent clear contrary evidence of legislative intent.
129. 657 F.2d 204 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981).
130. Id. at 210.
131. 715 F.2d at 497.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). The Tax Injunction Act provides that: "[T]he district
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax
under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
such State."
133. 715 F.2d at 498.
134. 715 F.2d 522 (1lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1593 (1984).
135. Id. at 529.
136. As recognized by the Southern Ry. court, Burford abstention is generally invoked
where the "exercise of federal review of the [state law] question in a case or similar cases
would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter
of substantial public concern." Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (from which Burford
abstention derives its name); see also BT Inv. Managers, Inc. v. Lewis, 559 F.2d 950, 954-55
(5th Cir. 1977).
Burford abstention is separate from two other forms of abstention. Pullman abstention
may be appropriate in order to avoid unnecessary friction in federal-state relations by ab-
staining on federal constitutional questions which "depend upon, or may be altered by,
the determination of an uncertain issue of state law." Southern Ry., 715 F.2d at 527 n. 10
(quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965) (citing Railroad Comm'n v. Pull-
man Co., 213 U.S. 496 (1942)). In Younger abstention, the federal courts withhold their
intervention in state criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971).
137. 715 F.2d at 527.
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Regents' s 8 that "[a] court should not defer the exercise of its jurisdiction
under a Federal'statute unless it is consistent with [the statute's] in-
tent." 13 9  Federal courts, therefore, should be required to evaluate
whether a state has assessed rail property at a value higher than its true
value. In the Tenth Circuit, however, a federal forum is not available for
railroads alleging that a state has discriminated against it by overasses-
sing the fair value of its rail property.
Finally, both Atchison and Burlington Northern are inconsistent as to
section 306 construction. Atchison stated that a railroad "may easily de-
termine the true market value of its railroad property."' 40 Burlington
Northern found "complex problems associated with the valuation of rail
property."' 4 ' This alleged complexity lead the Burlington Northern court
to find certain state discriminatory tactics unreviewable. The two cases
are also unreconcilable when assessing the burden of proof necessary to
make a prima facie showing under section 306. Atchison adopted the sec-
tion 306(2)(c) provision which provides relief when the assessment ratio
for railroad property exceeds the assessment ratio for other commercial
and industrial property by five percent.14 2 Conversely, under Burlington
Northern, a prima facie case exists whenever a railroad can make a strong




138. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
139. Id. at 501-02.
140. 732 F.2d at 1500.
141. 715 F.2d at 497.
142. 732 F.2d at 1500.
143. 715 F.2d at 498.
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WHITE V. UNITED STATES: TENTH CIRCUIT ALLOWS PARENTS
"CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION" DEDUCTION FOR
SUPPORT PAYMENTS MADE DIRECTLY TO
MORMON MISSIONARY SON
INTRODUCTION
In May of 1981, the United States District Court for the District of
Utah held' that amounts paid by taxpayers directly to a travel agent and
their son for support during his period of Mormon missionary service
were not deductible as charitable contributions. 2 The Tenth Circuit re-
versed, holding that such payments constituted contributions "for the
use of' the Church within the meaning of the statute.3 This holding
contradicts many general charitable contribution principles. Moreover,
the holding directly conflicts with a recent Tax Court ruling that disal-
lowed a charitable deduction under indistinguishable facts.
4
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs, Don and Alice White, were members of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormon Church) when this action
was filed. It is the policy of the Mormon Church to have all young men
fulfill a two year mission beginning at about age nineteen. The primary
function of the missionary is to contact people and teach the doctrines
of the Church. For a two year period, the missionaries perform this
function full-time, six and one-half days a week.
To pay the expenses of each missionary, the Mormon Church re-
I. White v. United States, 514 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Utah 1981), rev'd, 725 F.2d 1269
(10th Cir. 1984) (Logan, J., writing for the Tenth Circuit).
2. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Allowance of Deduction.
(1) General rule. There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable
contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made
within the taxable year. A charitable contribution shall be allowable as a
deduction only if verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary.
(c) Charitable contribution defined. For the purpose of this section, the
term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use
of ....(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes ....
3. White v. United States, 725 F.2d 1269, 1270 (10th Cir. 1984).
4. Brinley v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 734 (1983) (Brinley 1). In Brinley I, the
plaintiff was not represented by counsel. After the White decision, the Brinleys retained
the services of the same counsel that represented the Whites. The Brinleys filed a motion
to reconsider in light of the new White decision. The Tax Court granted the Brinley's
motion, but affirmed the Brinley I opinion, and disallowed any deduction. Brinley v. Com-
missioner, 82 T.C. 932 (1984) (Brinley II). The Tax Court held that the Brinleys should
not be allowed to take a deduction as unreimbursed expenses, and that the Mormon
Church did not manifest enough control over funds because the Brinleys transferred the
money directly to the son and travel agent.
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quests direct support from the parents of each missionary in an amount
it determines necessary to meet minimal living expenses. 5 Contribu-
tions in excess of this amount are regarded as personal gifts to the
missionaries.
6
In 1978, plaintiffs' son, Lyle White, was chosen to be a missionary.
The Whites sent $100 to Murdock Travel, Inc. to defray part of their
son's transportation expenses incurred during travel to his missionary
post. They also sent approximately $175 per month directly to Lyle to
help pay expenses for food, housing, transportation, proselytizing
materials, 7 recreation and personal expenses. Between November 16,
1978, and December 19, 1978, plaintiffs deposited $560 directly into
Lyle's personal checking account. Lyle was the sole authorized signator
on the account.
On April 15, 1979, the Whites filed a joint income tax return for
1978. They claimed no deduction for monies paid to Murdock Travel or
deposited in Lyle's account. 8 On September 21, 1979, plaintiffs filed an
amended return claiming a $795 charitable contribution deduction to
the Mormon Church. 9 The Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) denied the
claimed deduction by notice of disallowance. The Whites sued for a re-
fund in federal district court.
The District Court of Utah ruled in favor of the I.R.S.. The district
court held that the Whites' method of direct contribution to an unquali-
fied recipient precluded the Church from having full control of the
funds and thus the opportunity to channel them to other objects.' 0
Plaintiffs appealed the decision.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows a deduc-
tion from adjusted gross income for charitable contributions.'1 The
first such provision for a charitable contribution deduction appeared in
the War Revenue Act of 1917.12 Since its inception, the charitable con-
tribution provision has been the subject of much controversy, stimulat-
ing increased statutory qualification. 13 From two sentences in the
original legislation, the provision has been transformed into a complex
5. White, 725 F.2d at 1270.
6. Id. at 1270.
7. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (2d College ed. 1980) defines "proselytize"
as an attempt to convert a person to one's religion.
8. White, 514 F. Supp. at 1061.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1982). See supra note 2.
12. War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1201, 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
13. See generally Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV.
309, 344-75 (1972); Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28
TAx L. REV. 37 (1972); Dye, Personal Charitable Contributions: Tax Effects and Other Motives, 70
PROC. NAT'L TAx A. 311 (1977); McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contribu-
tions: A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAx L. REV. 377 (1972); Stane, Federal Tax






In its present form, section 170(a) allows a deduction for any chari-
table contributions made within the taxable year. "Charitable contribu-
tion" is defined in section 170(c) as "a contribution or gift to or for the
use of" various charitable organizations.1 5 Many eligible organizations
are also exempted from taxation under section 501(a). 16 However, not
every payment to an organization that qualifies as a charity is a charita-
ble contribution. 17 To qualify, the donation must be:
1) a "contribution or gift";'
8
2) "to or for the use of" a qualified donee.
In order to fully understand the significance of the White decision, each
of these criteria must be examined in greater detail.
A. Contribution or Gift
No definition of "contribution or gift" is contained in section 170.
Courts have fashioned a definition based on an examination of both the
common-law meaning of "gift" and their perception of congressional
motives for granting the charitable contribution deduction.19 In accord-
ance with common-law principles, there must be a bona fide intent on
the part of the donor to make a gift. Additionally, the donor must not
receive any consideration in return, other than personal satisfaction
from the act of generosity.
20
Historically, there has been some confusion among the courts about
what type of donative intent is necessary to effect a deductible contribu-
tion. The confusion has resulted from the different focus of various
courts. Some courts have looked to the subjective intent of the tax-
payer, while others have examined the objective value of the benefits
received by the taxpayer for making the gift. 2 ' To compound the confu-
sion, many courts have accepted one of these analyses in theory, yet
have applied another in their rulings.
2 2
The courts of appeals and the Court of Claims have developed
three methods of analysis in determining the intent of a taxpayer in mak-
ing a contribution. 2 3 First, the subjective method was adopted by the
14. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION ON INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFTS 35.1.1 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as BITrKER].
15. 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (1982).
16. 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982). See organizations listed at 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1982).
17. Seed v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 265 (1971).
18. Most courts have held that the terms "contribution" and "gift" are synonymous.
See generally Hobbet, Charitable Contributions-How Charitable Must They Be?, 11 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1-2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hobbet].
19. Colliton, The Meaning of "Contribution or Gift"for Charitable Contribution Deduction
Purposes, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 973, 975 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Colliton].
20. Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 1977). See infra note 82.
21. Hobbet, supra note 18, at 2.
22. Colliton, supra note 19, at 988-89. For a more detailed explanation of this prob-
lem, see Hobbet, supra note 18; Colliton, supra note 19; and Note, Deductions For Charitable
Contributions-An Objective Test, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 349 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SUFFOLK].
23. Colliton, supra note 19, at 990-91.
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Ninth Circuit in Dejong v. Commissioner.24 In Dejong, the court reviewed
payments to a religious school attended by the taxpayer's children. The
organization which ran the school, the Society for Christian Instruction,
charged no tuition. It did, however, furnish the parents with an estimate
of the costs of educating the children and requested the parents to con-
tribute as much as possible. 25 Finding no helpful decisions interpreting
the terms "charitable contribution or gift" as used in section 170, the
Ninth Circuit adopted the test 26 used by the Supreme Court in Commis-
sioner v. Duberstein.27 In Duberstein, the Supreme Court stated the famous
"detached and disinterested generosity" test. The Court held that "if
the payment proceeds primarily from 'the constraining force of any
moral or legal duty,' or from 'the incentive of anticipated benefit' of an
economic nature . ..it is not a gift. . . . A gift in the statutory sense,
on the other hand, proceeds from a 'detached and disinterested
generosity .... , "28
After quoting extensively from Duberstein, the Dejong court adopted
this subjective test for purposes of section 170 analysis. 29 Based on this
reasoning, the court disallowed as a personal expense the portion of the
contribution which reflected the cost of the children's education.3 0 The
Dejong reasoning and test has been followed by the Second 3 l and
Tenth3 2 Circuits.
Second, the objective method of determining donor intent was best
outlined by the First Circuit in Oppewal v. Commissioner.3 3 The Oppewal
court followed an earlier case, Crosby Valve and Gage Co. v. Commissioner,
34
which had rejected the subjective test in Duberstein. The Crosby court rea-
soned that the "disinterested generosity" test would cause "an impor-
tant area of tax law [to] become a mare's nest of uncertaintly woven of
judicial judgments irrelevant to eleemosynary reality."
'3 5
In reviewing facts nearly identical to Dejong, the First Circuit stated
the "fundamental objective" test by way of an awkwardly phrased ques-
tion: "[H]owever the payment was designated, whatever motives the
taxpayers had in making it, was it, to any substantial extent, offset by the
24. 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
25. Id. at 374-75. This methodology is somewhat similar to the method employed by
the Mormon Church in White. See White, 725 F.2d at 1270.
26. DeJong, 309 F.2d at 376-79.
27. 363 U.S. 278 (1960). The Duberstein decision involved the construction of the
term "gift" relative to the § 102(b) exclusion of gifts from gross income.
28. Id. at 285-86. (citations omitted) (quoting Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S.
34, 41 (1937) and Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)).
29. DeJong, 309 F.2d at 379.
30. Id.
31. Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972). In considering facts iden-
tical to Dejong, the court disallowed the entire amount paid into an educational fund of the
school attended by the taxpayer's children. The court found that the payment for tuition
was a nondeductible personal expense of tuition. Id. at 781.
32. Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1977).
33. 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972), aft'gJacob Oppewal v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1177 (1971).




cost of services rendered to taxpayers in the nature of tuition?" 36 Utiliz-
ing this test, the First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court ruling which disal-
lowed a portion of the money paid to the Society for Christian
Instruction for tuition. 3 7 The objective test has also been adopted by
the Seventh Circuit.
3 8
A third test was enunciated by the United States Court of Claims in
Singer Co. v. United States.39 Singer, a manufacturer and distributor of
sewing machines, sold machines at a forty-five percent discount to vari-
ous charitable organizations. Singer then claimed a charitable contribu-
tion deduction in the total amount of such discounts. The Court of
Claims rejected the subjective test of Duberstein and instead applied what
could be viewed as a "hybrid objective-subjective analysis."'40 The court
noted that in many cases "[i]f the transfer was made with the expectation
of receiving something in return as a quid pro quo for the transfer then in
such an instance the I.R.C. section 170 deduction [must be denied].
4 1
The Court of Claims found that Singer's predominant reason for grant-
ing discounts was the expected economic return in the nature of future
increased sales. 4 2 Thus the court concluded that the discounts were of a
business nature and were not charitable.
4 3
B. To Or For The Use Of
A second qualifying criteria for a charitable contribution focuses
upon whether the contribution was made either "to or for the use of"
charitable organizations. 4 4 In determining whether a gift has been
made "to" a charitable organization, courts generally have required that
there be an actual payment to a qualified donee 4 5 or his agent and that
the donor relinquish full control of such payment. Contributions to in-
dividuals, as opposed to organizations, are not within the ambit of sec-
tion 170(c). 4 6 The Supreme Court, reviewing a trust for charitable
public purposes, stated in Russell v. Allen 4 7 that charitable gifts must be
for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons. The element of in-
36. 368 F.2d at 1002. See SUFFOLK, supra note 22, at 349-50.
37. Jacob Oppewal v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1177 (1971), affid, 468 F.2d
1000 (lst Cir. 1972).
38. Sedam v. United States, 518 F.2d 242, 245 (7th Cir. 1975).
39. 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
40. Hobbet, supra note 18, at 6.
41. 449 F.2d at 422. The court stated its test:
It is our opinion that if the benefits received, or expected to be received, are...
greater than those that inure to the general public from transfers for charitable
purposes . . . then in such case we feel the transferor has received, or expects to
receive, a quid pro quo sufficient to remove the transfer from the realm of deduct-
ibility under section 170.
Id.
42. Id. at 424.
43. Id. at 423.
44. 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (1982). See supra note 2.
45. Mayo v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 505 (1971); Peace v. Commissioner, 43
T.C. 1 (1964).
46. Mayo, 30 T.C. at 507.
47. 107 U.S. 163 (1882).
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definiteness is one of the essential characteristics of a legal charity. 48
This test sheds light on a taxpayer's donative intent. When the do-
nor relinquishes all control of a gift by giving it to an organization to
direct its distribution, it becomes clear that the gift was intended for use
in a manner consistent with the charity's purpose and direction and not
that of the donor. Charity has been held to begin where the certainty in
the beneficiary ends. 49 Whenever a beneficiary is designated by name,
and his merit alone is to be considered, the bequest becomes private and
not public. The gift thus loses the essential element of indefiniteness. 50
Hence, donations "to" a qualified charity are not deductible if the donor
retains some measure of control over the gift. By designating a specific
individual as beneficiary, the deductible nature of the contribution is de-
stroyed, no matter how worthy the individual.
5 1
Contributions to charitable organizations also qualify if made "for
the use of" the organization. 52 Included are payments made by taxpay-
ers that further the organization's charitable activities, even when not
made directly to the organization, for example: unreimbursed expenses
incurred by volunteer workers. 53 These expenses are allowed as chari-
table deductions because the charity is directing the taxpayer in the ren-
dition of services, and the expenses are incidental to the performance by
the taxpayer of such charitable services.
Against this legal background, the Tenth Circuit allowed taxpayers
to deduct payments to their son when such payments were used for the
son's support and living expenses during a religious mission.
III. THE CASE
A. The Trial Court Decision
In the action for an income tax refund, the parties filed cross-mo-
tions for summary judgment. 54 In considering these motions, the dis-
trict court outlined the questions presented as whether: (1) monies paid
to a church-designated travel agent to defray their son's travel expenses,
and (2) monies paid directly to the son for support during the period of
missionary service were charitable contributions within the meaning of
section 170 of the Code, and hence deductible from adjusted gross
48. Id. at 167. For a detailed discussion of the public policy limitations on the availa-
bility of the federal charitable tax exemption, see Thompson, Public Policy Limitations on the
Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations, 2 TAx L.J. 1 (1984).
49. Thomason v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 441, 443 (1943) (citing Russell v. Allen, 107
U.S. 163 (1882)).
50. Davenport v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1585, 1587 (1975); Thomason v.
Commissioner, 2 T.C. 441, 443-44 (1943).
51. Teitell, Earmarked Charitable Gifts, 117 TR. & EST. 439, 442 (1978).
52. The "for the use of" language was adopted by Congress to overrule a Treasury
Department decision, O.D. 669, 3 C.B. 187 (1920), which held that contributions in trust
for a charity were not deductible. Rev. Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a)(1 1), 42 Stat. 227,
241 (1921).
53. BITKER, supra note 14, at 35.12.




The district court granted the government's motion for summary
judgment holding that the contributions made by the Whites were not
deductible. 5 6 Central to this holding was the finding that the contribu-
tions were made to someone other than a qualified recipient. The dis-
trict court further stated that the Whites' reserved control over the gift
made it a private, not public, gift.
5 7
Recognizing that contributions may be deductible if received and
disbursed by an authorized agent of a qualified recipient, 58 the district
court held that because the funds were used solely for the support of
that agent, the gift lacked the required element of indefiniteness. 59 Be-
cause the donation lacked the required generality and indefiniteness, the
court held that the Whites had prevented the Church from exercising
control over the funds. 60
The district court then stated three public policy reasons for adher-
ing to the plain meaning of the statute:
First, qualified charitable institutions are limited by Congress to
a particular class of institutions, the activities of which are spe-
cifically limited and are thought to be of benefit to society in
general. . . . Second, a limited number of pre-qualified charita-
ble recipients are easier for the sovereign to monitor ....
Third, adherence provides assurance to the favored institutions
and, equally important, to the public that the opportunity for
abuse in the receipt and use of funds by persons who need not
account to the institutions for their receipt and disbursement is
minimized.
6 '
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the
case for further proceedings. 6 2 The court began its opinion by stating
that the holding did not depend on whether the Whites' contribution
was "to" the charity or "for the use of" the charity. 63 The court was
convinced from the outset that amounts contributed were at least "to
the use of" the Church within the meaning of section 170.
6 4
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1061-62.
57. Id. at 1061.
58. Id. at 1060 (citing Thomason v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 441, 444 (1943)).
59. White, 514 F. Supp. at 1060-61.
60. Id. at 1061.
61. Id.
62. White, 725 F.2d at 1272.
63. Id. at 1270. Presumably, the reason for making this statement was that under
prior tax law, contributions "to" a charity were eligible for an extra 10% deduction over
those "for the use of' a charity. See Rockefeller v. Commissioner, 676 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.
1982) where the Second Circuit held, in considering percentage deduction limitations,
that unreimbursed expenses were considered within the ambit of the extra 10%
deduction.
64. 725 F.2d at 1270. In choosing the words "to the use or' the court seems to have
misquoted the statute which reads "to or for the use of." See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (1982).
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Citing Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-l (g),6 5 the court stated
that the government's test of full fund control by the Church should not
apply to unreimbursed expenses of the taxpayer in performing services
for a qualified charity. 66 Instead, the court stated that the proper con-
sideration should focus on the donor's intent. 6 7 The court then stated
the controlling test as "whether the primary purpose of the expenditure
was to further the aims of the charitable organization or to benefit the
spender."'68 Applying this test, the court followed a Tax Court case 69
which had allowed a missionary to deduct his travel and living expenses
while away from home.
The court then identified the main issue of the case as whether tax-
payers may deduct the personal expenses incurred by their dependent
son but paid with their money. 70 Acknowledging Brinley,7 1 a case with
facts very similar to the case at bar, and I.R.S. Revenue Rulings72 which
would deny the deduction on the ground that it was a gift to the son, the
court ruled that the payments were deductible. 73 The Tenth Circuit
reasoned that there was no rational basis for distinguishing the payment
of expenses of a dependent son from the payment of a taxpayer's own
expenses in performing the same services.
74
Analogizing the facts as similar to a situation of parents supporting
their child, the I.R.S. had argued that such expenses were more personal
than charitable in nature and were thus non-deductible under section
262. 75 The court rejected this argument, stating that if "section 262
barred a deduction for expenditures made on behalf of a dependent
child, it would also bar a deduction for living expenses incurred by a
taxpayer while performing missionary services." 7 6 These expenses, the
court noted, were expressly allowed under Treasury Regulation section
1.262-1(b)(5) and Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-1(g).
77
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (1983) states as follows:
[U]nreimbursed expenditures made incident to the rendition of services to an
organization, contributions to which are deductible, may constitute a deductible
contribution. . . . [O]ut-of-pocket transportation expenses necessarily incurred
in performing donated services are deductible. Reasonable expenditures for
meals and lodging necessarily incurred while away from home in the course of
performing donated services also are deductible ....
66. White, 725 F.2d at 1271.
67. Id.
68. Id. Later in the decision, the court rephrased the test to be "whether the primary
purpose is to further the aims of the charitable organization or to benefit the person whose
expenses are being paid." Id. at 1272 (emphasis added). The reason for this change was not
given.
69. Smith v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 988 (1973).
70. 725 F.2d at 1271.
71. 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 734 (1983). See supra note 4.
72. Rev. Rul. 62-113, 1962-2 C.B. 10. This ruling disallows such a charitable contri-
bution as in the present case where the gifts were earmarked and not made to a general
fund or common pool.
73. 725 F.2d at 1271.
74. Id.
75. Brief for Appellee at 6.
76. White, 725 F.2d at 1271.
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.262(b)(5) (1983) provides that personal expenses "which include
transportation expenses, meals, and lodging" are deductible by the taxpayer "if incurred
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The court went on to distinguish cases denying deductions when
the donors earmarked a contribution to a person or defrayed expenses
of a person who would otherwise be dependent upon the charity. The
court stated that such payments "served the charity only by eliminating
the need of one possible object of the organization's bounty."' 78 Per-
sons receiving such contributions were not serving the charity, as was
Lyle, but rather were beneficiaries of a service provided by the charity.79
The White opinion concluded by reiterating the primary purpose
test.80 Without mentioning the district court's rule or reason, the court
held that the expenditures were deductible because the money primarily
served the Church. 8 1
IV. ANALYSIS
The holding in White is flawed in that it extends beyond the well-
settled parameters defining charitable contributions. In light of estab-
lished authority, the Whites, in making a direct payment to their son,
received a benefit greater than the act of generosity or the benefit flow-
ing to the public; hence, the deduction should have been denied. The
claimed deduction should also have failed as a private gift; it was not
made to a qualified donee and was earmarked for one specific
individual82
A. A Contribution or Gift
In Dowell v. United States,8 3 the Tenth Circuit adopted the subjective
donative intent test of Duberstein.84 A gift must proceed from disinter-
ested generosity; it must be a voluntary transfer without consideration
other than the personal satisfaction of having performed an act of gener-
osity.85 In reviewing opinions which disallowed deductions, the Dowell
court approved decisions that disallowed any deductions because of
legal or moral obligations. The taxpayers were found to have expected
or anticipated a benefit in making a gift of this sort.
86
in traveling away from home" under conditions specified in subsection (g) of Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-1 (1983). See supra note 65 for contents ofTreas. Reg. § 1.70A-1.
78. 725 F.2d at 1271.
79. Id. at 1271-72.
80. Id. at 1272. See also supra note 68.
81. 725 F.2d at 1272.
82. The Tenth Circuit also erred by not deferring to the district court's interpretation
of the facts and conclusions of law as mandated by Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233
(10th Cir. 1977). The Dowell court also held that interpretation of intent or motive is re-
served for the finder of fact and is not to be disturbed on appeal unless held to be clearly
erroneous. 553 F.2d at 1235, 1238 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)). The Dejong court also
suggested that appellate review of determination of gifts must be restrictive and must
stand unless clearly erroneous. 309 F.2d at 376. No such finding was made in the White
reversal.
83. 553 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1977).
84. Id. at 1238. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text for an explanation of
the subjective test.
85. 553 F.2d at 1238.
86. Id. at 1239.
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The parent-child relationship clearly creates at least a moral obliga-
tion to provide for a child's living expenses. The existence of a parent-
child relationship has been the basis for disallowing deductions for sup-
port in adoption cases8
7 as well as school tuition cases.
8 8
In McMillan v. Commissioner,89 the taxpayers claimed that one-half of
a $150 "adoption fee" was charitable and deductible. The court held it
to be a payment in furtherance of taxpayers' purpose of adopting the
child. The expenses incurred were those of a personal or family nature
and hence non-deductible. 90
In DeJong,9 1 the Tax Court held that the payments pledged and
made by the parents to help defray tuition expenses were not voluntary
and gratuitous contributions motivated merely by the satisfaction which
flows from the performance of a generous act. They were induced, in
substantial part, by the benefits which the parents sought and antici-
pated from school enrollment.
92
If the luxury of a child's education can be found to create a personal
benefit to the parent, then certainly a well-nourished and sheltered child
also must create a personal benefit to the parents. The court of appeals
in White realized that the direct payment from the parent to the child
would create a greater incentive for church members to support a mis-
sionary from their family. 9 3 This incentive is not created by an intent to
further the work of the church but by the personal nature of the gift. A
satisfaction beyond the act of charitable generosity inures to such tax-
payers-the satisfaction a parent derives in providing for a child.
A parent's moral and legal obligation creates the necessity of child
support. Regardless of where or what Lyle White was doing, his parents
would have provided support. The Fifth Circuit, in Or v. United States,
94
stated a test which, by analogy, applies to this situation.9 5 In construing
insurance premiums a taxpayer paid on vehicles used, in part, for chari-
table purposes, the court held that such insurance would have been paid
even if the taxpayer had not done any charitable work at all. The court
stated that the definition of "gift" will not stretch to include payments
which would have been made for non-charitable reasons. The payments
were therefore disallowed as a charitable deduction.
Similarly, the Whites had at least a pre-existing moral duty to sup-
port Lyle. 96 The payments to Lyle for food and housing incidentally
87. See, e.g., McMillan v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1143 (1959).
88. See, e.g., Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972); DeJong v.
Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1962); Cooper v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 889, 891
(4th Cir. 1959).
89. 31 T.C. at 1143.
90. Id. at 1147.
91. 36 T.C. 896, 900 (1961).
92. Id.
93. 725 F.2d at 1270.
94. 343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965).
95. Accord Peace v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 1 (1964).
96. The Whites advanced a Fifth Circuit case, Winn v. Commissioner, 595 F.2d 1060
(5th Cir. 1979), as support for taking a deduction. In Winn, a taxpayer was allowed a
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benefited the Church; however, the benefit to the Church was not the
main reason for the payments. In short, the payments would have been
made anyway. The personal benefit far exceeded the benefit, if any, that
inured to the public.
97
B. To The Charity
By making the gift directly to an individual, the Whites destroyed
one of the essential elements of a charitable gift-indefiniteness. 98 Lyle
White and Murdock Travel, Inc., were not qualified charities under sec-
tion 170(c); at best, they were agents of the Church. 9 9 However, be-
cause the payments were used by them and not given to the Church, any
Church control over the funds was precluded. The payments were pri-
vate, not public, because the benefit was for the support and subsistence
of the son, and not the Church. The payments should have been disal-
lowed due to the lack of Church control.
A plain reading of the statute, as well as the relevant case law, sup-
ports this conclusion. In Mayo v. Commissioner,' 0 0 the court disallowed
deductions for payments made directly to Mennonite missionaries
rather than through organizational channels. The court held that the
donee must be an organization designated in section 170(c).
In Morey v. Riddell,' 0 ' a case the Whites cited for support, the court
found that the payments were to the church although the checks were
made payable to four ministers. In so ruling, the court noted this was
the only way to contribute to the particular "church" in question.
10 2
The church had no distinct name, written charter, constitution, by-laws
or operational guide. 10 3 Moreover, the church maintained no perma-
nent headquarters, did not maintain records, and its funds were not held
in a church designated bank account.' 0 4 The court also found that the
taxpayers clearly did not intend to make contributions to the ministers
individually, but placed the funds in the ministers' hands as agents for
the use of the church.
10 5
In Lesslie v. Commissioner, ° 6 another case cited by the Whites, the
deduction for funds which were eventually channeled to his first cousin's checking account
to use in her missionary work. This case can be distinguished from White on several
grounds. Winn took no dependency deduction for her on his income tax return and de-
cided to contribute to her missionary cause only after becoming disillusioned with several
other charitable organizations to which he had previously donated.
97. Thus the facts of Whiite satisfied the objective test. See supra notes 33-38 and ac-
companying text.
98. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
99. Before proceeding on a mission, missionaries are ordained as ministers and may
perform civilly recognized marriages. Thus, as officers of the Mormon Church, they could
be found to be agents. Murdock is the travel agency exclusively used by the Church in
sending missionaries to their posts and could conceivably be deemed the Church's agent.
100. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 505 (1971).
101. 205 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
102. Id. at 921.
103. Other than the Holy Bible. Id. at 919.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 495 (1977).
1984]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
court allowed a charitable contribution deduction for a gift of a check to
a Presbyterian missionary. The Tax Court found it dispositive that the
money was not to be used for the missionary's personal use or even at
his discretion but rather was held in trust for the church.'
0 7
The majority of cases hold that even when payments are made to an
established organization, the charitable deduction is disallowed when
the donor designates an individual as beneficiary of the contribution. In
Tripp v. Commissioner,10 8 the court disallowed a deduction even though
the contribution was made to a common fund to be used in fulfilling the
organization's purpose of education. The fact that the payment was des-
ignated for one person, rather than being a gift to the college for an
indefinite number of persons, precluded qualification as a charitable
contribution.
In Thomason v. Commissioner,10 9 the court disallowed a contribution
to a children's home because the payments were earmarked for an indi-
vidual."I0 This case was cited and followed by the Tax Court in Daven-
port v. Commissioner,"'1 which disallowed a payment made to a
missionary's landlord. The Davenport court reasoned that it is irrelevant
that the church might have chosen to maintain the same residence. By
making payments directly to the landlord, the taxpayer took this option
from the church. 1 2 Because the payments were to an individual, the
court also found it irrelevant that the payments relieved the Church of
the necessity of paying for the residence.' 1 3 It is irrelevant that the
Mormon Church might have chosen to support Lyle. Because the pay-
ments were made directly to Lyle, the payments lost the requirement of
indefiniteness of bounty and prevented the Church from directing it
elsewhere if necessary.
B. For the Use Of The Charity
The Tenth Circuit's opinion is premised on the following syllogism:
Lyle White incurred expenses while performing services for the Church;
the expenses were paid by his parents; hence, the Whites should be enti-
tled to a deduction for the expenses because they were "for the use of'
the Church.
The plain language of Treasury Regulation section 1.170A- I (g) 114
allows a deduction for unreimbursed expenditures incurred incidentally
to the rendition of services by a taxpayer to a charity. The Whites did not
render any services to the Church, nor incur any expenses, and thus
107. Id.
108. 337 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964).
109. 2 T.C. 441 (1943).
110. Id. at 444-45. Again, a court disallowed a contribution even though it was meant
to fulfill the charitable organization's purpose.
111. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1585 (1975).
112. Id. at 1587.
113. Id. at 1588.
114. Treas. Reg. 1.170A-I(g) (1983). See supra note 65.
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should not be allowed to take a deduction.115
Generally, no deductions are allowed to a taxpayer for contribu-
tions madeby another, even when the money which is given to the or-
ganization is provided by the taxpayer. 116 Applying this rule to the
instant case, the Whites should not have been allowed to take a tax de-
duction for expenses Lyle incurred in his contribution of services, even
if the expenses were paid by the Whites.
Judge Logan, writing the opinion of the court, reasoned that Rocke-
feller v. Commissioner 117 allowed the charitable contribution deduction. 18
In Rockefeller, the court permitted deductions for salaries taxpayers paid
to employees who were specifically hired and directed by the Rockefel-
lers to provide services to charities which the Rockefellers supported.
This case, however, is readily distinguishable. Prior to hiring, the Rock-
efellers had no duty, legal or moral, to make such payments to the em-
ployees. Additionally, unlike Lyle, the employees did not incur any
personal expense. The only expense involved was the salaries contrac-
tually owed by the Rockefellers. 1 19 The Rockefellers did not receive any
benefit other than that which results from an act of generosity.
120
V. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit in White v. United States12 1 allowed the taxpayers,
the Whites, to deduct as charitable contributions payments made di-
rectly to their Mormon missionary son for purposes of defraying his liv-
ing expenses incurred while on his mission. The Whites' manner and
motive in making a charitable contribution did not conform with estab-
lished principles governing charitable contributions. The granting of
tax deductions is a matter of legislative grace. Regardless of any equita-
ble consideration, only when there is a clear statutory provision and
when such provision is followed can any particular deduction be al-
115. Lyle White, however, might be entitled to deduct his own expenses. See White, 514
F. Supp. at 1060 n.2.
116. In Herring v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 308, 312 (1976), the taxpayer sent his wife
funds for her support and their child's support while she was separated from the taxpayer.
The Tax Court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to any deductions for charitable
contributions made by his wife to a church. In J. Morgan Wilson v. Commissioner, 52
T.C.M. (P-H) 52,046, a taxpayer who supported his mother sought to deduct as charita-
ble contributions amounts contributed by his mother, from the allowance he gave her, to
various churches and charities. His mother was his dependent. The court disallowed the
deductions on the ground that the taxpayer had already received an allowance for the
deductions in the dependency exemption. The court held that ifa taxpayer makes a gift of
money to another person, and that person makes a gift to a church or charity, a deduction
is allowed to the person who makes the church contribution, but a deduction is not al-
lowed to the taxpayer who supplied the funds.
117. 676 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1982).
118. White, 725 F.2d at 1271.
119. The employees were not "donating" services as was Lyle. They were paid salaries
and thus were not performing voluntary services.
120. In fact, if the employees had been directed to perform business fuiclions, the
whole cost could presumably have been written off as a business expense. Thus, by di-
recting the employees to perform services for charities, the Rockefellers suffered a loss.
121. 725 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1984).
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lowed. 122 As the Supreme Court recognized: "While a taxpayer is free
to organize his affairs as he chooses, nevertheless, once having done so,
he must accept the tax consequences of his choice, whether contem-
plated or not. . . and may not enjoy the benefit of some other route he
might have chosen to follow but did not."'
12 3
There is no practical reason why the Whites could not have donated
money directly to the Church's missionary fund.' 24 By donating the
money to a common fund, the Whites would have relinquished all con-
trol over the money, thereby clearly bringing the payment within section
170. It is irrelevant that the Church might choose to apply the funds in
the same manner as the taxpayer. 125 A taxpayer's primary purpose in
making a disinterested gift of generosity controls-not the application
of the contribution by the charity.
By making the gift to the church, the indefiniteness of bounty can
be assured. Intentions could not be questioned because the taxpayer
would have no control over disbursement of the funds, and thus would
have no expectation of any specific benefit beyond the satisfaction de-
rived from the act of generosity. Only by conforming to this well-estab-
lished model may Congress and the public be assured that such funds
will be used in a manner consistent with legislative intent.
Jay Shoemaker
122. Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating, 417 U.S. 134, 148-49 (1973).
123. Id. at 149.
124. The Church argued that increased administrative costs would be involved. 725
F.2d at 1270. This is, however, just one of the costs of tax-exemption.
125. Davenport v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1585, 1587 (1975); see also supra




Although substantive tort law is developed almost exclusively by the
state courts, the federal courts must regularly apply this law in cases
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) I and under diversity
jurisdiction. 2 In light of the variety of tort cases considered by the
Tenth Circuit each year and the rapid developments in tort law, this sur-
vey, for ihe first time, includes an article covering the more significant
tort cases.
The article is divided into two major sections. First, it reviews cases
brought under the FTCA. This section covers cases that address a fail-
ure to warn claim arising from an inoculation administered pursuant to
the Swine Flu Act, the discretionary function exception to the waiver of
sovereign immunity under the FTCA, and the physical manifestation
limitation on negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.
The second section of the article addresses tort issues that arose in
diversity jurisdiction cases. Some of the tort areas covered in the second
section include the intentional injury exception to the exclusivity of
workmen's compensation relief, assumption of risk as a defense in prod-
ucts liability cases, and allowing the jury in a products liability case to
consider the ordinary negligence of a non-party employer. The article
concludes by briefly considering the Tenth Circuit's failure to ground
consistently its affirmance of punitive damages in products liability cases
on a thorough review of the record.
Recognizing that a federal court is not the proper forum for signifi-
cant developments in substantive tort law, this article, for the most part,
focuses upon background information and analysis, without much atten-
tion to the decisions' affect upon substantive law.
I. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMs ACT
A. Swine Flu Products Liability Litigation
Fearing an outbreak of a new strain of influenza that appeared to be
similar to a strain of influenza that killed over 450,000 people in the
United States during the pandemic of 1918-19, Congress passed the Na-
tional Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976 (Swine Flu Act).3 Pur-
l. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1982).
2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) the law of the place where the alleged
negligent conduct or omission occurred must be applied in a suit brought under the
FTCA. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). In diversity cases federal courts must
apply the substantive law of the jurisdiction in which the claim arose. Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. Pub. L. No. 94-380, § 2, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976) (amended 1978). The provisions of
this Act were originally codified in the Public Health Services Act, § 317, 42 U.S.C. § 247b
(j)-(1). However, Congress, when it passed the Health Services and Centers Amendments
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suant to the Swine Flu Act, the federal government attempted to
inoculate the entire adult population of the United States against swine
flu. Approximately forty million people were inoculated during the im-
munization program. 4 The Swine Flu Act relieved the vaccine manufac-
turers of liability and created an exclusive remedy against the United
States for any injuries resulting from the immunization program. 5
Unthank v. United States 6 was one of the many cases which arose out
of the swine flu immunization program of 1976. 7 Verlin Unthank con-
tracted transverse myelitis, a serious neurological disorder, after receiv-
ing her swine flu vaccination. 8 Unthank brought suit against the United
States under the FTCA seeking recovery under the theories of failure to
warn, negligence, and strict liability.9 The trial court found that Mrs.
Unthank's swine flu inoculation directly and proximately caused her
transverse myelitis and that it was predictable at the time of the inocula-
tion that this malady could result from the inoculation.' 0 The trial
court, however, rejected the plaintiff's theories of recovery."l It stated
that the consent form used by the government, warning of the possibil-
ity of a severe or fatal reaction to the vaccine, was sufficient to allow Mrs.
Unthank to make an informed decision as to whether she should be vac-
cinated.' 2 The court concluded that any additional warning regarding
the vaccine's potential for causing neurological disorders would not
have made the plaintiffs consent any more informed.
13
The trial court held that the government was not liable for any inad-
equacy in the consent form. 14 The trial court also held that Mrs. Un-
thank had failed to prove that her transverse myelitis was proximately
caused by the negligence of the federal government or of a program
participant 15 but, nevertheless, imposed liability without fault on the
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-626, § 202, 92 Stat. 3574, eliminated the statutory provisions
dealing with the establishment, operation, and civil liability of the swine flu program.
4. See In re Swine Flu Immunization Products Liab. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 703, 716-17
(D. Utah 1982), afd sub noma. Unthank v. United States, 732 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1984), in
which Judge Finesilver summarizes the history of the Swine Flu Act. He notes that the
cases of Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968), and Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974), which held man-
ufacturers of polio vaccine liable for failing to warn of the vaccine's inherent dangers,
significantly broadened liability in favor of consumers. 533 F. Supp. at 716-17 n.20. Due
to this broadening of liability, the government needed to provide protection for pharma-
ceutical manufacturers in order to obtain their cooperation and participation in the swine
flu program. Id. at 716-17.
5. In re Swine Flu Immunization, 533 F. Supp. at 717.
6. 732 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1984).
7. As of 1980, over 150 lawsuits had been filed in the judicial districts within the
Tenth Circuit. Alvarez v. United States, 495 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 n.7 (D. Colo. 1980).
8. 732 F.2d at 1518. For a detailed discussion of the facts and medical history of the
plaintiff see In re Swine Flu Immunization, 533 F. Supp. at 706-07.
9. In re Swine Flu Immunization, 533 F. Supp. at 705.
10. Id. at 713-14; see also 732 F.2d at 1518.
11. 533 F. Supp. at 714-16.
12. In administering the Swine Flu Act the government had each participant sign a
standardized consent form. See infra note 22.
13. 533 F. Supp. at 715-16.
14. Id. at 719.




The only issue on appeal was the basis for liability.' 7 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that the government's policy of
conceding liability where an inoculation caused Landry-Guillian Barre
Syndrome (GBS) applied in this case.' 8 The Tenth Circuit, however,
was not content with simply affirming the trial court; it also found the
government liable under the theories of negligent failure to warn and
strict liability.' 9 The Tenth Circuit, in reviewing the district court's find-
ings of fact, determined that the consent form signed by the plaintiff did
not adequately apprise her of the dangers of the swine flu vaccine.
20
The Tenth Circuit concluded that, based on the barrage of publicity the
government used to convince people the swine flue vaccine was both
safe and necessary, "it would be a travesty to suggest that people who
hurriedly signed the standardized form presented to them were ade-
quately informed of the risks."'2 ' The court held that the general lan-
guage of the consent form warning of a "possibility of severe or
potentially fatal reaction[s]" was not "informed" for the purposes of the
act.
2 2
The Tenth Circuit did not, however, adequately address the basis
for the trial court's rejection of the informed consent theory of liability:
inclusion of the neurological disorders that could result from the vac-
cine on the form would not have materially added to the knowledge im-
parted by the warning. 23 The Tenth Circuit suggested the consent form
should have provided participants with information on the risk of no
16. Id. at 719. Liability without fault, or absolute liability, is significantly different
from strict products liability. Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182
N.W.2d 800 (1970). Where liability without fault is imposed, an actor is liable for harm to
the person or property of another resulting from the activity in which he is engaging irre-
spective of his degree of care. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1965). In strict
products liability, a plaintiff must not only establish that the harm flowed from the use of a
product but also that the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Judge Finesilver decided that liability without fault was appropriate in this case for two
reasons. First, the federal government had adopted a policy whereby persons contracting
Landry-Guillian Barre Syndrome (GBS)-the most common demyelinating disease of the
peripheral nervous system-did not need to prove negligence on the part of those ad-
ministering the Swine Flu Program. The claimants had to show only that GBS developed
as a result of the Swine Flu vaccination. Judge Finesilver determined that transverse my-
elitis fell within the broad categories of maladies labeled GBS. 533 F. Supp. at 718-19,
721-22. Second, he determined that the legislative history of the Swine Flu Act favored
the imposition of liability without fault when the plaintiff contracted a malady that was
predictable at the time of the inoculation. 533 F. Supp. at 706.
17. 732 F.2d at 1519.
18. d. at 1520.
19. Id. at 1523.
20. Id. at 1520-21.
21. Id. at 1521.
22. Id. at 1521-22. The consent form, under a section entitled Special Precautions,
provided that -[a]s with any vaccine or drug, the possibility of severe or potentially fatal
reactions exists. However, flu vaccine has rarely been associated with severe or fatal reac-
tions." 533 F. Supp. at 715. See also Young v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 1306 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (providing the entire text of the consent form the government used in this
program).
23. See 732 F.2d at 1521.
1984]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
treatment at all. The decision seems to indicate that the government's
use of publicity aimed at overcoming citizens' resistance to participating
in this program negated the possibility that almost any standardized
consent form would be sufficient to inform those receiving shots of the
risks involved. 24 The court also held that liability could be imposed in
this case on a theory of strict products liability. 25 The court reasoned
that since the plaintiff was inadequately warned of the vaccine's dangers,
the vaccine was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Adequacy of a
warning, however, is a question of fact to be decided by a trial court-
not an appellate court.
2 6
The Tenth Circuit's decision regarding the adequacy of the warning
is unique. Other federal appellate courts that have, addressed this issue
have uniformly limited their holdings to a discussion of the proper stan-
dards under which to evaluate the warning.2 7 The Tenth Circuit, how-
ever, determined that the evidence in the case, coupled with the
decisions of several federal district courts, compelled a finding that the
warnings given were inadequate. 28 The court seems to have engaged in
appellate fact finding by reweighing the evidence presented and drawing
its own inferences.
B. The Discretionary Function Exception
Congress, in sweeping language, waived the federal government's
sovereign immunity from tort claims by passing the FTCA. 29 This
broad waiver of sovereign immunity, however, is limited by the discre-
tionary function exception.30 While the boundaries of this exception
24. See id.
25. Id. at 1522-23.
26. See Barber v. General Elec. Co., 648 F.2d 1272, 1277 (10th Cir. 1981).
27. See, e.g., Daniels v. United States, 704 F.2d 587 (11th Cir. 1983) (affirming trial
court's determination that the consent form met the requirements of Alabama law); Petty
v. United States, 679 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1982) (reversing and remandingbecause trial
court applied wrong standard).
28. 732 F.2d at 1520-2 1. The Tenth Circuit indicated that -it was relying on the deci-
sions in Hasler v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 1262 (E.D. Mich. 1981), rev'd on other grounds,
718 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ci. 84 (1984); Von Michalofshi v. United
States, No. C 78-568R (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 1983); and Petty v. United -States, 536 F.
Supp. 860 (N.D. Iowa 1980), rev d, 679 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1982), as the basis for conclud-
ing the evidence in this case required a finding that the warnings were inadequate. 732
F.2d at 1521 n. 1. The Tenth Circuit did not explain why the findings.of fact in these cases
required a finding that the warnings were inadequate when other federal district courts
have found that the warnings were adequate. See, e.g., Marneef v. United States, 533 F.
Supp. 129 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Warner v. United States,522 F. Supp. 87 (M.D. Fla. 1981);
Bean v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 567 (D. Colo 1980).
29. See supra note 1. United States v. Yellow Cab Cc.,' 340 U.S. 543,547 (1951); Miller
v. United States, 710 F.2d 656 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 352.(1983).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). This section provides that the government cannot be
held liable for:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the -Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a




are not clearly defined, if a government official is not relying upon a
fixed or readily ascertainable standard in performing his statutory du-
ties, his decision is within the ambit of the discretionary function excep-
tion.3 1 If, on the other hand, he is relying upon a "fixed or readily
ascertainable standard," his decision is not within the ambit of the ex-
ception.3 2 Thus, the discretionary function exception presents a signifi-
cant obstacle to practically any plaintiff bringing a tort action against the
United States government. This exception "poses a jurisdictonal pre-
requisite to suit, which the plaintiff must ultimately meet as part of his
overall burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction."
'33
In Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States,3 4 the plaintiff sought
damages and indemnification under the FTCA for its losses arising from
a mid-air collision of two small aircraft. 3 5 The plaintiff's aircraft was at-
tempting to make an instruments-only landing under the guidance of a
Stapleton airtraffic controller when it collided with another aircraft. 36
The plaintiff alleged that one of the causes of the collision was the de-
sign of the terminal control area (TCA) created by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) for Stapleton Airport.
3 7
The Denver TCA can be envisioned as an inverted wedding cake
consisting of three vertical cylinders, each at a different altitude and
each having its center at Stapleton.3 8 TCAs are intended to reduce the
danger of mid-air collisions by restricting the airspace near an airport to
controlled aircraft.3 9 The other aircraft involved in the collision was not
controlled by, or even in communication with, the Stapleton airtraffic
controllers. 40 The collision occurred when the plaintiff's aircraft passed
from the middle cylinder to the lower cylinder, temporarily leaving the
TCA.4 1 The plaintiffs' theory was that the FAA was negligent in design-
ing the TCA in a manner that allowed controlled aircraft to leave the
protection of the TCA while making an instruments-only landing.4 2
Although the district court found the FAA negligent in designing
the Denver TCA, because FAA failed to provide a buffer zone between
31. Burton v. United States, 609 F.2d 977, 979 (10th Cir. 1979). The United States
Supreme Court has noted that it is unnecessary and even impossible to define with preci-
sion every contour of the discretionary function exception. See United States v. S.A. Em-
presa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 104 S. Ct. 2755, 2765 (1984); Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 34 (1953).
32. Burton v. United States, 609 F.2d at 979.
33. Baird v. United States, 653 F.2d 437, 440 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1144 (1982).
34. 724 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1984).
35. Id. at 872.
36. Id. at 893.
37. Id. at 874-75 n.9.
38. For a diagram of the Denver TCA see Colorado Flying Academy, 724 F.2d at 881.
39. 724 F.2d at 873-74.
40. Id. at 873.
41. Id. at 874.
42. 724 F.2d at 875. See also id. at 881 (diagram). The plaintiff also alleged that the
radar controller was negligent on several grounds. See id. at 874-75 n.9.
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controlled and uncontrolled aircraft,4 3 the district court denied relief
because it found that the action was within the discretionery function
exception and not a primary cause of the accident. In affirming this de-
cision, the court of appeals reasoned that competing aviation interests
were weighed and policy decisions were made in determining the design
of Denver's TCA; therefore, the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA prevented the government from being liable for the design of the
TCA.
4 4
The Tenth Circuit's decision in this case is supported by the recent
Supreme Court decision of United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense.45 There the Court held that the discretionary function excep-
tion precludes a tort action based on the conduct of the FAA in certify-
ing aircraft for use in commercial aviation. 4 6 The Court stated:
[I]t is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the
actor, that governs whether the discretionary function excep-
tion applies in a given case.
[W]hatever else the discretionary function exception may
include, it plainly was intended to encompass the discretionary
acts of the Government acting in its role as a regulator of the
conduct of private individuals.
4 7
The Court also noted that "[t]he FAA has a statutory duty to promote
safety in air transportation, not to insure it."
' 4 8
The rationale and holding of this Supreme Court decision supports
the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Colorado Flying Academy. 4 9 The FAA, in
designing the TCA, was regulating conduct and, therefore, cannot be
held liable for any negligence associated with this activity. In fashioning
this exception, Congress took "steps to protect the Government from
liability that would seriously handicap efficient government opera-
tions." 50 The Tenth Circuit properly concluded that the acts of the FAA
43. Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 1221, 1227 (D.
Colo. 1981).
44. 724 F.2d at 876-77 (citing Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 665-66 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 352 (1983); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 552 F.2d 370,
375-76 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977)).
45. 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984).
46. Id. at 2769.
47. Id. at 2765 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 2769 (emphasis deleted).
49. The Tenth Circuit's opinion is also in line with decisions in other jurisdictions
which have found the actions of the Federal Aviation Administration to be within the dis-
cretionary function exception. See, e.g., Garbarino v. United States, 666 F.2d 1061 (6th
Cir. 1981) (setting standards for aircraft safety or crashworthiness is an activity squarely
within the discretionary function exception); Baird v. United States, 653 F.2d 437 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982) (decision on how detailed sectional aeronauti-
cal charts should be for flight information falls within the discretionary function excep-
tion); Rulli v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 1502 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (decisions as to the scope
of the FAA's regulation of navigational aids fall squarely within the discretionary function
exception); Miller v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Ky. 1974), aJ'd, 522 F.2d 386
(6th Cir. 1975) (due to the discretionary function exception, the government cannot be
held liable for failing to promulgate rules deemed necessary by a private litigant).
50. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963).
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in designing the TCA fell within this exception. 5 1
The court in Colorado Flying Academy relied on the recent Tenth Cir-
cuit opinion in Miller v. United States.5 2 In Miller, the plaintiffs were driv-
ing along Interstate 70 in Colorado when their vehicle skidded off the
slippery roadway and down a steep embankment, causing severe inju-
ries. 53 They brought an action against the United States under the
FTCA and the Federal Highway Safety Act,5 4 alleging that the govern-
ment had negligently approved the design of the highway and negli-
gently failed to require warnings of the dangers posed by the design.
5 5
The district court, without providing the plaintiffs an opportunity to
conduct discovery, granted the government's motion to dismiss based
on the discretionary function exception. 5 6 The court of appeals af-
firmed this decision.5 7 In analyzing the plaintiffs' claims, the Tenth Cir-
cuit first reviewed the Federal Aid Highway Act 58 and the Federal
Highway Safety Act. 59 The court found that the Secretary of Transpor-
tation had considerable discretion in reviewing and approving highway
designs and establishing safety measures for the nation's highways.
60
The court, therefore, concluded that the discretionary function excep-
tion prevented the plaintiffs from maintaining the suit.
6 1
In reaching this decision, the court relied on its decision in Wright v.
United States6 2 where it held that the discretionary function exception
barred a suit against the United States based on alleged negligence of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the design, placement, construction, in-
spection, and management of a bridge and its approach roads. 63 The
court, while noting that Wright was distinguishable, found it persuasive
as to the scope of the discretionary function exception regarding federal
activities relating to road building and maintenance. 64 The court found
51. The FTCA's legislative history "[t]ime and again ...refers to the acts of regula-
tory agencies as examples of those covered by the [discretionary function] exception
.... S.A. Emprese, 104 S. Ct. at 2765.
52. 710 F.2d 656 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 352 (1983).
53. Id. at 657.
54. 23 U.S.C. §§ 401-408 (1982).
55. 710 F.2d at 657-58.
56. Id. at 659.
57. Id.
58. Pub. L. No. 85-767, 72 Stat. 885 (1958) (current version codified at 23 U.S.C.
§§ 101-157 (1982)).
59. Pub. L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731 (1966) (current version codified at 23 U.S.C.
§§ 401-408 (1982)).
60. 710 F.2d at 659-60.
61. Id. at 667. The plaintiffs' FTCA claim was based on the Secretary of Transporta-
tion's alleged breach of a duty imposed by the Federal Aid Highway Act. Their claim
under the Federal Highway Safety Act was based on the theory that Congress created an
implied right of action for persons injured by the government failing to follow its provi-
sions. The Tenth Circuit rejected this claim because it found that under the factors listed
in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), Congress did not intend to create such a right in
passing this act.
62. 568 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978).
63. Id. at 159.
64. 710 F.2d at 664.
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the Millers' reliance on Griffin v. United States6 5 to be misplaced. In Grif-
fin, the Third Circuit stated that the discretionary function exception did
not bar a claim alleging that the Government negligently violated De-
partment of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) standards in testing
and approving a polio vaccine.6 6 The Third Circuit held that the gov-
ernment's conduct in testing the vaccine for compliance with HEW stan-
dards involved scientific evaluation rather than formation of policy.
6 7
The Tenth Circuit distinguished Griffin because the Secretary's evalua-
tion of a highway design involves a markedly different evaluation from
that used to test the purity of a drug.68
Other courts that have addressed the issue have decided that the
discretionary function exception protects the government from liability
for highway design. 69 While this decision may seem harsh or inequita-
ble, it is the role of Congress-not the courts-to modify the law to pro-
vide claimants a recovery.
C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Traditionally, courts have disfavored claims based on negligent in-
fliction of mental or emotional distress. 70 The Tenth Circuit's decision
in Holler v. United States7 1 reflects this disfavor. Holler brought an action
"alleging psychiatric malpractice against a doctor employed by the Vet-
erans Administration in Albuquerque, New Mexico." '7 2 Mr. Holler was a
Vietnam war veteran. In 1970 he was misdiagnosed as suffering from
"paranoid schizophrenia."' 73 In 1981 he was properly diagnosed as suf-
fering from post-traumatic stress neurosis. 74 The plaintiff sought recov-
ery for extreme emotional and mental distress caused by the negligent
misdiagnosis. 7 5 The government filed a motion to dismiss based on Mr.
Holler's failure to allege any physical injury. The district court granted
65. 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974).
66. Id. at 1069.
67. Id. at 1066.
68. 710 F.2d at 664-65.
69. See, e.g., Daniel v. United States, 426 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1970) (discretionary func-
tion exception barred claim against United States for alleged unsafe and inadequate de-
sign of a traffic separator on an interstate highway); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 565
F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Ill. 1983) (decision approving a state safety program under the High-
way State Act falls within the discretionary function exception); Patton v. United States,
549 F. Supp. 36 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (alleged negligent design by Army Corps of Engineers of
a government owned and operated recreation area road was within the discretionary func-
tion exception); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 893 (D. Or.
1979) (the discretionary function exception barred a claim against the government alleg-
ing that a forest service road had an unsafe design); Rayford v. United States, 410 F. Supp.
1051 (M.D. Tenn. 1976) (discretionary function exception barred claim alleging that the
United States was negligent in designing, constructing, approving, and maintaining an in-
terstate highway).
70. See W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 54 (4th ed. 1971).
71. 724 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1983).







Since actions under the FTCA are governed by the law of the state
where the action arose,7 7 the issue facing the Tenth Circuit was whether
New Mexico courts would find a cause of action for negligently caused
emotional distress absent physical injury. While there was no control-
ling precedent, the court of appeals decided that New Mexico courts
would find that such a cause of action did not exist in New Mexico.
The court of appeals relied on the cases of Aragon v. Speelman 78 and
Wilson v. Galt.79 In Aragon, a mother witnessed her son flying through
the air after he was struck by the defendant's vehicle. The New Mexico
Court of Appeals refused to permit bystander recovery because the
mother failed to allege a physical injury. In Wilson, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals refused to allow the parents of an infant who died
from allegedly negligent medical care to recover for their emotional dis-
tress because they had not witnessed a sudden trauma involving their
child. The Tenth Circuit relied on these two cases to determine that
New Mexico followed the general rule embodied in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts Section 436A, which requires a physical injury before permit-
ting recovery for emotional distress. 80 Holler failed to allege a physical
injury, and the Tenth Circuit accordingly upheld the district court's dis-
missal of the complaint.
8 1
The underlying policy of the physical injury requirement is to re-
lieve the judicial system and potential defendants of the burden of liti-
gating claims of damages for emotional distress that are "trival,
evanescent, temporary, feigned, or imagined."'8 2 In essence, the physi-
cal injury or physical manifestation requirement serves as an "acid test"
to determine whether a plaintiff has suffered an injury worthy of com-
76. Id.
77. Id. See also supra note 2.
78. 83 N.M. 285, 491 P.2d 173 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).
79. 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 100 N.M. 192, 668
P.2d 308 (N.M. 1983). Aragon and Wilson are bystander cases. A bystander case is one in
which the plaintiff alleges he or she has suffered an emotional injury by being an unwilling
witness to the death or injury of another. There are three lines of authority for determin-
ing when a plaintiff is entitled to prevail on such a claim: the impact test, the zone of
danger test, and the forseeability test of Dillion v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). See Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co., 572 F. Supp. 1201, 1202-3 n.3 (D.S.D.
1983) (summarizing the three tests and listing the jurisdictions which followed each at the
time of the decision). See also Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d
171 (1982).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) provides: "If the actor's conduct
is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional
disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily
harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional distur-
bance." While temporary fright, nervous shock, or nausea, even if accompanied by physi-
cal phenomena such as dizziness or vomiting, are not sufficient to establish bodily harm,
the physical injury requirement of this rule may be satisfied by long continued nausea,
headaches, or repeated attacks of hysteria. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A com-
ment c (1965). In fact, pleading and proving a physical injury or physical manifestation
may depend more on the ingenuity of counsel than on the condition of the plaintiff. See
Molien v. Kaiser Found.. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
81. 724 F.2d at 105.
82. Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 180 (1982).
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pensation. Some courts have recognized that requiring the plaintiff to
establish a nebulous physical injury, such as continued nausea or head-
aches, is an unreliable and untrustworthy indicator of the validity of a
claim.
8 3
Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court, in Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals,84 provided an excellent discussion of the problems
with the physical injury requirement. In Molien, a woman was negli-
gently misdiagnosed as having syphilis and was instructed by her physi-
cian to inform her husband of the purported condition. This diagnosis
directly caused the husband severe marital and emotional problems.
The plaintiff, however, alleged no physical injury. The court, after care-
ful analysis, rejected the physical injury requirement as an unreliable in-
dicator of the validity of a claim for emotional distress for three reasons.
First, the court found that the physical injury requirement is overinclu-
sive because it permits recovery for demonstrably trivial mental distress
claims accompanied by physical symptoms. Second, it is underinclusive
because serious distress is arbitrarily deemed uncompensable if not ac-
companied by physical symptoms. Third, the requirement of pleading
and proving a physical manifestation or physical injury encourages ex-
travagant pleading and distorted testimony.8 5 Justice Mosk, therefore,
determined that there was no justification for requiring allegations and
proof of some trivial physical injury to recover for extreme emotional
distress.
The problem with the Tenth Circuit's opinion is not that it imposed
the physical manifestation requirement but that it imposed the require-
ment without seriously analyzing whether it would effectively separate
meritorious claims from the trivial or fraudulent claims. In light of the
problems with the physical injury requirement, the Tenth Circuit's opin-
ion at a minimum should have provided a more thorough analysis
before imposing the physical injury requirement on the plaintiff.
8 6
83. See Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981); Molien v.
Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916,616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980);Johnson v.
Jamacia Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 598, 467 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1983), rev d on other grounds, 62 N.Y.2d
523, 467 N.E.2d 502, 478 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1984). See also Montinieri v. Southern New Eng-
land Tel. Co., 175 Conn. 3357, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978).
84. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
85. Id. at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. See also Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio
St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983) (Ohio 1983); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermkt's, Inc., 444
A.2d 433 (Me. 1982).
86. In Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (N.M. 1983), the New Mex-
ico Supreme Court recognized the right of a bystander to recover for emotional distress.
The court, however, required the plaintiff to plead and prove a physical manifestation of
the emotional distress. This case does not necessarily mean Holler was correctly decided.
The problem with Holler is not the ultimate decision that a physical injury is required, but
the cursory analysis the court used in reaching this decision. Moreover, this result seems
to immunize psychiatrists from malpractice claims unless any emotional distress caused by
their negligence results in physical manifestations. Such a result is hardly just. Where an
actor should recognize that negligent conduct on his part may subject another to severe
emotional distress and where a duty to prevent such conduct exists, the purpose of this
duty is defeated by denying recovery merely because harm is sustained solely in the form




A. Intentional Injury Exception to the Exclusivity of Workmen's Compensation
Claims
The purpose of workmen's compensation laws is to provide assured
recovery for the injured worker without regard to fault. In return for the
certainty of payment, workmen's compensation benefits are generally
the employee's exclusive remedy against his employer for on the job
injuries. 8 7 One of the few exceptions to this exclusivity is the ability of
the employee to bring a tort claim against an employer who "intention-
ally" injures the employee.8 8 While almost all courts recognize this ex-
ception, they narrowly define the circumstances under which an injury
may be considered intentional.
8 9
In Tyner v. Fort Howard Paper Company,90 the plaintiffs brought a
wrongful death action against the decedent's employer alleging that the
decedent's death was not "accidental" and, therefore, was not barred by
Oklahoma's Workmen's Compensation Act.9 1 Before his death, the de-
cedent was repairing an electrical crane. He began the repair after dis-
connecting the electrical current and padlocking the electrical control
switch. 92 A Fort Howard foreman, wishing to move the crane, removed
the padlock and activated the switch, thereby electrocuting the dece-
dent.93 The plaintiff alleged that both the foreman and the company
acted in willful and reckless disregard of the decedent's safety.
94
The district court found that the plaintiffs had not alleged facts
which would show that the injury met the "intentional" exception to
Oklahoma's Workmen's Compensation Act.9 5 Therefore, the court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction. 96 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that willful and reck-
less conduct on the part of the employer is not sufficient to establish an
intentional injury.9 7 The court felt compelled to follow previous Tenth
Circuit case law holding that "[n]othing less than genuine intent to in-
jure is intentional for purposes of the Act."
'98
87. See 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.10 (1983).
88. Id. at § 68.13.
89. Id. An injury is not intentional absent an employer's genuine intent to injure a
specific employee. See Love v. Flour Mills of Am., 647 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1981); Arring-
ton v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe-Line Co., 632 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1980). "[T]he common
liability of the employer cannot be stretched to include accidental injuries caused by the
gross, wanton, willful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, malicious negligence,
breach of statute, or other misconduct of the employees short of genuine intentional."
LARSON, supra note 87, at § 68.13.
90. 708 F.2d 517 (10th Cir. 1983).
91. OKLa. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 11 (West Supp. 1983).
92. 708 F.2d at 518.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 519.
95. Id.
96. ld. at 518.
97. Id. at 519. The court stated that the "facts alleged, even if true, would not indicate
that Fort Howard 'intentionally' caused the death of the decedent." Id.
98. Id. at 518. (following Love v. Flour Mills of Am., 647 F.2d 1058, 1060 (10th Cir.
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The Tenth Circuit decision is consistent with authority in other ju-
risdictions.9 9 Courts and legislatures have almost uniformly limited an
employee's recovery exclusively to workmen's compensation benefits for
any employer misconduct lacking a specific intent to injure.10 0 One ex-
ception to this rule is the decision in Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc.' 0 1
In Mandolidis, the West Virginia Supreme Court reviewed several
cases in which the plaintiffs alleged intentional employer misconduct
that was not specifically intended to injure a given employee. In exam-
ining its state's workmen's compensation act, the court limited the gen-
eral exclusivity rule and held that the act only shielded employers from
tort liability for inadvertence or negligence. 10 2 The court stated that
willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct requires a subjective realization
of the risk of bodily injury created by the activity and, therefore, such
conduct is not accidental in any meaningful sense.10 3 The court held
that such an injury would be considered inflicted with deliberate inten-
tion for purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
104
Although Mandolidis represents a distinct minority position, 10 5 it is
the better reasoned view. Mandolidis recognizes that workmen's com-
pensation statutes are designed to provide workers with a safe work-
place and an assured recovery in the event of an accident, while at the
same time protecting employers from large liability. The broad defini-
tion of the word "intentional" that was applied in Tyner results in an
employer's liability exposure which is the same whether he takes all pos-
sible safeguards to prevent injuries or whether he acts in callous disre-
gard of His employee's safety.' 0 6 Workers' Compensation Acts were
designed to improve the plight of the worker; employers were not given
the right to carry on their businesses without regard to the life or limb of
their workers and free from all common law liability. 10 7 The Mandolidis
rationale furthers this goal by deterring wilful or reckless misconduct.
A primary goal of tort law is to provide reasonable safeguards
1981) and Arrington v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe-Line Co., 632 F.2d 867 (10th Cir.
1980)).
99. LARSON, supra note 87, at § 68.13 n.10.1.
100. Id.
101. 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978), Annot. 96 A.L.R. 3d 1064 (1980).
102. 246 S.E.2d at 911-13.
103. Id. at 914.
104. Id.
105. See LARSON, supra note 87, at § 68.13 n.10.1; see, e.g., Blankenship v. Cincinnati
Milacron Chem., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982) (an employee may sue
an employer for intentionally exposing him to toxic chemicals even though the employer
did not have an intent to injure a specific worker).
106. See Santiago v. Brill Monfort Co., 11 A.D.2d 1041, 205 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1960), aff'd,
10 N.Y.2d 718, 176 N.E.2d 835, 219 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1961). In Santiago three employees
attempted to sue their employer under the intentional injury exception for injuries sus-
tained because the employer removed the safety guards from his equipment. The court
held that injuries incurred as a result of safety guards removed "for the sole purpose of
increasing production for greater increment and profits" were accidental within the mean-
ing of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 205 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
107. Mandolidis, 246 S.E.2d at 914; See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 com-
ment a (1965).
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against injury. Toward this end, the law of products liability has devel-
oped to hold manufacturers liable for selling products with "unreasona-
ble dangerous" defects, irrespective of any negligence in the
manufacturer's part.10 8 Employers, however, are not subject to civil tort
liability except for acts committed with intent to injure. Thus, employ-
ers are not fully accountable for willful, wanton and reckless conduct.
Given that reckless conduct does not subject an insured employer to
personal liability, it is not surprising that a significant number of prod-
ucts liability cases involve workers injured by their employer's ma-
chines. 10 9 It seems absurd that on one hand courts impose a very strict
standard of civil tort liability on manufacturers, in an effort to have them
design and produce safe products, while on the other hand courts per-
mit employers to set up and use those products with willful, wanton and
reckless disregard for their workers safety.1 10
B. Products Liability
Many of the diversity tort cases the Tenth Circuit addressed during
the survey period involved products liability claims. In deciding these
cases, the Tenth Circuit considered issues on the forefront of products
liability litigation.
1. Assumption of Risk
Strict products liability is not based on traditional concepts of negli-
gence and contributory negligence is not an available defense in such a
case. I I I Evidence of the plaintiffs negligent conduct is therefore irrele-
vant and inadmissible.' 12 However, assumption of risk, the voluntary
and unreasonable encounter with a known danger, is a defense in a strict
products liability action and evidence showing the plaintiff assumed a
risk in using the product is admissible.1 13 It is often difficult, however,
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
109. Of the seven cases involving a products liability claim the Tenth Circuit reviewed
during the period of this survey, six involved workplace accidents. See Hurd v. American
Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1984); Saupitty v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., 726 F.2d
657 (10th Cir. 1984); Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir. 1983); Prince v.
Leesona Corp., 720 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1983); Goodman v. Royal Indus., No. 81-2043
(10th Cir. Jul. 18, 1983) (not for routine publication); Wood v. McDonough Power Equip.
Inc., No. 82-1790 (10th Cir. Nov. 7, 1983) (not for routine publication).
110. Nor can manufacturers get indemnification from employers if they are liable to an
injured worker. See, e.g., Holly Sugar Corp. v. Union Supply Co., 194 Col.. 316, 572 P.2d
148 (1977).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965). "Products liability
under § 402A does not rest upon negligence principles, but rather is premised on the
concept of enterprise liability for casting a defective product into the stream of com-
merce." Kinard v. Coats Co., Inc., 37 Colo. App. 555, 557, 553 P.2d 835, 837 (1976); see
also Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153 (1976); Tray-
nor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363
(1965).
112. See, e.g., Good v. A.B. Chance Co., 39 Colo. App. 70, 72, 565 P.2d 217, 220
(1977).
113. See Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1976); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
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to properly categorize the plaintiff's conduct as either contributory neg-
ligence or assumption of risk. The Tenth Circuit's decisions in Beacham
v. Lee-Norse 1 1 4 and Prince v. Leesona Corp' 15 illustrate this difficulty.
In Beacham, a case arising in the district court of Utah, the plaintiff's
four fingers on his right hand were severed in an industrial accident.
The fingers were severed in an unguarded "pinch point"' "1 6 of a roof
bolter. A roof bolter is a piece of mining equipment designed to pre-
vent a cave-in by bolting steel matting to the ceiling of a mine."i 7 The
design of the particular roof bolter in this case only permitted it to reach
an eight-and-one-half foot ceiling." 8 The plaintiff and the roof bolter
operator placed the roof bolter on some wood cribbing to enable it to
reach the ten-foot ceiling of the mine. The plaintiffs job required him
to stand very close to the machine in order to hold and steady the steel
mats being bolted to the ceiling. Due to the elevation of the roof bolter,
he stood on a 10" X 10" X 36" wood block in order to position the
mats. The plaintiff slipped off the block and caught his hand in the un-
guarded "pinch point."" 1 9
The trial court rejected the defendants' evidence which tended to
show that the plaintiff acted unreasonably by standing on a narrow block
near the roof bolter.120 The court also rejected evidence as to the plain-
tiff's misuse of the product by elevating it on wood cribbing. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed these rulings. 1 1 It held that the proffered evidence
showed, at most, that the plaintiff acted negligently in standing on the
narrow crib block. The court went on to hold, however, that use of the
machine was not unreasonable because his job required him to stand
near the machine and, thus, his conduct was not voluntary. 12 2 The
court suggested that if the plaintiff had reached into the pinch point to
retrieve a tool or repair the bolter that perhaps this would have raised a
jury question as to whether his conduct was voluntary and unreasona-
ble. 12 3 The court rejected the defendant's claim that elevating the roof
bolter with wood cribbing constituted misuse because there was no evi-
dence that this conduct was causally connected to the plaintiff's
injuries. 124
114. 714 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir. 1983).
115. 720 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1983).
116. The pinch point refers to a point on the roof bolter where two arms of the
machine come together in a scissors-like fashion.
117. 714 F.2d at 1012-13.
118. Id. at 1012.
119. Id.
120. The court referred to the assumption of risk defense as unreasonable use. It
noted that it was doing so because the Utah Supreme Court, consistent with the concept of
comparative fault, is seeking to abolish the assumption of risk terminology. Id. at 1014
n.4.
121. Id. at 1017.
122. Id. at 1016.
123. Id. at 1015.
124. Id. When a product, safe for normal use and handling, causes an injury through
abnormal use or handling, the defendant manufacturer is not liable. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h (1965). The manufacturer of the roof bolter at-
tempted to argue that the plaintiff was injured when the roof bolter fell off the wood crib-
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The court's analysis regarding assumption of risk or unreasonable
use is unpersuasive. The plaintiff was standing on a cribbing block three
feet high and only ten inches in diameter. The block was positioned
very close to the roof bolter. The floor of the mine was uneven and
covered with one foot of oily water. It was very likely that the plaintiff
would slip and fall into the bolter. Furthermore, the evidence suggested
he knew of the dangers posed by the roof bolter's unshielded "pinch
points". Certainly, the danger he faced of being injured by the "pinch
point" by standing next to the machine on a narrow block was at least as
great as if he was simply reaching into the bolter to retrieve a tool. The
plaintiff could have constructed a more stable platform on which to work
but, instead, voluntarily chose to use a highly unstable platform near a
dangerous machine. A jury could reasonably infer from these circum-
stances that his conduct was both voluntary and unreasonable. Thus,
the jury should have been instructed on this defense.
An interesting contrast to the Beacham decision is Prince v. Leesona
Corporation.125 In Prince the plaintiff caught her hair in a rotating shaft of
a machine. 12 6 The district court, applying Kansas law, instructed the
jury on the affirmative defense of assumption of risk.1 27 The Tenth Cir-
cuit upheld this instruction, finding that the defendant's evidence
showed that the danger was obvious and revealed that the plaintiff had
been instructed on how to wear her hair. The evidence thus raised
proper questions for the jury as to whether the plaintiff had assumed a
risk. 128
These two decisions are inconsistent. In Beacham, the plaintiffs
conduct in attempting to balance himself on a highly unstable block near
a dangerous machine did not raise a jury question as to whether the
plaintiff had voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to encounter a
known danger. In Prince, the plaintiffs conduct in improperly wearing
her hair did raise a jury question of whether she had voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeded to encounter a known danger. While it is true
that Utah law applied to one case and Kansas law to the other, both
jurisdictions apply the strict liability and assumption of risk definitions
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts; 129 therefore, the Tenth Circuit should
have consistently applied the assumption of the risk defense.
bing and landed on him. 714 F.2d at 1015. The Tenth Circuit held that there was no
evidence to support this argument and, thus, there was no basis for a misuse defense. Id.
125. 720 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1983).
126. Id. at 1167.
127. Id. at 1170.
128. Id.
129. See Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965)) (assumption of risk is avail-
able as a defense in a strict liability case); Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 545 P.2d 1104
(1976) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A and applying the defense of
assumption of risk as described in comment n to § 402A).
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2. Comparative Fault
In Prince v. Leesona Corp.,130 the Tenth Circuit also applied Kansas's
Comparative Negligence Act 13 1 in a products liability action. The plain-
tiff's employer, immune from suit under Kansas's workmen's compensa-
tion law, was added by the district court as a "phantom" party in order
for the jury to allocate fault among the parties.132 The jury determined
that the plaintiff suffered $200,000 in damages, for which she was thirty-
five percent responsible, her employer was sixty percent responsible,
and the Leesona Corporation was five percent responsible. Since the
Leesona Corporation could only be held liable to the extent of its fault,
the plaintiff was awarded $10,000.133
On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the jury instructions which al-
lowed the jury to consider the ordinary negligence of her employer in
assessing fault. 134 The Tenth Circuit, while noting that traditional no-
tions of strict liability and negligence are analytically difficult to harmo-
nize, held that under Kansas law ajury is permitted to consider all types
of fault, even ordinary contributory negligence, to determine the degree
of an actor's responsibility for causing the injury. 13 5 The court con-
cluded that the instruction based on contributory negligence was not
reversible error.'
36
The court's holding in Prince reflects one of the ambiguities that is
at the heart of comparative fault: whether conduct which amounts to
assumption of risk or misuse of a product can be used to offset a judg-
ment or whether any conduct, including contributory negligence, can be
used to offset a judgment. 13 7 The Tenth Circuit noted its previous
holding in Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 13 8 that reversible error
does not result from only basing jury instructions on the concepts of
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 13 9 In Prince, the Tenth
Circuit held that it is not reversible error to base an instruction on con-
tributory negligence. The problem with the Prince opinion is that it
avoided the issue squarely before the court: when should ajury be per-
mitted to consider ordinary contributory negligence in determining the
comparative fault of the actors in a strict products liability case?
130. 720 F.2d 1166.
131. KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-258a (1976). See Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439,
460, 618 P.2d 788, 803 (1980) (comparative negligence principles are applicable in strict
liability cases).
132. 720 F.2d at 1167. Kansas comparative fault law allows defendants to force a com-
parison of fault with third parties even though the third parties cannot be held legally
responsible. See Albertson v. Volkwagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 230 Kan. 368, 374, 634
P.2d 1127, 1132 (1981). The Tenth Circuit referred to such parties as "phantom" parties.
133. 720 F.2d at 1167-68.
134. Id. at 1170-71.
135. Id. at 1171.
136. Id.
137. See V. SCHWARTZ., COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 12.2 (1974).
138. 691 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1982).




In Saupitty v. Yazoo Manufacturing Co., 14 0 the plaintiff, in the course
of his employment, rode the lawnmower down a hill when the mower
began bouncing and shaking. 14 1 The plaintiffs employer stripped a
mower of its throttle control, brakes and belt guard. When the plaintiff
attempted to slow the mower by placing the machine into reverse gear,
the mower bucked the plaintiff over the top of the machine, and severed
his thumb and two fingers.
142
The plaintiff contended that the mower blades, rather than one of
the unguarded belts, mangled his hand and that numerous design de-
fects in the mower made it likely that he would be thrown from the
machine. 143 The defendant argued that the removal of the mower's
throttle control, brakes, and belt guard amounted to a superseding, in-
tervening cause which negated the manufacturer's liability. 14 4 The jury
found for the plaintiff and awarded $560,000 in compensatory damages
and $440,000 in punitive damages. 14 5 The Tenth Circuit, applying
Oklahoma law, affirmed this award stating that the plaintiff produced
sufficient evidence to justify submitted the issue of punitive damages to
the jury. 14 6 The Tenth Circuit relied on the case of Thiry v. Armstrong
World Industries,14 7 in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court held:
Punitive damages may be assessed against the manufacturer of
a product injuring the plaintiff if the injury is attributable to
conduct that reflects reckless disregard for public safety. 'Reckless
disregard' is not to be confused with inadvertent conduct. To
meet this standard the manufacturer must either be aware of,
or culpably indifferent to, an unnecessary risk of injury.
148
The import of Thiry is that it permits manufacturers to be held liable
for punitive damage only when their conduct in designing or manufac-
turing a product is so egregious as to warrant sanction. Specifically,
Thiry carefully limited punitive awards in products liability actions to
cases where reckless disregard is established.
Strict liability in tort focuses on the nature of the product rather
than the conduct of the manufacturer. 149 Therefore, proof which sim-
ply establishes strict liability is not sufficient to justify an award of puni-
tive damages. In Saupitty, however, the court failed to indicate what
facts, if any, were established at trial to justify the award of punitive
damages. The court merely asserted that the "plaintiff produced suffi-
cient evidence of manufacturer's reckless disregard for public safety to
140. 726 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1984).
141. Id. at 658-59.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 659-60.
145. Id. at 658.
146. Id. at 659.
147. 661 P.2d 515 (Okla. 1983).
148. Id. at 518 (emphasis in original, footnote containing citations olniled).
149. See generally 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY, § I6A13 1 (1984).
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justify submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury."' 150 With-
out a discussion of facts which justify the imposition of punitive dam-
ages, Saupitty suggests that proof of a defect alone is sufficient to raise a
jury question on the issue of punitive damages, rendering manufacturers
potentially liable for punitive damage without any proof of misconduct
on their part. Judge Seth, in his dissent, asserted that the evidence did
not support an award of punitive damages. 15 1 In sum, it appears that
the majority simply affirmed the award of punitive damages without re-
ally examining whether the evidence justified such an award.
In Averitt v. Southland Motor Inn,15 2 Averitt contracted shigella after
eating at the restaurant in Southland's hotel.' 53 Averitt sued on theo-
ries of negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty, alleging that
the defendants sold him food contaminated with shigella. 15 4 Southland
appealed, inter alia, the award of punitive damages.
155
The court stated that Averitt's evidence, which showed that South-
land had repeatedly violated health department regulations by permit-
ting unsanitary conditions to exist in the restaurant and by failing to
notify its guests that they had been exposed to shigella, justified an
award of punitive damages. 156 These facts reflect the factors that the
court in Thiry stated should be considered in a products case.
The award of punitive damages is an award to the plaintiff in excess
of compensatory or nominal damages to punish the defendant's aggra-
vated misconduct. 15 7 Courts should take care to demonstrate that the
award is justified. In Averitt, the court's discussion of the factual basis for
punitive damages demonstrates that such care was taken and that the
judgment was not merely affirmed without any factual support in the
record. The court's decision in Saupitty, however, fails to demonstrate
similar well-reasoned decisionmaking.
James A. Gouwar
150. 726 F.2d at 660. This is the standard the Oklahoma Supreme Court set forth in
Thiry, 661 P.2d at 518, for determining when an award of punitive damages is justified.
151. 726 F.2d at 661 (Judge Seth dissenting).
152. 720 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1983).
153. Shigella is a genus of bacteria that causes infection or dysentery.
154. Id. at 1180.
155. Id. at 1182. Although the defendants attempted to attack the entire judgment, the
court prevented the defendants from doing so because the defendants' notice of appeal
only challenged the district court's decision "insofar as that judgment relates to punitive
damages." Id. at 1180-81 (quoting defendants notice of appeal). See FED. R. App. PRO.
3(c); Perington Wholesale, Inc. v. Burger King Corp., 631 F.2d 1369, 1379 (10th Cir.
1979) (an appellate court has jurisdiction to review only the part of the judgment desig-
nated in the notice of appeal).
156. Id. at 1183.
157. See generatty D. DOBBs, HANDIBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES 204-21 (1973).
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF TENTH
CIRCUIT DECISIONS
I. UNITED STATES V. CRONIC: SUPREME COURT REJECTS TENTH
CIRCUIT'S INFERENTIAL APPROACH TO DECIDING INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
Introduction
In United States v. Cronic, I the Supreme Court unanimously reversed
a Tenth Circuit decision 2 to vacate the defendant's conviction because
he did not have the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth
amendment. 3 The Supreme Court held that counsel are to be presumed
effective. 4 Absent extraordinary circumstances, a defendant may over-
come this presumption only by pointing out specific errors made by
counsel which undermined the adversarial process and prejudiced the
right of the defendant to receive a fair trial.
5
A. Facts
Defendant Cronic and two co-defendants were indicted on thirteen
counts of mail fraud and unlawful use of a fictitious name.6 The indict-
ment charged Cronic and his co-defendants with "kiting" checks worth
over $9,400,000 between banks in Tampa, Florida and Norman,
Oklahoma. The checks were drawn on the accounts of Skyproof Manu-
facturing, Inc., a Florida firm which the indictment alleged was a front
for the check-kiting operation.
7
Cronic and co-defendant Cummings had both retained Levine, a
private attorney, for trial. 8 The attorney withdrew as Cronic's counsel
shortly before the trial date, due to a conflict of interest between Cronic
and Cummings. 9 The trial court appointed new counsel for Cronic.
Cronic stated that he had spoken with the appointed counsel and had
found him helpful, but objected to the appointment because the new
counsel specialized in real estate, had never had a jury trial, and had
1. 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984). Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for the Court. Jus-
tice Marshall concurred in the judgment without opinion.
2. 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982).
3. The sixth amendment provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed on the nature and cause of the accu-
sation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. 104 S. Ct. at 2046 (citing Michel v. New York, 350 U.S. 91, 100-01 (1955)).
5. Id. at 2051.
6. 675 F.2d at 1127. The indictments were based on 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (mail
fraud) and 18 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982) (unlawful use of fictitious name).
7. 104 S. Ct. at 2042 n.4.
8. Levine had represented Cronic, Skyproofand the co-defendant prior to trial. 675
F.2d at 1129.
9. Id.
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previously handled only one federal criminal case.10 The trial court re-
plied that if Cronic wished to select his own lawyer, he could hire one,
but that his appointed counsel was very bright and had been selected
pursuant to normal screening procedures."I
New counsel requested a continuance of at least thirty days in order
to properly prepare for the trial. Cronic's former counsel, Levine, sup-
ported this request, telling the judge that the new attorney would need
at least thirty days to digest the enormous amount of government docu-
mentation gathered in the case.1 2 The trial court agreed to continue the
case, but only for a period of twenty-five days.
13
The government plea-bargained with Cronic's two co-defendants
and presented their testimony at trial in order to etablish that Cronic
had conceived and engineered the entire check-kiting operation. The
government's evidence at trial included the testimony of seventeen wit-
nesses from four states and the government had access to thousands of
documents collected over a four-year investigatory period.14
Counsel for Cronic put on no defense, but through cross-examina-
tion established that Skyproof was not a sham, but was actually an oper-
ating venture. Cross-examination also established the lack of written
evidence demonstrating that Cronic had any control over Skyproof or
had personally participated in withdrawals or deposits in the bank ac-
counts.15 Cronic did not testify because the trial court ruled that a prior
conviction could be used to impeach his testimony.16 At the conclusion
10. Brief for Appellee at 7, Cronic v. United States, 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982).
Appointed counsel told Cronic that his prior federal criminal practice was limited to "in-
volvement" in one other case. Counsel also told the jury that it was his first trial. 675 F.2d
at 1129 n.2.
11. The trial judge responded to Cronic's objections to the appointment in the fol-
lowing manner:
If you are getting around to saying you want to select your own lawyer, no way.
You have got a good lawyer, and if you want your own, you go hire your own.
This man was appointed under our system. We select qualified lawyers, he's
qualified or I wouldn't have appointed him. He's very bright, and he was ap-
pointed from an alphabetical list all of whom are screened and we just don't do it
any other way in this district.
Brief for Appellee at 23.
12. Levine stated that he was prepared to proceed on behalf of Cummings but that
government documentation was "a foot and a half high, if not two feet high," that it con-
strued "hundreds and hundreds of checks and thousands of entries," and that new counsel
hadn't even seen it. Trial Record of Motion to Withdraw and New Appointment of Coun-
sel,June 19, 1980 at 18, lines 7-9. Levine continued, "I would respectfully submit to your
Honor that if counsel were to devote all of his working days, he might be able to be ready
in 30 days, might be if he were to devote all of his time just to this case." Trial Record of
Motion to Withdraw and New Appointment of Counsel, June 19, 1980 at 18, lines 15-18.
13. 104 S. Ct. at 2041-42; 675 F.2d at 1128.
14. 104 S. Ct. at 2041; 675 F.2d at 1128-29.
15. 104 S. Ct. at 2042-43.
16. Id. at 2042. Before the court questioned Cronic to establish whether he under-
stood that he had the right to testify, the following exchange occurred:
The Court: This young man, Colston, I think has done a tremendous job repre-
senting you.
Cronic: I agree, certainly agree.
The Court: You acted at one time that you weren't happy, but that was earlier
when you hadn't seen him in action.
Cronic: I am certainly glad you overruled me.
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of the four-day jury trial, Cronic was convicted on eleven of the thirteen
counts. He was later sentenced to 25 years imprisonment and fined
$11,000.17
B. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
Cronic appealed on the grounds that he was denied effective assist-
ance of counsel at trial, and that his sentence was based on erroneous
information. 18 Cronic contended that his counsel was completely inex-
perienced in criminal law, that he had never tried a case before a jury,
that he was thrust into a situation that was complex both factually and
legally, that twenty-five days was not enough time to prepare for trial,
that prior to trial Cronic met only once with his counsel, and that his
counsel rarely raised objections during the trial and failed to tender any
jury instructions to the court. 19 Cronic argued that all these factors,
taken as a whole, constituted a denial of effective assistance of counsel.
20
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the government cited Dyer v.
Crisp 21 as establishing in the Tenth Circuit that "[t]he Sixth Amendment
demands that defense counsel exercise the skill, judgment and diligence
of a reasonably competent defense attorney."2 2 The government's con-
tention was that Cronic had not demonstrated that his counsel failed to
meet this standard.
23
The court of appeals stated that United States v. Golub 24 and United
States v. King,25 decided after Dyer, established that "when circumstances
hamper a given lawyer's preparation of a defendant's case, the defend-
ant need not show specified errors in the conduct of his defense in order
to show ineffective assistance of counsel." 2 6 In Golub, the defendant ap-
pealed his mail fraud conviction, claiming he was denied adequate assist-
ance of counsel at trial because his trial attorney had been unskilled in
criminal law and had not had adequate time to prepare the defense.
27
Trial Record of Proceedings on July 14, 15, 16, 17, 1980 at 568.
In his motion for new trial, however, Cronic explained his prior praise of counsel
through an affidavit of a psychologist who indicated he had advised respondent to praise
trial counsel in order to ameliorate the lawyer's apparent lack of self-confidence. 104 S.
Ct. at 2043 n.6.
17. 675 F.2d at 1128.
18. The court of appeals decided the case on the effective assistance issue, and de-
clared the erroneous information issue moot. 675 F.2d at 1128.
19. Reply Brief for Appellant at 5.
20. Reply Brief for Appellant at 3.
21. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980).
22. 613 F.2d at 278. In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel under the
standard used by the Tenth Circuit prior to the Dyer decision, a defendant was required to
show that the trial was a farce, a mockery of justice, shocking to the conscience of the
court, or that representation was in bad faith, a sham or pretense, or without adequate
time for conferences and preparation. See Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182, 1187
(10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977); Johnson v. United States, 485 F.2d 240
(10th Cir. 1973).
23. 675 F.2d at 1128.
24. 638 F.2d 185, 187 (10th Cir. 1980).
25. 664 F.2d 1171, 1172-73 (10th Cir. 1981).
26. 675 F.2d at 1128.
27. 638 F.2d at 188.
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Citing Wolfs v. Britton,28 the Golub court applied the following five factors
to determine whether inadequacy of representation could be inferred
from the surrounding circumstances without proof of specific prejudice
at trial: (1) the time allowed to investigate and prepare; (2) counsel's
experience; (3) the severity of the offenses charged; (4) the complexity
of the defense; and (5) counsel's accessibility to witnesses.2 9 According
to the Golub court, if application of these five criteria indicated that coun-
sel simply had not had sufficient time to prepare for trial, ineffective
assistance of counsel may be inferred by the court.
In King, the defendant was indicted for income tax evasion follow-
ing a three-year investigation. 30 The defendant's attorney withdrew,
and new counsel had twenty-seven days to prepare a defense for a eight-
day trial involving approximately 200 witnesses and 5,000 exhibits. 3 1
After his conviction, King appealed on the grounds that he had ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel at trial due to the lack of time given his counsel
for trial preparation. 32 The Tenth Circuit relied on the factors adopted
in Golub to find a sixth amendment violation without looking to any spe-
cific errors made by counsel at trial.
33
The Tenth Circuit in Cronic enunciated the Golub-King factors, and
in applying them, compared Cronic's case to King.3 4 The only material
difference the court found between King and Cronic was that King was
more complex.3 5 The court noted, however, that "Cronic's case was not
an ideal one for an aspiring criminal defense lawyer to cut his teeth on,"
and that if Cronic's case were simpler than King's, "this advantage was
offset by his appointed counsel's total or near-total lack of relevant ex-
perience."' 36 The court concluded that while an attorney's lack of rele-
vant experience does not inevitably give rise to ineffective assistance of
counsel, the Golub-King criteria required that Cronic's conviction be re-
28. 509 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1975).
29. 638 F.2d at 189. The Tenth Circuit found that although Golub's counsel had
performed adequately at trial, he had not had adequate time to prepare in light of the
complexity of the case, the geographical dispersion of witnesses and his unfamiliarity with
criminal law. Id. at 188-89. Golub's convictions were reversed and a new trial ordered,
but the government filed a motion for rehearing and tendered an affidavit from the trial
court stating Golub had received above average assistance of counsel. Granting the mo-
tion, the Tenth Circuit stayed the motion for new trial and ordered an evidentiary hearing
on whether the performance of Golub's counsel was inadequate, and whether he had been
given adequate time to prepare. The trial judge found the performance adequate and that
'no prejudice resulted from the short preparation time. The Tenth Circuit reviewed these
findings in United States v. Golub, 694 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1982), and applied the same
five factors to determine whether the trial preparation time met the constitutional require-
ments. The Tenth Circuit held that Golub failed to show how he had been prejudiced by
the short trial preparation time and that the facts of a particular case must demonstrate
either that the defendant was actually prejudiced by the amount of time allowed for prepa-
ration or that there was a substantial threat of prejudice in order to show a sixth amend-
ment violation. 694 F.2d at 215.
30. 664 F.2d at 1172.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1173.
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versed without finding any specific errors by counsel at trial.3 7
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the court
of appeals had correctly interpreted the sixth amendment. 3 8 The court
analyzed the sixth amendment by reviewing previous Supreme Court
decisions addressing the right to counsel. The Court reaffirmed the im-
portance of the right to effective counsel,3 9 but held that absent ex-
traordinary circumstances, defendants must point to specific errors
committed by counsel at trial in order to show ineffective assistance.
40
Citing McMann v. Richardson,4 1 the Court stated "[i]t has long been
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assist-
ance of counsel," 4 2 noting that in previous decisions it has held that the
Constitution guarantees "adequate legal assistance," 4 3 "a fair trial, and
a competent attorney," 4 4 and "counsel acting in the role of advocate."
4 5
According to the Court, the purpose of the constitutional guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel is to assure partisan advocacy on both
sides of a case, and "to assure fairness in the adversarial criminal pro-
cess." 4 6 The Court concluded that "[t]he right to the effective assist-
ance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the
prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial
testing."
4 7
Although the burden is usually on the accused to demonstrate that
specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the trial pro-
cess, 4 8 the Court noted that there may be circumstances of such magni-
tude that no specific showing of prejudice is required.49 The Court
cited Powell v. Alabama 50 as a case where the actual performance of
counsel at trial was not examined because under the circumstances, "the
likelihood that counsel could have performed as an effective adversary
was so remote as to have made the trial inherently unfair."'5 1 In Powell,
the defendants, indicted for capital offenses, were represented by a law-
yer appointed on the first day of trial who had no chance to prepare the
37. Id.
38. 104 S. Ct. at 2042.
39. Id. at 2043-44.
40. Id. at 2046, 2051. See also id. at 2047 n.26.
41. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
42. 104 S. Ct. at 2044 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 749, 771 n.14
(1970)).
43. 104 S. Ct. at 2044 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)).
44. 104 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982)).
45. 104 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743 (1967)).
46. 104 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1980)).
47. 104 S. Ct. at 2045.
48. Id. at 2046. See also United States v. McDonald, 723 F.2d 1288, 1297 (7th Cir.
1983); Mathews v. United States, 578 F.2d 1245, 1246 (7th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel,
Korval v. Attorney General, 550 F. Supp. 447, 454 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
49. 104 S. Ct. at 2047.
50. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
51. 104 S. Ct. at 2048.
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case or familiarize himself with local procedure. 5 2
In Cronic, the Supreme Court found that while the Golub-King factors
would be relevant to an evaluation of a lawyer's effectiveness in a partic-
ular case, they did not rebut the presumption that Cronic's counsel was
effective. 53 According to the Court, the Golub-King test could require a
reversal "even if a lawyer's actual performance was flawless."' 54 The
Court stated that neither the amount of time the government spent in-
vestigating the case, nor the number of documents government agents
reviewed during that investigation were necessarily relevant to the ques-
tion of whether a competent lawyer could prepare to defend the case in
twenty-five days. 55 The Court noted that Cronic's only bona fide de-
fense was lack of intent, and that an intent defense was "entirely differ-
ent" from the government's burden of presenting admissible evidence
which would prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 56
Although the government had reviewed thousands of documents
and records, 5 7 the Court reasoned that the government's organization
of these documents and records "simplified the work of defense counsel
in identifying and understanding the basic character of the defendant's
scheme."'5 8 The Court also noted that none of the defense lawyers re-
tained by Cronic had suggested that there was any reason to challenge
the authenticity, relevance or reliability of the government's evidence. 59
The Court also stated that while defense counsel's inexperience
might aid in an evaluation of his actual performance, it did not justify a
presumption of ineffectiveness absent an individual evaluation. 60 Like-
wise, the Court found that while the other factors applied by the court of
appeals may be helpful in evaluating a particular attorney's perform-
ance, they do not identify circumstances which alone or in combination
make it unlikely that Cronic received effective assistance of counsel. 6 '
D. Conclusion
In Cronic v. United States, the Supreme Court flatly rejected the Tenth
Circuit's inferential approach to determining whether the defendant's
right to counsel had been violated. A court may no longer apply the five
factors of Golub and King and infer from those circumstances that the
defendant had not been provided with effective assistance of counsel.
What, then, is the standard? What does Cronic tell us about the
sixth amendment guarantee to assistance of counsel? The Court re-
peated past pronouncements on the subject: the accused is entitled to a
52. Id. at 2047.
53. Id. at 2049.
54. Id. at 2043.




59. Id. at 2050 n.34.
60. Id. at 2050.
61. Id. at 2050-51.
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"reasonably competent attorney." 62 The Court also stated that the
right to effective assistance of counsel is the right of the accused to re-
quire the prosecution's case to survive the "crucible of meaningful ad-
versarial testing." 63 If an actual breakdown of the adversarial process
occurs during the trial, the accused will effectively be denied his funda-
mental sixth amendment right. Generally, there will be no basis for
finding such a breakdown unless the accused can show how specific er-
rors of counsel prejudiced his right to a fair trial and undermined the
reliability of the guilty verdict.
Although it rejected the inferential approach of the Tenth Circuit,
the Court stated that circumstances may exist in a case which are so
likely to prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial that specific errors
at trial need not be shown. Such circumstances include complete denial
of counsel at a critical stage of the trial, or a complete failure on the part
of defense counsel to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful ad-
versarial testing.
An example of the latter situation arose in Davis v. Alaska,6 4 in which
the accused was denied the right of effective cross-examination. 6 5 The
Court also stated that the sixth amendment right to counsel guarantee
would be violated if surrounding circumstances were to indicate the like-
lihood that any lawyer could provide effective assistance is so small that a
presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into actual con-
duct at trial. 66 The Court cited Powell v. Alabama 67 as a case in which
"[c]ircumstances of that magnitude" were found. 68 As mentioned pre-
viously, the facts and circumstances of Powell can only be considered ex-
treme: The defendants' lawyer was appointed the day of trial in a highly
publicized capital case. Only in the extraordinary case, therefore, may
ineffective assistance be presumed from the surrounding circumstances.
Cronic stands for the proposition that the five Golub-King factors do
not constitute the proper surrounding circumstances for presuming in-
effective assistance of counsel. The five criteria applied by the Tenth
Circuit in Cronic simply "do not demonstrate that counsel failed to func-
tion in any meaningful sense as the Government's adversary."
69
The effect of the Cronic decision will undoubtedly be widespread
and detrimental to criminal defendants. Most certainly, incidences of
new trials granted on the grounds of effective assistance of counsel will
decrease. The convicted defendant will be placed in a position where
she will have to demonstrate specific errors by counsel at trial or con-
vince the court that the surrounding circumstances are of such magni-
tude that ineffective assistance of counsel may be presumed. In the wake
62. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. at 2044 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 770).
63. 104 S. Ct. at 2045.
64. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
65. Id. at 318.
66. 104 S. Ct. at 2047.
67. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
68. 104 S. Ct. at 2047.
69. Id. at 2051.
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of Cronic, establishing circumstances of the proper magnitude may be an
extremely difficult feat.
Cronic opens the door for trial judges to appoint inexperienced
counsel a few days before trial-constitutionally. Such appointments
are now almost sure to pass muster on review. Although the Court sug-
gested in Cronic that it is "entirely possible that . . . courts should exer-
cise their supervisory powers to take greater precaution to ensure that
counsel . . . are qualified,"' 70 no constitutional mandate exists.
Although the potential abuse by trial judges is frightening, there is
also a possibility that trial courts will feel a sense of greater judicial re-
sponsibility after Cronic's green light. Only by making sure that counsel
for the accused is experienced in pertinent areas of the law and has suffi-
cient time to prepare for trial may judges preserve the vitality of the
sixth amendment guarantee to assistance of counsel. The burden also
falls upon the defendant's appellate counsel and the appellate courts to
ensure that the sixth amendment guarantee to assistance of counsel re-
tains its lifeblood. Although defendants and counsel on appeal may no
longer argue that ineffective assistance of counsel can be inferred from
surrounding circumstances, the Golub-King factors are still relevant when
evaluating counsel's actual performance 7 ' and may be cited in order to
buttress claims of specific errors by counsel at trial. Particularly in the
close case, as where an appellate court is confronted with facts less com-
pelling than Powell but more extreme than Cronic, persuasive recitation





70. Id. at 2050 n.38.
71. Throughout the Cronic opinion, the Court states that although no inference of
ineffective assistance of counsel can be drawn from applying the Golub-King factors, these
factors may be relevant when evaluating the attorney's actual performance at trial. See
Cronic, 104 S. Ct. at 2049, 2050 and 2051.
72. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Robbin Lego in preparing
this article.
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II. McDoNoUGH POWER EQUIPMENT, INc. V. GREENWOOD: SUPREME
COURT LIMITS RIGHT TO NEW TRIAL WHEN JUROR FAILS TO
DISCLOSE DURING VOIR DIRE
In McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood,' the Supreme
Court reversed the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision 2 which had
granted a new trial to the respondent Greenwoods because their right to
peremptory challenge was prejudiced when the jury foreman failed to
answer a voir dire question. The Supreme Court held that in order to
obtain a new trial when a juror gives an incorrect response to a question
on voir dire, a party must show that the question was material, the re-
sponse was dishonest, and that a correct response would have provided
a valid basis for a challenge for cause.
3
A. Background
The case arose out of a products liability action in the District Court
for the District of Kansas. Plaintiffs, Billy Greenwood and his parents,
sued McDonough Power Equipment for damages sustained by Billy
when his foot struck the blades of a riding lawn mower manufactured by
McDonough. 4 During voir dire, plaintiffs' counsel asked prospective ju-
rors the following question:
Now, how many of you have yourself or any members of your
immediate family sustained any severe injury, not necessarily as
severe as Billy, but sustained any injuries whether it was an ac-
cident at home, or on the farm or at work that resulted in any
disability or prolonged pain and suffering, that is you or any
members of your immediate family? 5
Ronald Payton, who later became the jury foreman, did not respond to
this question.
6
After a three week trial, the jury found for the defendant. 7 Shortly
thereafter, the Greenwoods filed a motion with the district court for per-
mission to approach the jury, contending that the jury foreman, Mr. Pay-
ton, failed to disclose that his son had been injured in an accident.8 The
district court denied the motion.9 The following day, the Greenwoods
filed a second motion for permission to approach the jury, and attached
an affidavit from John Greenwood, asserting that as a Navy recruiter,
Mr. Greenwood had reviewed the enlistment application of Payton's
1. 104 S. Ct. 845 (1984).
2. 687 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1982).
3. 104 S. Ct. at 850.
4. Id. at 846. A comprehensive factual recounting can be found in the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision on remand, Greenwood v. McDonough Power Equipment Co., 731 F.2d
690, 691 (10th Cir. 1984).
5. 104 S. Ct. at 847 (citing Appellate's Brief at 19).
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son, in which Payton's son stated he had been injured when a truck tire
exploded.' 0 The trial court granted the second motion in part, allowing
the plaintiffs to approach Payton for a limited telephone inquiry.''
The same day the motion was partially granted, but before the tele-
phone conference call with Payton, the plaintiffs filed a motion for new
trial alleging 18 grounds for error.1 2 One of these grounds was the trial
court's denial of respondents' motion to approach the jury.13 The trial
court denied the motion. 14 The telephone conference call to Payton
was not made a part of the record, nor were the results of the call re-
ported to the District Court.' 5 The parties' appellate briefs contained
differing versions of the telephone interview.
16
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the case and ordered a new trial.17 In
doing so, it relied on the standard enunciated in Photostat v. Ball.18 In
Photostat, an action arising out of an automobile accident, prospective
jurors misunderstood a voir dire question and unintentionally withheld
information about their involvement in automobile accidents and their
resultant claims. 19 The Tenth Circuit held that the failure of a juror to
fully and truthfully answer questions propounded to the panel is revers-
ible error upon a showing of probable bias of the juror and consequent-
ial prejudice to the unsuccessful litigant.
20
In McDonough, the Tenth Circuit found the unrevealed information
met the "sufficient cogency and significance" test of Photostat, indicating
the probable bias of Payton by suggesting his particularly narrow con-
cept of what constitutes a serious injury.2 1 As the telephone call was not
part of the record, the court of appeals discovered the nature of the
withheld information from reading the different versions of the confer-
ence call in the appellate briefs. 22 The court accepted as true that Pay-
10. 687 F.2d at 341.
11. Id. The district court noted that it was "not overly impressed with the significance
of this particular situation." 104 S. Ct. at 847 (citing Appellate's Brief at 89).
12. 104 S. Ct. at 847.
13. Id.
14. Id. The trial court found "the matter was fairly and thoroughly tried and that the
jury's verdict was a just one, well supported by the evidence."
15. Id.
16. 687 F.2d at 341.
17. Id. at 343.
18. 338 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1964).
19. Id. at 784-85.
20. Id. at 787. The information withheld was of"sufficient cogency and significance"
that the court believed counsel was entitled to know of it when he exercised his peremp-
tory challenges.
21. 687 F.2d at 342-43.
22. Id. at 341. The Greenwoods' brief stated that Payton said "it did not make any
difference whether his son had received a broken leg as the result of an exploding tire,"
that "having accidents are a part of life" and that "all his children have been involved in
accidents." McDonough's brief stated that Payton "did not regard (his son's injury) as a
Isevere' injury and as he understood the question (the injury) did not result in any disabil-
ity or prolonged pain and suffering, and that as far as Mr. Payton is concerned, he an-
swered counsel's question honestly, and correctly, by remaining silent." Id.
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ton's concealment of the information was unintentional, but stated that
good faith was irrelevant. 23 The proper standard is whether the average
prospective juror would have disclosed the information, and whether a
correct answer would have been evidence of probable bias on the part of
the juror.
2 4
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari2 5 to correct the legal standard
applied by the Tenth Circuit. Initially, however, the Court noted that
the Tenth Circuit erred in addressing the merits, as the court of appeals
should have remanded to the district court for a hearing on the new trial
motion.
2 6
Judicial economy was the paramount concern in the Court's rever-
sal of the Tenth Circuit.2 7 The Court, per Justice Rehnquist, indicated
that the Tenth Circuit decision on the merits was outmoded in that it
harkened to an era "when all trial error was presumed prejudicial"
2 8
and reviewing courts were considered "citadels of technicality". 2 9 The
Court reasoned that the financial and temporal costs of trials to parties
and jurors in light of the ever increasing caseload made it impossible to
provide flawless trials for litigants.
3 0
The Supreme Court assessed the Tenth Circuit's ruling in light of
the federal harmless error statute.3 1 Although this statute applies to ap-
pellate courts, it mirrors the harmless error principle of Rule 61 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 32 Both the statute and rule reflect a
movement away from automatic reversal for error, and direct trial courts
23. Id. at 343 (citing Photostat, 338 F.2d at 785).
24. Id.; 104 S. Ct. at 848 n.3.
25. 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
26. 104 S. Ct. at 848 n.3. The Court stated: "in cases in which a party is asserting a
ground for a new trial, the normal procedure is to remand such issues to the district court
for resolution."
The court of appeals had considered the versions of the telephone call to Payton in
the parties' appellate briefs to decide that the unrevealed information met the Photostat
"significance and cogency" test. The Supreme Court found this action by the court of
appeals highly unorthodox, stating "(a)ppellate tribunals are poor substitutes for trial
courts for developing a record or resolving factual controversies." Id.
27. The Court concluded that "[t]o invalidate the result of a three-week trial because
of a juror's mistaken, though honest response to a question, is to insist on something
closer to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give." Id. at 850. The
standard applied by the Tenth Circuit was "contrary to the practical necessities ofjudicial
management reflected in Rule 61 and § 2111." Id.
28. Id. at 848.
29. 104 S. Ct. at 848 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946)
(quoting Kavanaugh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial
Power, 11 A.B.A.J. 217, 222 (1925))).
30. Id.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982). "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in
any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard
to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Id.
32. 104 S. Ct. at 849. Rule 61 provides, in pertinent part that "No error.., or defect
in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties
is grounds for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict . . . unless refusal to take
such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every
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to exercise discretion in determining whether the substantial rights of
the parties and the essential fairness of the trial have been impaired.
The Court used the varied responses to the voir dire question to
demonstrate that there is no average juror.3 3 Consistent with the princi-
ples stated in Smith v. Phillips,34 the Court stated that the right of the
parties is to have "an impartial trier of fact." '3 5 By exposing personal
biases, voir dire examination protects that right.3 6 The most important
safeguard in this process is that prospective jurors answer honestly.
37
The Court reasoned that the Greenwoods' substantial rights had not
been impaired because Payton's answer to the question posed during
voir dire, though mistaken, was honest. The Court held that the stan-
dard for a new trial in this situation requires first, a demonstration that a
juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire and, sec-
ond, a showing that a correct response would have provided a valid basis
for challenge for cause. 38 The standard articulated by the Supreme
Court is more stringent than the Tenth Circuit standard. Having dis-
missed the validity of using the probable response of an average juror as
a benchmark, the Court indicated that honesty in answering material
questions is the determinative factor in deciding whether a juror is im-
partial. Furthermore, courts may only grant a new trial when the right
to challenge for cause is impaired, not when the right to peremptory
challenge is impaired.
39
Both concurring opinions attempted to clarify the standard
presented by the majority opinion. Justice Blackmun, joined by justices
O'Connor and Stevens, agreed that the proper inquiry is whether the
defendant had the benefit of an impartial trier of fact; and, that in most
cases, "the honesty or dishonesty" of a prospective juror's answer to a
voir dire question will be "the best initial indicator of the degree of im-
partiality." 40 Blackmun stressed, however, that the decision to grant a
post-trial hearing lies with the trial court's discretion based on factual
circumstances from which bias is demonstrated or inferred.
4 1
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
33. 104 S. Ct. at 849-50. Payton's belief that his son's injury was not an injury which
"resulted in any disability or prolonged pain or suffering," id. (citing Appellate's Brief at
19), was contrasted with another juror's belief that her six-year-old son did suffer such an
injury when he caught his finger in a bike chain, and a third juror's initial failure to re-
spond, although her husband had been injured in a machinery accident. The Court rea-
soned that there can be no standard for an "average juror", as they come from varied
backgrounds, and the statutory qualifications for jurors require only a minimal compe-
tency in the English language. Id. at 849 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1982). Furthermore,
the Court added that "such a standard is difficult to apply and productive of uncertain-
ties." Id. at 850.
34. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).




39. Id. at 850.




Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred with the
judgment based on procedural considerations, 4 2 but wrote to express
his dissatisfaction with the standard adopted by the Court.4 3 Brennan
interpreted the majority opinion to mean that a new trial is never war-
ranted if a juror answers voir dire questions honestly, but incorrectly.
Brennan agreed that the court of appeals applied an erroneous stan-
dard, but felt the inquiry should focus on the bias of the juror and the
resulting prejudice to the litigant. 44 Therefore, Brennan concluded, the
correct standard would require a demonstration that the juror incor-
rectly responded to a material question on voir dire, and a showing that
under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, the juror was
biased against the movant.4 5 Honesty and intent, according to Brennan,
should merely be additional factors for the Court's consideration.
46
Thus, unlike the Tenth Circuit, Brennan felt intent was relevant, but
discounted honesty's importance because it might not indicate implied
bias. 4 7 Because of the possibility of implied bias, Brennan felt a court
should consider two questions: whether there were any "facts in the
case suggesting that bias should be conclusively presumed; and, if not, is




McDonough is another disconcerting example of the Supreme
Court's tendency to decide cases on broader issues than the facts re-
quire. 49 Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed with the majority that
the Tenth Circuit should have remanded the issue of juror bias to the
district court for a hearing rather than deciding it on its merits. 50 The
Tenth Circuit never stated that the district court abused its discretion in
not ordering a new trial, nor did it confine its decision to a review of the
42. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 851.
45. "One easily can imagine cases in which a prospective juror provides what he sub-
jectively believes to be an honest answer, yet that same answer is objectively incorrect and
therefore suggests that the individual would be a biased juror in the particular case." Id.
46. Id.
47. Brennan stated that "the bias of a juror will rarely be admitted by the juror him-
self, 'partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias and partly
because the juror may be unaware of it' ". 104 S. Ct. at 85! (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 955
U.S. 209, 221-24 (1982)).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3446-48 (StevensJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (Fourth amendment case in which the Court acknowledged
that it could have remanded the case to the court of appeals for reconsideration of the
issue of probable cause in light of Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), yet voted it was
within its authority to decide the broader question of whether to modify the exclusionary
rule and, subsequently, reverse the court of appeals.); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2595-2610 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The District Court's
action was a preliminary injunction reviewable only on an abuse of discretion standard; the
Court treated the action as a permanent injunction and decided the merits, even though
the District Court had not yet had an opportunity to do so." Id. at 2596.).
50. 104 S. Ct. at 848 n.3; id. at 851 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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motion under the information available to the district court for its deci-
sion. The district court was in no position to exercise its discretion on
the issue ofjuror bias, because the results of the telephone conversation
with Payton were never reported to it. 5 1 Both appellate courts based
their rulings on the assumption that Payton incorrectly answered a voir
dire question. In fact, there is no indication in the record that the an-
swer was incorrect. The courts relied on the parties' briefs to conclude
that Payton gave an honest but incorrect answer.
52
The Supreme Court recognized that a motion for a new trial is com-
mitted to the discretion of the trial court and that the Tenth Circuit
should have remanded the case to the district court for a hearing on
Payton's non-disclosure. 53 Despite this criticism, the Supreme Court as-
serted a new standard without any record of the facts in controversy.
On remand, the Tenth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's new rule
and ignored its criticism, dismissing the claim based on Greenwood's
counsel's statement that Payton believed his answer was honest.
54
Thus, the issue in McDonough was appealed all the way to the United
States Supreme Court, remanded to the Tenth Circuit, and then dis-
missed without any finding of the underlying facts.
The Supreme Court's new standard is, however, clearer and more
objective than the tests announced by the Tenth Circuit in Photostat. It
promotes judicial economy by reducing the chance that courts grant
new trials due to insignificant mistakes in voir dire. Although the
Supreme Court did not expressly overrule Photostat, it in effect accom-
plished as much. To obtain a new trial under McDonough a party must
show that a correct and honest response would have provided a valid
basis for challenge for cause. Because this standard is far more stringent
than the Photostat test, the right to peremptory challenge has been se-
verely limited. Ironically, the Supreme Court chose to limit this right in
the interests of judicial economy in a case which should have been re-
manded to the district court at the appellate level based on procedural
considerations.
Susan H. Klann
51. The Greenwoods contend that their efforts to make a more extensive post-trial
record were "thwarted" and that "this was specifically pointed out to counsel for McDon-
ough by one of the circuit judges at oral argument." Petition in Opposition to Certiorari
at 15.
52. 104 S. Ct. at 848 n.3; 687 F.2d at 341.
53. The Court noted that "appellate tribunals are poor substitutes for trial courts for
developing a record or resolving factual controversies." 104 S. Ct. at 848 n.3.
54. 731 F.2d 690 (1984).
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III. FINAL SCORE: BOARD OF REGENTS 3, NCAA 0-SUPREME COURT
AFFIRMS TENTH CIRCUIT'S FINDING THAT NCAA TELEVISION
PLAN CONSTITUTED RESTRAINT OF TRADE
A. Introduction
In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma, ' the Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Circuit's ruling 2
that the 1982-85 television plan of the National Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation (NCAA) for broadcasting its members' football games 3 violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 4 More significant than the majority's
holding that the plan constituted a horizontal restraint of trade,5 how-
ever, was its application of the rule of reason 6 and its refusal to apply the
per se rule.
7
Antitrust litigants, already confused by the Supreme Court's recent
inconsistent application of the per se rule, 8 will view the NCAA decision
as further evidence of the Court's retreat from its "hardline" application
of the per se rule in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society. 9 Maricopa,
NCAA, and National Society of Professional Engineers v. United Statest ° were
all authored by Justice Stevens. In MaricopaJustice Stevens relied on per
se analysis, while in NCAA he clearly rejected the rule's applicability. In
Professional Engineers, although Justice Stevens did not state the rule on
1. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984) [hereinafter NCAA].
2. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983).
3. There are 850 colleges and universities within the NCAA, divided into Divisions I,
II and III. 187 out of the 276 members in Division I have football teams. Divisions II and
III have smaller sports programs but vote on all matters, including approval of the football
television plans. 104 S. Ct. at 2954.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
5. 104 S. Ct. at 2971.
6. The rule of reason, first suggested in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affid, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), examines the surrounding circum-
stances which gave rise to the presumption of illegality to determine if the questioned
business behavior is anticompetitive and violative of the antitrust laws. The classic adop-
tion of the rule of reason appears in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911).
7. The per se rule classifies certain categories of business behavior as antitrust viola-
tions without inquiring into circumstances surrounding the activity. The rationale behind
the rule is that certain behaviors have been identified as anticompetitive with such regular-
ity that analysis is no longer necessary to arrive at a decision as to its legality. This is so
even if there are instances in which the rule is unfairly applied. See United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
8. Justice White refused to apply the per se rule in a case of apparently straightfor-
ward price-fixing in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1
(1979). Three years later, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982), stated that once activity has been charac-
terized as price-fixing, there is no room for balancing procompetitive effects; the per se
rule must be applied.
9. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
10. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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which he relied, he apparently used the rule of reason.I1  These three
opinions, particularly NCAA, reflect the increasingly limited reliance on
the per se rule in antitrust analysis.
This comment analyzes the Supreme Court's distinction between
the per se rule and the rule of reason in examining the NCAA's alleged
antitrust violations. As the Supreme Court has previously noted, the
distinction between the two rules may not be critical. Under either rule,
one evaluates the competitive effects of the restraint. 12 This comment
suggests, however, that while abandonment of the per se rule appears to
be consistent with the Court's decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 13 it may have been unnecessary in this case. The
NCAA decision also illustrates the Court's increasing use of the Chicago
school's' 4 efficiency theory in analyzing alleged antitrust violations. The
comment concludes by discussing the problems inherent in this method
of antitrust analysis.
B. Background
For the past eight decades the NCAA, an unincorporated, non-
profit, educational association, has exerted almost complete regulatory
control over the sports programs of its member colleges and universi-
ties.' 5 There is little disagreement that most of the policies imple-
mented by the NCAA have not only enhanced intercollegiate sports
programs but have also been essential to such programs' existence.16 A
challenge to that consensus arose, however, in regard to the NCAA's
control over the sale of television rights to football.
17
11. In Professional Engineers, the Court moved away from reliance on the "price-fixing"
element as proof of a per se violation. The Court's inquiry, however, was a limited appli-
cation of the rule of reason insofar as it only examined the anticompetitive impact of the
restraint; the Court seemed reluctant to weigh procompetitive impacts.
12. If the restraint is clearly and always anticompetitive, the practice is banned under
the per se rule. If it is less clearly anticompetitive, the restraint may be either labelled
anticompetitive or procompetitive after analysis under the rule of reason. As Justice Ste-
vens stated in National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, "In either event, the
purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the
restraint .... " 435 U.S. at 692.
13. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
14. The Chicago school is a group of economists who favor a strict economic ap-
proach to antitrust analysis. Under this theory microeconomics provides the foundation
for interpretation of the antitrust laws. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY
AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978). For an analysis of the Chicago school and, in particular,
Judge Posner's disregard for objectives other than promotion of efficiency through compe-
tition, see Comment, Changing Configurations of Antitrust Law: Judge Posner's Applications of His
Economic Analysis to Antitrust Doctrine, 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 839, 882-96 (1983).
15. The NCAA was founded in 1905. "The NCAA, in short 'exist[s] primarily to en-
hance the contribution made by amateur athletic competition to the process of higher
education as distinguished from realizing maximum return on it as an entertainment com-
modity.' " NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2972 (WhiteJ, dissenting) (quoting Association for Inter-
collegiate Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 558 F. Supp. 487, 494 (D.C. 1983), afd, 735
F.2d 577 (D.C.'Cir. 1984).
16. These policies include the regulation of recruiting and the establishment of stan-
dards for academic eligibility. 707 F.2d at 1153.
17. Football is the only area of amateur intercollegiate sports in which the NCAA has
attempted to regulate television rights. 104 S. Ct. at 2954.
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In 1951, based on studies by the National Opinion Research
Center, the NCAA decided it was necessary to limit the number of tele-
vised football games in order to protect live attendance.' 8 This goal was
accomplished by a series of plans in which the NCAA sold exclusive tele-
vision rights. 19 In 1981, the NCAA adopted a plan for 1982-1985 which
awarded television rights to ABC and CBS. 20 The heart of the NCAA's
plan was the payment of a recommended fee 2 ' by the networks to each
member school for the right to televise its games. Importantly, the
amount any team received for such rights bore no relationship to the
size of the viewing audience or any particular feature of a game or
team.2 2 A much anticipated game between two prominent schools re-
ceived the same fee as a game which attracted a far smaller audience.
This fact was crucial to the Supreme Court's finding that the plan was
anticompetitive.
2 3
Dissatisfied with the television plans, in 1979 a small group within
the College Football Association (CFA) 24 began to push for a greater
voice in the creation of television policy for those schools with major
football programs. When the CFA signed its own contract with NBC in
August 1981, the NCAA threatened sanctions. In September, 1981, the
CFA brought suit charging that the NCAA's control unreasonably re-
strained the trade of televising college football.
2 5
18. The accuracy of the studies has been questioned. The district court found
NCAA's reliance on the studies "either an ill-founded belief at best or, at worst, a decep-
tion employed to make the majority of the NCAA membership believe that they should
control football television out of self interest." Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v.
NCAA, 546 F. Supp 1276, 1296 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
As the Supreme Court noted, the concern is not about protecting attendance at games
that are televised, but that fan interest in games shown on television may adversely affect
ticket sales for games which are not televised. The Court stated, however, that the evi-
dence simply did not lead to such a finding. Statistics from the 1984 college football sea-
son support the Court's conclusion. Although the NCAA decision resulted in a
tremendous expansion in the number of Division IA games broadcast on network and
cable television during 1984, live attendance at Division IA games actually increased over
the 1983 pre-decision figures. In 1984, 25,783,807 spectators attended 606 Division IA
games, for an average of 42,548 per game. In 1983, 25,381,761 spectators attended 602
games, for an average of 42,162 per game. Telephone interview with representative of
NCAA Statistics Department, Shawnee Mission, Kansas (Jan. 15, 1985).
19. The television plans were approved by referendum votes of the NCAA's member-
ship from 1952-1977. After 1977, the members voted only on the "Principles of Negotia-
tion" which purportedly formed the basis of the plans. 546 F. Supp. at 1283.
20. 104 S. Ct. at 2956.
21. A representative of the NCAA set fees based on the different types of telecasts
(e.g., national or regional). Id.
22. Id.
23. "Price is higher and output lower than they would otherwise be, and both are
unresponsive to consumer preference." 104 S. Ct. at 2963-64.
24. The CFA is an unincorporated voluntary association formed in June 1977. At the
time the Supreme Court heard NCAA, the CFA was composed of 61 institutions of higher
learning that had indicated commitments to major college football.
25. The CFA also obtained a preliminary injunction to prevent the NCAA from inter-
fering with its contract with NBC. The effect of NCAA's threats, however, was sufficient to
cause the CFA-NBC arrangement to fail. 546 F. Supp. at 1286-87.
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C. District Court Decision
In a thorough decision,2 6 Judge Burciaga, sitting by designation in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma,
held that the football television controls constituted a horizontal re-
straint of trade, a group boycott, and a monopoly in the market of col-
lege football. 2 7 Demonstrating the current uncertainty regarding
reliance on the per se rule, the district court held that the television plan
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act 28 when examined under either the
per se rule2 9 or the rule of reason.
3 0
The decision purported to lay to rest numerous contentions raised
by the NCAA as to the inappropriateness of applying antitrust sanctions
to a voluntary association. The NCAA argued that membership in the
NCAA was voluntary and therefore plaintiffs could withdraw from the
association if they were unhappy with the plan. The district court dis-
agreed. Forming a rival group was "neither practical, feasible nor desir-
able," 3' and, furthermore, plaintiffs wanted to remain in the NCAA.
Therefore, the district court found that relief under the antitrust laws
was appropriate.
The district court also labeled as "cavil" the NCAA's argument that
college football was not a business and therefore merited a different
type of antitrust analysis.3 2 The district court noted that the purpose of
the NCAA's television controls was to maximize football revenues of its
member schools, and that the NCAA was very much a business, free to
maximize revenues as long as the means were legal.3 3 The court also
dismissed the NCAA's argument that it did not possess market power.
Defining the relevant market as live college football, 34 the court found
the NCAA exercised monopoly power in that market.
The district court began its two-part analysis with a restatement of
three principles which it apparently believes are unchallenged: first, that
the intent of the Sherman Act is to preserve unrestrained economic
competition;3 5 second, that it is for Congress and not the courts to de-
26. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Okla.
1982).
27. Both the district court decision and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
are described in greater detail in the Antitrust section of the Tenth Annual Tenth Circuit
Survey (June 1, 1982-May 31, 1983), 61 DEN. L.J. 135 (1984). In particular, the reader is
'eferred to that article for careful analysis of the Tenth Circuit's opinion. This comment
focuses on the Supreme Court's review of that decision with respect to the application of
the per se rule and the rule of reason, and with respect to the Court's reliance on output
restriction theory.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
29. 546 F. Supp. at 1311, 1313.
30. Id. at 1319.
31. The district court reasoned that, "[a]s a practical matter, membership in the
NCAA is a prerequisite for institutions wishing to sponsor a major, well-rounded athletic
program." Id. at 1288.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1288-89.
34. Id. at 1297.
35. This belief is based, in turn, on the principle that unrestrained competition yields
the greatest good for society. Id. at 1304. See, Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356
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termine if competition is the wisest policy for a specific industry or if it
may, in fact, be ruinous;3 6 and third, that price fixing, group boycotts
and horizontal agreements among competing sellers to limit the availa-
bility of a product are unreasonable per se.
3 7
The court based much of its analysis on Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System. 38 In Broadcast Music, the Supreme Court re-
jected the per se rule in spite of the presence of all the outward signs of
traditional price fixing.3 9 In NCAA the district court demonstrated lit-
eral price fixing on the part of the NCAA and held that a finding of
literal price fixing does not automatically result in per se illegality.
40
The district court in NCAA found it necessary to inquire whether the
restraint increased efficiency and rendered the market more competi-
tive. Until this point in the decision, the district court appeared to be
following the Supreme Court's rejection in Broadcast Music of the third
principle which the district court had regarded as unchallenged-that
horizontal agreements limiting product availability and price fixing are
illegal per se.
The district court, however, then distinguished the NCAA television
restraint from the blanket license in Broadcast Music on several
grounds. 4 1 The district court also dismissed the NCAA's argument re-
garding the restraint's procompetitive features by reference to Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society, 4 2 wherein the Court held that the per se
U.S. 1 (1958). For a strong attack on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sherman
Act to protect existing enterprises to the exclusion of social objectives and an attack on the
Court's reliance on the "myth of cost supremacy over value," see Curran, Antitrust and the
Rule of Reason: A Critical Assessment, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 745 (1984). See generally Bork, The
Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965),
suggesting that "the sole appropriate value in this field of antitrust is the maximization of
consumer want satisfaction," id at 781. For a thorough analysis of contrary views, for
example, see Justice Peckham's rule of reason analysis in United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 390 (1897). Justice Peckham, as Judge Bork points out, believed the
goals of the Sherman Act could properly include the social and political as well as the
economic well-being of the nation.
36. 546 F. Supp. at 1304 (citing National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)). Traditionally, if competition appears to be disastrous to an
industry, the industry applies to Congress for a statutory exemption from the antitrust
laws.
37. 546 F. Supp. at 1304. See supra note 7.
38. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
39. In Broadcast Music, the defendants issued nonexclusive blanket licenses entitling
licensees to use of the member composers' works. The Court determined that the blanket
licenses would not always reduce output and restrict competition. The licensing was simi-
lar to the NCAA plan insofar as a single fee was charged with no relation to, for example,
the number of times the composition would be used. The Court found not only that the
restraints should not be accorded per se treatment but that they were likewise reasonable
under the rule of reason.
40. 547 F. Supp. at 1305.
41. The grounds include: (1) in Broadcast Music a federal law had granted composers
the right to copyright, and a market arrangement to protect a federally-created right did
not logically appear to be a violation of the antitrust laws; (2) individual composers were
free to make their own deals in spite of the blanket licensing; and (3) the arrangement in
Broadcast Music was a necessary means of marketing the composers' work. Similar consid-
erations were not found in ACAA. Id.
42. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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rule applied in spite of procompetitive justifications. 4 3 Thus, unlike the
Supreme Court in Broadcast Music, the district court did not find ade-
quate grounds for rejecting the per se rule.
Having concluded that the television plan was a per se violation of
the Sherman Act, the district court nevertheless proceeded to analyze
the television plan under the rule of reason. Considering only the plan's
impact on competitive conditions, 44 the court found the plan's contribu-
tion to the legitimate non-commercial goals of the NCAA was minimal
and indirect. The district court found the clear and overriding effect of
the plan was the suppression of competition in the marketing of games
for television viewing. Furthermore, the court found no procompetitive
benefits to offset or justify such anticompetitive restraints.
4 5
D. The Court of Appeals Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's two-part
analysis in finding that the plan constituted a Sherman Act violation
under either the per se rule or the rule of reason.4 6 The Tenth Circuit
held fast to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Professional Engineers4 7 that
noneconomic considerations cannot justify restraints that adversely af-
fect competition, and added that even if such a justification was legiti-
mate, any contribution to athletic balance by the NCAA's plan could be
achieved by less restrictive means. 4 8 It found that, on its face, the televi-
sion plan restricted output. 49 The Court of Appeals noted that in some
circumstances ancillary restraints5 0 will escape the per se rule.5 1 It
found in this case, however, that the NCAA television plan was not "an-
43. Id. at 351.
44. 546 F. Supp. at 1314. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978), which states:
The Rule of Reason. .. has been used to give the [Sherman] Act both flexibility
and definition, and its central principle of antitrust analysis has remained con-
stant. Contrary to its name, the Rule does not open the field of antitrust inquiry
to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of
reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on com-
petitive conditions.
45. The district court specifically found that the controls did not protect gate attend-
ance as claimed or preserve a competitive balance among the schools. 546 F. Supp. at
1319.
46. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983). The court also affirmed the district court's
grant of standing and reversed its finding that the controls constituted a per se group
boycott.
47. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
48. 707 F.2d at 1154.
49. Id. at 1156. Output restriction is one approach to assessing efficiency. It is used
widely by those who contend the sole purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote efficiency
and consumer welfare. See Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 COR-
NELL L. REV., 1140 (1981). The Court of Appeals concluded that there was a decrease in
output based on the drop in viewership that accompanied the plan. 707 F.2d at 1153-54.
The Supreme Court stated that "[b]y restraining the quantity of television rights available
for sale, the challenged practices create a limitation on output." 104 S. Ct. at 2960.
50. A restraint is considered ancillary only when "[t]he parties [are] cooperating in an
economic activity other than the elimination of rivalry, and the agreement must be capable
of increasing the effectiveness of that cooperation and no broader than necessary for that
purpose." 707 F.2d at 1153 (quoting R. BORK, THE AwrNImusT PARADOX 279 (1978)).
51. 707 F.2d at 1152-53 n.6.
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cillary to the rulemaking integration" because it did not increase the effi-
ciency of the integration and was broader than necessary to achieve the
procompetitive goals.
5 2
E. The Supreme Court Opinion 53
NCAA presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to ad-
dress the confusion surrounding the application of the per se rule and
the rule of reason. It also afforded the Supreme Court the opportunity
to determine the reasonableness of the alleged ancillary restraint by ex-
amining the nature, purpose and history of the television plan.
Although addressing many of these issues throughout its opinion, the
Court confined itself to a very narrow holding based primarily on the
Chicago school's output-restriction approach.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted that some restraints
are necessary to preserve amateur collegiate sports. Thus, rule of rea-
son analysis was required to determine whether the challenged restraint,
which appeared to violate the antitrust laws, actually enhanced competi-
tion. 54 In other words, the Court looked at the nature of the institution
and decided that application of the per se rule was inappropriate. The
Court conceded that the NCAA's agreement among competitors as to
how they compete was the type of horizontal restraint which has often
been presumed unreasonable.5 5 The Court, however, elected not to ap-
ply the per se rule, reasoning that some horizontal restraints are neces-
sary if the product is to be made available. 5 6 Moreover, the Court made
clear that the basic thrust of the inquiry under either test is essentially
the same-to determine the impact of the restraint on competitive con-
ditions.5 7 In this respect it is consistent with the lower court decisions.
Examining the effects of the NCAA restraints, the Court found that
price was higher and output lower than they would be under normal
market conditions. 58 It determined that both price and output were un-
responsive to consumer preference, and thus the restraints failed to
meet a primary goal of the Sherman Act.5 9 Addressing the NCAA's as-
52. Id. at 1154.
53. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
54. Id. at 2969.
55. Id. at 2959. Such restraints, limiting output and price fixing, are usually held to be
illegal per se. Id. at 2960. The per se rule has traditionally been applied in spite of the
occasional reasonableness of a restraint because of the probability that most restraints will
be anticompetitive. The rule itself, in order to preserve judicial economy, precludes con-
sideration of factors which may prove to have procompetitive effects.
56. The Court specifically stated it did not base its decision on lack of experience with
this type of restraint or the NCAA's nonprofit status. Id. The Court thus took upon itself
to inquire into the characteristics of the college football industry. It described the "vital
role" the NCAA plays in preserving the character of college football and enabling "a prod-
uct to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable." Id. at 2961.
57. 104 S. Ct. at 2960 & n.21.
58. Id. at 2963-64.
59. Id. (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979), which viewed the
Sherman Act as a "consumer welfare prescription"). "A restraint that has the effect of
reducing the importance of consumer preference in setting price and output is not consis-
tent with this fundamental goal of antitrust law." 104 S. Ct. at 2964.
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sertion that the plan could not have an anticompetitive effect because it
lacked market power, the Court noted that absence of proof of market
power did not justify naked restrictions on price or output. 60 Further-
more, as the District Court so painstakingly demonstrated, the NCAA
did possess market power.6 1 The Supreme Court thus concluded that
the effect of the NCAA's restraint upon the operations of the market
placed a heavy burden on the NCAA to present an affirmative defense
that justified the restraint.
6 2
At this point the Supreme Court, distinguishing the facts before it
from those in Broadcast Music, held that the NCAA television plan did not
enhance competitiveness or produce any "procompetitive efficiencies"
to prevent it from being found in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 6 3 The Court made short shrift of the NCAA's concern with protect-
ing live attendance. In addition to the fact that the record indicated the
plan simply did not protect live attendance, the Court noted that it could
not accept a justification based on the fear that the product itself might
not attract enough customers.64 Furthermore, the Court agreed with
the district court that the television restraints did not help maintain
competitive balance and that, if the restraints were removed, many more
games would be televised in a free market.
6 5
F. The Dissent
Justice White,joined by Justice Rehnquist, maintained that the tele-
vision plan was not fundamentally different from the other "anticompet-
itive" aspects of NCAA self-regulation such as fixing the number of
coaches, regulating recruitment and determining the number of games
to be played. Justice White attacked the majority as being caught up in
"commercial antitrust rhetoric and ideology."' 6 6 His primary disagree-
ment was with the majority's finding that the plan had a substantial an-
ticompetitive effect. First, Justice White specifically disagreed with the
idea that output should be measured by the number of televised games.
Rather, the Justice maintained, output should be measured by the size of
the actual television audiences; the Justice found that audience size was
actually enlarged by the plan.6 7 Second, he charged that respondents
failed to prove that it was the reduction in the number of televised
60. 104 S. Ct. at 2965.
61. Id. at 2965-67.
62. Id. at 2967. The effect, as previously noted, was to raise price and reduce output.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2968-69. See also supra note 18.
65. Id. at 2970.
66. Id. at 2974 (White, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2975. CompareJustice White's dissent, which deplores the majority's mea-
surement of price and output and proposes that the measure is not the reduction of games
shown locally and regionally but the increase in total audience as a result of greater net-
work coverage, with Judge Logan's statement in the Tenth Circuit's opinion: "We doubt
on its face the argument that the output may be properly characterized as viewership
... . An argument that total viewership is enhanced by restricting the sale of broadcast-
ing rights is speculative." 707 F.2d at 1154.
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games that increased the price.68 Traditionally, reductions in the mar-
ket result in higher prices for the same product. Justice White argued,
however, that the NCAA had created a new product (exclusive television
rights) that was more valuable than games marketed individually.
69
Third, he found the redistribution of revenues a "wholly justifiable, even
necessary" aspect of the intercollegiate athletic system.
70
Justice White also argued that the NCAA's program of self-regula-
tion was "essentially noneconomic."' 7 1 He attacked the Tenth Circuit's
and the district court's view that Professional Engineers7 2 precluded reli-
ance on policy considerations when analyzing a restraint's impact on
competition. 73 Finally, the Justice attempted to distinguish Professional
Engineers based on the fact the engineers were engaged in "standard,
profit-motivated commercial activities," as contrasted with the "primar-
ily noneconomic values pursued by educational institutions."
' 7 4
G. The Consequences of the Majority's Decision
The Supreme Court's NCAA decision immediately evoked wide-
spread speculation that it spelled disaster for smaller colleges and would
lead to the demise of college football. 7 5 Justice White's concern that the
television plan was part of the "essentially noneconomic" regulation of
collegiate sports and should not be examined by the same antitrust crite-
ria applied to business enterprises has been echoed by many
sportspersons.
The Supreme Court, however, arrived at the only conclusion as to
the anticompetitive effects and nature of the plan that would be consis-
tent with the Court's prior interpretation of the Sherman Act. It was
clear to the Court, regardless of the general defensibility of restrictions
on college sports, that the NCAA's television plan interfered with the
schools' basic freedom to sell their games at whatever price obtainable.
Justice Stevens effectively answered every attempt by the NCAA to jus-
68. 104 S. Ct. at 2975-76 (White, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2976. The Justice suggested that the price rise might more properly be
attributable to the increase in output. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2977.
72. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
73. 104 S. Ct. at 2978 (White, j., dissenting). The lower courts based this view on
language in Professional Engineers that the purpose of antitrust analysis "is to form a judg-
ment about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy
favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an
industry." 435 U.S. at 692.
74. 104 S. Ct. at 2978 (White, J., dissenting).
75. See, e.g., Taaffee, The Supreme Court's TV Ruling: Will the Viewer Benefit Most, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, July 9, 1984, at 9. Taaffee worried that, although the Court theoretically
"established an open market in which the schools could peddle their games indepen-
dently," the decision had actually created chaos in which the "only certainty is that college
football is going the way of college basketball, with games proliferating all over the dial."
Id. at 9. He also expressed the widespread fear that the decision meant that the TV net-
works and a handful of top schools would be better off financially, but that the less prestig-
ious schools were bound to suffer. Id
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tify the restraint and portray itself as incapable of violating the antitrust
laws.
It is unclear, however, whether it was necessary for the Supreme
Court to reject the per se rule in evaluating the anticompetitive effects of
the television plan. The Court's decision to apply the rule of reason was
based on the Court's recognition that other horizontal restraints were
necessary in the college football industry. None of the NCAA's other
restraints, however, involved price fixing, a restraint to which procom-
petitive justifications have not traditionally been allowed. 76 Arguably,
the Court could have held, regardless of the fact some restraints en-
hanced competition within the NCAA, that the restraint's price fixing
effect clearly distinguished the television plan and justified a finding that
it automatically violated the Sherman Act. This analysis would have
been consistent with Justice Steven's 1982 Maricopa7 7 opinion.
The NCAA decision, which moves away from the per se rule and
toward the rule of reason, is consistent, however, with the decisions in
Broadcast Music, Professional Engineers, and Continental T. V. v. GTE Sylva-
nia.78 Perhaps the Supreme Court chose to apply the rule of reason not
because the anticompetitive effects of the plan were unclear, but because
the Court felt that application of the per se rule to the NCAA, a volun-
tary association, would be inherently unfair. 79 The rule of reason, how-
ever, was not created by the courts as a way to avoid Sherman Act
liability, but as a method of evaluating anticompetitive effects when a
restraint clearly does not interfere with the freedom to make such funda-
mental decisions as to whom and at what price to sell. As pointed out
again by Judge Burciaga in October, 1984,80 the NCAA clearly coerced
76. But see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979),
holding that an apparent case of price fixing resulting from a blanket licensing agreement
should not be treated as a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
77. 457 U.S. 332 (1982). See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
78. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In Sylvania, the Court held that non-price vertical restrictions
should be analyzed under the rule of reason. The Court further held that such vertical
restrictions could contemporaneously reduce intrabrand competition and have a beneficial
effect on interbrand competition.
79. The Court noted that it is Congress, not the Courts, that must create exemptions
to the antitrust laws. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Thus the Court's applica-
tion of the rule of reason may have been a response to its inability to carve an antitrust
exemption for the NCAA. See also Note, Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 802
(1981). The note criticizes the courts' failure to arrive at a systematic application of anti-
trust concepts to associations (such as amateur athletic associations) which are concerned
primarily with objectives other than the maximization of profits. The note maintains that
the only justification for "anticompetitive" practices is solving market failures. In a purely
competitive market, education and amateurism would not be supplied, as they would not
coincide with profit-maximizing goals.
80. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 601 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 31, 1984) (memo-
randum opinion partially granting defendant's amended motion to modify the court's
judgment). Any misgivings about the application of the antitrust laws to voluntary associa-
tions such as the NCAA will be allayed by a reading of Judge Burciaga's memorandum
opinion. The opinion makes very clear that no evidence was presented to the court dem-
onstrating a " 'voluntary' relinquishment" of television rights by members. Id. at 310.
The court also sharply reprimanded the NCAA for its persistence in trying to test the
court's resolve and attempting to "reimpose the very activity this Court, as well as the
appellate courts, have found to be illegal." Id. at 310.
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member schools into assigning their rights to telecast football games
and interfered with their freedom to decide to whom and at what price
to sell those rights. In light of such obvious anticompetitive conduct, it
does not seem possible that any surrounding circumstances could justify
such a restraint. It seems clear that Justice Stevens should have applied
per se analysis.
In addition, the Supreme Court's reliance on the Chicago school's
efficiency theory may also have been unnecessary. The Court held it was
the television plan's limitations on output (and the subsequent harm to
consumer welfare) that violated the Sherman Act.8 ' There are, how-
ever, three problems with the Court's formulation. First, given the in-
conclusiveness of the statistics presented regarding television audience
and stadium attendance, the Court's reliance on a statistical approach
which measures anticompetitive effect in terms of numbers of televised
games and their effect on live gate attendance is subject to criticism.
8 2
There are numerous factors that go into game attendance, only one of
which is television programming. Factors such as weather conditions,
the closeness of conference standings, and other contemporaneous
events occurring in the community also have a direct effect on a fan's
decision to attend a college football game.
Second, the Court did not have to rely solely on output-restriction
theory to find a violation of the Sherman Act. The output-restriction
test is not the only method of evaluating the efficiency of a restraint.
Focusing on the enhancement of the competitive process itself, regard-
less of economic statistics, 8 3 the Court could have found that the mere
elimination of individual schools from the competitive process violated
the Sherman Act. Indeed, the Court noted in its opinion that one of the
anticompetitive effects of the plan was that "[i]ndividual competitors
lose their freedom to compete."8 4 The Court in its holding, however,
ignored this simple and direct effect on the competitive process among
the schools themselves and held that it was the curtailment of output
and effect on consumer preference that violated the Sherman Act.8 5
Third, the opinion notes that the district court did not find that the
81. "Today we hold only that the record supports the District Court's conclusion that
by curtailing output and blunting the ability of member institutions to respond to con-
sumer preference," the NCAA has violated the Sherman Act. 104 S. Ct. at 2971.
82. See supia notes 18 and 67. Justice White criticized the majority's measurement of
output in terms of the number of televised games. The Justice, however, simply would
have substituted another measure of output and thus does not go beyond the output-
restriction model of the majority.
83. See Fox, supra note 49 at 1169. Ms. Fox soundly rejects the view that antitrust
should be limited to efficiency objectives. Id. at 1178.
84. 104 S. Ct. at 2963. In admitting harm to individual competitors, the Supreme
Court began to move away from the school of thought that believes antitrust law is only
rightfully concerned with harm to competition, not harm to competitors. See generally
Schwartz, 'Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979).
Schwartz objects to "the dogma that the antitrust laws protect 'competition not competi-
tors,' because the goals ofjustice and the antitrust laws sometimes demand protection of
competitors." Id. at 1076.
85. Id. at 2971. See also note 81 for a direct quotation of the Court's holding.
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television plan "produced any procompetitive efficiencies. ' 8 6 This im-
plies that if the plan had increased output and reduced price, the inquiry
would have gone no further and the restraint would have been allowed.
If this were the case, the other goals of antitrust law such as protection
against concentration of economic power, protection of the process of
competition in itself and the promotion of justice would be rendered
useless.
87
This is not to say that efficiency has no place in antitrust analysis; 88
however, it is only one antitrust goal, not the exclusive one. Antitrust
also restrains entities such as the NCAA from abusing their market
power 8 9 and protects individual competitors such as the member NCAA
schools in their ability to freely compete in the television market.
These other goals were inadvertently met as a result of the Supreme
Court's NCAA decision. The NCAA is being restrained from coercing its
member schools to market their football games through the NCAA's
plan. The Supreme Court's formulation of its-holding solely in terms of
output-restriction theory and effect on consumer welfare, however, was
unnecessarily narrow. The Court, although aware of the plan's violation
of the spirit of the antitrust laws, felt compelled to rely on modern effi-
ciency theory as the basis of its holding. As discussed above, this ap-
proach unfortunately moves the Court toward a narrow economic-based
theory of antitrust analysis.
Christine O'Connor
86. 104 S. Ct. at 2967.
87. "This conception of antitrust would prohibit almost nothing at all ......
[E]conomic analysis keyed solely to 'efficiency' and 'consumer welfare' has revealed with
stark simplicity that there will be very little remaining of antitrust.' " Fox, supra note 49, at
1145-46 (quoting Rowe, New Directions in Competition and Organizational Law in the United
States, in ENTERPRISE LAW OF THE 80's, at 177, 201 (Rowe, Jacobs & Joelson eds. 1980)).
88. See Fox, supra note 49, for an excellent analysis of other approaches to the mea-
surement of efficiency, approaches which incorporate some of the other goals of antitrust.
89. See Schwartz, supra note 84. Schwartz finds clear evidence of congressional pur-
pose to create procedural protection for competitors which "serves the very useful role of
preventing abuse of power when the growth of power cannot be checked." Id. at 1076.
Schwartz sees a clear congressional exercise of "supervision over fair procedure and jus-
tice in economic relationships" in a number of areas of business. Id. at 1079. For exam-
ple, Schwartz points to banking regulation as "subordinat[ing] 'efficiency' considerations
to considerations of excessive concentrations of power when it seeks to prevent banks and
bank holding companies from extending their operations into 'non-banking' business."
Id. at 1077.
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